In my contribution, I discuss the important role of moral anthropological questions in the development of Schiller’s theoretical thought. I underline the fact that Schiller’s philosophical questions in Jena are much closer to those he confronted in Stuttgart – much closer than is considered to be the case in contemporary Schiller scholarship. I show how this continuity becomes evident when we take into consideration the moral anthropological topics that continued to interest Schiller throughout his life. To ground my argument, I show that the concept of the“whole human being” (i. e. the concept of a human considered in its entirety, as both sensible and rational) constitutes the continuous characteristic of Schiller’s philosophical considerations.
Kant-Studien is devoted to philosophical and historical studies on Kant and Kantian topics. The journal publishes a comprehensive bibliography of new works on Kant, and provides reviews of the most important books. It is thus the leading German and English language resource on the current state of Kant research.