PREFACE

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Secret intelligence had always been an element in statecraft, but in the twentieth century, it acquired an altogether new standing as an ingredient in the security arrangements of nations that tired of 'total warfare'. This applied to the Soviet Union, with its tens of millions of casualties in World War II, and equally to democratic countries, with their memories of Galipoli and Paeschendale. In fact, special factors applied in the case of the democratic nations, with their increasingly universal voting rights. Enfranchised male citizens – who supplied the infantry, yet could make or break the governments that sent them to the front – displayed a fondness for their arms and legs and for life in general. The arrival of the female voter only intensified the aversion to militarism and to body bags. War was no longer acceptable as a reflexive recourse in times of diplomatic crisis. The search for alternative methods yielded initiatives ranging from United Nations mediations to nuclear deterrence. The century's commitment to secret intelligence stemmed from the same source.

To be sure, secret intelligence is an ingredient in military success. It can help to make war more precise and more decisive. But for those very reasons, it can also make war less bloody, especially for the civilians so often caught up as 'collateral' casualties. Furthermore, it can yield information that anticipates, and helps to prevent, conflict. We are only too painfully aware that things do not always work out like this. There have been intelligence blunders with terrible consequences. The preference for more subtle means, nevertheless, remains. You have only to follow the dollar to appreciate the point – the United States intelligence community's budget for 2009 was US\$80 billion.

Naturally, such a major phenomenon has attracted extensive study. Marjorie W. Cline's *Teaching Intelligence in the mid-1980s* (1985) was a thorough survey of college and university courses across the US, which revealed how they had become pervasive. A 2003 survey by Aberystwyth University's Paul Maddrell established that the teaching of intelligence was expanding in the United Kingdom, too. Off-campus, an appetite for books and articles in the intelligence

field encouraged a growth in the literature. Intelligence studies developed into a distinctive genre, and its practitioners acquired a professional identity of their own.

Intelligence studies faced a number of perils. Some of these were common to any fast-growing discipline. Those who have witnessed the expansion of, say, labour history or American Studies will recognise the pitfalls. Aspiring scholars, characterised more by opportunism than by ability, jump on the bandwagon, hoping for an easy ride. Able scholars in more established fields take a snooty, stand-offish approach to the new discipline. By refusing to engage in or offer competition, they ensure that the ride can, indeed, be too easy, with mediocrity as the natural result. Another common danger is hubris. It feeds on a feeling of being unappreciated and results in an exaggeration of the importance of one's newly discovered topic. The proposition that intelligence is a missing dimension of diplomatic history can degenerate into the conviction that it is *the* missing dimension.

Other perils inhere in the particular nature of the field. Secrecy has not resulted in a *dearth* of information, but too often it suppresses *key* information. The absence of key information can give rise to speculation and thus to damaging myths. In turn, this has occasioned official efforts to set the record straight. However, official efforts can be tainted with an official agenda. The temptation to whitewash affects the chroniclers of more than one type of government activity. But the opportunity to misinform is greater in the field of secret intelligence studies, where, in the interest of 'national security', information is withheld from relatively objective scholars and only made available to chosen insiders.

Special mention might here be made of the American curse of the revolving door. This is the process by which scholars depart academia to join an intelligence agency, later rejoining the academic community to impart their insights based on practical experience. On the one hand, the advantages are plain. Bright-eyed professors entering the clandestine profession import the latest expertise from the academic world. Returning to the campuses with knowing looks, they are able to bring down to earth some of the more fanciful academic theories. On the other hand, there are disadvantages. Scholars in the intelligence community can 'go native', re-emerging in academia as propagandists. They may not have been the best scholars in the first place. Top scholars publish regularly and do not take kindly to the interruptions and controls involved in secret government service. Nor do they relish the contempt in which they are often held, once having dabbled in 'dirty espionage'.

To be sure, intelligence veterans have made thoughtful and successful teachers. But teaching and scholarship in the intelligence field is, to too great an extent, blighted by the presence of pensioners who are not only biased in favour

of officialdom, but also second-rate intellectually. Speaking anonymously (as such individuals do in the UK), the former head of a major intelligence agency recently told me that such problems do not exist in Britain. But it would be rash to assert that British intelligence writing has always been free of official odour.

Awareness of problems such as these has given rise to a new and special branch of the intelligence studies profession. This is the study of intelligence studies. British initiatives are important here, and they tend to look beyond British shores. Perhaps this compensates for the lack of British official enquiries into how other nations conduct their intelligence affairs (in contrast, there have been several *American* official enquiries into *British* intelligence). For an initial example, one can turn to the activities of Aberystwyth University's Centre for Intelligence and International Security Studies. One outcome of the Centre's work was a book edited by R. Gerald Hughes *et al.*, *Exploring Intelligence Archives* (2008). It is testimony to the strength of the profession that this appeared as the *forty-fifth* title in the *Studies in Intelligence* book series, edited by Richard J. Aldrich and Christopher Andrew. Hughes' compilation provided scholarly commentaries on a series of intelligence documents from around the world. On one level, it was instructive about certain episodes in intelligence history. But on another level, it taught the reader how to study not just the documents, but also the interpreters of the documents.

The book that you are about to read is a second example of a work that shows how important it is, before embarking on a study of intelligence itself, to study the study of intelligence. A sophisticated primer for those engaged in the field, it stems from another British research initiative in intelligence studies. This is the jointly run project by the Universities of Warwick and Nottingham, entitled 'Landscapes of Secrecy: The CIA and the Contested Record of US Foreign Policy, 1947–2001'. One of the book's two young editors, Christopher Moran, was associated with that project, and the other, Christopher Murphy, teaches at Salford University – a centre of excellence in intelligence studies.

In a preface of this kind, it is common to 'plug' the pages that follow and to urge the reader to plough through the text for worthy reasons. The task is not difficult in light of a cast of characters that includes Salvador Allende, George Blake, Fidel Castro, Winston Churchill, Mansfield Cumming, Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, Christopher Hitchens, Patrice Lumumba, Compton Mackenzie, Norman Mailer, Kim Philby, Stella Rimington, William Stephenson, George Tenet, Margaret Thatcher and Alfred Zimmerman.

Notable, too, is the quality of the contributors. Fred Hitz, for example, was a hard-hitting Inspector General of the CIA in the 1990s. His report on the circumstances surrounding the treason of Richard Ames ranks with the incisive critique of the Bay of Pigs fiasco by his illustrious predecessor, Lyman Kirkpatrick.

Amongst the academic contributors, Richard J. Aldrich has few peers in the field of intelligence history. Just as promising is the clutch of younger contributors, from whom we shall hear a great deal in the future.

The book is a thoughtful dissection of a wide variety of sources, ranging from works of history and official reports through memoirs, movies, novels and exposés. The historiographical prism is revolved in a way that provides a plurality of perspectives. Space is allotted both to critical works and to critiques of the critics: Nicholas Dujmovic of the CIA's History Staff offers a self-aware defence of what official historians set out to do, while Keith Jeffery – the authorised historian of the MI6 – supplies a general vindication of the writing of official intelligence history.

To accommodate their ambitious methodologies, the editors have restricted themselves to American and British themes. There is ample consolation here. For although the KGB has been influential in the past, and the rise of China, Brazil and the European Union point to a different future, the Anglo-American dimension has been the dominant feature of intelligence history over the last century. It makes this book a landmark study.