Notes

FROM PREDATION TO GENOCIDE

Epigraphs: Member of Civil Society 10, February 2, 2016; Thirty-five-year-old displaced woman from Lomuku village, Yei county, June 16, 2017


2. The exception may be South Sudanese intellectual Peter Adwok Nyaba’s latest book, largely ignored by international circles, most likely due to his affiliation with the opposition. Peter Adwok Nyaba, South Sudan. Elites, Ethnicity, Endless Wars and the Stunted State (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki Na Nyota Publishers Ltd, 2019).


4. Member of Civil Society 4, June 14, 2017. I use the term “civil society” very broadly to protect the anonymity of local nonstate and unarmed organized actors I interviewed.


7. Replace “Holocaust” with “Rwanda” in Moses and Bloxham’s remark: “If the Holocaust is taken as an ‘ideal type’ genocide, scholars and advocates of particular cases often seek to fit theirs within a ‘Holocaust paradigm’ at the expense of careful contextualization.” A. Dirk Moses and Donald Bloxham, “Editor’s Introduction: Changing Themes in the Study of Genocide,” in The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, 4.

8. “Rulers and their associates resemble a mafia rather than a government if one thinks of the latter as necessarily serving some collective interest, however faint and by whatever means, to be distinguished from the mafia.” William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 3.

9. The “Equatorians” are not an ethnic group but a regional label for various ethnic groups. I return to the issue later.

10. I borrow the expression from Donald Bloxham in the case of the Armenian genocide: “The expulsion during the First World War of the majority of the Ottoman Armenians, including the murder of approximately one million of them, was part of a drive for Ottoman-Turkish population homogeneity in Anatolia . . . and in adjacent Cilicia on the Mediterranean coast. An intrinsic part of this drive, indeed, a trigger at certain points, was the settlement of Muslims in the stead of the Armenians in a sort of ‘inner colonization,’ as one contemporary observer described it: an attempt to consolidate Ottoman control of the land by the installation of ‘ethnically-reliable’ subjects in the stead of ‘untrustworthy’ ones.” Donald Bloxham, “Internal Colonization, Inter-Imperial Conflict and the Armenian Genocide,” in Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation and Subaltern Resistance in World History, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 326.


17. “The concept of mode of production, therefore, involves a complex interaction between economy, society, and the state in a form that reproduces these relationships. The essential ingredients include the prevalence of slave labour in vital sectors of the economy, the development of class relationships based on the relegation of slaves to the bottom of the social order, and the consolidation of a political and commercial infrastructure that can maintain these forms of exploitation . . . other relationships, such as those based on kinship, tribute, taxation, and plunder, are usually affected and may become dependent on relationships associated with slavery.” Paul E. Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa*, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 9–11, 269–70.

18. For a history of the Marxian concept of mode of production, neglected in favor of Immanuel Wallerstein’s “world systems” since the 1980s, and for parallels between capitalism and slavery (capitalism being a transformation of slavery), see David Graeber, “Turning Modes of Production Inside Out: Or, Why Capitalism Is a Transformation of Slavery,” *Critique of Anthropology* 26, no. 1 (2006): 61–85. My point of view differs since I see a historical connection in South Sudan, when Graeber focuses on logical terms and industrial capitalism elsewhere.


21. Civilian support was key in running the SPLA, which exhibited traits of both an “activist” and an “opportunist” rebellion in the second civil war. Jeremy M. Weinstein,


25. “A way to distinguish between the two is to ask whether at least one political actor intends to govern the population it targets for violence; an empirical indicator of this intention is whether the targets of violence have the option to surrender.” Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 26.


27. “Governments and rebel groups with narrow domestic and international constituencies tend to be more isolated from domestic and international criticism, thus reducing the costs of violence and the incentives for restraint.” Jessica A. Stanton, Violence and Restraint in Civil War Civilian Targeting in the Shadow of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 10.

28. The way in which the West has shaped the ideology of ethnic supremacy in South Sudan includes steering feelings of humiliation, which is not atypical. See Louisa Lombard, State of Rebellion: Violence and Intervention in the Central African Republic (London: Zed Books, 2016), 14.

29. This was particularly evident in the souring relationship of South Sudan with its biggest backer, the United States. See for a history of the relationship between South Sudan and the U.S. John Young, South Sudan’s Civil War: Violence, Insurgency and Failed Peacemaking (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2019).

30. I consulted some of the national archives regarding the colonial period and the first interwar period in Washington, DC, and Juba; some of the latter I cite in the first chapter. They constitute a minority of my sources.


33. “We remember insults and injuries best . . . . When something terrifying happens, like seeing a child or a friend hurt in an accident, we will retain an intense and largely
accurate memory of the event for a long time . . . the more adrenaline you secrete, the more precise your memory will be. But that is true only to a certain point. Confronted with horror—especially the horror of ‘inescapable shock’—this system becomes overwhelmed and breaks down.” Bessel Van Der Kolk, The Body Keeps The Score. Brain, Mind And Body In The Healing of Trauma. (New York: Penguin Books, 2015), 177–78, 192, 196.

