We interpret the discriminatory power, r, in the Power Contest Success Function (Tullock, 1980) as the contest designer's accuracy level. We look at the cases where two contestants are heterogeneous in ability and construct an equilibrium set for r > 0. We find that if the contestants are sufficiently different in ability, there always exists an optimal accuracy level for the contest designer. Additionally, as the difference in their abilities increases, the optimal accuracy level decreases.

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The Optimal Accuracy Level in Asymmetric Contests
Zhewei Wang1
1University of Edinburgh, zheweiwang@hotmail.com
Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. Volume 10, Issue 1, Pages –, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1613, April 2010
Publication History:
- Published Online:
- 2010-04-09
Keywords: imperfectly discriminating contest; contest success function; heterogenous abilities; optimal accuracy level


















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