Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation

Online

99,00 € / $149.00*

* Prices subject to change. Shipping costs will be added if applicable.
Publication Date:
March 2011
ISSN:
1558-9544
DOI:
10.2202/1558-9544.1219

See all formats and pricing

Online
Individual Subscription Online only
Euro [D] 99.00
RRP for USA, Canada, Mexico
US$ 149.00 *
Print
Individual Subscription Online only
Euro [D] 378.00
RRP for USA, Canada, Mexico
US$ 510.00 *
Print + Online
Individual Subscription Online only
Euro [D] 454.00
RRP for USA, Canada, Mexico
US$ 612.00 *
*Prices subject to change. Shipping costs will be added if applicable.
VolumeIssuePage

Does Patient Use of Medical Information Affect Physician Practice Incentives to Provide Care?

Hai Fang1 / John Rizzo2

1University of Colorado Denver, hai.fang@ucdenver.edu

2State University of New York at Stony Brook, john.rizzo@stonybrook.edu

Citation Information: Forum for Health Economics & Policy. Volume 14, Issue 2, Pages –, ISSN (Online) 1558-9544, DOI: 10.2202/1558-9544.1219, March 2011

Publication History:
Published Online:
2011-03-17

Patients as consumers are assuming a more active role in their medical care decision-making, which has been prompted by better access to medical information. Patient use of medical information may affect physician practice incentives to provide care, which critically depends on the agency relationship between physician and patient. If patient use of medical information improves communication and understanding, physicians may need to spend less time explaining what treatments are needed and convincing patients about the appropriateness of their recommendations, increasing incentives to provide care. If patients use information to demand treatments and procedures that are at odds with what the physician would recommend, this might lead to a contentious relationship, making it more difficult to agree upon any course of treatment. We use the Community Tracking Study (CTS) physician survey data, a nationally representative sample in the United States, to study the effects of more-informed patients on physician incentives to provide care. We estimate ordinary least squares and ordered probit models, and apply instrumental variables method to correct for the potential endogeneity of the measure of more-informed patients. The empirical results indicate that more-informed patients appear to be reducing physician incentives to provide care. This is consistent with the view that patient use of medical information from alternative sources besides their own physician may be interfering with the physician’s ability to provide care.

Keywords: informed patients; physician services; practice incentives; medical information

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.