What do we Know About Lobbying in Germany?

  • 1 Hochschule für Wirtschaft und Recht Berlin, Badensche Str. 50-51, 10825, Berlin, Germany
Andreas Polk
  • Corresponding author
  • Hochschule für Wirtschaft und Recht Berlin, Badensche Str. 50-51, 10825, Berlin, Germany
  • Email
  • Search for other articles:
  • degruyter.comGoogle Scholar

Abstract

Contribution payments and information are two important channels of lobbying influence. This survey analyzes what is known about these channels in Germany from a political economy perspective. Based on a discussion of the empirical literature and the available data, I argue that the state of empirical knowledge about lobbying in Germany is rather limited. To improve our understanding of the lobbying process, I identify research gaps and discuss potential methodological approaches which can be suitable to address these questions. Also, I discuss the role of party donations and temporary employment of bureaucratic staff, based on two novel data sets. The analysis indicates that party donations might play a role as a means to achieve access; in contrast, the temporary exchange of employees in the public administration seems to be of rather less importance in informational lobbying.

  • Adams, K.-H. (2005): Parteienfinanzierung in Deutschland. Tectum Verlag, Marburg.

  • Allianz für Lobbyingtransparenz 2019):(Allianz für Lobbytransparenz – Gemeinsam für eine transparente Interessenvertretung. Online at https://www.vci.de/ergaenzende-downloads/2019-06-24-eckpunktepapier-allianz-fuer-lobbytransparenz.pdf accessed October 2, 2019).(

  • Ansolabehere, S., J. M. de Figueiredo and J. M. Snyder Jr. (2003): Why Is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?, Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(1),105–130.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Ansolabehere, S., J. M. Snyder and M. Tripathi (2002): Are PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked? New Evidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Act, Business and Politics 4(2),131–155.

  • Arnold, F., B. Kauder and N. Potrafke (2014): Outside Earnings, Absence, and Activity: Evidence from German Parliamentarians, European Journal of Political Economy 36, 147–157.

  • Becker, J., A. Peichl and J. Rincke (2009): Politicians’ Outside Earnings and Electoral Competition. Public Choice 140(3–4), 379–394.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Bertrand, M., M. Bombardini and F. Trebbi (2014): Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process. American Economic Review 104(12),3885–3920.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Bischoff, I. (2003): Determinants of the Increase in the Number of Interest Groups in Western Democracies: Theoretical Considerations and Evidence from 21 OECD Countries, Public Choice 114(1–2), 197–218.

  • Blanes i Vidal, J., M. Draca and C. Fons-Rosen (2012): Revolving Door Lobbyists, American Economic Review 102(7),3731–3748.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Bülow, M. (2010): Die Lobbyrepublik. Schriftenreihe Denkanstöße Nr. 4. Institut solidarische Moderne.

  • Bundesministerium des Inneren (2015): Vierzehnter Bericht über den Einsatz externer Personen in der Bundesverwaltung (24. September 2015). Online at https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/themen/moderne-verwaltung/14-bericht-externe-personen-in-der-bundesverwaltung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 accessed October 7, 2019).(

  • Bundesministerium des Inneren (2019): Externe Personen in der Bundesverwaltung. Online at https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/moderne-verwaltung/integritaet-der-verwaltung/externe-personen/externe-personen-node.html accessed October( 7, 2019).

  • Bunea, A. and R. Ibenskas (2015): Quantitative text analysis and the study of EU lobbying and interest groups, European Union Politics, 16(3),429–455.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Cassel, S. (2017): Politische Ökonomie der Energiewende: Reformen des EEG im Interessengeflecht, in: J. Haucap and H. J. Thieme (eds.) Wirtschaftspolitik im Wandel. De Gruyter, Berlin, Boston, 37–62.

  • Chari, R., J. Hogan and G. Murphy (2010): Regulating Lobbying: A Global Comparison. Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York.

