NOTES

Introduction
1. Hong Yeopyo describes the circumstances that drove him to board smuggling ships between Osaka and Jeju in his memoir, Ko Chanyu, *Koria taun ni ikiru: Hon Yopyo rafu hisutorii* (Osaka: Entaitoru Shuppan, 2007), pp. 19–33.


3. Despite the fact that pilfering and reselling goods from US military bases played a key role in local economies throughout the region for decades, scholars have largely examined this phenomenon within a national framework. For a transnational study on a related topic, American GIs and local prostitutes, see Maria Höhn and Seungsook Moom, eds., *Over There: Living with the U.S. Military Empire from World War Two to the Present* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).


10. In his study on mobility and encounters on the margins of the Japanese Empire, David Ambaras explains that “what borderland people understand as licit exchanges is frequently different from what states define as illegal transactions.” David R. Ambaras, *Japan’s Imperial Underworlds: Intimate Encounters at the Borders of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 22. More broadly, see Willem Van Schendel and Itty Abraham, "Introduction:


13. See, for example, Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Daniel Gorman, Imperial Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010).


18. Rogers Brubaker, “Aftermaths of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples,” in After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building, edited by Karen Barkey and Mark Von Hagen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 155–180. For an incisive study on the population exchange between Turkey and Greece, which was enforced as a part of the process of dismantling the Ottoman Empire, see Bruce Clark, Twice a Stranger: The Mass Expulsions that Forged Modern Greece and Turkey (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).


27. Michael Cullen Green, Black Yanks in the Pacific: Race in the Making of American Military Empire after World War II (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010); Deokhyo Choi,


38. As Bruce Cumings has noted, there was no historical justification for the division of Korea, adding that if any East Asian country should have been divided it was Japan, like Germany, its Axis partner. Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), p. 186.


41. The American occupation of Japanese territory was also divided by separate branches of the US military, which established their respective command structures in the region. The Ogasawara Islands, which the Americans renamed the Bonin Islands, were administered by the US Navy as part of its Pacific Command, whereas Japan, southern Korea, and the Ryukyu Islands that are the focus of this book were administered by the US Army’s Far East Command. For a political history of the US Navy’s occupation of the Bonins between 1945 and 1968, see Robert D. Eldridge, Iwo Jima and the Bonin Islands in U.S.-Japan Relations: American Strategy, Japanese Territory, and the Islanders In-Between (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2014). For a longer social and cultural history of these islands and their inhabitants, see David Chapman, The Bonin Islanders, 1830 to the Present: Narrating Japanese Nationality (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016).


44. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), p. 44.


47. Gang Deng, Maritime Sector, Institutions, and Sea Power of Premodern China (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999). In regard to pirates (wakō)—many of whom originated from Japan—and their smuggling activities, see Peter D. Sharpinsky, Lords of the Sea: Pirates, Violence, and Commerce in Late-Medieval Japan (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2014).

48. See, for example, Ronald P. Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991);


53. Ibid. See also Takashi Fujitani, *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

54. According to Japanese government records, 139 Taiwanese were arrested for illegal entry and were subsequently deported from Sasebo, Japan, through May 1950. Sasebo Hikiage Engokyoku, ed., *Kyokushi*, vol. 2 (Sasebo: Sasebo Hikiage Engokyoku, 1951). The Chinese Mission began to register Taiwanese in Japan as Chinese nationals—and, by extension, Allied nationals—from June 1946, but Japanese and American authorities treated them as former colonial subjects who retained Japanese nationality. While Taiwanese in Japan were not officially recognized as Chinese nationals until April 1952, they were included in the mass repatriation program and were required to carry alien registration passbooks. A Sino-Japanese history of repatriation, resettlement, and unauthorized migrations with a focus on Chinese efforts to de-colonize Taiwan constitutes an important subject that awaits future study.

Chapter 1. Liberation and Segregation in Occupied Japan


3. Kim Ilhwa, a fourteen-year-old Korean girl living in Osaka at the end of the war, described this euphoric scene of Korean comrades in her neighborhood rushing out to celebrate their emancipation. She is one of fifty-two first- and second-generation Koreans in Japan who were interviewed as part of an oral history project, many of whom gave vivid accounts of how they experienced the moment of liberation in Japan. Kim Ilhwa, “Watashi no ‘kokoro no kunshō,’” in *Zainichi issei no kioku*, edited by Kang Sang-jun and Oguma Eiji (Tokyo: Sūeisha, 2008), pp. 623–624.

4. This episode of Kim Deukjung’s experiences at the Kamioka mining plant was recorded by the South Korean government’s Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under Japanese Imperialism, which also compiled and published the oral testimonies of eighteen other conscript laborers in wartime Japan. Iljegangjeomha Gangjedongwon Pihae Jinsang Gyumyeong Wiwonhoe, ed., *Gangjedongwon gusulgirokjip*, vol. 1: *Dangkko ragoyo?* (Seoul: Gungmu

5. This Korean organization in Osaka, Chōsenjin Kyōkai, was formed on August 28, 1945. For further details concerning Korean organizations in Japan that emerged in the wake of liberation, see Chang’s remarkably vivid autobiography on how he became a tireless activist representing various social-political movements on behalf of Korean residents in Japan: Chang Jeongsu, Zainichi rokujūnen, jiritsu to teikō: Zainichi Chōsenjin undōshi eno shōgen (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 1989), pp. 131–137.

6. Hong Yeopyo’s story is retold by Ko Chanyu, a resident Korean writer who was instrumental in the oral history project published as Zainichi issei no kioku. Ko then decided to publish Hong’s memoir separately, including this description of intergenerational differences on how Koreans experienced liberation in Japan. Ko Chanyu, Koria taun ni ikiru: Hon Yopyo raifu hisutorii (Osaka: Entaitoru Shuppan, 2007), p. 20.

7. After the annexation of colonial Korea, twenty-six members of the Korean royal family were incorporated into the Japanese imperial household (Chōsen ōkōzoku). The son of the last Korean emperor, Yi Un, and other family members remained in Japan after liberation. Shinjō Michihiko, Tennō ōkōzoku: Teikoku Nippon no jun-kozoku (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2015), pp. 209–232. Forty-six ethnic Koreans were elected to public office in Japan between 1929 and 1936, mostly to municipal councils, though Pak Chungum is most famous for his successful bid to become a member of parliament in the Imperial Japanese Diet. Pak also decided to remain in postwar Japan. Michael Weiner, Race and Migration in Imperial Japan (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 1994), p. 149.


12. Kuwae Chōkō, Tsuchi ga aru, asu ga aru: Kuwae Chōkō kaikoroku (Naha: Okinawa Taimusu-sha, 1991), pp. 33–47. This is one of several autobiographies written by Kuwae, who, like many other Okinawans in Japan, describes how he cast aside his Japanese identity shortly after the war.

13. Miyazato Eiki’s remarkably straightforward view that Okinawans were liberated after the war is recounted in his memoir written by his son: Miyazato Kazuo, “Uchinaa” mihatenu yume: Miyazato Eiki to sono jidai (Naha: Bōdā Inku, 1994), pp. 121–123.
14. Yamashiro’s autobiography honestly grapples with his renunciation (tenkō) of leftist politics, support for the war effort, and bitter resentment towards Japanese authorities, sentiments that were commonly expressed by many other Okinawans from his generation. Yamashiro Zenkō, *Hi no sōsōkyoku: Ichi tenkōsha, sekirara no kyūseki* (Naha: Ryūyōdō Shobō, 1978), p. 174.

