TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

John Makeham

In China, Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885–1968) is typically regarded as one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. In standard works introducing Chinese philosophers to Western readers, he is also widely portrayed as a seminal figure. In 1963, historian of Chinese philosophy Wing-tsit Chan went so far as to claim that Xiong “has influenced more young Chinese philosophers than any other contemporary Chinese philosopher.”¹ More recently, Xiong has been described as “perhaps the most creative philosopher within Modern New Confucianism,”² and he is “often considered to be one of the most innovative Chinese philosophers of the modern period. Few could match him when it comes to building his own distinctive comprehensive philosophical system.”³ Furthermore, “it is now almost universally held that in the *New Doctrine* (*Xin weishi lun*) Xiong built the most creative philosophical system in contemporary Chinese philosophy.”⁴ Ng Yu-kwan finds Xiong to have been a philosopher of such originality and importance that he is prepared to give the following assessment: “Whether judged in terms of depth and comprehensiveness in content or in terms of

1. Wing-tsit Chan, *A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 765.

2. Lauren Pfister, “Xiong Shili,” in *RoutledgeCurzon Encyclopedia of Confucianism*, ed. Xinzhong Yao (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 2:706.

3. Tan Sor-hoon, “Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy,” in *History of Chinese Philosophy*, ed. Bo Mou (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 540.

4. Jiyuan Yu, “Xiong Shili’s Metaphysics of Virtue,” in *Contemporary Chinese Philosophy*, ed. Chung-Ying Cheng and Nicholas Bunnin (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), p. 128.

its theoretical vigor, Xiong's philosophical achievements are great, and can be compared with those of Western philosophers such as Aristotle, Leibniz, Husserl, Heidegger, and Whitehead. In Chinese philosophy, his scope is on par with that of Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) and Wang Fuzhi.⁵ Although such effusive appraisals are not universally shared, Umberto Bresciani perceptively points out that the “variety of judgments concerning Xiong’s thought is an eloquent indication of the complexity of his philosophical thought.”⁶ Indeed, *New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness* (*Xin weishi lun* 新唯識論) remains one of the least understood major Chinese philosophical works of the twentieth century.

Xiong’s philosophical training began with Buddhist philosophy—in particular, Yogācāra Buddhism. Just as a strong emphasis on logic exercised a formative influence on the development of the academic discipline of Chinese philosophy in the first two decades of the twentieth century, so too the revival of Yogācāra thought by leading Chinese intellectuals from the late 1890s to the 1930s played a key role in shaping currents in Chinese philosophy and modern Chinese thought more generally. Yogācāra (*Yuqie xingpai* 瑜伽行派; yogic practice)⁷ is one of the two most influential philosophical systems of Indian Buddhism, along with Madhyamaka. Historically, both *weishi* 唯識 (nothing but consciousness) and *faxiang* 法相 (*dharma-lakṣaṇa*; dharma⁸ characteristics) were used to refer to the Yogācāra school in China. After the Tang dynasty, *faxiang* was used to denote the famous pilgrim and monk Xuanzang’s 玄奘 (602–644) Yogācāra school but soon became a mildly derogatory expression used by its opponents, mocking the Yogācāras for pursuing the “characteristics of dharmas” rather than the real nature of dharmas (*faxing* 法性). Despite this, Yogācāras later adopted the term, and in Japan it continues to be the official name of this school (Hossō in Japanese).

5. Ng Yu-kwan, “Xiong Shili’s Metaphysical Theory About the Non-Separability of Substance and Function,” in *New Confucianism: A Critical Examination*, ed. John Makeham (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 239.

6. Umberto Bresciani, *Reinventing Confucianism: The New Confucian Movement* (Taipei: Taipei Ricci Institute, 2001), p. 140.

7. Other names for the Yogācāra school include the Way of Consciousness (*vijñānavāda*) and Nothing but Cognition/Consciousness (*vijñapti-mātratā*).

8. The building blocks of complex physical and mental phenomena. Xiong treats them more simply as physical and mental phenomena.

Yogācāra ostensibly begins with the fourth-century A.D. Indian thinkers Asaṅga (無著) and Vasubandhu (世親); their ideas began to appear in China almost immediately. By the sixth century, competing traditions of Yogācāra thought had developed in China, with the Weishi 唯識 (*vijñapti-mātratā*; nothing but consciousness) school rising to preeminence in the seventh century. By the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), however, certain key commentaries of this school had ceased being transmitted in China, and it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that a number of them were reintroduced into China from Japan, where their transmission had been uninterrupted. Crucial to the late Qing revival of interest in Yogācāra thought was the friendship between Japanese scholar Nanjō Bun'yū 南條文雄 (1894–1927) and lay Chinese Buddhist scholar Yang Wenhui 楊文會 (1837–1911). Between 1891 and 1896, Nanjō sent 235 Buddhist texts to Yang, including thirty Yogācāra texts that had long ceased being transmitted in China.⁹ Within the context of a broader renewal of interest in traditional philosophical writings (including other indigenous Chinese Mahāyāna texts) in the late Qing (1644–1911), the corpus of Yogācāra writings attracted unparalleled attention. One of these texts, Kuiji's 窺基 (632–682) *Cheng weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記 (Commentary on *Demonstration of Nothing but Consciousness*) is particularly important for providing crucial glosses on *Cheng weishi lun*, the foundational text of the East Asian Yogācāra tradition.¹⁰

China's Yogācāra revival—specifically the Weishi 唯識 school—from the late 1890s to the 1930s was spearheaded by two generations of prominent intellectuals: monastics, lay believers, and secular figures alike.¹¹ Xiong began his Yogācāra studies in Nanjing at the China Institute of Inner Learning (支那內學院) in 1920 under the tutelage of the Institute's founder, Ouyang Jingwu 歐陽竟無 (1871–1943).¹² Two years later, he was appointed to teach

9. Chen Jidong 陳繼東, "Shinmatsu ni okeru Yuishiki Hōsō tenseki no kankō ni tsuite 清末における唯識法相典籍の刊行について" (On the Publication of Yogācāra Texts at the End of the Qing Dynasty), *Indogaku Bukkyūgaku kenkyū* 44, no. 2 (1996): 811.

10. For an overview of these historical developments, see the introduction to *Transforming Consciousness: Yogācāra Thought in Modern China*, ed. John Makeham (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

11. For a comprehensive study of this revival, see the essays in Makeham, *Transforming Consciousness*.

12. The institute was not formally launched until 1922, but it had already been running since 1918, based on the grounds of the Jinling Sutra Press (Jinling kejing chu 金陵刻經處) in Nanking.

Yogācāra philosophy in the philosophy department of Peking University, where he initially taught for two years. He subsequently led a peripatetic and frequently interrupted academic career, suffering various ailments for much of his life. After spending much of the second half of the 1920s in south China recuperating from illness, he returned to academic life at Peking University in 1932. As a refugee during the period of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), he moved between cities and towns in south and west China, living periodically in monasteries and teaching in small, private academies. He returned to Peking University in 1947, and in 1949 he made the decision to remain in China rather than relocate to Hong Kong or Taiwan. From 1954 until his death in 1968 he resided in Shanghai, but he continued to be employed by Peking University for most of that period.

Over the thirty-year period from the early 1920s to the early 1950s, he moved from a largely uncritical belief in Yogācāra philosophy to a position where it served as a foil for his own constructive philosophy. His criticisms of Yogācāra grew progressively more trenchant over this period. The incremental nature of this transition is reflected in the different versions of his major philosophical writing, *New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness*.¹³ In 1923 he published *Weishixue gailun* 唯識學概論 (A General Account of Yogācāra Learning; 1923), based on his lectures at Peking University. In 1926 this book was revised, but the original title was retained. The next revised version, *Weishi lun* 唯識論 (Treatise on Yogācāra), was published in 1930. The literary redaction (文言文本) of *New Treatise* was published in 1932 and represents Xiong's mature rejection of Yogācāra philosophy (although he still retained many elements of Yogācāra, deploying them for his own purposes). As Guo Qiyong has noted, the literary redaction of *New Treatise* represents his most foundational and important writing.¹⁴ With the pub-

13. This English rendering of the title is based on Xiong's own idiosyncratic gloss of *weishi* 唯識. The Chinese title may well have been intended to carry a second level of meaning. Given that *Xin weishi lun* is presented as a critical response to Xuanzang's 玄奘 (602–664) *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論 (Demonstration of Nothing but Consciousness), an argument could be made that the title of Xiong's work has the additional implicit sense of *New Demonstration of Nothing but Consciousness*.

14. Guo Qiyong 郭齊勇, *Tiandi jian yige dushuren: Xiong Shili zhuan* 天地間一個讀書人: 熊十力傳 (A Scholar Poised Between Heaven and Earth: A Biography of Xiong Shili) (Taipei: Yeqiang chubanshe, 1994), pp. 50–54, 61.

lication of the 1932 literary redaction (hereafter *New Treatise* refers to this redaction), Xiong was catapulted to national prominence (and controversy). A vernacular redaction (語體文本) of *New Treatise* was published in 1944, and an abridged edition of the vernacular redaction was published in 1953.

Even though the lengthy vernacular redaction is generally considered to be the fullest expression of Xiong's mature philosophy, Xiong's main arguments were already substantially in place in the 1932 literary redaction of *New Treatise*.¹⁵ The genesis of the vernacular version lies in Xiong's unrealized plan to have a student translate the literary redaction into English. When the English version failed to materialize, Xiong had students translate several chapters into vernacular Chinese. Some of the translation was dictated by Xiong; some of it was not.

1. NEW TREATISE: CONFUCIAN OR BUDDHIST?

Conventionally, Xiong is recognized as a founding figure of the modern New Confucian school of philosophy.¹⁶ Included among his students are such towering figures as Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–78), Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1903–82), and Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–95), each of whom in turn spawned disciples and promoters. Since the 1970s, New Confucian philosophy has been growing in influence in “cultural China” to become the dominant philosophical current in Chinese philosophy of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Its rise to preeminence in mainland China over the past two decades is nothing short of phenomenal.

Over the past three decades, there has been a widespread tendency to portray Xiong narrowly as a Confucian philosopher who also happened to criticize Buddhist philosophy, but whose philosophical achievements lie in his accounts of the relationship between *ti* 體 and *yong* 用, the principle

15. One real philosophical difference is that Xiong extends his criticism—albeit with ample qualification—to Madhyamaka conceptions of emptiness. When reference is made to the 1944 vernacular redaction of *Xin weishi lun*, this will be clearly indicated.

16. In English, the term “New Confucian” is to be distinguished from “Neo-Confucian.” New Confucianism is a modern neo-conservative philosophical movement, with religious overtones. Proponents claim it to be the legitimate transmitter and representative of orthodox *ru* 儒 (“Confucian”) values. The movement is promoted and/or researched by prominent Chinese intellectuals based in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States.

of change, and the two concepts “contraction” (翕) and “expansion” (闢) derived from the *Book of Change*.¹⁷ This tendency has no doubt been encouraged by the comments of such New Confucian luminaries as Mou Zongsan: “Only the lifetime of learning of my teacher Mr. Xiong Shili inherited, carried on, and advanced the teaching of humaneness of the Confucian sages, and also inherited, carried on, and advanced the aspirations of the great Confucians of the late Ming.”¹⁸ Making Xiong a vital link in the transmission of the “succession of the way” (道統)¹⁹ from late Ming times to the twentieth century has been a key strategy in the retrospective creation of the New Confucian school generally and in the revised succession of the way genealogy formulated by Mou Zongsan.

Contemporary promoter of New Confucian thought Liu Shuxian 劉述先 similarly describes Xiong as the first person after the May Fourth period to have “mastered the fundamental wisdom of [Song and Ming] Neo-Confucianism” and to have “applied his energies to reviving the thought of this tradition. . . . After the Song and Ming periods, the Qing Confucians lost the thread of the succession of the way once again, and it was not until the Republican period that Xiong Shili opened up the beginnings of New Confucianism.”²⁰

Xiong's sustained engagement with Buddhist philosophy has tended to be dismissed as a passing phase²¹ or inconvenient distraction rather than an

17. The following comments by Jiyuan Yu, “Xiong Shili's Metaphysics of Virtue,” p. 129, are typical: “His major philosophical contribution has been, through appropriating some aspects of Buddhism and combining them with his sophisticated understanding of the *Yi-jing*, to provide Confucianism—which has traditionally been regarded as being only an ethics—with a more solid metaphysical basis and a more dynamic character.”

18. Mou Zongsan, *Shengming de xuwen* 生命的學問 (Vital Learning) (Taipei: Sanmin shuju, 1970), p. 38.

19. For a detailed treatment of this concept in the context of New Confucian discourse, see chapter 7 of my *Lost Soul: “Confucianism” in Contemporary Chinese Academic Discourse* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008).

20. Liu Shuxian, *Zhuzi zhexue sixiang de fazhan yu wancheng* 朱子哲學思想的發展與完成 (The Development and Completion of Zhu Xi's Philosophical Thought) (1982; rev. 3rd ed., Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1995), 1980 preface, p. 4; pp. 425, 481.

21. Lin Anwu 林安梧 even departs from the conventional consensus that Xiong gradually changed his philosophical allegiance from Buddhism to Confucianism, instead insisting that Xiong had always adopted a Confucian stance. See his “Dangdai Ru-Fo lunzheng de yixie wenti: Li Xiangping xiansheng ‘Xiong Shili zhaxue de qieshi yu Ru-Fo huitong’ du hou

essential framework that could be used to tease out the complexity of his thought. Too often, Xiong's uncompromising critiques of Yogācāra philosophy, in particular, seem to have provided a convenient pretext for ignoring other key elements of Buddhist philosophy in his constructive philosophy. This is not to deny that Xiong's primary philosophical allegiance was with Confucian philosophy, an allegiance that grew remarkably more pronounced from the 1940s onward. At the same time, however, he also prided himself on his syncretism: "People might suspect that my *New Treatise* is Buddhist on the outside and Confucian on the inside. Only Zaiping [his close friend Lin Zaiping 林宰平 (1879–1960)] knows that it is a self-made system—it enters into and departs from the various schools of thought and is complete, rounded, and without hindrances."²² In the 1944 vernacular redaction of *New Treatise*, Xiong explained this in more detail:

There are people who say that my philosophy introduces Confucian [thought] into Buddhist [thought]. Now while this might seem a reasonable thing to say, in fact other people are not in a position to know what my own feelings are on this matter. Formerly there was a period when I was very much inclined toward Indian Buddhist thought. My motivation in studying Buddhist learning was certainly not to broaden my scholarship but rather to realize truth fully, a goal to which I was driven by my great wish to secure a meaningful life. I had received instruction about the school of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu from Venerable Master Ouyang [Jingwu 歐陽竟無 (1871–1943)], and had for a period resolutely adhered to the doctrines of that school.

Later, I gradually moved away from the teachings of the various schools, both Buddhist and the others. Including the school of Confucius.²³ I had no thoughts for anything other than "to seek within myself" (反己自求). I held that truth is not something lying at a great remove from us and most certainly is not something that can be apprehended by immersing oneself in other people's writings. Accordingly, I trusted only my own sincerity and humility,

當代儒佛論爭的一些問題——李向平先生「熊十力哲學的缺失與儒佛會通」讀後”(Some Issues in Contemporary Confucian-Buddhist Debates: On Reading Mr. Li Xiang-ping's "Shortcomings in the Philosophy of Xiong Shili, and Confucian-Buddhist Interconnections"), *Ershiyi shiji* 48 (1998): 126.

22. Xiong Shili, *Shili yuyao chuxu* 十力語要初續 (The First Sequel to Selected Letters and Talks of Xiong Shili) (Taipei: Mingwen shuju, 1990), pp. 29–30. This work was published in 1949, but the selections include material from the 1930s.

