1. Introduction

In different formulations, the principle that it is worse for a person to do injustice than to suffer it figures most prominently in three of the Socratic dialogues: the Apology, Crito, and Gorgias. To understand this principle (which I will call the “principle about justice”), and in particular to find some justification for Socrates' unwavering confidence in it, much attention has understandably centered on the Gorgias, since there Socrates does not simply assert the principle to an audience which does not respond (as in the Apology) nor does he propose it to someone who accepts it with little resistance (as in the Crito). Both Polus and Callicles reject it, albeit in different ways. The presence of such anti-Socratic opponents suggests that we will at last hear a defense of this central Socratic principle. When we arrive at the arguments, however, we are disappointed. Jonathan Lear calls Socrates' arguments against Callicles “among the most unconvincing arguments in the Platonic corpus“. And the arguments against Callicles are generally thought to be significantly better than the arguments that Socrates offers against Polus.