The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics
Editor-in-Chief: Abraham, Arpad / Cavalcanti, Tiago
Ed. by Carceles-Poveda , Eva / Kambourov, Gueorgui / Lambertini, Luisa / Ruhl, Kim
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Most Downloaded Articles
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- The Effects of the Great Recession on Central Bank Doctrine and Practice by Bernanke, Ben S.
- Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Rules in a Model with House Price Booms by Kannan, Prakash/ Rabanal, Pau and Scott, Alasdair M.
- How have global shocks impacted the real effective exchange rates of individual euro area countries since the euro’s creation? by Bussiere, Matthieu/ Chudik, Alexander and Mehl, Arnaud
Are Banking Supervisory Data Useful for Macroeconomic Forecasts?
1Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, (email)
2Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, (email)
3Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, (email)
4Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, (email)
Citation Information: Contributions in Macroeconomics. Volume 3, Issue 1, ISSN (Online) 1534-6005, DOI: 10.2202/1534-6005.1066, February 2003
- Published Online:
Some argue that central banks can improve monetary policy by including confidential supervisory assessments of banking organizations in their forecasts of inflation and unemployment. In this study we examine the extent to which forecasts of these variables would have been improved with the inclusion of supervisory data. We begin by reproducing the earlier results used to support the claim. We critically examine them and extend the analysis from in-sample to out-of-sample testing. Finally, we check the robustness of our findings by extending the analysis period, using a different methodology to determine the contribution to forecasts, and substituting a different measure of supervisory information. Our analysis does not support claims that confidential supervisory information would have improved forecasts of inflation. Confidential supervisory information improved forecasts of unemployment in some periods. It is unclear, however, if the frequency or level of improvement would have altered monetary policy in a nontrivial way.