  • de Figueiredo, J. M. and B. K. Richter (2014): Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying, Annual Review of Political Science 17(1),163–185.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Deutsche Bundesregierung 2019):(Karenzzeit für Regierungsmitglieder. Klare Regeln bei Wechsel. Online at https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/klare-regeln-bei-wechsel-437700 accessed October 7, 2019).(

  • Deutscher Bundestag (2019a): Festsetzung der staatlichen Mittel für das Jahr 2018 (Stand: 15. April 2019). Online at https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/629810/135f0bf08e1998526c360099218397f8/finanz_18-data.pdf accessed December 16, 2019).(

  • Deutscher Bundestag (2019b): Öffentliche Liste über die Registrierung von Verbänden und deren Vertretern. Online at https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/lobbyliste accessed October( 7, 2019).

  • Deutscher Bundestag (2019c): Fundstellenverzeichnis der Rechenschaftsberichte. Online at https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/praesidium/parteienfinanzierung/rechenschaftsberichte/rechenschaftsberichte-202446 accessed December 16, 2019).(

  • Deutscher Bundestag (2019d): Parteienfinanzierung. Online at https://www.bundestag.de/parteienfinanzierung accessed October( 7, 2019).

  • Deutscher Bundestag (2019e): Tätigkeiten und Einkünfte neben dem Mandat. Online at https://www.bundestag.de/abgeordnete/nebentaetigkeit/nebentaetigkeit-213826 accessed October 7, 2019).(

  • Döhler, M. (2012): Gesetzgebung auf Honorarbasis - Politik, Ministerialverwaltung und das Problem externer Beteiligung an Rechtsetzungsprozessen, Politische Vierteljahresschrift 53, 181–210.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Diermeier, D., M. Keane and A. Merlo (2005): A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers, American Economic Review 95(1),347–373.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Dörrenbächer, N. (2016): Patterns of Post-Cabinet Careers: When One Door Closes Another Door Opens?, Acta Politica 51(4),472–491.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Eggers, A. (2010): The Partisan Revolving Door. Working Paper (unpublished).

  • Eggers, A. C. and J. Hainmueller (2009): MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics, American Political Science Review 103(04),513–533.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Eising, R. (2016): Studying Interest Groups: Methodological Challenges and Tools, European Political Science 16(3),291–305.

  • Eising, R. and F. Spohr (2017): The More, the Merrier? Interest Groups and Legislative Change in the Public Hearings of the German Parliamentary Committees. German Politics 26(2),314–333.

  • Epperson, R., W. Habler and U. Wagner 2019):(Wie der Einfluss von Lobbyismus auf die Politik in Deutschland und der EU wahrgenommen wird. Auswertung einer repräsentativen Umfrage in Deutschland zu Lobbyismus allgemein und Lobbyismus in der Klimapolitik. ZEW Studie vom 23.8.2019. Online at http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/gutachten/ZEW_Expertise_Lobbyismus_2019.pdf accessed October 2, 2019).(

  • Fink, A. (2012): The Effects of Party Campaign Spending Under Proportional Representation: Evidence from Germany, European Journal of Political Economy 28(4),574–592.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Fink, A. (2017): Donations to Political Parties: Investing Corporations and Consuming Individuals? Kyklos 70(2),220–255.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Geys, B. (2015): Looks Good, You’re Hired? Evidence from Extra-Parliamentary Activities of German Parliamentarians, German Economic Review 16(1),1–12.

  • Geys, B. and K. Mause (2012): Delegation, Accountability and Legislator Moonlighting: Agency Problems in Germany, German Politics 21(3),255–273.

  • Geys, B. and K. Mause (2013): Moonlighting Politicians: A Survey and Research Agenda, The Journal of Legislative Studies 19(1),76–97.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Geys, B. and K. Mause (2014): Are Female Legislators Different? Exploring Sex Differences in German MPs’ Outside Interests. Parliamentary Affairs 67(4),841–865.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Goerres, A. and M. Höpner (2014): Polarizers or Landscape Groomers? An Empirical Analysis of Party Donations by the 100 Largest German Companies in 1984–2005, Socio-Economic Review 12(3),517–544.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Goldberg, F., D. Pakull and P. Bernhagen (2019): The Effects of Issue and Interest Group Characteristics on Lobbying Success in Germany. Paper Prepared for the ECPR General Conference, September 4 – September 7, in Wroczlaw, Poland.

  • Gregor, M. (2017): Lobbying Mechanisms. In: N. Schofield and G. Caballero (eds.) State, Institutions and Democracy: Contributions of Political Economy. Springer International Publishing, Cham, 17–52.

  • Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1994): Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84(4),833–850.

  • Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (2001): Special Interest Politics. MIT Press, Cambridge.

  • Hartmann, B. (2014): Inklusive Verwaltung. Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn.

  • Hershey, M. (2015): Party Politics in America. Routledge, New York, NY, 17 Auflage.

  • Hönigsberger, H. (2013): Die sechste Fraktion - Nebenverdiener im Deutschen Bundestag. OBS-Arbeitspapier, 11.

  • Hönigsberger, H. (2014): Aufstocker im Bundestag. Nebeneinkünfte und Nebentätigkeiten der Abgeordneten zu Beginn der 18. Wahlperiode. OBS-Arbeitspapier, 13.

  • Holman, C. and W. Luneburg (2012): Lobbying and Transparency: A Comparative Analysis of Regulatory Reform, Interest Groups & Advocacy 1(1),75–104.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Horgos, D. and K. W. Zimmermann (2009): Interest Groups and Economic Performance: Some New Evidence, Public Choice 138(3–4), 301–315.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Horgos, D. and K. W. Zimmermann (2010): It Takes Two to Tango: Lobbies and the Political Business Cycle, Kyklos 63(3),383–399.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Höpner, M. (2006): Beiträge der Unternehmen zur Parteienfinanzierung: Wer spendet an wen? Und warum? Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 37(2),293–311.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Jain, A. K. (2001): Corruption: A Review, Journal of Economic Surveys 15(1),71–121, ISSN 09500804. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=truedb=ecnAN=0562372&site=ehost-live.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Kalla, J. L. and D. E. Broockman (2016): Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment, American Journal of Political Science 60(3),545–558.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Klüver, H. (2009): Measuring Interest Group Influence Using Quantitative Text Analysis, European Union Politics 10(4),535–549.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Klüver, H. (2013): Lobbying in the European Union: Interest Groups, Lobbying Coalitions, and Policy Change. Oxford University Press, New York.

  • Klüver, H. (2015a): Interest Groups in the German Bundestag: Exploring the Issue Linkage between Citizens and Interest Groups, German Politics 24(2),137–153.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Klüver, H. (2015b): The Promises of Quantitative Text Analysis in Interest Group Research: A Reply to Bunea and Ibenskas, European Union Politics 16(3),456–466.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Klüver, H. (2018): Setting the Party Agenda: Interest Groups, Voters and Issue Attention, British Journal of Political Science, 1–22. Published online: 13 June 2018, doi:.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Klüver, H. and M. Pickup (2019): Are They Listening? Public Opinion, Interest Groups and Government Responsiveness, West European Politics 42(1),91–112.

  • Klüver, H. and E. Zeidler (2019): Explaining Interest Group Density Across Economic Sectors: Evidence from Germany, Political Studies 67(2),459–478.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • K, M. (2008): Staatliche Parteienfinanzierung und politischer Wettbewerb. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden.

  • Kolbe, A., H. Hönigsberger and S. Osterberg (2011): Marktordnung für Lobbyisten. Wie Politik den Lobbyeinfluss regulieren kann. Ein Vorschlag der Otto Brenner Stiftung. OBS-Arbeitsheft 70. Otto Brenner Stiftung.

  • LaPira, T. M. and H. F. Thomas (2014): Revolving Door Lobbyists and Interest Representation, Interest Groups & Advocacy 3(1),4–29.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Lobbycontrol (2017): Transparenz beim Lobbyismus. Online at https://lobbyregister.org/ accessed October( 2, 2019).

  • Lobbypedia 2019):(Seitenwechsler in Deutschland im Überblick. Online at https://lobbypedia.de/wiki/Seitenwechsler_in_Deutschland_im_%C3%9Cberblick accessed October 7, 2019).(

  • Lohmann, S. (1993): A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action, American Political Science Review 87(2),319–33.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Luechinger, S. and C. Moser (2014): The Value of the Revolving Door: Political Appointees and the Stock Market, Journal of Public Economics 119, 93–107.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Maisch, A. (2015): Der Einsatz externer Mitarbeiter in Bundesministerien. Springer VS, Wiesbaden.

