Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details
More options …

Capitalism and Society

A Journal of the Center on Capitalism and Society

Ed. by Phelps, Edmund / Bhidé, Amar

More options …

Family Values or Crony Capitalism?

Harold James
Published Online: 2008-06-12 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1932-0213.1031

Family firms are very prominent in many parts of the world, including in many of the most dynamic emerging markets. They are often thought to be associated with poor corporate and political governance. This article examines the debate about their durability and efficiency, using material drawn from the long experience of continental Europe and sketches out an ideal type of the family, in which there is a historical experience of entrepreneurship, a brand, and a network built around family enterprise. It then tests various common explanations for the prevalence of family firms, including Roman law versus common law traditions, tax incentives, share voting privileges, and inheritance law; and finds that each applies only in a quite particular historical epoch. Finally, the article suggests that family businesses offer advantages that are most apparent at times of shocks and discontinuities, and that they are thus a response to uneven development.

About the article

Published Online: 2008-06-12


Citation Information: Capitalism and Society, ISSN (Online) 1932-0213, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1932-0213.1031.

Export Citation

©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston. Copyright Clearance Center

Citing Articles

Here you can find all Crossref-listed publications in which this article is cited. If you would like to receive automatic email messages as soon as this article is cited in other publications, simply activate the “Citation Alert” on the top of this page.

[1]
Mike Geppert, Christoph Dörrenbächer, Jens Gammelgaard, and Ian Taplin
British Journal of Management, 2013, Volume 24, Number 3, Page 316

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in