In this paper we study the optimal file-sharing mechanism in a peer-to-peer network with a mechanism design perspective. This mechanism improves upon existing incentive schemes. In particular, we show that peer-approved scheme is never optimal and service-quality scheme is optimal only under certain circumstances. Moreover, we find that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a mixture of peer-approved and service-quality schemes.
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Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks
1University of Missouri, loginovao@missouri.edu
2University of Missouri, luhaibin@missouri.edu
3University of Missouri, wangx@missouri.edu
Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages –, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1501, January 2009
Publication History:
- Published Online:
- 2009-01-22
Keywords: peer-to-peer networks; file sharing incentive schemes; mechanism design
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