This paper provides a coherent framework for classifying cases with multiple tortfeasors in relation to the efficient allocation of liability across the tortfeasors. We construct a simple model in which various tortfeasors contribute to a loss, and consider efficient liability rules under various assumptions.
Editor-in-Chief: Parisi, Francesco
Ed. by Cooter, Robert D. / Gómez Pomar, Fernando / Kornhauser, Lewis A.
1 Issue per year
Issues
Volume 8 (2012)
Volume 7 (2011)
Volume 6 (2010)
Volume 5 (2009)
Volume 4 (2008)
Volume 3 (2007)
Volume 2 (2006)
Most Downloaded Articles
- Federalism, Budget Deficits and Public Debt: On the Reform of Germany's Fiscal Constitution by Feld, Lars P. and Baskaran, Thushyanthan
- On the Behavioral Economics of Crime by van Winden, Frans A.A.M. and Ash, Elliott
- Judicial Review in China: A Positive Political Economy Analysis by Ip, Eric C.
- The Costs and Benefits of Secured Creditor Control in Bankruptcy: Evidence from the UK by Armour, John/ Hsu, Audrey Wen-hsin and Walters, Adrian
- Emissions Trading and the Polluter-Pays Principle: Do Polluters Pay under Grandfathering? by Woerdman, Edwin/ Arcuri, Alessandra and Clò, Stefano
Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis
Robert Young / Michael Faure / Paul Fenn
1Nottingham University, Business School, UK
1Metro, Maastricht University, The Netherlands
1Nottingham University, Business School, UK
Citation Information: Review of Law & Economics. Volume 3, Issue 1, Pages 111–132, ISSN (Online) 1555-5879, DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1093, May 2007
Publication History:
- Published Online:
- 2007-05-16
Comments (0)