This book is not intended as an exhaustive examination of every aspect of Massachusetts' relationship with Nova Scotia–Acadia for the entire 1630 to 1784 period. Rather, it is primarily concerned with describing and attempting to account for, first, the continuing economic hammer-lock Massachusetts had during most of the period from 1630 to 1784 over the neighbouring colony and, second, the various military thrusts sent from New England to the region to the northeast. Around these military expeditions are to be found clustered the various individuals and interested groups concerned with what may be referred to as Nova Scotia–Acadia (all of present-day New Brunswick and Nova Scotia).

What is particularly significant about the 1630—1784 Massachusetts–Nova Scotia relationship is that it was emphatically not one of equals. Nova Scotia's population was always merely a small fraction of that of Massachusetts. In 1670, for example, after four decades of existence, Massachusetts had over 30,000 settlers, while Nova Scotia had fewer than 500. Forty years later, in 1710, Massachusetts had approximately 62,000 inhabitants and Nova Scotia, 1,700. In 1750, five years before most French-speaking Acadians of Nova Scotia were expelled, there were almost 190,000 Massachusetts residents, while the Nova Scotia population consisted of an estimated 10,000 Acadians.
and approximately 2,000 newly arrived British immigrants in the vicinity of Halifax. There were, in addition, about 4,000 French inhabitants on the French-controlled island colony of Cape Breton. By 1770, Massachusetts had a population of 235,000, in sharp contrast to Nova Scotia's fewer than 15,000 citizens. Taking into account these population statistics, one is hardly surprised that there was a widespread ignorance and indifference in Massachusetts concerning Nova Scotia and Nova Scotia affairs. Apart from a relatively small number of fishermen, traders, and governmental officials, few Massachusetts residents, except briefly during periods of war, wished to involve themselves or their government in affairs involving the neighbouring colony.

Massachusetts' interest in and concern with the Nova Scotia region probably peaked in 1690 with the Phips expedition, and again in 1745 with the amazing capture of Louisbourg, the so-called French Gibraltar of North America. What these and other Massachusetts military thrusts against the French seemed to show was that military expansion into Nova Scotia would happen only if there was some initial encouragement from Great Britain or from British officials and supporters in Massachusetts, who possessed a somewhat grandiose vision of an Anglo-American empire. In addition, it was essential to have the support of the fishing interests of Essex County, of the Boston merchants, and often that of the northeastern frontier interests. When these interests and pressure groups fused during periods of war, they cleverly utilized propagandists initially to create public enthusiasm and then to channel that enthusiasm into active participation and support. This enthusiasm and support, however, was never translated into any permanent form of Massachusetts imperialism vis-à-vis Nova Scotia. Instead, the military expeditions were short-lived outbursts of temporary concern. After King George's War and the Seven Years' War, a few outcroppings of a new and bitter hostility towards Nova Scotia were to be observed within the prevailing bedrock of Massachusetts indifference. Thus, by the outbreak of the American Revolution, most Massachusetts residents probably viewed the neighbouring colony through a conceptual filter clogged by scorn, ignorance, or apathy. It was clear that during the years following King George's War, Nova Scotia was no longer seen as "New England's Outpost," as had been the case in the seventeenth century. Instead, it was viewed by some influential Massachusetts inhabitants as a backward Anglophile
colony incapable and unworthy of political redemption.

This book, obviously, owes a great deal to J. B. Brebner's two outstanding volumes, *New England's Outpost* and *The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia*. I have, however, tried to do more than to fill some of the gaps which may be found in Brebner's work. It is evident that less than 20 percent of both *New England's Outpost* and *The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia* deals implicitly or explicitly with what may be called Massachusetts—Nova Scotia relations. The bulk of Brebner's work is concerned with the political and cultural history of Nova Scotia—Acadia written from the vantage point of Annapolis Royal or Halifax. In *New England's Outpost*, Brebner set out to explain, as he cogently put it, how and why "New England . . . stimulated and carried out the expulsion of the Acadians in 1755." But even in trying to find answers to this fascinating historical problem, he seemed content to concentrate his attention on the Nova Scotia scene, especially on the Acadians, during the years from 1710 to 1756. In a similar manner, his *Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia* is primarily a book about the "Yankees" in Nova Scotia and why they did not join the American Revolution. For Brebner, the Yankees, despite their New England heritage, were forced by external and domestic circumstances, to walk the knife-edge of neutrality as had their immediate predecessors, the French-speaking Acadians. Locked into his neutrality paradigm, Brebner viewed all events in pre-1755 New England—Nova Scotia relations as leading inevitably to the expulsion. He then threw the net of neutrality forward from his location in time in 1755 to catch all the Nova Scotia residents during the revolutionary war.

Brebner's brilliant and suggestive neutrality thesis certainly provides a meaningful overview for an otherwise extremely confused relationship. Only recently it has been referred to as the "classic and satisfactory" interpretation. Yet in spite of my own original predilection towards the Brebner approach to the study of prerevolutionary Nova Scotia, my research has led me in a somewhat different direction. Instead of seeing what Brebner called the "expanding energies" of New England leading "inevitably and naturally" to the expulsion, I perceived a Massachusetts interest in the area as suddenly declining after the Louisbourg episode of 1745. And, so far as I could determine, the so-called expanding energies of New England had nothing to do with the expulsion. Instead of being giant steps leading
towards *le grand dérangement*, the military expeditions of 1654, 1690, 1704, 1707, 1710, 1745, 1746, and 1755 really reflected the ebb and flow of a rather limited Massachusetts interest in Nova Scotia. They certainly did not represent a growing Massachusetts or New England imperialism. Finally, the original response of the Nova Scotia Yankees to the Revolution seemed to me more one of confusion than of neutrality. This acute disorientation was symptomatic of a collective identity crisis, which was resolved for many when they became part of the Great Awakening of Nova Scotia led by the young, charismatic evangelist Henry Alline. This religious revival, one of the most significant social movements in the long history of Nova Scotia, was the means by which a significant number of Nova Scotians extricated themselves from the domination of New England. By creating a religious ideology that was specifically geared to conditions in the northern colony, the Great Awakening enabled some residents to regard themselves as a people with a unique history, a distinct identity, and a special destiny.\(^5\)

*Savage Harbour*

*P.E.I.*

*August, 1971*