23. The text in a lighter font is Xiong's interlinear autocommentary. It runs throughout the *New Treatise* and is integral to Xiong's exposition, as he explains in his introduction.

constantly guarding against the deceptive and blinding effects of personal bias, partial views and so forth. I sought nothing but what Chen Baisha 陳白沙 [1428–1500]²⁴ referred to as “lodging one’s mind in not-having” (措心於無)²⁵—that is, remove all attachments and mistaken views—enabling the mind to become expansive, with no constraints at all. Only in this way could truth be personally experienced at every turn.

After some time, what I came to realize through personal verification was a sudden feeling of profound intimacy with the meaning of the *Book of Change* as transmitted by the Confucius school. Accordingly, only then did I completely destroy *Weishixue gailun* 唯識學概論 (A General Account of Yogācāra Learning; 1923), which had been written using the views of the school of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu and also make a pledge to revise it and write *New Treatise* so as to correct the mistakes of the former work.

What I have obtained from Confucius has been not through books, but through personal experience. On this basis I then began to feel that it was verified by what Confucius said in books. It is impossible to tell most people of the difficulties involved. As for the Buddhist scriptures I most value, none surpasses the *Āgama-sūtras* (阿含經),²⁶ Some of its methods of self-cultivation correspond with those of the Confucians (孔門). the *Perfection of Wisdom Sutra* (*Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra*; 大般若波羅蜜多經),²⁷ [These teachings] remove all views derived from being impeded by habituated tendencies, and, with regard to things, there is no attachment at all. the *Nirvāṇa Sutra* (*Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*; 涅槃經),²⁸ Having refuted all forms of attachment, it then directly reveals the true and eternal Fundamental Reality of all dharmas. and the *Flower Ornament Sutra* (*Avataṃsaka-sūtra*; 華嚴經).²⁹ This sutra describes each and every manifestly apparent thing as god-like (神)—a pantheism. It also shows people how to aspire to good conduct and so draws near to conventional thought. Although the transformations within Buddhism are many and varied, this sutra is unique. All of these sutras have places that can merge comprehensively with the *Book of Change* of the Confucians. Note the word “have places that can”—it is not the case that they are completely the same. In the future I plan to write a separate essay on this, so I will not go into detail here. Most people say that I introduce Confucian [thought] into Buddhist [thought]—this sort

24. Chen Xianzhang 陳獻章, Ming dynasty Confucian thinker.

25. See Chen Baisha, “Yu Zhan Minze 與湛民澤” (Letter to Zhan Minze), in *Ming ru xue'an* 明儒學案 (Case Studies of Ming Ru), compiled by Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), vol. 1, p. 86.

26. A collection of early Buddhist discourses preserved primarily in Chinese translation.

27. A collection of sutras that articulate the doctrine of the perfection of wisdom.

28. A group of sutras called *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*.

29. Key scripture for the Huayan school of Sinitic Buddhism.

of claim is made in complete ignorance of the meaning of learning and its difficulties.³⁰

Apart from providing a succinct intellectual autobiography, these comments highlight the syncretism that Xiong consciously employed to develop his thought.³¹

Writing in the mid-1930s, a year or so after the publication of *New Treatise*, he explains that this syncretism is premised on his conviction that Confucian and Buddhist insights into reality are identical:

In regard to the verified experience (證會) of Fundamental Reality, there is no difference between Buddhists and Confucians. Fundamental Reality is absolute; it is beyond all differentiating characteristics. The only question of difference is that of being able to see it or not being able to see it. If it is seen, then there are no further differences that can be drawn. . . . The absolute Reality [that I refer to] in my *New Treatise* is not a matter on which there can be differences between Confucians and Buddhists. It was with a firm grasp of this principle that I established my discourse using the method of skillful/expedient means [*upāya*].³² This is why my *New Treatise* is far from being misguided conceptual elaboration. However, as for the Buddhist view of life, the account in *New Treatise* is completely different: mental afflictions arise from mental afflictions, and the mundane world is the mundane world. These views are grounded in the Confucian idea that “physical form is heavenly nature.”³³ Thus [Confucians] advocate vigor and creativity and have no fears about mortality, nor do they take delight in extinction, and because of this they ultimately belong to Chinese thought. Indeed this is a characteristic of Chinese thought. Buddhist thought about human life, from primitive Buddhism to the later Mahāyāna, consistently advocates transcending the ocean of mortality. . . . This is perhaps a special feature of the Indian people—there is no need for us to discuss its pros and cons.³⁴

30. Xiong Shili, *Xin wei shi lun*, vernacular redaction, pp. 136–137.

31. Also *Xiong Shili quanji*, vol. 8, p. 423, where he claims that *New Treatise* synthesizes Buddhism and Confucianism into an independent system. “It is the crystallization of Oriental philosophy.”

32. Xiong is using the concept in the sense of a hermeneutic strategy (1) for dealing with real and apparent differences between Buddhist and Confucian teachings and (2) to indicate the limits and limitations of language, but also the necessary role played by language in pointing toward the truth.

33. The idea that human life is “mandated” by heaven, that the transcendent is immanent in human life.

34. Xiong Shili, “Shili lunxue yu jiyao 十力論學語輯要” (Reconstructed Essentials of Xiong Shili’s Discussions of Learning), *Xiong Shili quanji* 熊十力全集 (The Complete Writings of Xiong Shili) (Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001), vol. 2, p. 254.

Elsewhere, Xiong drew attention to the importance of Madhyamaka Buddhist thought in *New Treatise*, declaring that *New Treatise* “establishes its discourses using the method of convenient/skillful means to probe directly the essence of the Madhyamaka school.” He proceeds to explain that he identifies the doctrine of impermanence to be the key Madhyamaka teaching, and that this teaching lies at the heart of two central chapters of *New Treatise*, “Transformation” and “Productive Power”:

Although the constructs I have devised in these chapters using the method of skillful means may seem to be different from [the teachings of the] Mahāyāna Madhyamaka School, they are in fact identical. . . . My *New Treatise* nominally (假 [*prajñapti*]) talks about the “flow of Fundamental Reality.” Being based on the Confucian *Book of Change*, [it might be assumed that] there would be no necessary reason for the content of *New Treatise* to accord with Madhyamaka [teachings]. Now, this might seem to be correct. One must, however, understand that when Mādhyamikas³⁵ establish words on the basis of skillful means, they do so purely to stop attachment. In other words, they directly lead people to cultivate the discernment of emptiness and thereby render their attachments empty.³⁶

In other words, Madhyamaka philosophical insights lie at the heart of *New Treatise*, in particular the view that emptiness and the phenomenal world ultimately are not two different things but rather are two characterizations of the same thing. Madhyamaka provided a deconstructive method, a radical apophasis, central to which is the concept of emptiness.³⁷ Crucially, however, Xiong moves beyond a purely Madhyamaka perspective, to adopt a view that remains firmly entrenched in the conceptual genealogy of so-called nature origination (*xingqi* 性起), a doctrine developed in Huayan Buddhism to indicate “that all phenomenal appearances are nothing but manifestations of the nature.”³⁸ Nature origination . . . goes beyond conditioned arising in locating an ultimate ontological basis for the phenomenal

35. Followers of Madhyamaka.

36. Xiong Shili, “Shili lunxue yu jiyao,” pp. 252, 253.

37. It should be noted that in *New Treatise*, Xiong is not prepared to endorse any notion of nihilism, such as might be ascribed to Madhyamaka philosophy. In the 1944 vernacular redaction of *Xin weishi lun*, Xiong is more explicitly critical of Madhyamakan conceptions of emptiness.

38. In the context of Sinitic Buddhism, “the nature” refers to Buddha-nature; for Xiong, it refers to Fundamental Reality.

world.”³⁹ The theory of nature origination provides an ontological basis for all phenomena by presenting phenomena as manifestations of the nature (which, in turn, is the functional equivalent of Suchness, the Absolute, Fundamental Reality, *dharma* realm [*dharmadhātu*], and so on). The influence of this doctrine is particularly evident in Xiong's conception of the *ti-yong* conceptual model.⁴⁰

At the same time, Xiong is highly critical of Yogācāra philosophy (as represented by major figures in the school such as Vasubandhu, Dharmapāla [護法; sixth century],⁴¹ Xuanzang, and Kuiji) for promoting what he regards to be ontological dualism and pluralism. At the heart of his critique is the charge that key Yogācāra thinkers had effectively substantialized the concept of seeds (*bīja*; 種子)—originally just a heuristic metaphor—by presenting seeds as the ontological basis of all things. Xiong's critique of Yogācāra pluralism extends to the division of consciousness into eight groups, and to Dharmapāla's/Xuanzang's appropriation of the tripartite theory of consciousness put forth by Indian logician and philosopher Dignāga 陳那 (ca. 480–540). Xiong's critiques are grounded in the Mahāyāna doctrine of dependent arising (*pratītya-samutpāda*; 緣起)—everything arises from causes and conditions and has no inherent self-nature—and the doctrine that the phenomenal world is not ontologically distinct from undifferentiated absolute reality (*dharmakāya*), a thesis he develops using the *ti-yong* 體用 conceptual polarity.

The central metaphysical problem Xiong grappled with in *New Treatise*—and indeed throughout his life—was the relation between the ontological

39. Peter N. Gregory, *Inquiry into the Origin of Humanity: An Annotated Translation of Tsung-mi's Yüan jen lun with a Modern Commentary* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), p. 18.

40. It is thus perhaps not entirely surprising that in 1933 the cleric Taixu 太虛 (1890–1947) described *New Treatise* as representing a new kind of Huayan. See Taixu, “Lüe ping Xin weishi lun 略評新唯識論” (A Brief Review of *New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness*) *Xiong Shili quanji*, supplementary volume A, p. 32.

41. A student of Dignāga, this major sixth-century Indian Yogācāra scholar wrote an influential commentary on Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā* (*Weishi sanshi lun song* 唯識三十論頌; Thirty Verses), translated by Xuanzang, *Taishō Tripitaka*, vol. 31, no. 1586, the text on which Xuanzang's *Cheng weishi lun* comments. Xuanzang's *Cheng weishi lun* is said to draw heavily on Dharmapāla's commentary and privileges many of its interpretations. See, however, note 44 below.

and the phenomenal. Opposed to ontological dualism, he sought to develop an ontological monism that was combined with a phenomenological dualism (experienced through ultimate truth and conventional truth) and encapsulated in his understanding of the *ti-yong* polarity. Identifying the ontological with the phenomenal, he insisted that phenomena are not different from Reality even if they are not identical. Ontologically they are not different; phenomenologically our experience of them is not the same.⁴²

2. THE CONTENT OF *NEW TREATISE*

This volume is a translation of the literary redaction of *New Treatise*.⁴³ It does not attempt to provide an intellectual biography covering major facets of Xiong's long and productive career. This volume is first and foremost a translation of one book in Xiong's life, albeit his most important book. To provide even a modestly comprehensive intellectual biography would mean introducing the philosophical content of all of his main writings from the 1910s to the 1950s. That would be a very different project—one well worth undertaking—but not in this introduction, which is focused on introducing the content of Xiong's *New Treatise*.

As indicated by the title, *New Treatise* is presented as a commentary on, or critical response to, Xuanzang's *Cheng weishi lun*, a foundational text in East Asian Buddhism.⁴⁴ *New Treatise* consists of an interpretive summary

42. See, for example, my essay "Xiong Shili's Understanding of the Relationship between the Ontological and the Phenomenal," in *Chinese Metaphysics and Its Problems: An Introduction*, ed. Chenyang Li and Franklin Perkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in press).

43. I have used the recension in *Xiong Shili quanji*, vol. 2, collated against a photographic reproduction of the original recension first published by Zhejiang Provincial Library in October 1932 and republished in Taipei by Wenjing chubanshe in 1973. The photographic reproduction was made from a copy of the original recension provided by Tang Junyi to Zhou Shaoxian 周邵賢, a former student of Xiong.

44. *Cheng weishi lun* is a composite of commentaries on Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā*. In order to buttress his own claim as rightful successor to a lineage through Xuanzang, Kuiji claimed that *Cheng weishi lun* was strictly based on ten Indian commentaries, with the opinion of sixth-century Indian Yogācāra exponent Dharmapāla invariably prevailing. Hidenori Sakuma and Dan Lusthaus, however, argue that it is often the interpretations of the seventh-century Yogācāra master Sthiramati that are the authoritative position (demonstrable by

and discussion of key Yogācāra teachings that feature in *Cheng weishi lun*, a sustained critique of views Xiong attributes to the sixth-century Yogācāra master Dharmapāla, and a synthesis of Yogācāra thought with ideas derived from Madhyamaka Buddhism, various Sinitic traditions of Buddhism, the *Book of Change*, Laozi and Zhuangzi, and from Chinese Neo-Confucian thinkers associated with the Lu-Wang wing of Neo-Confucian philosophy, as well as Zhu Xi. Xiong was very much a syncretist.⁴⁵

Xiong had originally intended that *New Treatise* would consist of two parts: *On Cognitive Objects* (境論) and *On Epistemology* (量論), but *On Epistemology* was never written.⁴⁶ *New Treatise* thus consists of eight chapters that collectively constitute *On Cognitive Objects*. The main content of those eight chapters is introduced below.

2.1 EXPLANATION OF THE THESIS (明宗)

This opening chapter presents an overview of the main thesis underpinning *New Treatise*, the gist of which is expressed in the opening paragraph: “Reality (實體 [tattva])⁴⁷ is not a perceptual field (境界) detached from one’s own mind, nor is it a cognitive object of knowledge. . . . Moreover, the word

comparing Sthiramati’s commentary, the only one of the supposed ten that is extant today, with *Cheng weishi lun*). See Hidenori Sakuma, “On Doctrinal Similarities between Sthiramati and Xuanzang,” *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 29, no. 2 (2006 [2009]): 357–382; Dan Lusthaus, *Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogacara Buddhism and the Chèng Wei-shih Lun*, Curzon Critical Studies in Buddhism Series (London: Routledge, 2002), chapter 15.

45. See my essay, “Xiong Shili’s Critique of Yogācāra Thought in the Context of his Constructive Philosophy,” in Makeham, *Transforming Consciousness*, where I prosecute this case.

46. Xiong had planned this division as early as 1923, as he relates in the opening paragraph of his *Weishixue gailun*, in *Xiong Shili quanji*, vol. 1, p. 45. There he also reveals that the title “Liang lun 量論” does mean “epistemology,” but he deliberately chose not to use the term *renshilun* 認識論 because it was a Japanese translation and it was also a term derived from “philosophers” (哲學家). Xiong drew a distinction between philosophy and what he termed “fundamental wisdom” (玄學).

47. Occasionally I have suggested what I believe would have been the particular matching Sanskrit terms, based on established Sinitic Buddhist usage. Inter alia, this serves the purpose of reminding readers that Xiong is drawing upon a long-established technical vocabulary, even though he often chooses to invest certain terms with new meaning.

'self-nature' (自性) is but a different term for [Fundamental] Reality." Reality is the underlying locus: it both ontologically grounds the phenomenal world yet is not different from the phenomenal world, just as the sea supports the waves yet is not different from the waves. It is the single most important concept in *New Treatise* and is invoked frequently, albeit under a variety of names.

