In this paper, we propose an optimal marketing decision model in the context of poor agrarian economies. We consider a risk averse banana producer who faces an optimal allocation decision on how much to sell to a cooperative vis-à-vis private traders. To validate the model, a numerical exercise was undertaken using farm-gate transaction data. The overall result suggests that under different risk scenarios, an optimal earning is obtained if a farmer allocates 70 to 85 percent of his produce to a cooperative and the rest in the private market. Any allocation more than 85 percent or less than 70 percent is likely to result in a sub-optimal solution given the current market structure and price setting.

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Optimal Farmer Choice of Marketing Channels in the Ethiopian Banana Market
Getachew Abebe Woldie
1Justus-Liebig-Universität Giessen
Citation Information: Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization. Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages –, ISSN (Online) 1542-0485, DOI: 10.2202/1542-0485.1298, October 2010
Publication History:
- Published Online:
- 2010-10-29
Keywords: cooperatives; institutions; smallholder producers; risk; banana; Ethiopia


















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