A Spatial Election with Common Values : Contributions in Theoretical Economics

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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier

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A Spatial Election with Common Values

Carlos Maravall-Rodriguez1

1Universidad Carlos III de Madrid,

Citation Information: Contributions in Theoretical Economics. Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 1–17, ISSN (Online) 1534-5971, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1269, August 2006

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This paper extends the Downsian-Hotelling model of electoral competition to allow for unobserved qualitative differences between candidates. I show that these underlying qualitative differences generate pure strategy Nash equilibria, even if policies are defined in a multidimensional space, and explain platform divergence from the median. Moreover, the extension gives content to a second (well-known) role elections play apart from bridging conflict: to reveal information about candidates.

Keywords: spatial election; imperfect information; common values; valence issues

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