In the vernacular edition of *Xin weishi lun*, *shiti* 實體 is largely replaced by *benti* 本體. As Xiong points out, however, the meaning is the same: "'Fundamental Reality' (本體) is but a different term for the true nature (真性). As the real principle (實理) by which we and the ten thousand things live, it is called true nature. As for this true nature's being the true aspect 實相 [tattvasya-lakṣaṇam] of myself and the myriad things as they inherently are (本然), it is also called Fundamental Reality. Here, 'true aspect' is the same as saying 'Reality 實體.'"⁴⁸ Elsewhere he explains that in Buddhist writings the term *xing* 性 is often used synonymously with the term *ti* 體 to express the meaning of "absolute truth" (絕對的真理), which in "Oriental philosophy" is expressed using the terms *benti* 本體, *shiti* 實體, or the *ti* 體 of *ti-yong* 體用.⁴⁹ Later in *New Treatise*, both "mind" (心) and "the nature" (性) also equate with this ontological Reality that thoroughly inheres all phenomena. "The nature is that whereby we as humans live. In relation to the ten thousand existents, it is also nominally termed 'constant transformation.'"⁵⁰ One of Xiong's main characterizations of Reality is as an uninterrupted holistic process of constant transformation. This concept is the subject of chapter 3.

Xiong explains that Reality can be apprehended or realized only by seeking within, returning to one's inherent mind (本心), where Reality, the true principle, can be realized. This realization is wisdom (智 [jñāna]), a concept that is to be distinguished from discernment (慧 [prajñā]). Although Xiong does not discuss the concept of discernment further in this pithy first chapter, he does so in chapter 8:

Discernment is concerned merely with discriminating cognitive objects, and so those who depend on discernment are always attached to things and so lose their innate wisdom (智) and have no means by which to realize truth. Ordinarily the word "truth" refers to: grasping those general principles, laws,

48. *New Treatise*, vernacular edition, *Xiong Shili quanji*, vol. 3, p. 20.

49. Xiong, *Fojia mingxiang tongshi* 佛家名相通釋 (Complete Explanation of Buddhist Terms) (Taipei: Mingwen shuju, 1994 [1937]), pp. 45–46.

50. *New Treatise*, p. 142.

and so forth that, in the course of investigating things, have suitable applications for us. In the present context, however, “truth” has a particular meaning; this is because it is a word that implicitly refers to Reality. If one can seek within for “the wisdom that is self-nature” and hold fast to it, Here “the wisdom that is self-nature” has the same meaning as “self-nature is awareness,” as spoken of in the chapter “Explanation of the Thesis.” then purity (貞明) will shine everywhere, involving no deliberation. Even if one were once again to follow conventional distinctions, the boundaries would not exist. This is called “when there is the mysterious merging (玄同) with the nature, the myriad things are all in their proper order.” This is the realm of true wisdom, far removed from petty discernment.

Direct awareness of self-nature, being awoken to Reality, is wisdom (智).

According to Yogācāra soteriology, it is by transforming the consciousnesses⁵¹ into “direct cognitions” that the eight consciousnesses cease and one attains non-conceptual wisdom (智). When all the seeds in the eighth consciousness are transformed into pure, undefiled seeds, one attains “perfect mirror wisdom” (大圓鏡智; *mahādarśa-jñāna*) enabling direct, unmediated cognition of things just as they are. Xiong similarly describes wisdom as direct, unmediated cognition of one’s inherent nature that is at the same time Fundamental Reality.⁵² Discernment, by contrast, serves only to provide knowledge of the phenomenal world, on the basis of discriminative constructions. Personal experience of Reality entails returning to one’s inherent mind, which is also one’s self-nature.

The passage cited above, however, also has clear resonances with “One Mind, two aspects” (一心二門), a key concept in the most influential text of East Asian Buddhism: *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith* (*Dasheng qixin lun* 大乘起信論).⁵³ Starting from the premise that the One Mind is the ultimate

51. The five sensory consciousnesses are the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile. The sixth or *mano-vijñāna* (mental consciousness) is the thinking consciousness. It also brings together and differentiates the sensory impressions derived from the five sensory consciousnesses. That is, it can think about what the other five consciousnesses perceive; the five consciousnesses do not have this reflective capacity. The seventh or self-centered consciousness (*manas*) is the source of self-attachment, and the eighth, or storehouse consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*), retains the impressions of past experiences and “perfumes” new experiences on the basis of that previous conditioning.

52. He does, however, reject the mirror analogy, as he explains in chapter 2.

53. *Dasheng qixin lun* is an apocryphal text written in China (late sixth century) but purports to be the work of a well-known second-century Indian scholar-monk named Aśvaghoṣa. Traditionally, it was further claimed to have been translated by Paramārtha

source of all phenomena, the scripture proposes that this One Mind has two aspects or “gateways.” The first aspect is characterized by an original, pristine, pure Buddha-nature intrinsic in all things (*tathāgatagarbha*), the all-pervading, undifferentiated absolute reality (*dharmakāya*; “truth body”; “true body of reality”). The second aspect is characterized as being subject to birth and death. Although this aspect of the One Mind is identified with the eighth or store consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*),⁵⁴ it is grounded in *tathāgatagarbha*. Only ignorance prevents us from realizing the fundamental unity of the two aspects of the One Mind.

Intriguingly, the mind also plays a similar nodal role in Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi’s moral psychology, where it has an inner and an outer directionality. It is both the locus of the nature and that in which the emotional responses are rooted: “The mind refers to the combination of the nature and emotional responses. That which is referred to as combining the nature and emotional responses contains the nature and emotional responses. . . . The mind refers to the combination of *ti* and *yong*.”⁵⁵ “Precisely because the mind is the locus of the nature, it is also the locus of the patterns (理) that constitute the nature. People have but one mind, and all the patterns in the world are assembled therein.”⁵⁶ In citing these passages, my intention is not to suggest the influence of Zhu Xi on Xiong (although that

(499–569). Although modern scholarship has shown that in language, style, vocabulary, and underlying models it has more in common with writers and translators *other than* Paramārtha, traditionally it was accepted as his text or as having been written by a member of his school. *Dasheng qixin lun* quickly struck a chord among East Asian Buddhists who assigned it a central role in their thinking. Today it remains one of the foundational texts in Korea and still strongly influences the thinking of East Asian Buddhists. *Dasheng qixin lun* proposed a version of Yogācāra blended with *tathāgatagarbha* (matrix of the buddhas; *rulaizang* 如來藏) thought that its interpreters took to mean a grounding of all reality in “one mind” that is originally enlightened. The *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine is the idea that the potentiality for buddhahood exists in all sentient beings but is hidden or obscured because of ignorance. In China it became closely associated with the doctrine of “Buddha-nature.”

54. This is the consciousness that retains the impressions of past experiences and “perfumes” new experiences on the basis of that previous conditioning.

55. *Zhuzi yulei* 朱子語類 (Topically Arranged Conversations of Master Zhu), compiled by Li Jingde 李靖德 (fl. 1263) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), 2:475. Cf. 1:91: “The mind contains within itself the nature and the emotional responses. The nature is *ti* and the emotional responses are *yong*.”

56. *Zhuzi yulei*, 2:446.

influence is clearly there, as is the influence of a wide range of Song-Ming Neo-Confucian thinkers).⁵⁷ Rather, I intend to highlight the profound influence exerted on traditional Chinese thought not simply by the *ti-yong* polarity⁵⁸ but more specifically by the “One Mind, two aspects” paradigm. Xiong was very much an heir to that tradition.

The question of whether the mind is quiescent or moving occupied Xiong for much of his life and became a key issue of contention in the series of exchanges with Buddhist scholar and erstwhile fellow student Lü Cheng 呂澂 (1896–1989) in 1943.⁵⁹ Throughout most of the 1920s Xiong had upheld the view that the ontological character of the mind was transformation alone. Under the influence of friend and mentor Ma Yifu 馬一浮 (1883–1967), however, beginning in 1929, Xiong had adopted the view that the mind was characterized simultaneously by transformation (change, activity, movement) and constancy (quiescence; being undisturbed). In this opening chapter of *New Treatise*, Xiong expresses this view as follows: “This mind does indeed flow incessantly, yet it is also profoundly tranquil and undisturbed. In regard to its incessant flow, it is nominally termed ‘moving.’ In regard to its undisturbed, profound tranquility, it is nominally termed ‘at rest.’” He continued to uphold this view until the mid-1950s, when he finally reverted to the view he had originally maintained in the 1920s.⁶⁰ It is a view that runs throughout *New Treatise*.

57. As will become evident, Xiong would have no problem identifying with Neo-Confucian Wang Yangming’s 王陽明 (1472–1529) thesis that “mind is not different from principle” (心即理), just as Xiong equally espoused the doctrine that “the nature is not different from principle” (性即理), associated with Neo-Confucians Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107) and Zhu Xi.

58. *Ti* and *yong* are conventionally translated as substance and function, but “substance” is incompatible with the process ontologies of Chinese philosophy more generally. For Xiong, this was a key conceptual pair, as we will see.

59. See Chen-kuo Lin, “The Uncompromising Quest for Genuine Buddhism: Lü Cheng’s Critique of Original Enlightenment,” in Makeham, *Transforming Consciousness*. The question of whether the mind is active or quiescent has a long history in Sinitic Buddhism and became a central point of contention, and later accommodation, between *faxing* and *faxiang* traditions in the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries.

60. See Li Qingliang 李清良, “Lun Ma Yifu dui Xiong Shili *Xin weishi lun* zhi yingxiang lun 馬一浮對熊十力《新唯識論》之影響” (The Influence of Ma Yifu on Xiong Shili’s *Xin weishi lun*). *Taiwan Dong-Ya wenming yanjiu xuekan* 7, no. 1 (2010): 201–232.

2.2 WEISHI (唯識)

The two main sections that make up this chapter address two respective goals: to refute attachment to external objects and to refute attachment to consciousness. This division parallels yet differs from that in the opening sections of *Cheng weishi lun*, where it is self (*ātman*) and dharmas (both mental⁶¹ and “external world” objects⁶²) that are refuted. Xiong’s critical analysis focuses almost entirely on the distinction between material dharmas (external objects) and mental dharmas (consciousness—or more specifically, the eight consciousnesses—or the mind and mental associates). From the very opening paragraph he makes it plain that he is critical of what he identifies as a failing in *Cheng weishi lun*: to have successfully refuted attachment to external objects but at the price of having fallen into the trap of presenting consciousness as a real entity, a cognitive object. In doing so, Xiong also introduces the distinction between true mind and deluded consciousness. Again, this invites parallels with the two aspects of mind distinguished in the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith*.

The first of the chapter’s two major sections sets out a series of arguments used by Yogācāra masters to refute attachment to cognitive objects. Here “cognitive objects” refers to material phenomena, objects in the “external” world. Xiong identifies two broad categories of views or “presumptions” (計) used variously by early non-Buddhist and Hīnayāna thinkers to argue for the existence of external objects: those based on utility—the habits formed as a result of the use of things in everyday living—and those based on various Indian theories about atoms.

The so-called presumption based on utility supports a belief both in the existence of discrete objects as well as in a life-world separate from our consciousness. The following theses are each briefly introduced: gross material objects exist independent of consciousness; the existence of gross material objects is proven by their integrated characteristics; the whiteness and solidity of a pot are external characteristics; solidity, whiteness, and other char-

61. For example, when the seventh consciousness takes up a mental image of the eighth consciousness or the inner cognitive objects that the sixth consciousness takes as cognitive objects. On the latter, see the account in chapter 7.

62. That is, the cognitive objects taken up by the first five consciousnesses as well as by the sixth consciousness.

acteristics have external causes; experience confirms that solidity, whiteness, and other characteristics have external causes; the evidence provided by memory confirms that visual and other consciousnesses have previously sensed external cognitive objects; and the illusory nature of cognitive objects experienced in dreams is confirmed when one is awake, therefore the experience of cognitive objects when awake should be trusted and so external objects exist. Having attributed these views to Hīnayāna and non-Buddhist thinkers, they are then refuted in a dialectical fashion, one after the other.

The so-called atomic presumption refers to non-Mahāyāna theories about atoms. These atomic theories are of two broad kinds—those premised on the belief that individual atoms serve as cognitive objects and those premised on the belief that clusters of atoms serve as cognitive objects. In response to each of the atomic theories—attributed variously to the ancient Sarvāstivādins,⁶³ the Sautrāntikas,⁶⁴ and the later Sarvāstivādins⁶⁵—Xiong sets out “the Mahāyāna school’s” responses, drawing largely on Yogācāra accounts of the workings of cognition.

The ancient Sarvāstivādins represent the theory that there really are numerous atoms, each of which is distinguished to be a real cognitive object, and thus the cognitive objects of visual consciousness, for example, are individual atoms. Pots and so on, by contrast, are constituted through the clustering of many atoms and so have no “reality” (實體 [*dravya*]). The Yogācāra

63. The Sarvāstivādins were an early Indian Buddhist school of realist philosophy that emerged in the second or first century B.C. and is associated with the view that “everything exists.” See Collette Cox, *Disputed Dharmas, Early Buddhist Theories of Existence: An Annotated Translation from Saṅghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra*, Studia Philologica Buddhica Monograph Series XI (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1995), p. 24.

64. Sautrāntikas means “those who rely upon the sutras” rather than other scriptural or scholastic sources. They espoused a doctrine of extreme momentariness. According to Collette Cox, because there is no evidence of a separate Sautrāntika monastic disciplinary code, “they would appear to represent a particular doctrinal perspective, most likely the same doctrinal party within the Sarvāstivāda school.” See her entry, “Mainstream Buddhist Schools,” in Robert E. Buswell, Jr. (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Buddhism* (New York: Thomson Gale, 2004), vol. 2, pp. 501–506.

65. Possibly the term refers to the Vibhāṣā sub-branch of the Sarvāstivādins, in particular to the views expressed in *Abhidharma-nyāyānusāra śāstra* (阿毘達磨順正理論; Abhidharma According with Reason Treatise), attributed to the fifth-century scholar-monk Saṅghabhadra.

refutation is that when consciousness gives rise to cognition on the basis of the mental appropriation of a cognitive object (所緣 [*ālambana*]), the image of the cognitive object that has been mentally appropriated must necessarily appear in consciousness. Thus, given that there are no images of atoms in the visual or other consciousnesses, atoms are thus not the cognitive objects from which the sensory consciousnesses—the first five consciousnesses—derive mental impressions.

In turn, the Sautrāntikas represent the theory that there are actually numerous atoms that aggregate (和合 [*samūha*]) to constitute cognitive objects. Individual real atoms are not the cognitive objects of the visual and other consciousnesses, because there are no atoms in the visual and other consciousnesses. “If, however, many atoms aggregate to constitute jars and other gross cognitive objects, even though the entity is only nominal, because the images of these cognitive objects are in the visual and other consciousnesses, they are cognitive objects of the visual and other consciousnesses.” The Yogācāran refutation is that all “conditions enabling the mental appropriation of cognitive objects” (所緣緣 [*ālambana-pratyaya*]) must have “real existence” if they are able to function as causal conditions leading consciousness forth, but clusters of atoms do not have real existence.

Finally, the later Sarvāstivādins represent the theory that collections of numerous atoms, in close proximity to one another and supporting one another, contributes to a large image that in turn constitutes a cognitive object from which mental impressions are derived. For example, numerous blue atoms pool their blue quality to form a visible blue patch. The Yogācāran refutation is that atoms gathered in close proximity to support one another do not lead to the sensory consciousnesses’ mentally appropriating mutually supporting atoms. This is because any such mental appropriation would appear as images of atoms, but we never have the appearance of images of atoms in our cognition.

The remaining parts of this chapter introduce Xiong’s views on change (易), his thesis that consciousness and cognitive objects form an indivisible unity, his revisionist interpretation of the concept of *weishi* 唯識, and his conviction that Indian Mahāyāna masters and Chinese sages or wise men share common insights into Reality. Collectively, these topics function as a transition between his use of Yogācāra theories to critique the view that there are real external objects, to his critique of *Cheng weishi lun* for effec-

tively treating consciousness as having real existence (despite Xuanzang's claims to the contrary)⁶⁶ and thus being philosophically just as flawed as the theories proposed to support the thesis that external objects are real, a thesis that the Yogācāra masters had themselves thoroughly criticized.

