This paper addresses the fundamental question of what costs and prices would look like under competitive conditions and how close the FCC's total element long-run incremental cost (TELRIC) pricing rules allow one to approximate such competitive outcomes. We consider: what types of firms would enter in competitive network industries, what effect would new entry have on the asset values and prices of incumbent firms, and what impact would competition have on (1) the types and vintages of capital equipment, (2) prices for that equipment, and (3) conditions in the operating environment? The paper concludes by highlighting alternative pricing proposals offered by contending parties and identifying the major drivers that explain what have proven to be large differences among competing proposals.

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Pricing Unbundled Network Elements and the FCC's TELRIC Rule: Economic and Modeling Issues
Timothy J. Tardiff
1National Economic Research Associates, timothy.tardiff@nera.com
Citation Information: Review of Network Economics. Volume 1, Issue 2, Pages –, ISSN (Online) 1446-9022, DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1010, September 2002
Publication History:
- Published Online:
- 2002-09-01


















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