The aim of this paper is to analyse the chronology and itinerary of the march of the Macedonian army during the last days (September 18–October 1) of the Gaugamela campaign in 331 BC in the light of literary sources, cuneiform data, topographic and archaeological data, and GIS capabilities. The overall aim of this analysis is to contribute to the topographical enigma of the identification of Gaugamela as either (in the vicinity of) Tell Gomel or Karamleis/Qaraqosh. The cuneiform data allows us to establish the most important dates of the final course of the Gaugamela campaign: the Tigris crossing on September 18, a lunar eclipse on the evening of September 20, and the battle on October 1. Furthermore, a critical analysis of Arrian and Curtius suggests that the Macedonians spent only six days on the march and four days in the camp. Given the estimated average rate of the march of the Macedonian army, it is possible to reject certain routes between the Tigris crossing and Gaugamela and consider others as more or less likely. It is concluded that the Macedonians crossed the Tigris in the vicinity of modern Basorin and not Abu Dhahir or Abu Wajnam, as is widely assumed. Furthermore, it is also demonstrated that the difference between Tell Gomel and Karamleis/Qaraqosh, regarding their distance from Arbela, is much less striking than is frequently assumed, and as such does not speak against any of the widely held identifications of Gaugamela.
The First Sacred War was hotly debated in the 4th century. The crimes committed by the Crisaeans in this war were later equated to those committed by the Phocians during the Third Sacred War, or those committed by the Locrians of Amphissa during the Fourth Sacred War. This paper shows how the parallels drawn between the First and Third Sacred Wars (SW1–SW3) and between the First and Fourth Sacred Wars (SW1–SW4) were respectively shaped and used as an argument in two different milieus: in pro-Macedonian intellectual circles in Athens, and in the Athenian forensic and deliberative arena. The main aim of this paper is to understand why ‘SW1–SW3’ is not used as an argument in the latter. In fact, Athens’ most prominent politicians had to cope with the Athenian support for the Phocians in the so-called Third Sacred War. Thus, the Phocians were depicted as guilty, but not to the point that they were compared to the Crisaeans. The legacy of the latter was ambivalent and lent itself to this shift in meaning.
In a previous paper (When Valor Isn’t Always Superior to Numbers: homoioi oliganthrôpia Caused by Attrition in Incessant Warfare, KLIO 100, 2018, 626–666) I argued that the population of Ancient Spartan citizens, homoioi, declined predominantly due to attrition in warfare. Here, I revisit the argument and present a more refined model that includes additional samples, directly incorporates information on losses, and improves assumptions. I argue that Sparta may have experienced an initial population plunge in the early 5th century and was unable to recover. The results of this study reaffirm that warfare may have been an integral cause of oliganthrôpia.
Der Artikel bietet die Bearbeitung eines bislang unveröffentlichten Keilschrifttextes (LB 863) aus der Liagre Böhl Collection (Leiden), der weiterführende Aussagen zur Dauer der Koregentschaft von Seleukos I. Nikator und Antiochos (I. Soter) erlaubt. Aufgrund des darin genannten Datums lässt sich wahrscheinlich machen, dass Antiochos’ Erhebung zum Koregenten wenigstens zwei Jahre früher anzusetzen ist als allgemein angenommen. Im Übrigen ist diese Beobachtung gut mit einem anderen Keilschrifttext (D.T. 189) vereinbar, dessen ungewöhnliches Datum sich bislang einer befriedigenden Erklärung entzogen hat.