Acknowledgments

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Portions of this book build on ideas that first appeared in:


Apart from published sources, I have drawn on extensive conversations with Selznick and several of his colleagues, and conducted a series of
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structured interviews with him. Eight of these were videotaped and can be accessed at http://law.berkeley.edu/selznick.htm. Other useful resources can also be found at that site, including the transcript of Roger Cotterrell’s interviews with Selznick for University of California, Berkeley’s Bancroft Library’s Oral History Project.
PHILIP SELZNICK