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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Cervellati, Matteo / Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier

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Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

George J. Mailath1 / Steven A. Matthews2 / Tadashi Sekiguchi3

1University of Pennsylvania,

2University of Pennsylvania,

3Kobe University,

Citation Information: Contributions in Theoretical Economics. Volume 2, Issue 1, ISSN (Online) 1534-5971, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1046, June 2002

Publication History

Published Online:
2002-06-17

We present three examples of finitely repeated games with public monitoring that have sequential equilibria in private strategies, i.e., strategies that depend on own past actions as well as public signals. Such private sequential equilibria can have features quite unlike those of the more familiar perfect public equilibria: (i) making a public signal less informative can create Pareto superior equilibrium outcomes; (ii) the equilibrium final-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium; and (iii) even if the stage game has a unique correlated (and hence Nash) equilibrium, the first-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium.

Keywords: Private strategies; repeated games; public perfect equilibria

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