Copyright Infringement, Product Quality and Producer's Profit : Review of Law & Economics

www.degruyter.com uses cookies, tags, and tracking settings to store information that help give you the very best browsing experience.
To understand more about cookies, tags, and tracking, see our Privacy Statement
I accept all cookies for the De Gruyter Online site

Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation

Review of Law & Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Parisi, Francesco

Ed. by Cooter, Robert D. / Gómez Pomar, Fernando / Kornhauser, Lewis A. / Parchomovsky, Gideon / Engel, Christoph


SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2014: 0.179
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2014: 0.610
Impact per Publication (IPP) 2014: 0.311

VolumeIssuePage

Issues

Copyright Infringement, Product Quality and Producer's Profit

Dyuti Banerjee1 / Vivekananda Mukherjee2

1Department of Economics, Monash University, Australia

2Department of Economics, Jadavpur University, India

Citation Information: Review of Law & Economics. Volume 3, Issue 3, Pages 793–816, ISSN (Online) 1555-5879, DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1159, December 2007

Publication History

Published Online:
2007-12-31

This paper uses a strategic entry-deterrence framework to study the relationship between copying cost, and a monopolist’s profit and product quality. The potential entrant is a fake-producer producing and selling identical copies of the monopolist’s product. The monopolist’s subgame perfect equilibrium quality and profit is either unaffected or positively affected by changes in the copying cost. Tariffs on copying devices may be an effective copyright right protection instrument. Though an increase in tariff increases the product quality and monopolist’s profit, its welfare effects are ambiguous.

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.