Fairness in Extended Dictator Game Experiments : The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy

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The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy

Editor-in-Chief: Jürges, Hendrik / Ludwig, Sandra

Ed. by Auriol , Emmanuelle / Brunner, Johann / Fleck, Robert / Mendola, Mariapia / Requate, Till / Zulehner, Christine / Schirle, Tammy


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Fairness in Extended Dictator Game Experiments

Felix Oberholzer-Gee1 / Reiner Eichenberger2

1Harvard University,

2University of Fribourg,

Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy. Volume 8, Issue 1, ISSN (Online) 1935-1682, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.1718, July 2008

Publication History

Published Online:
2008-07-07

Abstract

We test the robustness of behavior in dictator games by offering allocators the choice to play an unattractive lottery. With this lottery option, mean transfers from allocators to recipients substantially decline, partly because many allocators now keep the entire endowment for themselves (without playing the lottery). In our standard dictator game, the median transfer amounts to 41% of the dictators' endowment. Once the lottery option is present, the median transfer falls to zero. Introducing an additional unattractive choice thus leads subjects to violate the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP).

Keywords: dictator game; fairness

Citing Articles

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[1]
Rafael Di Tella, Ricardo Perez-Truglia, Andres Babino, and Mariano Sigman
American Economic Review, 2015, Volume 105, Number 11, Page 3416
[2]
Christina M. Fong and Felix Oberholzer-Gee
Journal of Public Economics, 2011, Volume 95, Number 5-6, Page 436
[3]
Stephen Mark Rosenbaum, Stephan Billinger, and Nils Stieglitz
International Journal of Development Issues, 2013, Volume 12, Number 3, Page 192
[4]
Gunter Bahr and Till Requate
German Economic Review, 2014, Volume 15, Number 3, Page 374

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