Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Wenzelburger, Jan


IMPACT FACTOR increased in 2015: 0.412
5-year IMPACT FACTOR: 0.471

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2015: 0.458
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2015: 0.553
Impact per Publication (IPP) 2015: 0.329

Mathematical Citation Quotient (MCQ) 2015: 0.16

Online
ISSN
1935-1704
See all formats and pricing

 


Select Volume and Issue
Loading journal volume and issue information...

30,00 € / $42.00 / £23.00

Get Access to Full Text

Markets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets

Zvika Neeman1 / Nir Vulkan2

1Tel Aviv University,

2Oxford University,

Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. Volume 10, Issue 1, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1554, February 2010

Publication History

Published Online:
2010-02-10

The paper considers the consequences of competition between two widely used exchange mechanisms, a “decentralized bargaining'' market, and a “centralized'' market. In every period, members of a large heterogenous group of privately-informed traders who each wish to buy or sell one unit of some homogenous good may opt for trading through one exchange mechanism. Traders may also postpone their trade to a future period. It is shown that trade outside the centralized market completely unravels. In every strong Nash equilibrium, all trade takes place in the centralized market. No trade ever occurs through direct negotiations.

Keywords: centralized markets; decentralized markets; decentralized bargaining; market microstructure; competition

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.