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Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie

Ed. by Horn, Christoph / Serck-Hanssen, Camilla

Together with Carriero, John / Meyer, Susan Sauvé

Editorial Board Member: Adamson, Peter / Allen, James V. / Bartuschat, Wolfgang / Curley, Edwin M / Emilsson, Eyjólfur Kjalar / Floyd, Juliet / Förster, Eckart / Frede, Dorothea / Friedman, Michael / Garrett, Don / Grasshoff, Gerd / Irwin, Terence / Kahn, Charles H. / Knuuttila, Simo / Koistinen, Olli / Kraut, Richard / Longuenesse, Béatrice / McCabe, Mary / Pasnau, Robert / Perler, Dominik / Reginster, Bernard / Simmons, Alison / Timmermann, Jens / Trifogli, Cecilia / Weidemann, Hermann / Zöller, Günter


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Socrates’ Philosophical Protreptic in Euthydemus 278c–282d

1Department of Philosophy and Religion, University of Central Arkansas

Citation Information: . Volume 94, Issue 2, Pages 208–228, ISSN (Online) 1613-0650, ISSN (Print) 0003-9101, DOI: 10.1515/agph-2012-0009, October 2012

Publication History

Published Online:
2012-10-25

Abstract: At Euthydemus 278c–282d, Socrates defends strong claims about the relative value of wisdom, fortune, and other goods in relation to happiness. He concludes that wisdom guarantees all of the good fortune a person needs, and that wisdom alone is good and ignorance alone is bad. However, Socrates’ arguments prove insufficient to establish his strong conclusions. I argue that Socrates does not aim to support his strongest conclusions with adequate arguments. Instead, the context indicates that Socrates’ arguments – with their evocative examples and strong but unsupported conclusions – are designed primarily to draw Clinias into the activity of philosophy.

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