This paper analyzes an entry-deterrence model in which the incumbent decides whether to invest in research and development (R&D) that promotes clean technology. We consider the case in which the entrant could benefit from a technology spillover and analyze the conditions that facilitate the incumbent’s entry-deterrence behavior. We show that higher levels of the spillover make entry more attractive compared to a standard entry game. In addition, regulator and incumbent prefer entry when the spillover from clean technology is sufficiently high and the cost of investing in R&D is relatively low. However, preferences are misaligned when the spillover and cost of R&D are low.
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The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (BEJEAP) is an international forum for scholarship that employs microeconomics to analyze issues in business, consumer behavior and public policy. Topics include the interaction of firms, the functioning of markets, the effects of domestic and international policy and the design of organizations and institutions.