Schillers zwei Arten der Freiheit. Eine ästhetische Transformation von Reinholds Theorie der Willensfreiheit

  • 1 Universität Bern, Philosophisches Institut, Unitobler, Länggassstr. 49a, CH-3000 9, Bern, Schweiz
PD Dr. Martin Bondeli
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  • Universität Bern, Philosophisches Institut, Unitobler, Länggassstr. 49a, CH-3000 9, Bern, Schweiz
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Abstract

In his treatment of a Kantian concept of moral freedom, Schiller argues for two kinds of freedom: freedom in the spirit of autonomous practical reason and freedom in which man is considered a mixed (sensual and rational) being. It is apparent that Schiller is on a Reinholdian path. He follows Reinhold’s theory of free will in conceiving of moral freedom primarily as the capacity to decide between the material drive as a sensible, self-interested drive and the formal drive as a rational, unselfish drive. But it is also obvious that Schiller modifies Reinhold’s results in order to obtain a concept of aesthetic freedom. This project is important in view of a deeper understanding of the concept of aesthetic consciousness but is of little use in achieving a better understanding of the concept of moral freedom.

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Kant-Studien is devoted to philosophical and historical studies on Kant and Kantian topics. The journal publishes a comprehensive bibliography of new works on Kant, and provides reviews of the most important books. It is thus the leading German and English language resource on the current state of Kant research.

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