Volume 17 (2015)
Volume 16 (2014)
Volume 15 (2013)
Volume 14 (2012)
Volume 13 (2011)
Volume 12 (2010)
Volume 11 (2009)
Most Downloaded Articles
- Regulation and Economic Globalization: Prospects and Limits of Private Governance by Mayer, Frederick and Gereffi, Gary
- Corporate Political Donations: Investment or Agency? by Aggarwal, Rajesh K./ Meschke, Felix and Wang, Tracy Yue
- Private Regulation in the Global Economy: A (P)Review by Büthe, Tim
Corporate Political Donations: Investment or Agency?
1University of Minnesota
2University of Kansas
3University of Minnesota - Twin Cities
Citation Information: Business and Politics. Volume 14, Issue 1, ISSN (Online) 1469-3569, DOI: 10.1515/1469-3569.1391, April 2012
- Published Online:
Abstract: We examine corporate donations to political candidates for federal offices in the United States from 1991 to 2004. Firms that donate have operating characteristics consistent with the existence of a free cash flow problem, and donations are negatively correlated with returns. A $10,000 increase in donations is associated with a reduction in annual excess returns of 7.4 basis points. Worse corporate governance is associated with larger donations. Even after controlling for corporate governance, donations are associated with lower returns. Donating firms engage in more acquisitions and their acquisitions have significantly lower cumulative abnormal announcement returns than non-donating firms. We find virtually no support for the hypothesis that donations represent an investment in political capital. Instead, political donations are symptomatic of agency problems within firms. Our results are particularly useful in light of the Citizens United ruling, which is likely to greatly increase the use of corporate funds for political donations.
Here you can find all Crossref-listed publications in which this article is cited. If you would like to receive automatic email messages as soon as this article is cited in other publications, simply activate the “Citation Alert” on the top of this page.