This paper characterizes the utility possibility frontier resulting in a model of private voluntary provision of a public good. It is shown that ex-ante lotteries over resource distributions among the agents can be Pareto improving. A corollary is that an equal distribution of resources among the agents, or any distribution where all agents contribute in equilibrium, is always Pareto dominated by a lottery between two unequal distributions.
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Pareto Improving Lotteries and Voluntary Public Goods Provision
Alexander Karaivanov1
1Simon Fraser University, akaraiva@sfu.ca
Citation Information: Topics in Theoretical Economics. Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 1–13, ISSN (Online) 1534-598X, DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1246, July 2006
Publication History:
- Published Online:
- 2006-07-13
Keywords: public goods; private provision; lotteries; efficiency
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