Reiterating his criticisms of those who maintain that objects are separate from consciousness and exist independent of consciousness, he insists that consciousness and the appearance of cognitive objects constitute a single, indivisible whole that cannot be neatly separated into two pieces. "Accordingly, the term *weishi* 唯識 [serves] to refute only [the presumption of the independent existence of] external objects and does not mean that objects do not exist. Because cognitive objects and consciousness are the same whole and are not separated, hence it is said to be '*weishi*.' *Wei* 唯 means 'unique' (殊特); it does not mean 'only/solely.'" This is a radical reinterpretation of the term 唯 (*mātra*) as it occurs in such Sanskrit terms as *vijñapti-mātra* (唯識: cognition only; nothing but cognition) or *citta-mātra* (唯心: mind only; nothing but mind). There is no question that in Sanskrit it means "only," "nothing but," and not "unique."

Xiong further relates that the meaning of "cognitive objects are not separate from consciousness" was created and elucidated by the Mahāyāna school in India long ago. In China also, former wise men silently intuited its meaning; it is just that they were unwilling to develop this understanding in the form of treatises and discourses. He cites a range of Chinese texts and thinkers to support this claim: *Doctrine of the Mean*, Mencius, Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1084), Lu Jiuyuan (Xiangshan) 陸九淵 (象山) (1139–1193), Yang Cihu 楊慈湖 (1140–1225), and Wang Yangming. He concludes: "what Chinese and Indian wise men have realized is identical." To this he adds

66. *Cheng weishi lun* specifically objects to the hypostatization of consciousness: "To oppose false attachment to the view that external to the mind and mental associates there are real existent cognitive objects, we say that nothing but consciousness exists. If you are attached to 'nothing but consciousness' as something truly existent, that is no different from being attached to external cognitive objects—that is, just another dharma-attachment." Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association (CBETA) edition of the *Taishō Tripiṭaka* (Taishō Revised Tripiṭaka), T31n1585_p0006c25–26. (All references to the Chinese Buddhist Canon are to the CBETA edition unless otherwise noted.) Xiong, however, directs his criticisms at *Cheng weishi lun* for treating the eight consciousnesses as discrete entities and also for hypostatizing the doctrine of dependent arising (緣起) into a doctrine of seeds.

the significant qualification: "Most of the Mahāyāna teachers, however, became narrowly concerned with phenomenal characteristics and their names (名相). Examples such as *Weishi ershi lun* 唯識二十論 [*Vimśatikā-vṛtti*] and other treatises established [the principle] of *weishi* so as to refute [the existence] of external objects. In doing so they all used formal logic, and although reasoned arguments are repeatedly in evidence, these treatises suffer from an excess of empty theorizing that borders on sophistry. Nearly all Mahāyāna treatises suffer from this problem."

The second of this chapter's two main sections is devoted to refuting attachment to consciousness (here referring to the eight consciousnesses). Xiong freely acknowledges that former Mahāyāna masters (= Dharmapāla /Xuanzang)⁶⁷ had clearly maintained that attachment to the belief that consciousness is real is just as mistaken as the attachment to cognitive objects and had "therefore nominally talked about [consciousness's] being generated by dependent arising (緣生) so as to show that the characteristics of consciousness are illusory and unreal." Despite this, Xiong further maintains that Yogācāra philosophy (as principally represented by *Cheng weishi lun*) hypostatized the doctrine of dependent arising into a doctrine of seeds, which, as Shu-hsien Liu (Liu Shuxian) points out, suggests a structural realism.⁶⁸ It also entails various forms of ontological dualism (seeds and consciousness [or so-called manifest activity]; seeds and mind/*tathatā* [Suchness]; pure and impure seeds) and even ontological pluralism, with seeds posited as the ontological basis of all things. All of these perspectives were antithetical to Xiong's own ontological monism, which he develops in his theories of *ti* and *yong* and contraction (翕) and expansion (闢).

For Xiong, consciousness has no self-nature (自性 [*svabhāva*]); it is generated by dependent arising. The images in consciousness are merely the deceptive manifestation of a multitude of mutually dependent causal conditions. Xiong equates "multitude of conditions" (眾緣) with "causes as condition" (因緣), the first of the Four Conditions (四緣). He develops his critique of the Yogācāra doctrine of seeds in the context of articulat-

67. Because Xuanzang's *Cheng weishi lun* purportedly draws heavily on this commentary and privileges many of its interpretations, in Xiong's hands, "Dharmapāla" effectively functions as a metonym for views expressed in *Cheng weishi lun*.

68. Shu-hsien Liu, "Hsiung Shih-li's Theory of Causation," *Philosophy East and West* 19, no. 4 (1969): 403.

ing his own revisionist account of the Four Conditions: causes as condition, continuous sequence of sameness condition (等無間緣), conditions enabling the mental appropriation of cognitive objects (*ālambana* condition) (所緣緣), and contributory factors as condition (增上緣). The Four Conditions are crucial to Yogācāra accounts of causality—in particular, in explaining the causal relationship between seeds, consciousness, and cognitive objects.

According to Xiong, a key defining characteristic of the standard view of causes as condition is that causes directly accomplish their own effects. Thus the seeds of visual consciousness, functioning as cause, directly bring about their own visual consciousness effects. Much of Xiong's analysis and discussion is devoted to critiquing the Yogācāra view—or at least the Dharmapāla/Xuanzang view that seeds (種子) are causes—in particular the idea that seeds are the cause of consciousness. “They presumed that the arising of mind-consciousness (心識) had an origin. Hence they established seeds as causes, and mind-consciousness was posited as the effect that seeds themselves had brought to completion.” For Xuanzang, seeds are a “potentiality that immediately engenders an actual dharma.” Real seeds, as distinct from nominal seeds, can function as causal conditions. This view contrasts with the view upheld in the Abhidharma (ancient scholastic Buddhism) literature, according to which seeds are not real existents with causal power (*dravya*) but simply metaphors. Thus Xiong remarks: “Conventionally it is presumed that rice and other things all issue from seeds. Now this is also presumed about mental dharmas (心法). Is this not a great mistake?” His point is that rather than treating seeds as a nominal/provisional (*prajñapti*) device, an expedient means to refer to something that lacks inherent existence, these Yogācāra teachers had effectively substantialized seeds by attributing causal power to them. For Xiong, consciousness or mind-consciousness is not a product of seeds. It arises as an incessant flow of ever-renewing thought-moments; ever-renewing yet self-generating.

Xiong also criticizes the view (espoused by Dharmapāla/Xuanzang) that “seeds are simultaneous [with their effects],” that cause and effect are simultaneous: just as manifest activity (the seven consciousnesses) perfumes seeds in the eighth consciousness, these newly perfumed seeds simultaneously generate a new seed of similar kind, engendering new manifest activity. “Thus understood, they classified mind and seeds as the two dharmas

of subject and object, just like mother and child are two bodies. Are their fallacies not great indeed!" He further faults "former masters" for analyzing mind-consciousness into eight discrete constitutive entities, comparing it to the analysis of material objects into molecules and thus mistakenly comparing mind to matter.

The "consistent and continuous condition" concerns the relation between successive manifest activities—successive moments of mind-consciousness—and does not rely directly on seeds to be established. Also, unlike seeds that must be simultaneous with their effects, the immediately preceding condition—a thought-moment of consciousness—is contiguous with, yet sequentially prior to, the following thought-moment of consciousness. This condition provides theoretical support for the key Buddhist concept of impermanence: all dharmas extinguish as soon as they are produced.

Xiong presents the "continuous sequence of sameness condition" to be when an immediately preceding instant of consciousness "vacates" and simultaneously "induces" the following moment of consciousness; as the one is extinguished, the other is generated. Again he is critical of the "former Yogācāra masters" on several grounds. Whereas they treated each of the eight consciousnesses as discrete constitutive entities, Xiong champions a single, holistic notion of consciousness. Thus, although the seeing of colors and the hearing of sounds differ, this is a function not of different consciousnesses but rather of the different defining activities (行相)—the definitive activity that something engages in, by which it can be defined—present in one and the same overarching consciousness. "This is not like in the old accounts, according to which the visual and the rest of the eight consciousnesses are each independent entities." Xiong further explains that because innumerable defining activities can all be accommodated and arise in consciousness, this is termed "continuous." "This is a completely different sense of *wu jian* (無間) from that [proposed] by the former [masters]."

An *ālambana* (所緣) is the mental appropriation of a cognitive (or sense) object (*viśaya*; 境; 境界). Once taken up it forms a mental image (*ākāra*; 相) in the mind that resembles (*sādrśya*; 似) the *viśaya*. The "*ālambana* condition" refers to the condition enabling the mental appropriation of cognitive objects.

Clearly based on the definition of "*ālambana* condition" given in *Cheng*

weishi lun,⁶⁹ Xiong identifies four component senses of the *ālambana* condition. (1) It is a cognitive object that has real existence and leads a particular consciousness (visual, auditory, and so forth) to arise simultaneously with it. (2) The cognizing consciousness is causally dependent on it. “Consciousness does not arise by itself since it necessarily depends upon cognitive objects. The [sensory] consciousnesses depend solely on sense objects (塵 [*viṣaya*]), whereas the sixth consciousness depends upon reflected images (影 [*prati-bimba*]). There must be that upon which they depend for it to constitute an [*ālambana*] condition.” (3) The cognitive object is closely borne by the cognizing consciousness such that this cognizing consciousness joins itself to the cognitive object to be a whole. For example, the cognizing capacity of the visual consciousness—seeing—combines with the cognitive object “white” to be inseparable. (4) It is that which is cognized by consciousness. If, to be an *ālambana*, a real dharma had only to be causally depended upon and to convey its own image, then even the reflections one sees in mirrors would qualify as doing the job of an *ālambana*, because the external thing is a real dharma (and thus is causally depended upon), and because when it functions so as to appear in the mirror, that is also taking the external thing as what it is causally dependent on and as conveying its image. Thus this fourth condition is necessary: consciousness must cognize; mirrors cannot cognize.⁷⁰

Xiong's account is generally in line with that in *Cheng weishi lun*; where he parts company is on the issue of “direct and remote” *ālambana* conditions, which he faults for being derived from the doctrine that each of the eight consciousnesses is a discrete entity. “The objects grasped by consciousness do not exist independent of consciousness, but it should be agreed that the

69. In his 1923 work, *Weishixue gailun*, Xiong defines the *ālambana* condition by citing the following line in *Cheng weishi lun*, which, based on Xiong's understanding, might be translated as follows: “The third [condition] is the *ālambana* condition. This means it is an existent dharma and it conveys an image of itself that is the cognitive concern of the mind or mental associates and is what [cognition] depends upon. Such real [dharmas] are of two kinds: direct and remote” (三所緣緣。謂若有法是帶已相心或相應所慮所託。此體有二。一親二疏)。See Xiong Shili, *Weishixue gailun*, in *Xiong Shili quanji*, vol. 1, p. 103.

70. Xiong had in fact made this argument already in his 1923 work, *Weishixue gailun*. See John Makeham, “The Significance of Xiong Shili's Interpretation of Dignāga's *Ālambana-parikṣā*,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 40:S, (2013): 205–225.

relationship of objects to consciousness is that they function as *ālambana* conditions. What need is there to draw the further distinction of direct and remote? However, because this doctrine of the former masters maintains that the eight consciousnesses are each discrete entities, direct and remote were thus distinguished.” Xiong identifies the direct condition to be linked to what he considers the conceptually mistaken notion that there are individual consciousnesses (visual, auditory, and so forth), and the equally mistaken notion that these consciousnesses can, in turn, be bifurcated into an image part and a perceiving part.⁷¹

Xiong distinguishes two meanings for the category of “contributory factors as condition.” The first is when one particular dharma relies on another particular dharma for its continuing existence, however directly or indirectly. This condition has obvious resonances with the doctrine of dependent arising (緣起; *pratītya-samutpāda*).⁷² The second is when such a condition is compatible with or antagonistic toward other dharmas. For example, in relation to withered grain, frost and snow are compatible conditions; in relation to the former green-colored grain, they are antagonistic conditions. This is the one category of conditions where Xiong does not pass any sort of criticism.

Having thus outlined his views on the Four Conditions, Xiong next asserts that mind-consciousness is merely an illusory manifestation; being a product of dependent arising, it lacks self-nature. Elsewhere he reveals his real target: “Vasubandhu and Asaṅga gradually changed the meaning of what previous Buddhists had referred to as dependent arising. It seems that they looked upon each of the many conditions as single parts and thereupon began to construct [their notion of consciousness (心)] by regarding it as the aggregation of many conditions. In this way, they changed the doctrine of dependent arising into a kind of structuralism (構造論).” For Xiong, just as atomism is logically indefensible, so too is the idea that reality is constructed out of aggregations of atomic-like seeds.

71. Xiong, *New Treatise*, p. 34: “Visual consciousness’s direct *ālambana* condition (親所緣緣) is its own transformation (所變) into ‘the image part of consciousness’ (相分). Its ‘remote *ālambana* condition’ (疏所緣緣) is the eighth consciousness’s ‘image part of consciousness’ (相分).”

72. Dependent arising is the doctrine that everything arises from conditions and has no inherent self-nature.

Next he relates that the theory of dependent arising is an “apophatic mode of explanation” (遮詮)⁷³ that provides an expedient means (方便 [upāya]) for dispelling attachment to the view that consciousness has self-nature:

Since ancient times there have been many who have written on fundamental wisdom. The most sublime exponents of the apophatic mode of explanation are certainly the Buddhists, with the Emptiness Schools (空宗) being especially skilled. Only this school commanded a fully penetrating insight into principles and so their theses encountered no obstacles. With the arrival of the Existence School (有宗),⁷⁴ only then did [Buddhists] begin to turn their back on the apophatic mode of explanation, instead advocating the manifestation of [Fundamental] Reality through function (即用顯體).

For Xiong, there is nothing in ontological Reality that can be established, so the proposition that it can be established through function is meaningless. “As a word, ‘function’ refers to the flow of Reality and describes the expression of Reality. In this expression there is no thing, and in this flow there is no abiding. Accordingly, it is not possible for there to be anything established in function.” His position can be seen to be consistent with the views expressed in the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith* in that the latter does not present the phenomenal world as ontologically distinct from the all-pervading, undifferentiated absolute reality (*dharmakāya*). Rather, it posits ignorance as hindering us from realizing that the phenomenal world lacks independent existence, self-nature, reality.

He asserts that Vasubandhu had privileged consciousness’s capacity to transform into a perceiving part and an image part, and this was termed “function” relative to “Suchness” (眞如 [tathatā]), which does not transform; that Vasubandhu posited consciousness as really existing in function; that Vasubandhu and Kuiji deemed seeds to be the Reality (體) of manifestly activated consciousness; and that function had self-nature (自體). “What Vasubandhu and the others referred to as manifestly activated consciousness and its seeds are dharmas that arise and cease, are ‘dharmas [that are generated by consciousness’s] capacity to transform,’ and are function. Suchness, however, is a dharma that does not arise and cease; a dharma that does

73. Argument developed on the basis of what may not be said of something; *via negativa*.

74. The Yogācāra school.

not transform. It is Reality. It is patently evident that they regarded Reality and function as two parts.”

2.3 TRANSFORMATION (轉變)

Here Xiong sets out his account of transformation (轉變 [*pariṇāma*]), the transformation of consciousness being a key concept in Yogācāra cognitive epistemology and soteriology. To establish his positive thesis, Xiong takes critical aim at the account of transformation presented in *Cheng weishi lun*, according to which consciousness—the mind—is bifurcated into two modes: consciousness-as-transformer (能變)—the capacity of consciousness to transform into a perceiving part and image part—and what consciousness becomes, what it transforms into (所變): the perceiving part and the image part.

