Weltweiter Patentschutz für pharmazeutische Innovationen: Gibt es sozialverträgliche Alternativen?

Michael Stolpe 1
  • 1 Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel


This article discusses alternative incentive mechanisms for encouraging pharmaceutical innovations that support global health policy priorities. It concludes that Michael Kremer’s proposal of patent buyouts, in which a public fund pays a mark-up on private valuations of patents from sealed-bid second-price auctions, should be adapted to serve global health needs. This could boost the efficiency of research and technology diffusion in areas suffering severe market failures, like vaccine research to fight international epidemics of infectious diseases. Finally, the paper outlines a strategy for the proposal’s implementation, tapping the expected financial savings to key players within the international health economy.

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