In this paper we assert that, if an offender can dispose of some or all of his wealth after violating the law, raising the fine up to his wealth level will induce him to dispose of his wealth, thereby increasing social cost without deterring more offenses. This suggests that the socially optimal fine should be set below the offender's maximum wealth level.
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Optimal Law Enforcement when the Offender can Dispose of his Wealth
Jeong-Yoo Kim
1Kyung Hee University, Seoul
Citation Information: Review of Law & Economics. Volume 3, Issue 2, Pages 221–229, ISSN (Online) 1555-5879, DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1074, August 2007
Publication History:
- Published Online:
- 2007-08-06
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