15. Ibid., pp. 175–176.


18. From the police chief of Niigata Prefecture to the chief of the Police Department, Home Ministry, “Zaijū Senjin no toriatsukai ni kansuru ken,” Tokkō hisen gōgai, August 20, 1945, in an annual report by the Tokkōka, “Shōwa 20-nendo naisen kankei shorui, shumushō hōkoku” (Japanese National Archives). At the time, the Japanese Special Police (Tokubetsu kōtō keisatsu) in every prefecture submitted investigative reports on the activities of Korean residents to the police chief, and the governor then forwarded the final report to the Home Ministry.

19. In some isolated mining districts, supervisors did not even inform the Koreans that they were liberated, so that they were forced to continue mining into the postwar period. Kim Taegi, *Sengo Nihon seiiji to zainichi Chōsenjin mondai: SCAP no tai-zainichi Chōsenjin seisaku, 1945–1952 nen* (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1997), p. 86.

20. “Sensō shūketsu ni tomonau kōjō, jigyōjō jūgyōsha no ōkyū sochi ni kansuru ken” (Kōseishō hatsu kin dai 189 gō), August 22, 1945. See Kōseishō Engokyoku, *Hikiage to engo 30-nen no ayumi*, p. 150.

21. The US Strategic Bombing Survey later found that only four 10,000-ton class ships and 158 ships of more than 1,000 tons remained in Japan at the end of the war. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *The War against Japanese Transportation 1941–1945* (Washington, DC: USSBS Transportation Division, 1947), pp. 96–98.


23. The US Pacific Fleet had issued a temporary ban on all Japanese ships over one hundred tons from setting sail while the first American occupation forces began arriving in Japan on August 24. It was on this very day that the *Ukishima Maru* exploded off the coast of Maizuru. The exact cause of the explosion has never been determined since the Japanese government used media censorship to cover up the incident, fearing an angry backlash from resident Koreans. See Kim Chanjeong, *Ukishima maru Pusan-kō e mukawazu* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1984).

24. “Himitsu shirei, Chōsenjin shūdan inyū rōmusha nado no kinyū sochi ni kansuru ken” (Keihokyo kohakkō dai 3 gō), September 1, 1945. A copy of this order can be found in Pak Gyeongsik, ed., *Zainichi Chōsenjin kankei shiryō shūsei*, vol. 5 (Tokyo: San’ichi Shobō, 1976).


26. “Himitsu shirei, Chōsenjin shūdan inyū rōmusha nado no kinyū sochi ni kansuru ken.”

27. The total number of Koreans conscripted to work for private companies in Japan since 1939 is estimated to be more than 667,000. As a result of a great number who escaped, died, or were otherwise unaccounted for, the best estimate of those who remained in Japan at the end
of the war is believed to be 280,000. See Higuchi Yūichi, “Chōsenjin senji rōdōinsha no kikoku,” in Chōsenjin senji rōdō dōin, edited by Yamada Shōji, Koshō Tadashi, and Higuchi Yūichi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005), pp. 254–255.


32. Kim, Sengo Nihon seiji to zainichi Chōsenjin mondai, p. 100.

33. According to William Underwood, these Japanese corporations received state compensation from the fall of 1945 to the spring of 1946. See Underwood, “Names, Bones, and Unpaid Wages,” pp. 11–12.


38. Ibid., p. 267.


40. For further details regarding the wartime evacuation of Okinawans to Japan, and their treatment by Japanese officials after the war, see Matthew R. Augustine, “Dividing Islanders: The Repatriation of ‘Ryūkyūans’ from Occupied Japan,” in Japan as the Occupier and the Occupied, edited by Christine De Matos and Mark E. Caprio (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 206–225.


42. The local history office of Naha City, Okinawa, recorded an impressive number of interviews with residents regarding their wartime and postwar experiences, including this one, that have been published in a two-volume set. Ikemiyagi Mitsuko, “Sokai no asa,” in Naha shishi shiryōhen, vol. 3, part 7: Shimin no senji-sengo taikenki 1, edited by Naha-shi

43. For example, the so-called Ōshima incident took place in Miyazaki Prefecture in July 1946, and the “Nihongi incident” in Kumamoto Prefecture took place the following month. For further details of these incidents by an Okinawan in Kumamoto at the time, see Arakaki, “Fukuin gunjin to sokaisha no hazama,” p. 402.

44. Okinawan migration to Asia-Pacific regions such as Micronesia and the Philippines during the first half of the twentieth century is the subject of several chapters in Ronald Y. Nakasone, ed., Okinawan Diaspora (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2002). For Okinawan migration to Taiwan, see Hiroko Matsuda, Liminality of the Japanese Empire: Border Crossings from Okinawa to Colonial Taiwan (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2018).


46. Dōhō was the Japanese term used in the report to refer to compatriots who were repatriating from Davao, Philippines. “Dabao’ zairyū dōhō hikiage jōkyō hōkoku.” Reproduced in Katō, Kai-gai hikiage kankei shiryō shūsei, vol. 33, pp. 203–207.

47. Kagoshima Hikiage Engokyoku, Kyokushi, pp. 2–3.


53. Kim, Sengo Nihon seiji to zainichi Chōsenjin mondai, pp. 91–93.


59. *Unzen Maru*, a freight ship with a capacity to carry 800 people, was dispatched to Hakata, while *Asahaku Maru*, a commercial ferry with a capacity of 1,000 people, was dispatched to Senzaki. By the end of September, at least four more ships were dispatched to make the round trip between Japan and Korea. Izumi, “Haisengo no Hakata- wan ni okeru Chōsenjin kikoku ni tsuite,” pp. 80–81.


63. *Minseika* were social welfare departments specifically designated to handle Korean affairs in a number of prefectures that had large Korean populations, such as Hokkaido, Osaka, Yamaguchi, and Fukuoka.


65. Ibid., p. 20.


70. From the time the Shimonoseki Repatriation Center’s Senzaki Branch Office was established in December 1945 until it was closed down in August 1946, 125,737 ordinary repatriates departed from Senzaki. Kōseishō Senzaki Hikiage Engokyoku, *Senzaki hikiage engokyoku-shi*, p. 26.


72. Precise figures for this category of return migration are impossible to account for, due to the exodus of Koreans through unofficial channels. Edward Wagner, who described it as a spontaneous exodus, estimated up to 525,000; Wagner, *The Korean Minority in Japan*, p. 44. Morita Yoshio, on the other hand, gives an estimate of around 400,000; Morita, “Zainichi Chōsenjin shogū no suii to genjō,” p. 57.

73. Gwon Il was involved in the formation of Zairyū Chōsenjin taisaku inkkai (Committee for Korean Residents), while Kim Duyong formed Zai Nippon Chōsenjin kyoryūmin renmei (League for Korean Residents in Japan), respectively.


78. Chang, Zainichi rokujūnen, jiritsu to teikō, pp. 136–137.

79. The full name of this committee was Zainichi Chōsenjin Renmei Chūō Kessei Junbikai (Preparatory Committee for the Formation of the Central League of Korean Residents in Japan). Tsuboe Senji, Zainichi dōhō no ugoki: Senzen sengo, zainichi Kankokujin (Chōsen) kankei shiryō (Tokyo: Jiyū Seikatsusha, 1975), pp. 78–79.

