With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome.
Ed. by Cervellati, Matteo / Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Schipper, Burkhard
1 Issue per year
Increased IMPACT FACTOR 2011: 0.490
Issues
Volume 12 (2012)
Volume 11 (2011)
Volume 10 (2010)
Volume 9 (2009)
Volume 8 (2008)
Volume 7 (2007)
Volume 6 (2006)
Volume 5 (2005)
Volume 4 (2004)
Volume 3 (2003)
Volume 2 (2002)
Volume 1 (2001)
Most Downloaded Articles
- Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding by Ausubel, Lawrence M and Milgrom, Paul R
- Seller Cheap Talk in Almost Common Value Auction by LI, Daniel Zhiyun
- Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition by Farrell, Joseph and Shapiro, Carl
- Strategic Effects of Renegotiation-Proof Contracts by Gerratana, Emanuele and Koçkesen, Levent
- An Experimental Comparison of Sequential First- and Second-Price Auctions with Synergies by Leufkens, Kasper/ Peeters, Ronald and Vorsatz, Marc
Sequential Decision-Making and Asymmetric Equilibria: An Application to Takeovers
1Trinity College, University of Oxford, david.gill@economics.ox.ac.uk
2Faculty of Economics and Churchill College, University of Cambridge, daniel.sgroi@warwick.ac.uk
Citation Information: Topics in Theoretical Economics. Volume 4, Issue 1, Pages –, ISSN (Online) 1534-598X, DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1178, December 2004
Publication History:
- Published Online:
- 2004-12-28
Keywords: takeovers; sequential; pivotal
Comments (0)