Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation

Online

99,00 € / $149.00*

* Prices subject to change. Shipping costs will be added if applicable.
Publication Date:
January 2006
ISSN:
1935-1682
DOI:
10.2202/1538-0653.1486

See all formats and pricing

Online
Individual Subscription Online only
Euro [D] 99.00
RRP for USA, Canada, Mexico
US$ 149.00 *
Print
Individual Subscription Online only
Euro [D] 345.00
RRP for USA, Canada, Mexico
US$ 473.00 *
Print + Online
Individual Subscription Online only
Euro [D] 414.00
RRP for USA, Canada, Mexico
US$ 568.00 *
*Prices subject to change. Shipping costs will be added if applicable.

Ed. by Auriol , Emmanuelle / Brunner, Johann / Fleck, Robert / Friebel, Guido / Ludwig, Sandra / Requate, Till / Schneider, Hilmar / Tsui, Kevin / Wichardt, Philipp

2 Issues per year

IMPACT FACTOR 2011: 0.550

 

 

VolumeIssuePage

Do Plants Overcomply with Water Pollution Regulations? The Role of Discharge Variability

Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay1 / John Horowitz2

1World Bank, sbandyopadhyay@worldbank.org

2University of Maryland, jhorowitz@ers.usda.gov

Citation Information: Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy. Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages –, ISSN (Online) 1538-0653, DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1486, January 2006

Publication History:
Published Online:
2006-01-24

Abstract

This paper uses previously unexploited data to examine polluters' compliance with point-source water pollution regulations, a line of inquiry motivated by widespread apparent overcompliance. We use a nationwide panel of monthly plant-level effluent concentrations from 1991-1999. These monthly data allow us to observe month-to-month variability in discharges and therefore to test hypotheses not previously examined.We find that plants that have higher discharge variability have lower median discharges. This is strong evidence for the purported "safety margin" effect. This result then implies that average discharges, a common measure of polluter behavior, are not an accurate indicator of polluter behavior.In response, we construct a plant-specific implied probability of a violation that accounts for discharge variability. We show that plants in richer communities have lower violation probabilities. We further argue that plants are indeed overcomplying with the regulations even when accounting for the safety margin effect.

Keywords: water pollution; overcompliance; safety margin; community effects

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.