80. Ibid., pp. 79–80.

81. These regional headquarters were located in Aomori, Iwate, Kanagawa, Mie, Nara, Kyoto, Osaka, Tottori, and Okayama Prefectures. Pak, Kaihōgo zainichi Chōsenjin undōshi, p. 51.

82. Tsuboe, Zainichi dōhō no ugoki, pp. 89–91.


85. These statistics are from Morita, “Zainichi Chōsenjin shogū no suii to genjō,” p. 98; and Pak, Kaihōgo zainichi Chōsenjin undōshi, p. 322.

86. Pak, Kaihōgo zainichi Chōsenjin undōshi, p. 66.

87. This figure includes an estimated 60,000 war evacuees, 30,000 overseas returnees, and another 20,000 young men and women who were mobilized for labor service at munitions factories in Japan proper. Urasaki, Kieta Okinawa-ken, p. 75.


89. For a good description of the background behind the formation of the Kansai regional branch of the Okinawa Council in Osaka, see Yamashiro, Hi no sōsōkyoku, pp. 183–186.

90. Ibid., p. 177.

91. See, for example, Okinawa Kenjinkai Hyōgo-ken Honbu, Koko ni yōju arī, pp. 135–136.

92. Ibid., p. 87.

94. Ibid., p. 45.
96. To this day, Korean and Chinese victims of Japan’s wartime program of labor conscription have continued to demand compensation for the wages and benefits that should have been paid them at the time they were deported from Japan. For an examination into how American occupation authorities became involved in this issue, see Matthew R. Augustine, “Restitution for Reconciliation: The US, Japan, and the Unpaid Assets of Asian Forced Mobilization Victims,” Journal of Northeast Asian History 8, no. 1 (Summer 2011): 5–37.
97. The pro-imperial propaganda was supported by such widely publicized ideas as the “Japan-Korea common ancestry theory” (Nissen dōsoron) and “Japan-Ryukyus common ancestry theory” (Nichiryū dōsoron). For insightful studies on these ideas and the debates they generated in imperial Japan, see Eiji Oguma, A Genealogy of “Japanese” Self-Images (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2002); Eiji Oguma, The Boundaries of “the Japanese,” vols. 1–2 (Tokyo: Trans Pacific Press, 2014–2017).
98. Beyond the return migration of various groups of people, this also included internal migrations within Japan. For other studies that have drawn attention to the relationship between repatriation and the reemergence of postwar Japan’s discourse on ethnic homogeneity, see Lori Watt, When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009); Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Borderline Japan: Foreigners and Frontier Controls in the Postwar Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Chapter 2. Repatriation as a “Privilege” for Non-Japanese
1. American officials in various military and government agencies interviewed Koreans, Chinese, and other minorities who resided in the United States, as well as those serving in the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy who had been captured by US military forces during the war.
6. Check sheet from G-3 to CIC, October 8, 1945 (NDL GHQ/SCAP Records, G3-00046).

9. The inaugural issue of *Minjung sinmun* was published on October 10, 1945, and was briefly renamed *Chosun minjung sinmun* before reverting to its original name. For a concise study on Korean newspapers published during the occupation period, see Kobayashi Sōmei, *Zainichi Chōsenjin no media kākan: GHQ senryōki ni okeru shinbun hakkō to sono dainamizumu* (Tokyo: Fūkyōsha, 2007).

10. Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy* (London: Continuum, 2002), pp. 452–453. Founded in 1922, the JCP was outlawed in 1925, leading to a series of arrests and defections of party members. The resulting void was gradually filled by Koreans who assumed leadership positions in the 1930s, as the JCP struggled to remain an underground political party. See Michael Weiner, *Race and Migration in Imperial Japan* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 1994), pp. 165–186.


12. The Ashio copper mines, primarily known for their major industrial pollution that led to Japan's earliest environmental movement in the late nineteenth century, were also known to have employed Korean conscript laborers as well as Allied POWs during World War II. Yamada Shōji, Koshó Tadashi, and Higuchi Yūichi, *Chōsenjin senji rōdō dōin* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005), p. 235.

13. The Korean YMCA in Tokyo, founded in 1906, was a youth organization known not only for religious and educational activities but also for its great political significance. On February 8, 1919, several hundred Korean students gathered at its assembly hall where activist leaders read out loud their declaration of Korean independence from Japanese colonial rule. This incident inspired a similar public declaration that was made in Seoul on March 1, sparking the March First Movement throughout Korea. For an excellent study on the role of Christianity in these two independence declarations, see Matsutani Motokazu, “2.8 Dokuritsu sensengen to 3.1 dokuritsu undō ni okeru Kirisutokyō,” in *Higashi Ajia no naka no 2.8 dokuritsu sensengen: Wakamonotachi no deai to yume*, edited by Zainichi Kanjin Rekishi Shiryōkan (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2020).


15. For further details on SCAP’s initial support for retaining Korean laborers to produce coal in Japan, see Wagner, *The Korean Minority in Japan*, pp. 49–50.


21. See “Okinawa-jin Renmei sōritsu taikai hōkokusho,” Okinawajin renmei kankei shiryō 1, located in Naha City’s Historical Archives Room.


24. “A Petition to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces.” A copy of the English text of this petition by the League of Okinawans can be found in Okinawajin renmei kankei shiryō 1, held in the Naha City’s Historical Archives Room.

25. In addition, Tomiyama also maintains that the appeal of Okinawans as a special category of Japanese nationals and their criticism of the Japanese government must be understood as constituting essential components in a conscientious effort by Okinawans to attain their requests, as seen in the petitions. See Tomiyama Ichirō, Kindai Nihon shakai to “Okinawajin” (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 2006), pp. 257–258.


34. Shirōto Teizō refers to this American lieutenant only as “Diitsu,” which is a Japanese pronunciation for the surname Dietz or Deetz. Hakata Hikiage Engokkyoku Kyokushi-gakari,

35. According to Edward Wagner, the urgent need for coal production was not only to supply Japan but to meet South Korea’s minimum requirements. Wagner, The Korean Minority in Japan, p. 49.

36. Kim Duyong and Imamura Hideo were prevented from continuing their public speech because they called for the abolition of the emperor system. Mainichi shinbun, October 31, 1945.

37. SCAP’s Monthly Summation in November 1945 reported that an estimated 130,000 Korean and Chinese miners had been repatriated, and the Summation in January 1946 noted that their repatriation was largely accomplished. See General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Monthly Summation of Nonmilitary Activities in Japan and Korea (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1945–1948).


43. Sixth Army, G-2 Periodic Report No. 45, November 19, 1945 (NARA RG 332, Box No. 34).

44. "Korean Pirates Toss Countrymen into Sea," Stars and Stripes, December 20, 1945 (NARA RG 332, Box No. 33).


47. The main island group of Okinawa, or the Okinawa Islands (Okinawa shotō), include the Iheya-Izena Islands, Ie Island, the Aguni Islands, Kume Island, the Kerama Islands, and Okinawa Island (Okinawa hontō).

48. "Repatriation of Non-Japanese from Japan" (SCAPIN 224), November 1, 1945.