Cheng weishi lun presents all experience as contained within the transformations of consciousness. Consciousness's transformations into a perceiving part (subject) and an image part (object) characterize a range of cognitive activities, including each of the eight consciousnesses. Karmic “seeds” (*bīja*) or potentials emerge from the eighth or store consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*), giving rise to the “manifest activity” of the seven consciousnesses and causing or “perfuming” future seeds. As described by Tagawa Shun'ei: “The seeds stored in the *ālaya-vijñāna* function to generate manifest activities. From this perspective, the causes are the seeds. Then, the manifest activities that were generated by the seeds immediately perfume impression-momentum seeds in the *ālaya-vijñāna*, and in this way those manifest activities are the direct causes of those seeds. Thus there are two kinds of direct causes: seeds as direct cause and manifest activity as direct cause.”⁷⁵

Xiong's own account of transformation is presented as a direct challenge to, and radical departure from, the seeds-based causal theory found in *Cheng weishi lun*. Xiong seeks to develop and defend an ontological account of transformation in which Reality (實體; 本體 [*tattva*]) is presented as nothing other than an uninterrupted holistic process of constant transformation that cannot be reduced to subject-object characteristics. Doctrin-

75. Tagawa Shun'ei, *Living Yogācāra: An Introduction to Consciousness-Only Buddhism*, trans. A. Charles Muller (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2009), p. 50.

ally, it is consistent with such basic Mahāyāna teachings of emptiness (空; *sūnyatā*) and dependent arising, and its critical edge is closely and explicitly informed by standard Madhyamaka deconstructive ploys. To this are wedded concepts taken from the *Book of Change*, adapted here to characterize the inherent processual qualities of transformation.

Xiong begins by asking two questions: What is able to transform? What is transformation? His reply to the first question is, “The universe has only ever been this constantly renewing transformation—how could it be possible for there ever to have been something into which it is transformed?” His reply to the second question is: “One contraction (翕) and one expansion (闢) is called transformation.”⁷⁶ For Xiong, contraction is the basis for nominally (假; *prajñapti*) talking about material dharmas (色法), and expansion is the basis for nominally talking about mental dharmas (心法). Material dharmas are associated with the contracting tendency of constant transformation; mental dharmas are associated with the expanding tendency of constant transformation. For Xiong, however, the claim that there are real material objects and real minds is a misguided conceptual elaboration. Material and mental dharmas are devoid of self-nature. The various dharmas extinguish at the very moment of their generation. There is only instant upon instant of separate, sudden ceaseless flow that merely seems to be continuous.

76. The *locus classicus* of *xi* 翕 and *pi* 闢 is “Appended Statements, A” (“Xici, shang” 繫辭上), *Zhou Yi* 周易 (Book of Change), 7.15a, *Shisan jing zhushu* 十三經注疏 (The Thirteen Classics with annotations and sub-commentaries) ed., compiled by Ruan Yuan 阮元 (1764–1849) (Taipei: Yiwen yinshuguan, 1985). Closer to Xiong’s own time, in the preface to his 1898 translation of T. H. Huxley’s *Evolution and Ethics* (1893), Yan Fu 嚴復 (1853–1921) had described *xi* and *pi* in similar terms. Yan was a pioneering figure at the turn of the twentieth century in translating many key Western writings in sociology, logic, and evolutionary theory. His translations had an enormous impact. See Yan Fu (trans.), *Tian yan lun* 天演論 (Evolution and Ethics) in *Yan Fu heji* 嚴復合集 (Combined Writings of Yan Fu), ed. Wang Qingcheng 王慶成 (Taipei: Caituan faren Gu Gongliang wenjiao jijinhui 財團法人辜公亮文教基金會, 1998), vol. 7, p. 186. Similarly, Liu Shipai 劉師培 (1884–1919), “Zhelixue shi xu 哲學史序” (Prolegomena to a History of Philosophy), *Guocui xuebao* 國粹學報, 3 (1905): 4a, 4b, states: “Only the great *Book of Change* and *Doctrine of the Mean* develop and illuminate the [Aristotelian] concepts of actuality (效實) and potentiality (儲能),” concepts he identifies with quiescence (翕) and activity (闢) of the *Book of Change*, and *wei fa* 未發 (not yet emerged into concrete manifestation) and *zhong jie* 中節 (emerged to be in a state of due modulation) of *Zhongyong*. He concludes: “Chinese philosophy has relied exclusively on these texts for its survival.”

Rather, the Reality of material and mental dharmas is “constant transformation” (恆轉). It should be noted that Xiong has a particular understanding of dharmas; for him they are phenomena (物; 事物)—mental and physical phenomena.⁷⁷

Drawing on the *Ornament for Great Vehicle Discourses* (大乘莊嚴經論; *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra*),⁷⁸ Xiong adduces an extended series of nine arguments (which I will not rehearse here) to support the thesis that no dharmas are able to abide even temporarily. Each argument takes the general form of Xiong's refutation of an attempt to establish the claim that dharmas can be abiding and Xiong's consistent appeal to the doctrine of sudden and continuous generation and extinction of all dharmas.

Although not explicitly stated, Xiong would appear to be imputing to Xuanzang the view that dharmas can somehow abide temporarily. As Tao Jiang argues, Xuanzang had done away with the instantaneous nature of a movement—and hence dealt with the problem of continuity (“Is it possible to account for continuity without positing some persisting entity?”)—by recognizing a structure of past, present, and future within each moment that manifests itself in the semblance of the past and the future. “In other words, a moment is itself conceived as a continuum that is a horizon containing what immediately proceeds and immediately follows instead of a discrete instant.”⁷⁹

Xiong then proceeds to develop his own account of “transformation,” characterizing it as having three meanings: (1) It does not mean “movement” (動) in the conventional sense: something proceeding from one locus to another locus. Rather, there is only instant upon instant of separate, sudden ceaseless movement that seems to be continuous. (2) It means “active” (活): “‘Active’ is a term used merely to forestall any notion of emptiness—it does not positively express some particular thing. . . . In general terms, . . . ‘active’ [means] ‘having no creator’ (作者).” He further characterizes “active”

77. In Abhidharma teachings (ancient scholastic Buddhism), dharmas are real and do not pass away; the composite things they constitute change from moment to moment, but dharmas remain. Madhyamaka theory construes dharmas as impermanent and dependently arisen. Xiong is clearly following this latter understanding.

78. Attributed to Asaṅga; one of the treatises on which the *Cheng weishi lun* is purportedly based.

79. Tao Jiang, *Contexts and Dialogue: Yogācāra Buddhism and Modern Psychology on the Subliminal Mind* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), pp. 77, 33.

as “illusory,” “real,” “perfect,” “intermeshed everywhere,” and “limitless.” (3) It means “cannot be conceptualized.” In addition to drawing comparisons with Henri Bergson’s⁸⁰ (1859–1941) understanding of movement and Zhuangzi’s “Discourse on Making All Things Equal” (齊物論), Xiong also draws variously from Madhyamaka and Huayan philosophical perspectives, again underscoring the vital presence of Mahāyāna thought in his systematic philosophy.

The concluding section of this chapter begins with a discussion of Dignāga’s three parts theory of consciousness: the image part (相分), the perceiving part (見分), and the self-verifying part (自證分). Xiong relates that when Dharmapāla discussed epistemology (量), he established four parts, but when he discussed transformation, he still employed Dignāga’s three parts. The significance of the three parts theory is that it relates to Xuanzang’s opening comments in *Cheng weishi lun* (apparently following the lead of Dharmapāla) to the effect that self and the external world are to be explained by the transformation of consciousness. According to *Cheng weishi lun*, the transformation of consciousness is the result of being bifurcated into an image part and a perceiving part: “Transformation [of consciousness] refers to consciousness itself turning to appear as two parts. This is because both parts, the image part and the perceiving part, arise due to the self-verifying part of consciousness.”⁸¹ Self and dharmas are posited on the basis of these two parts.”⁸² Drawing on the scholarship of Katsumata Shunkyō 勝又俊教, Tao Jiang points out that this was a departure from the original verse seventeen of Vasubandhu’s *Thirty Verses*, and by adopting Dharmapāla’s explanation, Xuanzang was able to interpret the verse as stating that “the transformation of consciousness is the result of its being bifurcated into the discriminating and the discriminated. Because neither of the two exists outside consciousness, there can be nothing but consciousness.”⁸³

Xiong notes that when Dharmapāla (presumably channeled by Xuanzang) discussed transformation, he broke it down into two types: seeds functioning

80. Henri Bergson was an influential French philosopher noted for his process philosophy and views on such concepts as duration, intuition, and vital impulse (*élan vital*).

81. This self-verifying or self-corroborating part is seen to be theoretically required because every moment of consciousness needs to be aware of itself if memory is to be possible; otherwise, there would be just an array of unconnected moments.

82. Xuanzang, *Cheng weishi lun*, T31n1585_p0001b01–02.

83. Tao Jiang, *Contexts and Dialogue*, p. 52.

as causes capable of bringing about transformation (因能變) in consciousness, and manifestly activated consciousness itself (現體)—the self-verifying aspect of all minds and mental associates (心所; *caitta*)⁸⁴—functioning as transforming effects (果能變). Xiong explains that “manifestly activated consciousness itself” is a general reference to the self-verifying aspects of all minds and mental associates. Because each and every self-verifying part is, in turn, able to transform and be manifest as a perceiving part and an image part, these parts are referred to as “transforming effects.”

The perceiving part and the image part represent what consciousness becomes, what it transforms into (所變).⁸⁵ The reason the perceiving part and the image part together represent what consciousness transforms into is that both are needed for perception to occur. Consciousness-as-transformer (能變)—the capacity of consciousness to transform into a perceiving part and image part—provides the raw material one re-presents to oneself as what consciousness transforms into. Central to Xiong's objections is this bifurcation of consciousness: “In regard to transforming effects, he held that seeds as transformer are manifest as that which is transformed. In sum, subject (能) and object (所) are each made separate. This is just like taking something that is already whole and then breaking it into fragments. How could this possibly explain what transformation is?”

2.4 PRODUCTIVE POWER (功能)

Xiong's stated aim in this chapter is to set out three main differences between his understanding of productive power [*śakti*] and that of Dharmapāla.

84. *Caitta* means “belonging to thought.” These “mental associates” are analyzed at length in the last chapter of the *New Treatise*.

85. Lambert Schmithausen, *On the Problem of the External World in the Cheng weishi lun* (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2005), p. 13, notes that in Vasubandhu's works the term *bian* 變 “is used as an action noun describing a process taking place in the continuum (*saṃtāna*, *saṃtati*) of a person or in the consciousness continuum or its latent stratum. . . . In [*Cheng weishi lun*], however, it refers to a *detemporalized* ‘transformation’ or ‘development,’ from the outset, into an image (相) of an object cognized (or into a duality of image 相 and vision 見 . . .). This image (or duality of image and vision) is called 識所變 (‘what *viñāna* [consciousness] has changed, or developed, into,’ which is equivalent to a passive expression of ‘developed by *viñāna*’) or, by way of ellipsis of 識, simply 所變.”

The first of these differences concerns the concept of “productive power.” Whereas for Dharmapāla productive power is synonymous with seeds, for Xiong productive power is a further characterization of Reality (albeit like all verbal characterizations it is employed nominally, as a skillful/expedient means). Xiong continues his criticism of Dharmapāla for assuming that the basis of the phenomenal world—“the realm of manifest activity” (現行界), the world created by consciousness—is constituted by hidden productive powers called causes as conditions or seeds. Adopting a Prajñāpāramitā-like perspective, on which he elaborates more fully in the conclusion to this chapter, Xiong affirms his commitment to the view that the phenomenal world is inherently empty, having no self-nature, and that only by understanding this can Fundamental Reality be truly realized: “the characteristics of the phenomenal world have always been devoid of self-nature, and so one should not engage in conceptualizing the phenomenal world. Rather, what is manifest before one is nothing other than the presentation of Reality (真體).” Again, it may be noted that Xiong’s position is consistent with the notion of Suchness privileged in the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith*: a meta-physical locus upon which everything is ontologically grounded.

The second of the main differences identified by Xiong between his understanding of productive power (功能) and that of Dharmapāla is that for Xiong, productive power is the totality of all things, whereas for Dharmapāla it is individuated: “Taking productive power to be the causal condition for the phenomenal world Dharmapāla divided the phenomenal world into numerous discrete entities.” Xiong is further critical of Dharmapāla for adopting seeds as a metaphor of productive power, as this reinforced the impression that seeds were real entities, and for adopting a view of seeds that aligned Dharmapāla with the views of the proponents both of atoms and of the *ātman*, as well as proponents of a mechanistic theory of the universe.

The third main difference, according to Xiong, is Dharmapāla’s conflation of habituated tendencies with productive power by treating habituated tendencies as seeds. Habituated tendencies are the karmic residue of past actions: “It is like when burnt incense has extinguished and there still remains a lingering smell.” As Xiong explains, there are said to be two types of seeds: those which have always existed and are already stored in the *ālaya* consciousness when a sentient being is born and which give rise to the “manifest activity” of the seven consciousnesses, and seeds which begin to arise: “this is

due to the [first] seven consciousnesses' perpetual perfuming of habituated tendencies (習氣)," thus causing future seeds. Dharmapāla's "fundamental error" lay in "his conflation of habituated tendencies with productive power, thus leading him to say that in addition to productive power that has existed without a beginning, there is productive power that begins to arise."

Xiong instead proposes using the concepts of heaven (天) and humans (人)—in particular their association with what is ontological/ultimate and phenomenal/conventional—to understand the relationship between productive power and form-and-vital-stuff. "Productive power is a heavenly matter; habituated tendencies are a human capacity. To mix up the human with the heavenly is to be obscured by form-and-vital-stuff and be ignorant of the original condition of human life." Xiong's "concept matching" does not stop there—he further suggests that the relationship can be understood in terms of *li* 理 and *qi* 氣: "As for productive power, it is that by which form-and-vital-stuff is constituted and is the controller of form-and-vital-stuff. Thus its wondrousness (靈妙) can be described as god-like, and the norms it provides as it issues forth are also called principles (理)."

The vexed issue of the relationship between *li* and *qi* was central to Neo-Confucian metaphysics, due in large part to an obfuscation between the goal of giving *li* a logical priority over *qi* (so that there would be a "pattern/norm" for a given thing to conform to and hence exist) and the actual ontological and temporal privileging of *li* over *qi*. Although Xiong avoids the trap of granting Suchness/Reality/productive power a temporal precedence over the phenomenal world, the question of any ontological privileging of the former over the latter is more complex, as we will see. Later in this chapter he identifies *li* with the nature (性): "principle's enabling the psycho-physical to coalesce is called the nature, Here the word "principle" implicitly refers to Fundamental Reality. and so one cannot talk of the nature independent of the psycho-physical. . . . The moral nature and the psycho-physical nature do not exist as two. . . . The nature includes vital stuff within it such that it is all pervasive; they cannot be separated into two."

Xiong then sets out three main differences between productive power and habituated tendencies, the first of which is that whereas productive power is dynamic, habituated tendencies are of fixed form. Significantly, productive power is also equivalent to "the nature" (性). The second difference is that whereas productive power is pure and undefiled, there are both pure

and defiled habituated tendencies, and because Dharmapāla had used the notion of “productive power” (seeds) to refer to both, Xiong argues that this committed Dharmapāla to the view that evil is grounded in human nature. Variations of this charge date to the Tang dynasty, when one of the main criticisms of Yogācāra was that a person’s potential for awakening was said to be determined by the good seeds already in one’s consciousness stream. This meant that one particular class of humans, the *icchantika*, deemed to lack any pure seeds whatsoever, was inherently incapable of enlightenment. This did not sit well with the traditional Mencian view of human nature and the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine, also known as the doctrine of buddha-nature (*foxing* 佛性), which had become popular in China from the sixth century, and according to which everyone has the potential for enlightenment.

