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Rosenzweig Foundation for Personality Dynamics and Creativity of St. Louis, with additional funding from the Austrian Cultural Forum of New York, and the New York Acad- emy of Medicine. Other institutional benefactors included the American Psychological Association Division 26, the Association for Psychoanalytic Medicine, and the Sigmund Freud Museum and Sigmund Freud Founda- tion of Vienna, along with these individuals: Jules Bohnn, George S. Gold- man, Sheila Hafter Gray, and Nathan G. Hale Jr. Individual donors included Bernard W. Bail, Helen Beiser, Donald L

and popular culture, a vogue for mental illness persists and in some ways has crested, as in the “outsider art” that exoticizes the creativity of the usually untutored mentally ill and sells it for high prices. Every year, it seems, a new Hollywood fi lm or bestselling novel or memoir explores its protagonist’s descent into madness. But we seem to want to hear stories of those who fall and bounce back, without thinking about why it is that only some can bounce. Few of these popular works portray the truly desperate situations of those lacking suffi cient

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comfortable homes, vacations, and transportation. And it often confers dignity, pride, and self- respect from realizing the American Dream. But do these benefits translate into psychological benefits? What are the costs of competitive success, and what effect do they have? Is careerism in fact an American scourge, robbing people of their spirit and reducing op- portunities: for relationships, creativity, self- expression, and self- realization? Might the endless anxiety of the pursuit define the experience, outweighing the benefits? Men like my research participants

viewpoint is compounded by a psychological contradiction—to be artists in this gen- eration is to be diseased by the very force that makes them artists in the fi rst place. They are torn between creativity and neurosis, both of which are the hallmarks of their time. Work, which had been the simple prov- ince of the peasants, the thing that kept them sane, is now transmuted to monomaniacal labor, most notably writing, which is no longer salutary but dangerous. Most remarkably, the last line of the novel, uttered by San- doz, whose previous diatribe against work sits

creativity. Hence, speak- ers and writers constantly draw upon an available repertoire of expressive resources that they integrate and shape according to their communicative and interactive affordances. All these aspects have to be processed cogni- tively, and if one wishes to develop a theory of language that is cognitively realistic, then he or she must account for this complexity of linguistic struc- ture. This is a profound theoretical and methodological issue, and for support I shall return to a classic work on semantics written by Stephen Ullmann: To take a

into discus- sions of analytic technique, and outlined a normal narcissism that was the wellspring of human ambition and creativity, values and ideals, empathy and fellow feeling. He burst onto the cultural scene in the 1970s brandish- ing an appealingly normalized narcissism that, in the estimation of social critics, was symptomatic of the nation’s precipitous decline. To them, both Kohut, whom they cast as the analyst of abundance and plentitude, and the fi gure of this new narcissist—greedy, solipsistic, entitled, grandiose— were echt American. Yet to

Anthropologist 66:l-19. Newton-Smith, W. 1973. A conceptual investigation of love. In Philosophy and Personal Relations, ed. H. Montefiore. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Nisbett, R. E., and T. Wilson. 1977. On saying more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review 84:231-59. Nowlis, V. 1963. The concept of mood. In Conflict and Creativity, ed. S . M. Farber and R. H. L. Wilson. New York: McGraw-Hill. O’Hara, R. J. 1988. Homage to CIio, or towards an historical philosophy for evolutionary biology. Systematic Zoology 37

M (clouds) in terms of A (woman’s head) creates a new mental image B (woman’s head) materialized in clouds. Notably, the process described by Aldrich does not appear to be very different from the principles underlying human creativity that are accounted for in blending theory. The identification of such a triadic meaning structure in the above- mentioned cases clearly operates on a rather strong abstraction. Since it con- stitutes a minimal point of convergence in existing theories, it is not only an attractive point of departure for a critical evaluation of

that metaphor is a basic form of human creativity. Weinrich (1976), Oksaar (1988), and Störel (1997) regard metaphor as an im- portant device for constructing scientific models of thought. Brünner (1987), Störel (1997), and Lakoff (2002) regard metaphors as an everyday and as a scientific means of conceptualizing abstract domains, such as communica- tion, music, and morality. In the same vein, Schön (1993) takes metaphor to be a form of perspectivization of experience with consequences for social policy; Sternberg, Tourangeau, and Nigro (1993) view metaphors as

of Psychology 18: 182–186. Silverstein, Michael. 1985. On the pragmatic “poetry” of prose: Parallelism, repetition, and cohesive structure in the time course of dyadic conversation. In D. Schiffrin (ed.), Meaning, Form, and Use in Context: Linguistic Applications, pp. 181–199. Washington: Georgetown University Press. ———. 1997. The improvisational performance of culture in realtime discursive practice. In R. K. Sawyer (ed.), Creativity in Performance, pp. 265–312. Greenwich, CT: Ablex. Slobin, Dan I. 1987. Thinking for speaking. In J. Aske, N. Beery, L. Michaelis