This paper shows that unilateral-harm contexts with role-type uncertainty can create incentives similar to bilateral-harm contexts. For this purpose, we show that the result of Dharmapala and Hoffmann (2005), namely that standard liability rules do not lead to efficient care choices by injurer and victim if precaution costs are interdependent and harm is unilateral whereas they can in the case of bilateral harm, depends on role-type certainty.
Editor-in-Chief: Parisi, Francesco
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On the Similarity of Bilateral Harm and Unilateral Harm with Role-Type Uncertainty
Tim Friehe
1Eberhard Karls University, Tuebingen
Citation Information: Review of Law & Economics. Volume 3, Issue 2, Pages 553–580, ISSN (Online) 1555-5879, DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1108, December 2007
Publication History:
- Published Online:
- 2007-12-20
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