The third difference between productive power and habituated tendencies is that whereas productive power is continuous, habituated tendencies can be severed. Xiong uses this distinction to develop a much broader discussion of eternalism (常見) and nihilism (斷見), which, in this chapter’s conclusion, provides a basis for his understanding of the doctrine of the Two Truths and how this doctrine relates to his main philosophical goal: to elucidate Fundamental Reality.

Eternalism usually refers to the view that the self exists in life and persists after death, and nihilism to the view that sentient beings cease when they die. In turn, the Middle Path—based on the doctrine of dependent arising—avoids these extreme views by claiming there is no independently existing entity with self-nature to exist eternally or to be annihilated in the first place. Xiong, however, uses the concepts of externalism and nihilism to highlight his own understanding of the relationship between Fundamental Reality (productive power, Original Nature, and so forth) and the form-and-vital-stuff (the body; the physical forms of the myriad things), echoing his previous discussion of *li* and *qi*. “Regarding the myriad forms, they are certainly each different; regarding the nature, it is the Reality of the myriad things, operating everywhere. . . . By virtue of the nature’s coalescing as bodily form and thereby controlling and being active within bodily form, bodily form is actually constantly being born anew, never ceasing for a moment.” Thus, on the one hand, nihilism is challenged by appealing to the nature/Reality—which is never ceasing—and eternalism is challenged by appealing to bodily form, which, by virtue of constantly being born anew, is not eternal.

What, then, of the phenomenal world? Although the phenomenal appearances of arising and ceasing, change and movement, never stop for a moment, they are not real and do not abide even momentarily. They are what they are because of what we mistakenly impute to them through deluded attachment. What Xiong is at pains to draw our attention to is that there is no dharma of change to be apprehended in the first place:

Those who conventionally talk about change probably maintain that when things encounter differing conditions, they undergo certain transformations, and this is called change. Because they do not understand the import of never abiding for an instant, they actually regard change as an actual object undergoing transformation. This is not the case. As for what are conventionally presumed to be real objects, careful examination reveals that there never were things; there were only illusory images, renewed instant by instant and none abiding even temporarily. This is called change. Hence what is conventionally presumed to be a changing world of things and events is in fact unobtainable.

This, in turn, provides the key to interpreting a series of paradoxes and seeming contradictions: arising is non-arising because arising does not exist; ceasing is non-ceasing because ceasing does not rest;⁸⁶ change is non-changing because change is always constant; and movement is non-moving because movement does not shift. “Non-arising,” “non-ceasing,” “non-changing,” and “non-moving” are all references to inherent nature, to Fundamental Reality. Arising, ceasing, change, and movement are references to phenomenal appearances. That which ontologically underpins non-existent phenomenal arising is this non-individuated inherent nature that itself is non-arising. That which ontologically underpins phenomenal ceasing is this non-individuated inherent nature that itself is non-ceasing. That which ontologically underpins phenomenal change is this non-individuated inherent nature that itself is non-changing. And that which ontologically underpins phenomenal movement is this non-individuated inherent nature that itself is non-moving.

“From talking about arising without yet understanding that arising is non-arising, right through to talking about moving without yet understanding that moving is non-moving—this is to be attached to things. From talk-

86. Ceasing does not cease because there is nothing to cease since nothing arose in the first place.

ing about non-arising without yet understanding the arising of non-arising, right through to talking about moving without yet understanding the moving of non-moving—this is to be mired in emptiness.” Being attached to things is caused by a failure to understand that phenomenal appearances have no self-nature, by looking no further than conventional truth. “It is due to following conventional truth that the mundane world is accepted as proven. Earth is nothing but earth, water is nothing but water, right through to the myriad existents—all are differentiated and understood on the basis of specific and general attributes and do not run counter to the mundane world’s [conventional truth]. Because absolute truth is experienced, however, there is a categorical refutation of conventional knowing. Hence, earth is not thought of as earth, because earth’s nature is empty. What is manifest before one is Reality (真體), perfectly clear.” Despite this, Xiong still insists that phenomenal appearances—the world established by conventional truth—are, in fact, nothing other than Suchness (真 [*tathatā*]). “Reality cannot be sought independent of phenomena. The Ruler (真宰) is to be discerned among the flow [of phenomena].”

Here Xiong might seem to affirm the Madhyamaka thesis that absolute and conventional truth are ultimately identical. However, whereas a thoroughgoing Madhyamaka perspective would insist that emptiness is itself empty—that is, that emptiness is also conditional because it depends on a network of conditions and has no self-nature—Xiong effectively posits Fundamental Reality/Suchness/inherent nature/the Absolute as the locus in which phenomenal/conventional reality is ontologically grounded.

2.5 DEMONSTRATION OF MATERIAL [DHARMAS], A (成色上)

This very short chapter returns to the topic of material dharmas—physical phenomena—and aims to provide an explanation for conventional accounts about the material world. At the heart of conventional accounts, we are told, is the view that physical phenomena offer physical resistance. Contrary to the conventional view, because of the nature of constant transformation, phenomena in fact offer no resistance. Resistance is nothing other than the illusory semblance of movement: matter moving through space. As the process of transformation coheres (攝聚), there is apparent contraction: “Contraction (翕) is the illusory construction of countless moving points.” As

stated in chapter 3: “Constantly coalescing, and so without any prearranged agreement, countless points of movement are illusorily constituted, the tendency of which seems to be toward solidifying—this is called ‘contraction.’” These moving points—analogueous to atoms—appear to have material form but do not.

The formation of these illusory moving points is attributed to differences of *yin* and *yang* (although he does not explain just what the ontological status of *yin* and *yang* is). In turn, as (illusory) moving points attract and repel one another, they variously combine to form different systems. The mutual attraction between two or more systems gives rise to the illusion of physical objects such as desks and human bodies. “The characteristics of things are but movement, and just as things are tending to contraction, they appear to offer resistance, yet actually offer no resistance. Hence it is said that the Reality of material forms is constant transformation.”

The chapter concludes with a note on two Indian views on how the world came about. The Sāṃkhya⁸⁷ transformation thesis is faulted for positing a notion of an external god, and the Vaiśeṣika theory of atomic clustering (集聚) is criticized for its materialist, mechanical view of the universe.

2.6 DEMONSTRATION OF MATERIAL [DHARMAS], B (成色下)

This short chapter is also devoted to the topic of physical phenomena, including the body. Xiong's regular refrain throughout this chapter is that despite the appearance of a world constituted of separate, individual phenomena, in fact all things are interconnected and interpenetrating, forming a whole. The first part of the chapter addresses physical phenomena generally. Contrary to the conventional view, phenomena in the natural world do not abide or endure through time. This is because both phenomenal entities and time lack self-nature and so are not real. The natural world is nothing but countless moving points, illusorily manifested as semblances of coalesced matter. These moving points cease as soon as they arise. Xiong explains that the idea there is a brief interval between each instant of arising and instant ceasing is mistaken because the term “instant” does not refer to

87. A non-Buddhist Indian school that was active in debates with Yogācāras up to the seventh century.

time in the conventional sense but rather is nominally posited. Similarly, the terms “preceding” and “following” used in reference to this process are also posited only nominally. “To speak of the ceasing of a preceding instant serves to highlight that it is not eternal. To speak of the arising of the following instant serves to refute attachment to nihilism.”

The second part of the chapter first focuses on the body as interpenetrating the whole that is the natural world and vice versa, before Xiong moves to declare that the body and physical things have always been devoid of reality. Rather, both the body and the natural world are epiphenomena of “constant transformation,” illusorily generated through contraction (翕). The chapter concludes with some brief comments on the central nervous system.

2.7 EXPLAINING THE MIND, A (明心上)

This is the first of two long chapters. The content of this first chapter is an extended, concatenated description of the concept and characteristics of mind. The chapter also reiterates a theme found throughout *New Treatise*: movement and stillness. Here Xiong variously describes constant transformation as absolutely still yet moving, and as having a constant nature that cannot be altered yet is incessantly transforming; being activated, it gives rise to myriad beginnings yet itself remains ever still. Similarly, the mind is said both to move and to be quiescent; both to issue forth and to be restrained; both to transform and to be constant; and both to move and to be stationary. Mind and constant transformation are both references to Fundamental Reality.

Xiong returns to the concepts of contraction (翕) and expansion (闢) to elucidate mind and its relation to Reality. Mind, just like physical phenomena, does not have real existence—it is devoid of its own individuated self-nature. There is, however, a self-nature or Reality that makes mind possible. This self-nature or Reality of mind is called constant transformation. In relation to contraction, constant transformation is expansion, and in relation to things, it is mind: “mind and expansion are different in name but the same actuality.” Equally, however, the relative contrast of mind and things is merely constant transformation’s illusory manifestation of both contraction and expansion. In this sense, Xiong further insists, as the expression of the power of constant transformation’s self-nature, mind is not different from constant

transformation and so is not different from Reality. “It is not the case that the mind is identical to Fundamental Reality (心非即本體也). Nevertheless, because the mind definitely is not transformed by things, therefore it may also be said that the mind is not different from Fundamental Reality (心即本體耳).” The implicit premise here is that Reality and mind stand in a relationship of *ti* and *yong*. Mind is *yong*, function, and thus is not *ti*; yet equally *ti* and *yong* are two sides of the same coin. This also helps to clarify Xiong’s statement that “the Reality (實性) of mind is not different from constant transformation—mind does not have a real self-nature within itself.”

Mind is also transcendent: “this mind has no ‘you’ or ‘me,’ is not constrained by time or space, is an undifferentiated [whole] without duality and distinctions, and is inexhaustible and without end. . . . The mind of a single person or a single thing is the mind of heaven and earth and the myriad things. This is not something that physical substance can separate, and so they are thoroughly interconnected.” In providing this description, Xiong explicitly refers to the Huayan 華嚴 themes of “the mutual identity of one and many” and “[all things] are endlessly interdependent.”

Mind is not, however, simply an undifferentiated flow—it controls as it flows, and that is why mind controls the body. Xiong refers to this as “life” (生命). This is what accounts for individual entities that are the transformed manifestation of Fundamental Reality. Although human nature innately possesses life, this life extends throughout the universe and is not impeded by the physical body. “Our life and the universe, from beginning to end, are not two entities.” Despite this, humans are subject to afflictions that take the form of habituated tendencies (習氣). Afflictions are defiled mental associates, the main topic of chapter 8. Afflictions are said to “arrive without being caused” and to be “without root.” It is thus incumbent upon us as humans to “[seek] within for the remnant sprouts of the inherently existing life force; that is, the incipient manifestation of the inherent mind. It is like what Mencius called ‘[the restorative] night air’s being [enough] to preserve [the vegetation on Ox Mountain].’” And although cognitive activity is not the mind, if we preserve and do not let go of our inherent mind, then cognitive activity will be nothing other than the expression of the mind. “Bodhidharma said, ‘It is in activity that [buddha-]nature is seen.’”

After providing a substantially orthodox Yogācāran summary description of the eight consciousnesses, Xiong returns to his earlier critiques of certain

“Mahāyāna masters” for dividing the one mind into eight discrete entities and for positing seeds as causal conditions (因緣). He begins with the account of seeds in Asaṅga’s *Mahāyānasamgraha-sāstra* 攝大乘論 (Compendium of the Great Vehicle) and Vasubandhu’s commentary on the idea that each seed produces its own fruits or effects. Xiong’s critique is twofold: first, he objects to the idea that each of the eight differentiated clusters of seeds is able to generate mind or consciousness and mental associates, and second, he is opposed to the mechanistic clustering of seeds, mind, and mental associates: “Asaṅga and Vasubandhu through to Dharmapāla, Xuanzang, and Kuiji all maintained this, and none of them altered this view at all. This is indeed an extreme pluralism (多元論), or alternatively it could be called a theory of clustering (集聚論) or mechanistic theory (機械論).” Xiong further compares it to the type of atomic clustering propounded by the non-Buddhist Vaiśeṣika (勝論) school.

He also objects to the techniques of “breaking down” (分析): “When they broke-down mind-consciousness, the contents were extremely fragmented, in order to accommodate multiple seeds. It is just as if a material object was analyzed into atoms, molecules, right down to electrons.” The idea here is that consciousness was broken down into eight clusters, and these clusters were in turn attributed to seeds. He extends his criticism of the techniques of “breaking down” to the analytic methods used in science and philosophy. Xiong instead champions a monism, stating that learning concerned with fundamental wisdom (玄學) strives to apprehend That Which Holds All (總持 [*dhāraṇī*]): Fundamental Reality, original mind, or what Chan monks referred to as “one’s own lot” (本分事).⁸⁸ This monism is non-reductionist in that it is not reducible to a single characteristic: “Although it has always been absolutely nothing, it is not nothing; although it gives rise to the myriad existents, it does not exist. Hence, dispel both existence and nonexistence; sever names and images at the ford of constant stillness. Roll up or release at will; cease verbal distinction-making [upon the realization of that which lies] beyond snares and traps.” The snares and traps are an allusion to the fish-trap and the rabbit-snare allegory in *Zhuangzi*. Just as snares and traps are used to catch game, once the game has been caught, one no longer needs

88. This clustering of concepts seems to be of Xiong’s own making; there is no particular textual source he is drawing on.

the snares and traps; so too with words and what words refer to. To able to understand this Reality—which Xiong also variously refers to as the First Thing, and absolute principle—it must be personally realized, personally experienced.

Having criticized Dharmapāla for choosing to adopt the method of “breaking down” over the method of “understanding through personal experience” (體認) or inner realization (內證), Xiong next identifies Vasubandhu as marking the actual beginning of misguided conceptual elaboration. In order to exonerate Asaṅga (for reasons that are not immediately apparent), Xiong presents Asaṅga’s true position as being that consciousness was merely a nominal construction, devoid of self-nature. “In this way, he made assertions with ingenuity, sweeping them away no sooner than he had made them, never establishing anything and thereby distancing himself from any misguided conceptual elaboration.” Vasubandhu, however, “started having consciousness subsume the various dharmas and so came to look upon the dharma of consciousness as something relatively real. Furthermore, if we infer on the basis of his account of seeds, since consciousness is generated from seeds, consciousness is therefore a real dharma (實法) with self-nature.” He also criticizes Vasubandhu for mechanically attributing the production of the universe to the causal role played by seeds and for talking about the mind in terms of defiled and pure seeds. Because Dharmapāla characterized innate seeds (本有種) as both pure and defiled, Xiong finds grounds to criticize him for identifying deluded consciousness with original mind.

The chapter next addresses the topic of mind, thought, and consciousness. Mind, it is explained, is not different from the nature (心即性也), and the nature is a synonym for Fundamental Reality. As this Reality is also the same Reality for the myriad things, the mind is everywhere and has never been limited to one body. When the mind is pursued within oneself, it has a fixed orientation that is called thought (意). This fixed orientation “means developing in such a way that one is constantly in accord with one’s ever-renewing inherent nature (本性) and not willing to be transformed by things.” This fixed orientation is revealed only when one is mentally alone. This fixed orientation is expressed in life (生命) and revealed in solitude (獨體). The dominant sense of the term “mind” is “a whole” (統體), whereas the dominant sense of the term “thought” is the mind as it exists in individual people.

The term “consciousness” refers to the first six consciousnesses and was established so as to discern cognitive objects. Whereas mind and thought are expressions for Reality (體), consciousness is but a different expression for “function” (作用), which in turn refers to the flow or manifest expression of Reality.

