Volume 19 (2013)
Volume 18 (2012)
Volume 17 (2011)
Volume 4 (1996)
Volume 3 (1995)
Volume 2 (1994)
Volume 1 (1993)
Most Downloaded Articles
- How Many Wars Is the US Fighting Today? by Bilmes, Linda J. and Intriligator, Michael D.
- Evidence about the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism among Palestinians by Berrebi, Claude
- Remittances and the Financing of Terrorism In Sub-Saharan Africa: 1974 - 2006 by Elu, Juliet U. and Price, Gregory N.
- The Impact of Employment in Israel on the Palestinian Labor Force by Etkes, Haggay
- Youth Unemployment, Terrorism and Political Violence, Evidence from the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict by Caruso, Raul and Gavrilova, Evelina
Provision of Public Goods with the Presence of Inter-Class Conflicts
1Thailand Development Research Institute, firstname.lastname@example.org
Citation Information: Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy. Volume 18, Issue 1, Pages –, ISSN (Online) 1554-8597, DOI: 10.1515/1554-8597.1227, April 2012
- Published Online:
In the countries that experience the problem of inter-class conflict, the self-interested elite tend to pursue allocation policies that maximize their own welfare. In the absence of the binding revolutionary constraint, under some conditions, the amount of public goods provided is too low, relative to the optimal level of public good from the perspective of general welfare. With the revolutionary constraint, there exists a set of parameter values whereby the elite provide strictly positive amount of public goods. With unconditional foreign aid, there is no guarantee that the elite will use these additional resources to finance public good provision. For conditional foreign aid, the conditionality requirements depend on the degree of transparency of the recipient country.