51. "Repatriation to Ryukyus" (SCAPIN 558), January 5, 1946.

52. The regional repatriation centers also provided repatriates with bedding while awaiting their designated time of embarkation. Köseishō shakaikyokuchō, "Nansei shotō shushinsha kikan toriatsukai yōryōan" (shahatsu, no. 157), January 24, 1946, in Köseishō, Showa 20-nen Hi-Nihonjin yusō kankei tsūchōtei, pp. 161–166.


56. The global collapse of sugar prices in 1920 devastated the Amami economy, which, like Okinawa, depended heavily on its brown sugar industry, driving impoverished farmers to the labor markets in mainland Japan. Nishimura Tomiaki, Amami guntō no kingendaishi: Meiji ikō no Amami seisaku (Osaka: Kainokusu, 1993), pp. 43–51.


59. Between January 27 and February 9, 1946, alone, 1,827 people were repatriated to the Miyako Islands, while another 742 were repatriated to the Yaeyama Islands. Okinawa Kenjinkai Hyōgo-ken Honbu, ed. Koko ni yōju ari: Okinawa kenjinkai Hyōgo-ken honbu 35-nenshi (Kobe: Okinawa Kenjinkai Hyōgo-ken Honbu, 1982), p. 145.

60. For more details, see Sasaki Tadao’s testimony in Kobe Amami-kai, Amami: Kobe Amami-kai sōritsu 60-shū-nen kinenshi (Kobe: Kobe Amami-kai, 1990), p. 145.

61. For displaced persons organizations that were formed in part to claim resources from American occupation authorities, see, for example, Lori Watt, When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009); Pamela Ballinger, The World Refugees Made: Decolonization and the Foundations of Postwar Italy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020).
62. The figure 13,675 is based on the numbers recorded by the Uraga and Kagoshima repatriation centers, which were the two ports from which Japanese officials carried out repatriation to the Ryukyus during this period. Kōseishō Engokyoku, ed., *Hikiage to engo 30-nen no ayumi* (Tokyo: Gyo-sei, 1978), p. 151.


65. “Displaced Persons in Japan” (SWNCC 205/1), December 5, 1945.

66. “Repatriation and Koreans Affairs in Japan,” a confidential report from Captain Robert L. Beyer to the chief of Foreign Affairs Section, USAMGIK, February 5, 1946 (NARA RG 332, Box No. 33).


74. March 18, 1946, the last date of the one-month registration period, was designated as the end of “volunteer repatriation” and the beginning of “controlled mass repatriation.” GHQ/SCAP, “Treatment of Foreign Nationals,” *History of Nonmilitary Activities,* pp. 11, 16.

75. According to SCAP, 646,711 Koreans were registered at this time. GHQ/SCAP, “Treatment of Foreign Nationals,” *History of Nonmilitary Activities,* p. 18. However, this figure does not include large numbers of Koreans who did not register and others who had illegally entered Japan since the end of the war.

76. SCAP Memorandum for Imperial Japanese Government, “Repatriation of Chinese, Formosans, and Koreans” (SCAPIN 876), April 13, 1946. In Takemae, *GHQ shirei sōshūsei*, vol. 4, p. 1432. The rate of repatriation and target date for completion contained in this directive were subsequently amended several times.

77. The League of Koreans was known to have asked members of one of its rival Korean organizations to be shipped out of Japan by scheduling them for repatriation. *Minjung sinmun,* July 1, 1946. Cited in Wagner, *The Korean Minority in Japan,* pp. 51–52.

78. According to Edward Wagner, the League of Koreans negotiated with the Ministry of Finance and secured withdrawals from these accounts of more than ¥100,000,000 in the first four months of 1946. Wagner, *The Korean Minority in Japan,* p. 53.


80. For USAMGIK’s liaison teams, including the Tokyo Liaison Office, see Wagner, *The Korean Minority in Japan,* pp. 78–80.


83. Such strong measures included forcibly deporting any Korean who interfered with the Japanese government’s implementation of procedures for the mass repatriation program. This was based on the Home Ministry Security Bureau’s order no. 35, issued on June 21, 1946. Reference to this official document is found in Kyoto-fu Keisatsushi Hensan Iinkai, ed., Kyōto-fu keisatsushi (Kyoto: Kyoto-fu Keisatsu Honbu, 1980), pp. 592–597.

84. Kōseishō, “Nippon seifu gawa tachiai no moto ni okonawaretaru Ma shireibu no Chōsenjin dantai daihyōsha ni taisuru taidan yōshi,” March 6, 1946. This document is reproduced in Pak Gyeongsik, ed., Chōsen mondai shiryō sōsho, vol. 1: Senji kyōsei renkō “Kasen rōmu taisaku iinkai katsudō kiroku” (Kawasaki: Ajia Mondai Kenkyūjo, 1990), pp. 155–167. The two Korean organizations represented at this meeting were the League of Koreans and the Youth Alliance.

85. Daejung sinmun, June 20, 1946. This Korean language newspaper, like its successor Hae-bang sinmun, was censored by SCAP’s Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD). Copies of this and other editions of Daejung sinmun are available in the Gordon W. Prange Collection of the University of Maryland and the National Diet Library of Japan.


87. Among the 9,701 Koreans who registered their desire to repatriate to northern Korea in March 1946, more than 9,000 remained in Japan after the two shipments in March and June 1947. GHQ/SCAP, “Treatment of Foreign Nationals,” History of Nonmilitary Activities, pp. 28–29.

88. Ibid., pp. 41–44.


90. According to Home Ministry records, 200,784 Ryukyuans registered, of whom 141,369 stated their desire to repatriate. GHQ/SCAP, “Treatment of Foreign Nationals,” p. 18. However, this figure does not accurately reflect the actual number of Ryukyuans in Japan, as a considerable number never showed up for registration.

91. The decision to register Ryukyuans was based on SCAPIN 224, which explicitly stipulated that they were included among other non-Japanese to be repatriated. For the registration of Okinawans and Amamians in mainland Japan as Ryukyuans, see Matthew R. Augustine, “Dividing Islanders: The Repatriation of ‘Ryūkyūans’ from Occupied Japan,” in Japan as the Occupier and the Occupied, edited by Christine De Matos and Mark E. Caprio (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 214–217.


95. For the Ministry of Health and Welfare’s Order No. 19, see Takagi, “1946-nen ‘hi-Nihonjin’ chōsa to Amami renmei, Nansei shotō renmei,” pp. 32–33.

96. Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 74.


99. Ibid.

100. They escorted repatriates to Ujina, Ōtake, Sasebo, and Kagoshima, although they could also board repatriation ships from Uraga and Nagoya as well. For more details, see Okinawa Kenjinkai Hyōgo-ken Honbu, *Koko ni yōju ari*, pp. 147–150.


102. Ibid., p. 20.


Chapter 3. Resettlement without Reintegration

1. Iljegangjeomha Gangjeongwon Pihae Jinsang Gyumyeong Wiwonhoe, ed., *Gangjeongwon gusulgikjip*, vol. 1: *Dangkko ragoyo?* (Seoul: Gungmu Chongnisil Sosok Iljegangjeomha Gangjeongwon Pihae Jinsang Gyumyeong Wiwonhoe, 2005), pp. 297–299. Many Korean conscript laborers were killed during their period of servitude in Japan. Others repatriated with permanent injuries and illnesses, including those who were employed at munitions factories in Hiroshima and Nagasaki when those two cities were devastated by atomic bombs. Until recently, these Korean repatriates were denied medical treatment and health care benefits provided by the Japanese government. For further analysis on the subject,

2. This verse is taken from the Chinese poem “Marching On and On” (Xing Xing Chong Xing Xing), the first of the Nineteen Old Poems (Gushi Shijiu Shou), which is an anthology of classical Chinese poems dating from the Han Dynasty. The Japanese name for this anthology is Koshi jyūkyū shu.

3. Jiyū Okinawa (Kyushūban), August 5, 1946.

4. The “space of liberation” and the “three-year history of liberation” were terms of historical periodization, referring to the period between August 15, 1945, and August 15, 1948, and which were popularized by young scholars in South Korea in the 1980s. For a good explanation of these terms and their significance, see, for example, Yang Jeong Sim, “‘Liberation Space’ and Times of Resistance in Visual Records,” International Journal of Korean History 19, no. 2 (August 2014): 71–105. For an influential series in Korean that represents critical, revisionist views of this time period, see Song Geonho et al., Haebang jeonhusa ui insik, vols. 1–3 (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1979–1980).


8. The distribution of the Government-General’s subsidy provided to the Sewakai branches in southern Korea was as follows: ¥5 million to Seoul, ¥1 million to Busan, ¥400,000 to Taegu, ¥200,000 to Taejon, and ¥200,000 to Gunsan. Harada, “Shūsen ni tomonau hikiage jimu shori,” p. 152.

9. Ibid., pp. 156–158.


12. Ibid., pp. 270–271.


15. Maeil sinbo, October 1, 1945.


20. For more details on official plans regarding displaced persons and their repatriation, see Gane, “Foreign Affairs of South Korea,” pp. 17–30.

21. 40th Infantry Division, “Evacuation and Repatriation in Korea” (undated) (NARA RG 332, Box No. 32).


25. Ibid., p. 56.

26. For further details regarding Chong Taehui’s ouster from the Central Committee, see Gane, “Repatriation,” pp. 61–62.

27. Ibid., pp. 69–70.

28. For further details on these plans devised by Lieutenant Martin J. Ross, see Gane, “Repatriation,” pp. 70, 78–79.


32. In addition, Council members included five teachers, one police official, a former president of the Naha bar association, and the former managing editor of a local newspaper. Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, p. 105.


35. Most of the twenty-five assemblymen had previously served in the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly. The military government permitted them to serve in the new Okinawa Assembly,
since there was a dearth of Okinawans with administrative experience who had survived the war. Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, pp. 110–111.

36. As it turned out, the III Amphibious Corps, which advanced north, took in nearly 66,000 refugees by April 20, while the XXIV Corps, moving south and east, had taken in only 20,000 civilians, rather than the 200,000 expected. Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, pp. 63–64.

37. For example, in late May, the Tenth Army supervised one of the largest enforced relocations when the entire population of Ie Shima was dispersed to other islands, engendering widespread animosity towards the US occupiers. Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, pp. 57–60.


39. In early September the Okinawa Advisory Council was given permission to go on an inspection tour of the entire island of Okinawa to assess the extent of the damage inflicted by the war. Okinawa-ken Kyōiku linkai, ed., *Okinawa-ken shiryo, sengo 1: Okinawa shijunkai kiroku* (Naha: Okinawa-ken Okinawa shiryo henshūjo, 1986), p. 36.


41. To this day some of these people, including former repatriates, have been unable to return to their place of origin in Okinawa. See Okinawa-ken Kyōiku linkai, *Okinawa shijunkai kiroku*.

42. This nickname was coined by journalist Frank Gibney after his visit to Okinawa in 1949. See Frank Gibney, “Forgotten Island,” *Time*, November 28, 1949.


44. The exact figure of 33,075 is based on the official records of the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare. See Aniya Masaaki, “Sengo no kaigai hikiage,” in *Innumi kara: 50-nenme no shōgen*, edited by Okinawa-shi Kikakubu Heiwa Bunka Shinkō-ka (Naha: Naha Shuppan-sha, 1995), p. 13. In addition, a limited number of Okinawans also returned to the Miyako and Ishigaki Islands from Taiwan during this period.


46. Camp Kubasaki was established to be able to accommodate 6,000 repatriates at one time, while Innumi was set up to hold another 4,000. The three camps in Naze were each set up to accommodate 1,000 repatriates. In Miyako, a sufficient number of tents were erected to care for any overflow of persons that could not locate their homes or relatives. Ryukyus Command, Military Government, “Final Report on the Ryukyuan Repatriation,” p. 2. A copy of this report is reproduced in Okinawa-shi Kikakubu Heiwa Bunka Shinkō-ka, *Innumi kara*, pp. 230–235.


48. This was a process that those working on the name lists called tejimari. Ishiki, “Innumi Yādui ni tsuite,” p. 19.


52. In August 1945, the Guomindang drafted a plan to “demobilize the Northeast” of Japanese military rule, including articles stipulating the requisitioning of farmlands and industries, in addition to repatriating Japanese and Koreans. For further details regarding these plans, see Kim Chun-seon, “The Settlement and Repatriation of Koreans in Northeast China after Liberation,” Korea Journal 44, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 92–93.


55. Ibid., pp. 44–45, 114–123.


57. Statistics compiled by Korean officials showed a total of 317,182 Koreans were repatriated from Manchuria, in addition to 622,044 Koreans who relocated from northern Korea. U.S. Army Forces in Korea, South Korean Interim Government Activities, no. 34 (July–August 1948), p. 8.


59. Gane, “Repatriation,” p. 57. As of mid-October 1945, thirteen facilities were set up throughout Seoul to accommodate repatriates. Military government teams were using similar facilities in other parts of Korea. Gane, “Repatriation,” pp. 57–58.


62. Ibid., p. 158.


72. This part of Miyazato’s story is based on an interview found in Arasaki Moriteru, ed., "Meiji, Taishō, Shōwa no shakaisō," in *Okinawa gendashi eno shōgen*, vol. 2 (Naha: Okinawa Taimushusa, 1982), pp. 62–63.


79. The rations authorized to Okinawans were initially set at 1,990 calories per day, but were later reduced to 1,530 calories per day due to food shortages. From the Deputy Commander for Military Government to the Commander, NOB Okinawa and Chief MG Officer, “Final Report of Military Government Activities for Period from 1 April 1945 to 1 July 1946,” July 1, 1946 (NARA RG 260, Box 25).


81. For a short time after the war this currency was used simultaneously with the new yen being circulated in Japan proper. From 1948, however, the circulation of the new Japanese yen was prohibited and the B yen became the only legal currency used in Okinawa. Fisch, *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, pp. 146–148.

82. Like the Okinawa Advisory Council, these so-called provisional governments were powerless and strictly controlled by the military governments set up in each of these island groups.


86. According to Wakabayashi Chiyo, the expression “off limits” held two meanings in symbolizing the American occupation of Okinawa. One was an Okinawa under the exclusive control of the US military, cut off from international society. Another aspect referred to the internal manifestations of this condition by which people were driven out of their villages, which became off limits in their own island. See Wakabayashi Chiyo, “‘Ofu-rimittsu’ no shima,” *Gendai shisō* (March 1999): 24.


90. HUSAFIK, part 1, chapter 8, “Repatriation of Japanese Civilians and Other Foreign Nationals,” p. 59.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid., pp. 59–61.


94. According to this report, a Counter Intelligence Corps investigation showed the Sewakai in Busan “operates openly under the guise of instructing Japanese repatriates in the policies and regulations of the United States pertinent to their shipment to Japan.” G-2, 40th Division, Periodic Report no. 36. See HUSAFIK, “Repatriation of Japanese Civilians and Other Foreign Nationals,” p. 61.


100. Gane, “Foreign Affairs of South Korea,” pp. 88–89.

101. Nationals of other countries domiciled in Korea who desired Korean status, including stateless persons such as White Russians but excluding Axis nationals, could also be recognized as Korean. USAMGIK, Foreign Affairs Section, “Staff Memorandum Number 11,” January 10, 1946.

103. South Korean Interim Government, “Provisional Rules Regarding Nationality” (Public Act No. 11), May 11, 1948.

104. Ibid.


Chapter 4. Smuggling as Resistance to US Military Rule


2. As Tessa Morris-Suzuki notes, knowledge of the Jeju rebellion and subsequent massacre was suppressed within South Korea for nearly half a century; consequently, much of the outside world’s knowledge on the subject initially came from those who fled to Japan. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Borderline Japan: Foreigners and Frontier Controls in the Postwar Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 75. People from the Jeju Island community in Osaka, led by novelist Kim Seokbeom, began to write the first accounts of the tragic events during the 1960s, then went on to spearhead a reparations movement in the 1980s. For further details, see Mun Gyeongsu, Saishūtō 4.3 Jiken: “Tamno na kuni” no shi to saisei no monogatari (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2008).


4. Kajimura Hideki, “Teijū gaikokujin to shite no zainichi Chōsenjin,” in Kajimura Hideki chosakushū, vol. 6: Zainichi Chōsenjin-ron (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1993). Although Kajimura coined this expression to describe Koreans who remained in Japan after liberation, the concept is applicable to migrants who lived between the imperial metropole and the colonies before 1945.

5. Reports from AFPA-K to GHQ/SCAP (AFPAC/K/27) (NARA RG 331, Box 8547).


19. The story of Kinjō Natsuko, the “queen of the Okinawan smuggling trade,” is recounted by Okuno, Natsuko.


25. For further details concerning this association’s political inclinations, especially that of its publicity director, Cheong Taehui, see William J. Gane, “Repatriation: From 25 September 1945 to 31 December 1945,” pp. 61–62 (NARA RG 332, Box No. 33).


29. These three measures were promised by Kang Byeongdong of the KPR’s internal affairs section. See Kim Namsik, ed., Namnodang yeongu, vol. 3: Jaryopyeon (Seoul: Dolpegae, 1988), p. 72.


32. This description of the participation of League of Koreans representatives in the national conference of the People’s Committee representatives in Seoul is based on a report that was subsequently submitted to the League: Zai Nippon Chōsenjin Renmei Sōhonbu, “Hongoku tokuhain hōkoku—Nisshi.” Excerpts of this report are reproduced in Chang, Zainichi rokujujinen, jiritsu to teikō, pp. 247–253.


34. Chang, Zainichi rokujujinen, jiritsu to teikō, pp. 156–158.

35. Headquarters, USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor of Korea, Ordinance Number 33, December 6, 1945.

36. Headquarters, USAFIK, Office of the Military Governor of Korea, Custody Order Number 2, December 26, 1945.

37. Other categories of “traitors” included those who attempted to assassinate leaders of democratic organizations, those who attacked patriotic leaders and their families through the radio and publications, police who arrested and imprisoned democratic leaders, and those who brought about disgrace by slandering the military government. Kim, Namnodang yeongu, vol. 3, p. 281.


40. For an in-depth study on the range of problems relating to the disposition of formerly Japanese-owned property that was held by USAMGIK’s Office of Property Custody, see Tingting Li, “The Making of the Postcolonial Economy: The Disposition of Formerly Japanese Owned Enterprises in South Korea, 1945–1960” (PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2014).


51. Ko, Koria taun ni ikiru, p. 31.

52. After the US military invaded Okinawa, military government officials initially had difficulty finding qualified Okinawans who could help administer the islands. Out of necessity, they had to rely on local officials who had supported the Japanese war effort, many of whom served in the Civil Administration. See Arnold G. Fisch Jr., Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945–1950 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1988), pp. 103–104.

53. Yamashiro has described the details of this meeting, referred to as the Okinawa kensetsu kondankai in Japanese, in a series of articles published by one of the leading newspapers in Okinawa, Ryūkyū shinpō. See Yamashiro Zenkō, “Araya no hi,” Ryūkyū shinpō, March 27, 1982.


55. Aharen Yukitomo, for example, was a labor union organizer and member of the leftist Okinawan organization called the Sekiryūkai in the Kansai region in the 1920s. He repatriated to Okinawa in 1946 and was subsequently selected as a central committee member of the People’s Party. Arasaki Moriteru, “Shakai undō no teihen o sasaeru mono,” in Okinawa gendashi eno shōgen, vol. 1 (Naha: Okinawa Taimususha, 1982), pp. 121–46.


60. The US military retained over 12,000 Japanese POWs in postwar Okinawa for their labor until they were finally repatriated in October 1946. For further details, see Toriyama Atsushi, “Fukkō eno maishin: Günsagyō o meguru hitobito no ugoki,” in Sengo o tadoru: Amerika-yū kara “Yamato-yū” e, edited by Nahashi Rekishi Hakubutsukan (Naha: Ryūkyū Shinpōsha, 2007), pp. 92–93.

61. According to Arnold Fisch, RYCOM initially felt it was easier to import Filipino supervisors who spoke English and were already trained to operate military installations than it was to train Okinawans. Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, pp. 144–145.


63. This protest letter is a translation from the Japanese original, which is quoted in Senaga Kamejirō, Senaga Kamejirō kaisōroku (Tokyo: Shin Nippon Shuppansha, 1991), p. 69.


70. Senaga Kamejirō used his influence as the editor-in-chief of the *Uruma shinpō* to help establish two other newspapers, the *Okinawa mainichi shinbun* and the *Okinawa taimusu*, along with the journal *Jinmin Bunka*, all of which gave coverage of the mass rallies that these political parties organized. For further details, see David John Obermiller, “The U.S. Military Occupation of Okinawa: Politicizing and Contesting Okinawan Identity, 1945–1955” (PhD dissertation, University of Iowa, 2006), pp. 220–226.


73. Senaga, *Senaga Kamejirō kaisōroku*, p. 70.


84. The report also described revised plans for smuggling operations and the struggle for ethnic liberation as two other topics discussed at the liaison conference. Military Intelligence Section, SCAP, “Liaison Conference of the Korean League and the Japanese Communist Party Held at Kechi-machi, Tsushima Island,” June 30, 1948 (NARA RG 338, Box 35).


87. SCAP’s G-2 Section began frequently reporting on the liaison activities between pro-communist organizations on the Korean peninsula and the League of Koreans in Japan from the spring of 1948, though many of its intelligence reports admitted that the evidence was inconclusive. Kobayashi Tomoko, “GHQ no zainichi Chōsenjin ninshiki ni kansuru ichikōsatsu: G-II minkan chōhōkyoku teiki hōkusho o chūshin ni,” *Chōsen shi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 32 (October 1994): 165–192.

88. Investigative report, “Tsushima Island,” August 8, 1951 (OD, JN, No. 656) (NARA RG 331, Box No. 2133). Neither US military intelligence reports nor official histories of the JCP have verified the validity of this report. As Robert Ricketts has argued, the problem of corroborating intelligence reports on such sensitive issues as communist infiltration from Korea is that the Japanese government has failed to declassify official records related to the subject. See Robert Ricketts, “Zainichi Chōsenjin no minzoku jishuken no hakai katei: 1948–1949 o chūshin ni,” *Seikyū gakujutsu ronshū* 6 (March 1995): 271.

90. On the concept of transnational families and the important role they played in linking Okinawa with various parts of the world, see Edith Kaneshiro, “‘Our Home Will Be the Five Continents’: Okinawan Migration to Hawaii, California, and the Philippines, 1899–1941” (PhD dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1999).

91. Wakabayashi Chiyo convincingly argues that one of the major transformations of postwar Okinawan society was that residents were prevented from maintaining such transnational links with overseas Okinawans. Wakabayashi Chiyo, “Jeepu to sajin: Senryōshoki Okinawa shakai no henyo to henyi,” *Okinawa bunka kenkyū* 29 (2003): 244–245, 254.


95. The Itoman City’s official website provides a detailed explanation on historical development of its fishing industry. See www.city.itoman.okinawa.jp/english/ayumi/index.html#6.

96. The Itoman residents of Kagoshima had to compete with those from the Amami Islands, who had an equally well-organized base for their smuggling network. Ishihara Masaie, *Kūhaku no Okinawa shakaishi: Senka to mitsubōeki no jidai* (Tokyo: Banseisha, 2000), p. 238.

97. Ibid., pp. 233–234.


101. During the same period, RYCOM’s export of scrap metals also increased dramatically until it surpassed sugar as the number one export product from Okinawa in 1951. Okuno, *Natsumoku*, pp. 337–338.

102. For a detailed account of this incident, see Satake, *Gunseika Amami no mikkō, mitsubōeki*, pp. 87–133.

103. The Okinawa Youth Alliance had published the original version of this book, which was the culmination of Iha’s lifelong work on Okinawan studies, in November 1946. Ishihara, *Kūhaku no Okinawa shakaishi*, pp. 219–228.


105. As David Obermiller argues, the protest movements that preceded the reversion movement reveal the core impulse that propelled the reversion movement, namely, “popular resistance to foreign occupation and Okinawa’s neo-colonial status.” Obermiller, “The U.S. Military Occupation of Okinawa,” p. 201.

Chapter 5. “Blockade Runners” and the Making of “Aliens”


4. For details, see USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, especially those reports from November 1945 onwards.

5. “Smuggling of Koreans into Japan,” from Lieutenant James C. Graham to the Director, Office of Foreign Affairs, USAMGIK, May 4, 1946 (NARA RG332, Box No. 33).


7. Weekly Report, April 23–29, from Lieutenant James C. Graham of the Senzaki Liaison Office, USAMGIK, to Chief Liaison Officer in Tokyo, April 29, 1946 (NARA RG 332, Box No. 34).

8. USAFIK, “G-2 Periodic Report, No. 678,” November 6, 1947, USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, vol. 5. Other sources cited in the same report note that the Ulgi lighthouse near Busan, where a Korean Coast Guard detachment was stationed, was commonly known as “Little Moscow,” because leftist meetings were held there and Coast Guard members were accused of confining and terrorizing rightists in this lighthouse.


15. BCOF Monthly Intelligence Review No. 6, October 20, 1946 (AWM 114, 423/11/6).


18. The Shibuya Incident of July 19, 1946, was first reported by *Asahi shinbun* two days later, then received widespread coverage in the leading daily newspapers, which continued to follow the story through the public trials, which lasted until December. For a detailed account of the Shibuya Incident in Japanese, see, for example, Nanao Kazuaki, *Yami’ichi no teiō: Ō Chōtoku to fūin sareta “sengo”* (Tokyo: Ōshōsha, 2011).


20. Ibid., pp. 43–44.


28. A notable difference between the Japanese and American statutes was that the original 1947 Alien Registration Ordinance in occupied Japan did not require fingerprinting, although this was later made mandatory in 1952. See Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p. 450.


35. 2 NZEF (Japan) Quarterly General Reports No. 1, October 15, 1946 (WA-J 2/46).


37. BCOF Monthly Intelligence Review No. 7, November 20, 1946 (AWM 114, 423/11/7).

38. Letter, “Repatriation of Koreans from Japan,” from Lieutenant General John Hodge to SCAP, August 27, 1947 (NARA RG 331, Box No. 382, Folder No. 11).


40. Letter from GHQ/SCAP to CG USAFIK, October 1947 (NARA RG 331, Box No. 382, Folder No. 11).


44. See Haebang sinmun articles from late 1946, including October 10 and 15, December 1. These articles are reproduced in Pak Gyeongsik, ed., Kainhōgo no zaинichī Chōsenjin unŏđo, vol. 3 (Kawasaki: Ajia Mondai Kenkyūjo, 1984), pp. 47, 50, 59.


49. 1st Interim Report by Special Agent Frank J. Barth Jr., Tokyo-to Area 441st CIC Department, “Korean League Liaison Personnel to North Korea,” October 18, 1948 (NARA RG 338, Box 35).

50. Jack Napier had worked in Government Section's Korean Division, helping to coordinate the mass repatriation program with USAMGIK, and rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel. According to Takemae Eiji, Napier also developed a close working relationship with Home Ministry officials with expertise on Koreans in Japan, and continued to cultivate those ties after the ministry was dissolved in December 1947. Takemae, Inside GHQ, p. 450.

51. Nine of the JCP's executive members refused to turn themselves in to the police, including Tokuda Kyūichi, who fled to China and formed an underground resistance movement. For the Red Purge in occupied Japan, see, for example, John W. Dower and Hirata Tetsuo, “Japan's Red Purge: Lessons from a Saga of Suppression of Free Speech and Thought,” Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 5, no. 7 (2007); Hirata Tetsuo, Reddo Paaji no shiteki kyūmei (Tokyo: Shin Nippon Shuppansha, 2002).


55. For the diplomatic negotiations between SCAP and the Japanese government that led to the revised Alien Registration Ordinance, see Ōnuma, Tan’ītsu minzoku shakai no shinwa o koete, pp. 65–77.

