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Kant-Studien

Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft

Ed. by Baum, Manfred / Dörflinger, Bernd / Klemme, Heiner F.

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Hughes on Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology

Ralf Meerbote1

1University of Rochester

Citation Information: Kant-Studien. Volume 102, Issue 2, Pages 202–212, ISSN (Online) 1613-1134, ISSN (Print) 0022-8877, DOI: 10.1515/kant.2011.015, June 2011

Publication History

Published Online:
2011-06-05

Abstract

Hughes has recently argued that there is to be found in Kant's epistemology an aesthetic constraint that makes for an objectivity of empirical knowledge-claims. The reading that she defends leads to a rejection of an imposition-view of empirical concepts and the categories and to an affirmation of a realism in Kant's theory of empirical knowledge. I am in broad agreement with her thesis but disagree with her ultimate explanation of the ontology of Kant's objects of empirical knowledge. Hughes' exposition and my reading wind their way through both Kant's epistemology and his theory of free beauty and of pure judgments of taste.

Keywords:: Epistemological Realism; Imposition; Beauty

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