This paper studies the effects of uncoordinated environmental tax policies on firms' incentives to form bilateral R&D collaborations. It is shown that the complete network is pair-wise stable for small differences in the taxation of environmental emissions. Larger tax differentials may induce firms to abandon all their international collaborations.
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Tax Differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly
1Department of Economics, CIREQ, McGill University, hassan.benchekroun@mcgill.ca
2HEC Montreal & Gerad, denis_claude_economics@yahoo.fr
Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. Volume 7, Issue 1, Pages –, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1316, July 2007
Publication History:
- Published Online:
- 2007-07-20
Keywords: uncoordinated environmental actions; taxation; networks; R&D
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