Freiheit unter Bedingungen der Zeit? Schellings neuer Zeitbegriff im Nachgang zurFreiheitsschrift

  • 1 Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Fakultät für Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft, Lehrstuhl für Philosophie I, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539, München, Deutschland
Prof. Dr. Thomas Buchheim
  • Corresponding author
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Fakultät für Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft, Lehrstuhl für Philosophie I, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539, München, Deutschland
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Abstract

The concept of human freedom developed by Schelling in the Freiheitsschrift (1809) prompted him to explore a new concept of time in his Weltalter project. Schelling proposes the ‘generic subjectivity of time’: Time must be understood not as a precondition of dynamism, but rather as an effect of dynamic agency. The articulation of time into its moments, ‘presence’, ‘past’, and ‘future’, is realized through the dynamic contributions (motion, causality, and action) of every single causally involved being. Schelling’s concept thus fundamentally differs from Kant’s concept of time. For Kant, change and dynamism are located in the sensible world, whereas time (as well as space) is the subjective form of our sensible intuition. As such, time must be seen as a precondition of change and dynamism for Kant.

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Kant-Studien is devoted to philosophical and historical studies on Kant and Kantian topics. The journal publishes a comprehensive bibliography of new works on Kant, and provides reviews of the most important books. It is thus the leading German and English language resource on the current state of Kant research.

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