The first five or sensory consciousnesses cognize objects by means of direct perception (現量). “The cognizing consciousness (能緣識) directly apprehends the true aspect (體相) of a cognitive object that is taken as the cause of consciousness (所緣境). This is called ‘directly apprehending the cognitive object’s characteristics (境相).’” (We should continue to bear in mind [!] that in Yogācāra teachings, a cognitive object is the image part that arises from the transformation of one’s own consciousness [drawing on one’s mental seeds] in response to a stimulus.) Because the sensory consciousnesses of ordinary people are continually thrown into confusion by the chaotic sixth consciousness, ordinary people are unable to maintain this capacity for direct perception. The sixth consciousness is the cause of this confusion because by constantly conveying the characteristics of cognitive objects, the mind—expressed as the six consciousnesses—becomes transformed by things.

We learn that the sixth consciousness functions not only by taking (putatively) external objects as cognitive objects but also by taking inner objects as cognitive objects. This inner activity has two aspects. The first aspect is being aware of “being aware of cognitive objects.” The second aspect is direct gnosis (冥) of self-nature: “‘Direct gnosis’ means inwardly to perceive self-nature so that one knows oneself and sees oneself. This is referred to as inner verification independent of words. In this case, that which realizes is that which is realized; indeed, there is no ‘that which [realizes]’ and ‘that which [is realized]’ that can be distinguished.”

Xiong concludes what he calls “a general overview of the mind’s key features” with a detailed account of the so-called five states of mind produced by the perception of cognitive objects, based on *Cheng weishi lun*: the mind of first impressions, the actively seeking mind, the determining mind, the pure and impure mind, and the mind of the flow of sameness. This is followed by a series of objections and responses.

The final section of this chapter takes up the topic of mental associates, also the main subject of chapter 8. This section might thus be regarded as a

kind of prolegomenon to chapter 8. We learn that mind relies on the support of mental associates to be able to distinguish the characteristics of cognitive objects. Equally, mental associates depend on the mind to arise. And although both take the same cognitive object as their respective cognitive object, they each have different defining activities (現行). In chapter 2 Xiong defines defining activities as follows: “‘Defining activities’ are the characteristics (相) [that appear] when consciousness actively engages cognitive objects; that is, the characteristics [that occur] when consciousness interprets cognitive objects. For example, seeing colors and hearing sound are not the same. These are the different defining activities in consciousness.” Here that definition needs to be expanded to include the images that arise when mental associates appropriate those same cognitive objects. According to Xiong, mental associates are the manifest activity of habituated tendencies. They are not innately endowed but rather are clusters of “delusional forces that consolidate and do not disperse.” The accumulation of habituated tendencies means that when cognitive objects are cognized, this leads to attachment to particular characteristics such as “pleasant” and “unpleasant” and so forth. This prompts Xiong to contrast mind and mental associates: “Mind is not different from the nature, whereas mental associates are but habituated tendencies. Their fundamental difference is as starkly clear as this.” So long as mental associates obey the mind, assist the mind, and remain subservient to the mind, then all will be well: mental associates will also be the nature because the mind is not different from the nature. If, however, defiled mental associates (染數) are given unbridled free rein, they will attack the nature. “When habituated tendencies attack the nature, the mind cannot be seen, and so the mental associates alone are taken to be the mind. This is what is referred to as deluded mind. Deluded mind is also called deluded consciousness.”

When mental associates are in their concealed, yet-to-be-manifest mode, they are seeds. Xiong stresses that this is not seeds in the sense of “productive power” (功能) but rather is a metaphor for something that we are never aware of. “Hidden and manifest are merely a difference of state, not a difference of direct cause and the effect produced (能所). Former teachers said that mental associates are produced from seeds—that is, that hidden seeds are the direct cause (能生因), and manifest mental associates are the main effects produced (所生果). The two dharmas of cause and effect are

distinctly different, just as are the grain seeds that produce the grain. This view is confused.”

2.8 EXPLAINING THE MIND, B (明心下)

This chapter is devoted to a detailed exposition of thirty-eight mental associates (心所).⁸⁹ In this summary I provide a broad outline but do not discuss the substantive content, as that would entail duplicating much of Xiong's text.

The thirty-eight are based on the fifty-one listed in *Cheng weishi lun*, but with considerable rearrangement. My translation of the thirty-eight terms is based on Xiong's description. *Cheng weishi lun* lists six groups of mental associates:

1. Five omnipresent mental associates (遍行)
2. Five object specific mental associates (別境)
3. Eleven wholesome mental associates (善)
4. Six primary afflictions (煩惱)
5. Twenty secondary afflictions (隨煩惱)
6. Four indeterminate mental associates (不定)

Xiong reduces these to four groups:

1. Six omnipresent mental associates (遍行)
2. Six object-specific mental associates (別境)
3. Nineteen defiled mental associates (染)
4. Seven wholesome mental associates (善)

As suggested by the name, “omnipresent mental associates” always occur together with the mind. “Object-specific mental associates” refers to mental associates that take specific cognitive objects as their cognitive objects and so do not always occur together with the mind. “Defiled mental associates” work against and block good mental associates. “Wholesome mental associates” counteract the afflictions of defiled mental associates, driving them into submission and eventually destroying them.

89. Typically *caitta* (心所) is translated as “mental factors,” but Xiong applies his own interpretation to the concept. For Xiong, they are mental activities that accompany and assist the functioning of the mind.

2.8.1 SIX OMNIPRESENT MENTAL ASSOCIATES (遍行)

“Desire” from the original group of object-specific mental associates has been moved here to make six omnipresent mental associates: contact (觸), attentiveness (作意), received sensations (受), desire (欲), conceptualization (想), and volitional impulse (思).

2.8.2 SIX OBJECT-SPECIFIC MENTAL ASSOCIATES (別境)

This group consists of discernment (慧), general investigation (尋), detailed analysis (伺), uncertainty (疑), verification (解), and recollection (念). Xiong explains that these six mental associates take individual cognitive objects as their cognitive objects and hence are termed “object-specific mental associates.” From the original group of five object-specific mental associates, desire has been relocated to omnipresent mental associates, concentration (定) has been relocated to good mental associates, and discovery and scrutiny, from the original indeterminate (不定) mental associates, together with uncertainty from the original primary afflictions (本惑), have been moved into the six object-specific mental associates.

2.8.3 NINETEEN DEFILED MENTAL ASSOCIATES (染)

This new category is a combination of the original primary afflictions and secondary afflictions. Of the original six primary afflictions, uncertainty (疑) has been relocated to the object-specific mental associates, leaving five: craving (貪), antipathy (瞋), ignorance (癡), pride (慢), and pernicious views (惡見). Among these five, Xiong further distinguishes eight different kinds of craving, three kinds of antipathy, seven kinds of pride, and three kinds of pernicious views. Furthermore, the five mental associates that constitute the primary afflictions can be divided into gross or fine. Both kinds need to be suppressed and eliminated. The means for doing so lies with the wholesome mental associates.

Xiong reduces the twenty secondary afflictions (隨煩惱) listed in *Cheng weishi lun* to fourteen: anger (忿), animosity (恨), vexation (惱), hostility (害), jealousy (嫉), duplicity (覆), parsimony (慳), deception (誑), chicanery (諂), insolence (無慚), shamelessness (無愧), restlessness (掉舉), ennuui (昏沉), and unruliness (放逸). The power of these secondary afflictions

to impede good mental associates is even greater than that of the primary afflictions.

2.8.4 SEVEN WHOLESOME MENTAL ASSOCIATES (善)

From the original eleven, Xiong reduces the number to seven: concentration (定), conviction (信), contra-craving (無貪), contra-malevolence (無瞋), contra-ignorance (無癡), sustained effort (精進), and vigilance (不放逸). This was achieved by removing conscience (慚) and four other good mental associates, and adding concentration from the object-specific mental associates.

The chapter concludes with several summary observations, including: the mind is the nature and it is innate; mental associates, however, are post-natal and based on experience; the nature is the mind in its original, pristine state; realization of our inherent nature requires cultivation, and this cultivation is necessary because the nature is the principle by which humans are able to live (吾人所以生之理). The final pages develop a sustained argument to the effect that cultivation/practice and learning are not different from the nature itself but rather are an expression of the nature, and that without cultivation/practice, the nature cannot be revealed. Xiong's reaffirmation of the phenomenal world, the life-world, was in a sense dictated by the dialectical relationship between ultimate truth and conventional truth: Fundamental Reality/the nature/inherent mind has no meaning unless understood relative to, and personally realized in the context of, phenomenal existence.

What motivated Xiong to go so deeply into the difficulties of Yogācāra scholasticism? Was he just working through his own emancipation from his roots in the Ouyang school? Or did he think that he could not make his own philosophy of *ti-yong* and so forth complete without it? I think the main reason relates to the Confucian side of his syncretism. Xiong's strong rejection of nihilism (associated with Madhyamaka) provided the space for a morally inflected universe, and this is where the Confucian side of his syncretism gains added traction. The extended discussion of mental associates is strongly linked to moral concerns. According to Xiong, mental associates are the manifest activity (現行) of habituated tendencies. Afflictions are impure mental associates, clusters of "delusional forces that consolidate and do not disperse," arising "only after the human form and spirit issue forth." The accumulation of habituated tendencies means that when cognitive objects

are cognized, this leads to attachment to particular characteristics such as “pleasant” and “unpleasant” and so forth, prompting Xiong to contrast mind and mental associates: “Mind is not different from the nature, whereas mental associates are but habituated tendencies. Their fundamental difference is as starkly clear as this.” Xiong describes how “good mental associates” counteract the afflictions of defiled mental associates, driving them into submission and eventually eliminating them. Further, to be able to recover our inherent human nature, we must rely upon pure dharmas (淨法) (pure habituated tendencies; good mental associates). If, however, defiled mental associates (染數) are given free rein, they will attack the nature. Yet even though defiled mental associates overcome and obstruct the mind/the nature, Xiong maintains that this is necessary: “If there were no afflictions, then there would be no *prajñā* either. Thus all defilements are the seeds of *tathāgata* (如來). Confucius said: ‘As long as the way prevails in the world, [I] will not join them in changing the world.’” This is because when one realizes the emptiness of afflictions, the role of dependent arising in their generation, and their fundamental lack of self-nature, then one’s perspective is able to move from conventional truth to ultimate truth.

3. THE LEGACY OF XIONG’S THOUGHT

Confucio-Buddhist syncretism is a hallmark also of Mou Zongsan’s thought. Mou is arguably the most important Chinese philosopher of the past century, and his philosophical legacy continues to exercise a profound influence on contemporary Chinese philosophy. Mou is relevant to our consideration of Xiong Shili because of Xiong’s formative influences on Mou.

The most visible link between Xiong and Mou—other than their erratic mentor-student relationship—is the connection between them in the context of the retrospectively created genealogy of New Confucian philosophy. The movement is promoted and researched by prominent Chinese intellectuals based in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States. Particularly noteworthy is the high critical regard in which New Confucianism has come to be held by a large number of mainland Chinese scholars since the late 1980s. Successfully transcending the geographical and political boundaries of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, since the mid-1980s, New Confucianism has increasingly played a leading role in bridging the cultural and ideologi-

cal divide separating mainland and overseas Chinese scholars by providing a shared intellectual discourse. New Confucianism has also proven to be the most successful form of philosophical appropriation, reinvention, and “creative transformation” of “Confucianism” in contemporary China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. It is the most influential expression of indigenous Chinese philosophical values of the past century. Xiong and Liang Shuming are now widely regarded as the founding fathers of the New Confucian movement.

Yet even “internal participants” in the contemporary New Confucian movement have described the connection between Xiong and Mou as a “spiritual legacy” rather than one based on the transmission of a set of teachings or doctrines. This has been a regular refrain in Liu Shuxian's 劉述先 writings: “Tang [Junyi], Mou [Zongsan], and Xu [Fuguan] were all Xiong's students. Even Liang Shuming's influence pales in comparison to that of Xiong. As the publicly acknowledged founding figure of this trend of thought [contemporary New Confucianism], his thought must be discussed. . . . In fact, that which Xiong bequeathed was a spiritual inspiration. There was certainly no one who genuinely transmitted his learning (*xuewen*).”⁹⁰

Zheng Jiadong 鄭家棟 similarly relates that Mou Zongsan had completed the work Xiong had hoped to complete but was unable to do so, thereby enabling “learning of the nature of the mind” (心性之學) to become a system of thought that, “for the first time,” could be “grasped logically in respect of both its external structure and its inner normative principles (義理).” He further states that Mou's development of Xiong's thought was limited to a common “spiritual direction; in fact, in terms of their respective learning and inherent spiritual temperament, there was quite a distance between them.”⁹¹

90. Liu Shuxian, “Pingxin lun Feng Youlan 平心論馮友蘭” (A Balanced Account of Feng Youlan), *Dangdai* 35, no. 3 (1989): 63. See also Liu Shuxian, “Duiyu Xiong Shili xiansheng wannian sixiang de zai fansi 對於熊十力先生晚年思想的再反思” (Some More Reflections on Mr. Xiong Shili's Thought in His Later Years), *Ehu*, no. 3 (1992): 1–2.

91. Zheng Jiadong, “Xiandai xin Ruxue de luoji tuizhan ji qi yinfa de wenti 現代新儒學的邏輯推展及其引發的問題” (The Logical Development of New Confucianism and the Issues Generated), p. 26, paper distributed at the Second International Conference on New Confucianism, National Central Library, Taipei, 1992. In the same year, Luo Yijun 羅義俊 similarly described Tang, Mou, and Xu as being the transmitters of Xiong's legacy. “However, what they transmit is not the specific perspective of Xiong's scholarship but rather the desire to open up a spiritual direction for the future path of Chinese culture.” Luo Yijun,

Despite these judgments that Xiong's influence on Mou was limited to a "spiritual direction" and that no one subsequently transmitted Xiong's learning, important affinities and influences are in evidence. At the most general level, the first such affinity is a shared virulent cultural nationalism. Xiong and Mou's shared belief that Chinese philosophy must be genuinely Chinese (and not owe its origins to a foreign creed)⁹² and their commitment to the notion of an immanently transcendent, morally inflected, heavenly endowed human nature both contributed to their privileging of Confucian philosophy within their broader syncretistic projects.

There was also a shared modernist agenda animating this promotion of Confucian philosophy as the spiritual marrow of Chinese national identity. Both Xiong and Mou upheld a view widely accepted by Chinese intellectuals throughout the twentieth century: although China had always possessed a rich philosophical tradition, that tradition lacked systematization, and the systematization of Chinese philosophy was one of the most pressing tasks for the modern Chinese philosopher. Crucial to this task of systemization was to provide Chinese philosophy with a robust epistemology.

Mou is widely regarded as having completed the task Xiong set for himself but never accomplished: the development of a comprehensive philosophy that included a *liang lun* 量論 (epistemology).⁹³ It should, however, be noted that for Xiong, there is no clear division between issues relating to epistemology and those relating to metaphysics; hence, many aspects of Xiong's epistemology are revealed in his writings, and some of his key epistemological distinctions were adopted and developed by Mou Zongsan, such as the distinction between *liangzhi* 量智 (knowledge derived from measurement and inference) and *xingzhi* 性智 (direct insight into Reality gained

"Jin shiyu nian dangdai xin Ruxue de yanjiu yu suowei menhu wenti 近十餘年當代新儒學的研究與所謂門戶問題" (The So-Called Problem of Factionalism in New Confucianism over the Past Ten-Plus Years), p. 15, paper distributed at the Second International Conference on New Confucianism, National Central Library, Taipei, 1992.

92. This is also reflected in Mou's ranking of the Sinitic traditions of Huayan and Tiantai Buddhism over Yogācāra.

93. As previously noted, Xiong had originally intended that the *New Treatise* would consist of two major treatises: *On Cognitive Objects* (境論) (ontology) and *On Epistemology* (量論). *On Epistemology* was never written. Xiong's 1956 publication, *Yuan Ru* 原儒, has an outline version.

through realization of one's nature), which Mou referred to as *shizhi* 識知 (enlightened intuitive knowledge) and *zhizhi* 智知 (cognitive knowledge), respectively. For both Xiong and Mou this distinction marked the difference between scientific knowledge and metaphysical knowledge.

