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Accessible Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter November 30, 2019

Contagion of Self-Interested Behavior: Evidence from Group Dictator Game Experiments

Takehiro Ito, Akihiro Suzuki, Toru Takemoto, Kazuhito Ogawa and Hiromasa Takahashi
From the journal German Economic Review

Abstract

We examine how group decision-making affects other-regarding behavior in experimental dictator games. In particular, we assess whether the effects of iterated games differ for group and individual decision-making and whether the difference in decision-making style (individual or group) changes the perception of social identity. We make two findings on group decision-making. First, group decisions become more selfish when repeating the game after changing group members. Second, a dictator group donates more to a recipient group at the same university than to a recipient group at a different university. These findings are not true for individual decision-making.

Published Online: 2019-11-30
Published in Print: 2016-12-01

© 2019 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston