Monetary sanctions are less effective when agents cannot afford to pay them in full. We present a simple model of a society with two types of risk averse agents, differing in terms of productivity in the legal labor market. We consider transfers from the most productive to the least productive agents, and discuss the conditions under which redistribution can reduce crime.
Editor-in-Chief: Parisi, Francesco
Ed. by Cooter, Robert D. / Gómez Pomar, Fernando / Kornhauser, Lewis A.
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1University of Eastern Piedmont, Italy
1University of Eastern Piedmont, Italy
Citation Information: Review of Law & Economics. Volume 2, Issue 2, Pages 193–208, ISSN (Online) 1555-5879, DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1035, September 2006
Publication History:
- Published Online:
- 2006-09-08
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