Volume 18 (2016)
Volume 17 (2015)
Volume 16 (2014)
Volume 15 (2013)
Volume 14 (2012)
Volume 13 (2011)
Volume 12 (2010)
Volume 11 (2009)
Most Downloaded Articles
- Regulation and Economic Globalization: Prospects and Limits of Private Governance by Mayer, Frederick and Gereffi, Gary
- Private Regulation in the Global Economy: A (P)Review by Büthe, Tim
- All politics is local, but lobbying is federal and local: the validity of LDA data by Clemens, Austin C.
- Corporate Political Donations: Investment or Agency? by Aggarwal, Rajesh K./ Meschke, Felix and Wang, Tracy Yue
The Fallacy of Regulatory Symmetry: An Economic Analysis of the 'Level Playing Field' in Cable TV Franchising Statutes
1American Enterprise Institute, Z-Tel Communications
2American Enterprise Institute, Z-Tel Communications
Citation Information: Business and Politics. Volume 3, Issue 1, ISSN (Online) 1469-3569, DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1016, April 2001
- Published Online:
Formal regulatory parity can entail counterintuitive effects. In a series of state statutes, municipal governments have been directed to issue cable TV franchises to new competitors only after (a) formal hearings considering the 'public interest' in competition; and (b) imposing terms and conditions which are at least as burdensome as those contained in the incumbent's franchise. While billed as 'level playing field' laws, economic theory, an important case study in Connecticut, and a probit analysis of Ameritech's cable franchise acquisition strategy suggest that these statutes actually tilt the field against entrants.
Here you can find all Crossref-listed publications in which this article is cited. If you would like to receive automatic email messages as soon as this article is cited in other publications, simply activate the “Citation Alert” on the top of this page.