Etracker Debug:
	et_pagename = "Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology|selt|C|[EN]"
	
        
Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation

Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology

Editor-in-Chief: Cutter, Anthony Mark

1 Issue per year

Virtue Ethics and Prenatal Genetic Enhancement

Colin Farrelly1

1University of Waterloo

Citation Information: Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology. Volume 1, Issue 1, ISSN (Online) 1941-6008, DOI: 10.2202/1941-6008.1016, December 2007

Publication History

Published Online:
2007-12-21

In this paper I argue that the virtue ethics tradition can enhance the moral discourse on the ethics of prenatal genetic enhancements in distinctive and valuable ways. Virtue ethics prescribes we adopt a much more provisional stance on the issue of the moral permissibility of prenatal genetic enhancements. A stance that places great care on differentiating between the different stakes involved with developing different phenotypes in our children and the different possible means (environmental vs. genetic manipulation) available to parents for pursuing legitimate concerns of parental love and virtue. Key components of the virtue ethics account of morality, such as the Aristotelian account of happiness, love and the doctrine of the mean, provide an adequate basis for rejecting the claim that it is morally impermissible for parents to pursue (safe and effective) prenatal enhancements. Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that a virtue ethics account of morality could actually support the stronger claim that utilising such interventions can (in certain contexts) be morally required.

Keywords: virtue; prenatal enhancement; love; eudaimonia

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.