When we read Xiong's *New Treatise*, we need to remind ourselves—just as Xiong reminds us—that the sustained critique of Yogācāra is matched by a profound respect for Madhyamaka philosophy and that Xiong's appropriation of the *ti-yong* polarity and the concepts “contraction” (翕) and “expansion” (闢) are grounded in Madhyamakan philosophical premises. For Xiong, it was Buddhist philosophy that had inspired his commitment to developing both a *jing lun* 境論 (ontology) and an epistemology for his own systematic philosophy. Buddhist philosophy was also a key component of that systematic philosophy.

Buddhist philosophy was also central to Mou Zongsan's systematic philosophy. Mou's engagement with, and appropriation of, facets of Buddhist philosophy are also germane to my contextualization of Xiong Shili's philosophical thought as developed in *New Treatise*, as they serve to reinforce the importance of recognizing the vital role that Buddhist philosophy has played in the construction of New Confucian philosophy and the ongoing presence it still retains in the historical constitution of New Confucian philosophy. As Wing-cheuk Chan has reiterated, it is impossible to understand Mou's philosophical contribution to the development of New Confucian philosophy without a proper understanding of his interpretation of Buddhism.⁹⁴ And despite Mou's ultimate and unambiguous privileging of Confucian philosophy over Buddhist philosophy, as Jason Clower has pertinently remarked: “What makes Mou noticeable . . . is his catholicity of interest and breadth of reading in Buddhist writings and willingness to proclaim the philosophical superiority of Buddhists to Confucians and the necessity for Confucians to submit themselves to Buddhist tutelage, and then to openly reorganize and reevaluate the whole Confucian philosophical tradition in an explicitly Buddhist way.”⁹⁵

94. Wing-cheuk Chan, “On Mou Zongsan's Hermeneutic Application of Buddhism,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 38, no. 2 (2011): 174–175.

95. Jason Clower, *The Unlikely Buddhologist: Tiantai Buddhism in Mou Zongsan's New Confucianism* (Brill: Leiden, 2010), p. 3; see also Serina N. Chan, *The Thought of Mou Zongsan* (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

The principal doxographical methodology to be applied to this reevaluation is Mou's appropriation of the Sinitic Buddhist method of "doctrinal classification" (判教) and applying it to the whole of Chinese philosophy. Within this scheme, Mou identified the Tiantai paradigm of the Perfect Teaching (圓教) as providing a theoretical model to demonstrate how Kant's ideal of due correspondence between virtue and happiness can be achieved without appeal to God. He further insisted that certain Song and Ming Neo-Confucians had articulated the most perfect "Perfect Teaching." (We should also note in passing that Mou's Perfect Teaching can be seen to be indebted to Xiong's emphasis on the non-separability of *ti* and *yong*.)⁹⁶

Mou also adapted the "One Mind, two aspects" paradigm of the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith*, written in the late sixth century and eventually becoming the most influential text in East Asian Buddhism.⁹⁷ Starting from the premise that the One Mind is the ultimate source of all phenomena, the scripture proposes that this One Mind has two aspects. The first aspect is characterized by an original, pristine, pure Buddha-nature intrinsic in all things (*tathāgatagarbha*)—the all-pervading, undifferentiated absolute reality (*dharmakāya*). The second aspect is characterized as being subject to birth and death. Although this second aspect of mind is identified with the store consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*), it is grounded in *tathāgatagarbha*. Only ignorance prevents us from realizing the fundamental unity of the two aspects of the One Mind. (The influence of this vision on Xiong Shili's thought is also strongly in evidence.)

These views contrast sharply with sixth- and seventh-century Sinitic Yogācāra accounts that the constant transformation of seeds in the store consciousness is the basis of the phenomenal world and that ultimately the mind itself (*ālaya-vijñāna* and the mental factors associated with it) has to be transformed and replaced by the unmediated cognition of things just as they truly are if unmediated cognition of reality is to be realized. In *New Treatise*, one of Xiong's key objections to Yogācāra is that by positing seeds

96. On this latter point, see the discussion in Clower, *The Unlikely Buddhist*, pp. 181–184.

97. Purporting to be an Indian scripture, it was probably written in China during the late sixth century.

as causes of cognitive objects, the mind becomes bifurcated into a subject part and an image part, and its inherent oneness thus becomes artificially and mistakenly severed. To address this, Xiong appealed to the inseparability of *ti* (ontological reality) and *yong* (its manifest functioning), criticizing the Yogācāra position as advocating the manifestation of ontological reality through function (即用顯體) where function is understood actually to exist, which for Xiong amounted to drawing a bifurcation of ontological reality and the phenomenal world: "As a word, 'function' refers to the flow of Reality and describes the expression of Reality. In this expression there is no thing, and in this flow there is no abiding. Accordingly, it is not possible for there to be anything established in function. This is because the 'function' under discussion has never been a real dharma." Xiong's position can be seen to be implicitly consistent with the views expressed in the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith*, in that the latter does not present the phenomenal world as ontologically distinct from the all-pervading, undifferentiated absolute reality (*dharmakāya*). Rather, it posits ignorance as hindering us from realizing that the phenomenal world lacks independent existence, self-nature, reality.

Mou Zongsan, by contrast, engaged and appropriated the "One Mind, two aspects" paradigm much more explicitly and substantively, developing it in quite a different direction from how Xiong had used it⁹⁸ and making it a theoretical linchpin of his "self-negation of innate moral consciousness" (良知自我坎陷) thesis.⁹⁹ Mou's signature departure from Kant's metaphysics

98. Henry C. H. Shiu, for example, has recently argued that rather than following Xiong in interpreting the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine as a kind of ontological monism, Mou attempted to interpret it "instrumentally," as a "skillful means" employed to avoid Buddhism's being regarded as kind of nihilism. See his "Nonsubstantialism of the *Awakening of Faith* in Mou Zongsan," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 38, no. 2 (2011): 223–237.

99. That is, moral consciousness negates its inherent non-discriminating mode in order to allow the discriminating mind to arise and to effect action. Mou maintained that practical reason—the form of reason concerned with the a priori grounds for action, in particular moral choice according to the moral law—harbors an inexorable inclination for dialectical development that propels it toward its own "contradiction": from practical reason to theoretical reason (理論理性), the type of reason that enables us to have knowledge of objects given in experience. It is in this connection that Mou proposed his thesis of "self-negation of innate moral consciousness."

is his argument that the faculty of intellectual intuition (智的直覺)—which enables direct intuition of supersensible objects—is innately possessed by all people rather than being exclusive to God. Thus, unlike Kant, who held that humans have no faculty of intellectual intuition, that noumena, or “things-in-themselves,” can only be postulated and not directly intuited by humans, for Mou, noumenal reality (the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith* analogue of which is *tathāgatagarbha*) can be directly intuited. Humans can apprehend both sides of the coin: the noumenal and phenomenal character of things.¹⁰⁰ Mou's core notion of intellectual intuition can also be seen positively as an attempt to provide philosophical support for Xiong's repeated refrain about inner realization (內證), as well as Xiong's insistence that innate moral consciousness (良知) is an unmediated presence and not a postulate, just as much as negatively it is a critical response to Kant's view that noumena cannot be known.

The “One Mind, two aspects” paradigm can also be regarded as the inspiration behind Mou's dual ontology: a “phenomenal ontology” (現象界的存有論) or “attached ontology” (執的存有論) and a “noumenal ontology” (本體界的存有論) or “non-attached ontology” (無執的存有論). Whereas the former enables humans to realize their noumenal nature, the latter enables humans to function in the phenomenal world. Xiong's analysis of phenomenon in the context of his *ti-yong* ontology can also be regarded as having found further development in Mou's “phenomenal ontology.”

Mou also echoed Xiong in endorsing the philosophical importance of Indian Buddhist translator and interpreter Paramārtha 真諦 (499–569). Xiong had identified Paramārtha as a representative figure in the “old” tradition of Yogācāra as transmitted in China in contrast to the “new” tradition, which he associates with Xuanzang and Kuiji but which has its roots in the Weishi

100. Because practical reason requires its antithesis—theoretical reason—it artificially or forcefully instigates its own negation. The creative activity of practical reason is not predicated on an opposition between subject and object because, strictly speaking, this distinction is inapplicable within the sphere of practical reason. When practical reason is transformed into understanding, into theoretical reason, the resulting understanding and theoretical reason are moral in that they are controlled by and subordinate to practical reason. This is why Mou maintained that his is a moral metaphysics, not merely a metaphysics of morals like Kant's.

teachings of Dharmapāla and Vasubandhu.¹⁰¹ According to Xiong, the key difference between the old and new traditions in China is that the latter group posited seeds as the ontological basis of all things and so was guilty of promoting an ontological pluralism.¹⁰² Xiong's critique of the account of seeds in *Cheng weishi lun* is a central theme in his *New Treatise*. Similarly, Mou Zongsan identified Paramārtha to be the initiator of the so-called mature separation theory (終別教).¹⁰³ the universality of innate Buddha-nature; the doctrine that inherent enlightenment has merely been obscured by ignorance; that we all have a true mind or inherent mind we can return to; and that the phenomenal world is ontologically grounded in an immanently transcendent reality, as championed by various hybrids of Yogācāra and *tathāgatagarbha* 如來藏¹⁰⁴ thought, such as the Southern Dilun school of Yogācāra that was active in the sixth century in China and which became associated most famously with the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith*.¹⁰⁵

3.1 CRITICAL BUDDHISM

The *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith* also has a more contemporary connection with Xiong Shili. After Xiong published his *New Treatise* in 1932, two of his more trenchant critics were influential Buddhist layman Ouyang Jingwu—founder of the China Institute of Inner Learning—and Buddhist scholar Lü Cheng 呂澂. (Xiong had, in fact, first studied Yogācāra together with Lü Cheng under the tutelage of Ouyang.) Seeking to “return to the roots” of Indian Buddhism, Ouyang, Lü, and their colleagues sought to promote “true” Buddhism over “false” Buddhism, criticizing such core

101. Xiong Shili, *Fojia mingxiang tongshi*, B.256.

102. Xiong Shili, *Fojia mingxing tongshi*, B.262.

103. Jason Clower, *The Unlikely Buddhist*, pp. 112–135, provides a useful survey of this important doctrinal classification within Mou's philosophical system.

104. The doctrine that all sentient beings have the innate potential to be buddhas.

105. Mou even attributes the authorship (or a leading role in the authorship) of the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith* to Paramārtha. See his *Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang* 中國哲學十九講 (Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy) (Taipei: Xusheng shuju, 1983), pp. 289–290.

Sinitic Buddhist doctrines as “original enlightenment” and “returning to the source.”

In 1943, the year Ouyang died, Lü Cheng and Xiong Shili engaged in an extended series of polemical exchanges on the question of whether human nature is innately quiescent (性寂) or innately enlightened (性覺). At the most general level, this question touched upon the very legitimacy of the philosophical foundations of East Asian Buddhism. More specifically, this point of contention bears directly on a range of issues, including the interpretation of the doctrine that “the nature of the mind is inherently pure” (心性本淨) and methods of cultivation. In regard to these two matters, Xiong upheld the view that the already inherently awakened (and hence dynamic) nature of the mind can be personally realized through the “inner verification” of our own minds. (This view is associated in particular with the teachings of the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith*. Later, Mou Zongsan accorded “inherent enlightenment” a central role in his philosophical system by attributing to it the capacity for “intellectual intuition.” Lü Cheng, on the other hand, upheld the Yogācāra view (represented by Xuanzang and Kuiji) that although “the nature of the mind is originally pure” (心性本淨), realization of that purity requires a transformation of consciousness.

In more recent times, the standoff between the views upheld by Xiong, on the one hand, and by Ouyang and Lü, on the other, has resurfaced in the context of controversies surrounding so-called Critical Buddhism. Critical Buddhism is an intellectual movement initiated in mid-1980s Japan by Buddhist scholars Hakamaya Noriaki 跨谷縣昭 and Matsumoto Shirō 松本史郎.¹⁰⁶ Critical Buddhism takes aim at any doctrine that posits an eternal, metaphysical substratum, underlying ground, or locus on which everything else is ontologically grounded, since it is contrary to the Buddha's teachings on impermanence. In particular, Critical Buddhism regards Sinicized forms of Buddhism to be false Buddhism and incompatible with the project of modernity because they are not founded on rational critique. As Lin Chen-kuo points out, “Like Habermas, the Critical Buddhists choose to carry out the project of modernity because they see that both the West and Buddhism

106. Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson (eds.), *Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997).

share the same idea of enlightenment, namely as a quest for liberation from ignorance and domination.”¹⁰⁷

In setting out his understanding of the concept of “transformation”—a metaphor for ontological reality—in *New Treatise*, for example, Xiong describes one of its characteristics in the following terms: “Wondrously transforming, unfathomable; the myriad things are unequal. Equal by virtue of being unequal, and so each is as it is.” This is precisely the sort of notion of equality that Critical Buddhists object to because, as Paul Swanson explains, “if one assumes a single basis and underlying reality for all things—that good and evil, strong and weak, rich and poor, right and wrong, are fundamentally ‘the same’—there is no need or incentive to correct any injustice or right any wrong or challenge the status quo.”¹⁰⁸ In Xiong’s case, “a single basis and underlying reality for all things” is just what “transformation” is, in the same way that the pure Buddha-nature intrinsic in all things (*tathāgatagarbha*)—the all-pervading, undifferentiated absolute reality (*dharmakāya*)—functions in the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith*.

The *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith* is seen to be emblematic of so-called topical Buddhism or topical philosophy—“notions of a universal, ineffable, preconceptual ground or ‘topos’ from which all things are produced and to which they return at death”¹⁰⁹—because of such constructions as *dharmakāya* and *tathāgatagarbha* (which seemingly contradict the doctrine of no-self). These constructions, in turn, are foundational for such doctrines as inherent enlightenment (which appears to be inconsistent with the doctrine of dependent arising).

As it happens, in modern China it has been topical philosophy (in the form of New Confucian metaphysics, especially Mou Zongsan’s New Confucianism) that has emerged victorious over scholastic forms of Critical Buddhism (Ouyang Jingwu and Lü Cheng). Clearly, topical philosophy continues to have strong support in Chinese intellectual communities. Xiong’s

107. Lin Chen-kuo, “Metaphysics, Suffering, and Liberation: The Debate Between Two Buddhisms,” in Hubbard and Swanson, *Pruning the Bodhi Tree*, p. 305.

108. Paul L. Swanson, “Why They Say Zen Is Not Buddhism,” in Hubbard and Swanson, *Pruning the Bodhi Tree*, p. 7.

109. Jacqueline Stone, “Some Reflections on Critical Buddhism,” *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 26, no. 1 (1999): 161.

New Treatise provides us with the first substantive attempt to respond to the modernist challenge of providing Chinese philosophy with “system,”¹¹⁰ and Xiong did this in the form of an ontology. Thus understood, his *New Treatise* is also a response to modernism and, in its own Buddhist way, very much part of “a quest for liberation from ignorance and domination,”¹¹¹ even if the path he followed was metaphysics rather than scientific rationality.

110. Since the early 1900s, Chinese scholars have sought to respond to claims initially made by Japanese scholars that Chinese philosophy lacked systemization, that in method and organization it was simple and naive, and that it fell far short of the standards set by Western philosophy. I discuss this in detail in “The Role of Masters Studies in the Early Formation of Chinese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline,” in John Makeham (ed.), *Learning to Emulate the Wise: The Genesis of Chinese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2011), pp. 73–101.

111. Lin Chen-kuo, “Metaphysics, Suffering, and Liberation,” p. 305.