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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Wenzelburger, Jan


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Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry

Lixin Ye1

1The Ohio State University,

Citation Information: Contributions in Theoretical Economics. Volume 4, Issue 1, ISSN (Online) 1534-5971, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1158, October 2004

Publication History

Published Online:
2004-10-28

We consider a single object, independent private value auction model with entry. Potential bidders are ex ante symmetric and randomize about entry. After entry, each bidder incurs a cost, then learns her private value and a set of signals that may lead to updated beliefs about other entrants' valuations. It is shown that the Vickrey auction with free entry maximizes the expected revenue. Furthermore, if the information potentially available to bidders after entry is sufficiently rich, then the Vickrey auction, up to its equivalent class, is also the only optimal sealed-bid auction.

Keywords: Auctions; Vickrey auction; robust mechanism design; efficient entry; complete classes

Citing Articles

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[1]
Xiaoshu Xu, Dan Levin, and Lixin Ye
Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, Volume 79, Page 92
[2]
Nicolás Figueroa and Vasiliki Skreta
Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, Volume 144, Number 2, Page 884
[3]
Lixin Ye
Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, Volume 58, Number 1, Page 181
[4]
Xianwen Shi
Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, Volume 74, Number 2, Page 666

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