  • Mause, K. (2009): Nebentätige Bundestagsabgeordnete: Was offenbaren die Veröffentlichungspflichten?, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 10(2),146–174.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • McLeay, S., D. Ordeiheide and S. Young (2000): Constituent Lobbying and Its Impact on the Development of Financial Reporting Regulations: Evidence from Germany, Accounting, Organizations and Society 25(1),79–98.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Mitra, D. (1999): Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination, American Economic Review 89(5),1116–1143.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Niessen, A. and S. Ruenzi (2010): Political Connectedness and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany, German Economic Review 11(4),441–464.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Olson, M. (1965): The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

  • Olson, M. (1982): The Rise and Decline of Nations. Yale University Press, New Haven and London.

  • Osterberg, S. (2017): Aufstocker im Bundestag II - Bilanz der Nebenverdienste der Abgeordneten in der 18. Wahlperiode. OBS-Arbeitspapier, 26.

  • Osterberg, S. (2018): Aufstocker im Bundestag III - Eröffnungsbilanz der Nebenverdienste der Abgeordneten zu Beginn der 19. Wahlperiode. OBS-Arbeitspapier, 31.

  • Peichl, A., N. Pestel and S. Siegloch (2012): The Politicians’ Wage Gap: Insights from German Members of Parliament, Public Choice 156(3/4), 653–676.

  • Polk, A. (2002): How Special Interests Shape Policy: A Survey. Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich, Working Paper 0206.

  • Polk, A. (2011): Lobbying: Private Interests and Public Conduct, CESifo DICE Report 9(1),3–7.

  • Polk, A. (2012): Ein Lob des Lobbyismus, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 2012(11),36–38.

  • Potters, J. and F. van Winden (1992): Lobbying and asymmetric information, Public Choice 74, 269–292.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Proksch, S.-O. and J. B. Slapin (2016): Wordfish-Projekt. Website. Online unter http://www.wordfish.org/; abgerufen am 15. Juni 2016.

  • Rose-Ackerman, S. and B. J. Palifka (2016): Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2 Auflage.

  • Salisbury, R. H., P. Johnson, J. P. Heinz, E. O. Laumann and R. L. Nelson (1989): Who You Know versus What You Know: The Uses of Government Experience for Washington Lobbyists, American Journal of Political Science 33(1),175–195.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Scharfenkamp, K. (2016): It’s About Connections – How the Economic Network of the German Federal Government Affects the Top Earners’ Average Income Tax Rate, Journal of Economics and Statistics 236(4),427–453.

  • Scharfenkamp, K. (2018): The Effects of Bridging Business and Politics – A Survival Analysis of German Federal Ministers, European Journal of Political Economy, 55, 433–454.

  • Sühlsen, K. and M. Hisschemöller (2014): Lobbying the ‘Energiewende’. Assessing the Effectiveness of Strategies to Promote the Renewable Energy Business in Germany, Energy Policy 69, 316–325.

  • Speth, R. (2014): Lobbying in Deutschland. Bericht für Transparency International Deutschland, Berlin. Online at https://www.transparency.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/Publikationen/2014/Lobbying_in_Deutschland_TransparencyDeutschland_2014.pdf accessed October 2, 2019).(

  • Stratmann, T. (2005): Some Talk: Money in Politics. A (Partial) Review of the Literature, Public Choice 124(1/2), 135–156.

    • Crossref
    • Export Citation
  • Transparency International (2019): Corruption Perceptions Index. Online at https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview accessed October( 7, 2019).

  • von Arnim, H.-H. (2006): Der gekaufte Abgeordnete - Nebeneinkünfte und Korruptionsproblematik, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 25(3),249–254.

  • Wewer, G. (2015): Die Lobby des Guten. Interesse und Gemeinwohl im digitalen Zeitalter. Kiel: Lorenz-von-Stein-Institut für Verwaltungswissenschaften an der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel.

Purchase article
Get instant unlimited access to the article.
$42.00
Log in
Already have access? Please log in.


or
Log in with your institution

Journal + Issues

The Review of Economics (Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften) is a peer-reviewed general interest journal publishing articles from all fields of economics with a strong policy focus. The journal aims to provide a forum for policy contributions and to influence the public debate.

Search