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Bailouts and Bank Runs in a Model of Crony Capitalism
1Università Cattolica di Milano and CEPR, email@example.com
2Corresponding Author, Banca Intesa, Risk Management, Piazza Ferrari 10, 20121 Milano, Italy - pho. (39) 02-87937025, fax (39) 02-87937646,, firstname.lastname@example.org
Citation Information: Contributions in Macroeconomics. Volume 4, Issue 1, Pages –, ISSN (Online) 1534-6005, DOI: 10.2202/1534-6005.1153, October 2004
- Published Online:
We present a simple multiple equilibria model that incorporates the functioning of crony capitalism. We find that a government which is keen to support the interests of the élite is ready to stand the risk of a bank run since this is part of an equilibrium where investments are heavily subsidized, which favors the élite. However, we find that the liaison between the government and the business community is not per se sufficient to induce vulnerability of financial institutions to panic: the willingness to favor the élite also provides an incentive to rescue the banking system in the event of a run. This stabilizing effect dominates when the élite is relatively large. We also study how a policy of banks recapitalization may contribute to the stability of the banking institution. In fact, such a policy can make credible an ex post recovery of the financial system, thus preventing the panic from generating a self-fulfilling bank crisis.