Volume 5 (2014)
Most Downloaded Articles
- Aid, Growth, and Development: Have We Come Full Circle? by Arndt, Channing/ Jones, Sam and Tarp, Finn
- The Limits of Incrementalism: The G20, the FSB, and the International Regulatory Agenda by Helleiner, Eric
- Is the Era of the Dollar Over? by Wyplosz, Charles
- Contagion, Liberalization, and the Optimal Structure of Globalization by Stiglitz, Joseph E.
Compensation for Indirect Expropriation in International Investment Agreements: Implications of National Treatment and Rights to Invest
1Australian National University
2University of California, Berkeley and Giannini Foundation
3University of British Columbia
Citation Information: Journal of Globalization and Development. Volume 1, Issue 2, ISSN (Online) 1948-1837, DOI: 10.2202/1948-1837.1133, December 2010
- Published Online:
International investment agreements allow investors to bring compensation claims when their investments are hurt by new regulations. This requirement that host governments compensate for indirect expropriation helps solve post-investment moral hazard problems such as hold-ups, thereby helping to prevent inefficient over-regulation and encouraging foreign investment. However, when the social or environmental harm of a project is uncertain pre-investment, compensation requirements can interact with National Treatment clauses in a manner that reduces host government welfare and makes them less likely to admit investment. A police powers carve-out from the definition of compensable expropriation can be Pareto-improving and increase foreign investment.