56. CLO No. 2835, “Proposed Control of Illegal Entry,” June 12, 1946.

67. Ibid., p. 72.
69. For further details on the JCP’s policy shift and Tokuda Kyūichi’s ideas for Ryukyuan independence, followed by a reunion with Japan, see Mori Yoshio, *Tsuchi no naka no kakumei: Okinawa sengoshi ni okeru sonzai no kaihō* (Tokyo: Gendai Kikakushitsu, 2010), pp. 84–89.
70. Ibid., pp. 126, 205.
73. Ibid., pp. 72, 145–146.
75. As a result of these new measures, an *Okinawa taimusu* article reported that the number of captured smuggling vessels jumped from nineteen in 1949 to 109 ships through August of 1950. *Okinawa taimusu*, December 13, 1951. Cited in Okuno, *Natsuko*, p. 271.
76. This was part of a larger plan for deployment of a broad range of US Navy cruisers to the Japanese Coast Guard, the Ryukyu Coast Guard, and the South Korean Navy. Gabe Masaaki, *Nichibei kankei no naka no Okinawa* (Tokyo: San-ichi Shobō, 1996), p. 84.
78. 526th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, Ryukyu Command, “Fourth Year of Ryukyuan Politics,” December 5, 1950, p. 139 (RG 338 Entry 34179, Box 1).
81. From J. M. Ebitt, Captain, AGD, Assistant Adjutant General, by command of General MacArthur, General Headquarters, Far East Command, to Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, February 19, 1948 (NDL, USCAR Records, Box 286, Folder No. 8).

82. From Charles H. Andrews, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry, Director, General Affairs Department to the Legal Department, “Immigration and Customs Control,” August 6, 1949 (NDL, USCAR Records, Box 286, Folder No. 8).

83. From R. M. Levy, Colonel, AGD, Adjutant General, for the Supreme Commander, General Headquarters, SCAP, to Military Governor, Ryukyus Command, August 12, 1949 (NDL, USCAR Records, Box 286, Folder No. 8).

84. The fare for commercial transport from Naha, Okinawa, to Sasebo in Nagasaki Prefecture was initially fixed at ¥1,200, while the cost from Naze, Amami, to Sasebo was ¥800. Likewise, the rate from Naha to Yokohama in Kanagawa Prefecture was fixed at ¥2,370, and the Naze–Yokohama route was ¥1,920. From SCAP to Commanding General, RYCOM, “Passage Fares of Ryukyuan for Compassionate Reasons,” September 17, 1949 (NDL, USCAR Records, Box 286, Folder No. 8).

85. From J. R. Sheetz, Major General USA, Military Governor, Office of the Military Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Far East Command, “Entry and Exit of Persons into the Ryukyu Islands,” undated (NDL, USCAR Records, Box 286, Folder No. 8).


87. For further analysis of these travel regulations, see Edith Kaneshiro, “‘For Compassionate Reasons’: Okinawan Repatriations during the American Occupation of Japan,” in Sengo Okinawa to Amerika: Ibunka sesshoku no sogoteki kenkyu, edited by Yamazato Katsunori (Nishihara-cho: Ryukyu University, 2005), pp. 322–331.


89. The Japanese government’s Ordinance No. 85 issued on April 27, 1947, officially recognized the family registries in Okinawa as Japanese family registries.


95. Ōnuma, Tan’itsu minzoku shakai no shinwa o koete, p. 69.


106. Napier worked closely with the Japanese attorney general in drafting a revamped version of the Organization Control Ordinance, which was passed in July 1952 as the Subversive Activities Prevention Law, largely based on the Smith and McCarran Acts of the US government. Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, p. 493.


113. Civil Administration Ordinance No. 93, “Control of Entry and Exit of Individuals into and from the Ryukyu Islands,” January 7, 1953.

114. Civil Administration Ordinance No. 125, “Control of Entry and Exit of Individuals into and from the Ryukyu Islands,” February 11, 1954.
115. Civil Administration Ordinance No. 147, “Control of Travel to Japan by Residents of the Ryukyu Islands,” August 13, 1955.

Conclusion


2. For a discussion on how SCAP’s customs restrictions led Japanese repatriate organizations to demand compensation from the Japanese government after the occupation period, see Lori Watt, When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), pp. 173–178.


6. For an insightful discussion of this exodus, see Iain MacGregor, Checkpoint Charlie: The Cold War, the Berlin Wall, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth (New York: Scribner, 2019).


8. According to Tony Judt, the first to be sent home were Allied, or UN, nationals liberated from concentration camps; then came UN nationals who had been prisoners of war, followed by UN nationals who were forced laborers and foreign workers, then displaced persons from Italy, and finally the nationals of former enemy states. Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 29.


11. For a regional breakdown of the millions of Asians mobilized to support the Japanese war effort, see, for example, Paul H. Kratoska, ed., Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown Histories (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2005).


13. For comparisons between German expellees and Japanese repatriates, see Watt, When Empire Comes Home, pp. 200–208.


15. Ibid., pp. 11–12.


17. See, for example, Daqing Yang, “Resurrecting the Empire? Japanese Technicians in Postwar China, 1945–49,” in The Japanese Empire in East Asia and Its Postwar Legacy, edited


23. Taking advantage of these and other new rights, combined with Britain’s postwar need for labor, an estimated 400,000 people migrated from the colonies to Great Britain between 1946 and 1962. Todd Shepard, *Voices of Decolonization: A Brief History with Documents* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2015), p. 29.


25. An estimated 87,000 Koreans in Japan were shipped out to North Korea through the 1980s. For an in-depth study of this repatriation program, see Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Exodus to North Korea: Shadows from Japan’s Cold War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).


34. See, for example, Gavan McCormack, Client State: Japan in the American Embrace (New York: Verso, 2007).


36. Robert Ricketts, an American resident in Japan, joined a growing number of foreigners in Japan who were arrested for refusing to be fingerprinted. Takemae Eiji served as a witness in Ricketts’ trial, providing detailed testimony on the establishment of the alien registration system during the occupation period. See Takemae Eiji and Robert D. Ricketts, “Robaato Riketto shimon ōnatsu kyohi jiken kankei shiryō (1),” Tokyo Keidai Gakkai shi 161 (June 1989): 1–75.


42. 526th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, Ryukyus Command, “A Monograph of Ryukyuan Politics,” April 15, 1948, p. 42 (NARA RG 338, Entry 34179, Box 1).

44. In December 1946, JCP member and Amami native Hisadome Yoshizō made an unauthorized journey from Japan, having received Tokuda Kyūichi’s blessings to establish a communist party in Amami. Hisadome then returned to Japan in June to serve as a liaison between the ACP and the JCP headquarters in Tokyo. For further details, see Katō Tetsurō, “Aratani hakken sareta ‘Okinawa/Amami higōhō kyōsantō bunshō’ ni tsuite,” in Okinawa no higōhō kyōsantō shiryo (Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 2004).

45. For further details concerning the formation of the Amami Rengō in Japan, see Oikawa Eiho, Kusetsu hachinen ni omou (Osaka: Amami Oshima Fukki Taisaku Iinkai Osaka Honbu, 1954), pp. 5–15.


47. For further details involving this incident, see Murayama Iekuni, Amami fukkishi (Naze: Nankai Nichinichi Shinbunsha, 1971), p. 219.

48. Ibid., p. 248. According to Eldridge, while the total figure of 139,348 signatures was probably exaggerated, it nevertheless demonstrated the residents’ overwhelming support for returning the islands to Japan. Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands, p. 71, footnote 88.

49. The delegates of the Reversion Council were able to meet with Prime Minister Yoshida, Japanese Diet members, and SCAP officials. See Satake Kyōko, Gunseika Amami no mikkō, mitsubōeki (Kagoshima: Nanpō Shinsha, 2003), pp. 137–144.


51. For further details regarding USCAR’s repeated attempts to inaugurate a Ryukyuan flag, see Gabe Masaaki, Nichibei kankei no naka no Amami no okinawa (Tokyo: San-ichi Shobō, 1996), pp. 98–104.