34. “The fact that people can say that ‘this has happened’ remains the starting point for historiography.” Stone, “Genocide and Memory,” 104.


37. I also use the administrative delineations prior to the presidential decree of October 2015 that divided South Sudan into twenty-eight states for the sake of clarity, since administrative units keep on being added and divided since then.

38. Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations, 34.

39. Hence my imperfect decision to include in this case, whenever possible and relevant, the respondent’s ethnicity, since “Equatorian” is originally a regional identity (unlike Nuer or Dinka) with ethnic connotations. For example, I will write Madi (Equatorian). Madi refers to the respondent’s ethnic group, while Equatorian is the overarching regional category by which the respondent is identified and/or identifies.

40. Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups.


42. In other words, similar historical processes could have befallen another group than the Dinka—for example, the Nuer. But they did not, and this book explains why.


44. In this, I sympathize with Leo Kuper: “I shall follow the definition of genocide given in the UN Convention. This is not to say that I agree with the definition. On the contrary, I believe a major omission to be in the exclusion of political groups from the list of groups protected . . . However, I do not think it helpful to create a new definition of genocide, when there is an internationally recognized definition and a Convention on Genocide which might become the basis for some effective action, however limited the underlying conception.” Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 39.


46. Straus, 10, 20–24.


48. A lot of documents claiming to originate from the government of South Sudan but presumed to be fake have circulated online.

49. Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, 208.

50. Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, 1:157.


52. It is again consistent with other studies documenting various motivations among perpetrators, including in Darfur, as noted by Dominik J. Shaller, “From Lemkin to Clooney: The Development and State of Genocide Studies,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 6, no. 3 (2011): 252.

54. Writing of Rwanda’s masterminding elite, the “director” of violence, Lee Ann Fuji
noted that “no director’s vision is ever hegemonic. Realization of the director’s ideas

55. The US State Department labeled Darfur a genocide, unlike the UN Security Coun-
cil, who referred the case to the ICC but whose international Commission of Inquiry on
Darfur found no evidence of genocidal intent. I will highlight here the main differences
between Darfur and the third civil war in South Sudan. The first phase of genocidal vio-
lence in South Sudan was not started as a counterinsurgency like in Darfur; instead, it
triggered the civil war. Perpetrators in South Sudan are largely (with the exception of some
of the violence in Unity state) of the same ethnicity as the state ordering the violence—
Dinka—contrary to Darfur, where the state subcontracted local Arab militias. The state
perpetrated most of the violence in South Sudan on foot, in contrast to the much more
prominent role of aircrafts in Darfur. Extreme violence affected multiple groups and on
a longer time span in South Sudan (2003–4 were by far the most violent years in Darfur).
Sudanese state officials (for example Ahmed Haroun) and the militias they supported were
much less shy in outlining their decimating plans and claiming responsibility (until they
opted for denial and deception), as opposed to the South Sudanese state, which was much
more careful to cover its tracks from the beginning. There are still multiple links between
these two events. The history of the Sudanese state’s extractive relation and racism with
its (traditionally) non-Arab peripheries still permeates South Sudanese politics and the
making of a supremacist ideology, since the South Sudanese situation is partly a reaction
to and a consequence of it. It played out differently in Darfur, where the Arab supremacy
ist ideology originated in regional politics (particularly Libya since the 1980s) and was
supported by the state. For more, see Alex De Waal and Julie Flint, *Darfur: A New History
47–52; Gérard Prunier, *Darfour, Un Génocide Ambigu* (Paris: La Table ronde, 2005), 195,
226–29; Clémence Pinaud, “Genocides in the Sudans,” in *The Cambridge World History
of Genocide*, vol. 3, ed. Wendy Lower, Ben Kiernan, Norman Naimark, and Scott Straus

56. Thirty-four-year old displaced man from Wau, interview with the author, July 7,
2017.

57. Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
“‘They Came to Destroy’: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis” (Geneva: Independent Interna-


59. A metaconflict is a “conflict over the nature of the conflict.” Brubaker, *Ethnicity
without Groups*, 111.

60. Observer 5, interview with the author, October 31, 2017.

61. Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
“‘They Came to Destroy,’” 22, 27.

62. Member of civil society 4, interview with the author, June 14, 2017.

63. Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Genocide’s Sexuality,” *Nomos, Political Exclusion and


65. Thirty-year-old displaced woman from Kayaya village, Yei county, interview with
the author, June 16, 2017.

66. Member of civil society 3, interview with the author, July 4, 2017.

67. Destruction can be “in part” according to the 1948 UN Convention. A. Dirk Moses,
“Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of Genocide,” in *The Oxford Handbook of
Genocide Studies*, 21, 38.


70. Aid Worker 14.

71. “The conflict in South Sudan has likely led to nearly 400,000 excess deaths in the country’s population since it began in 2013, with around half of the lives lost estimated to be through violence.” The figure of fifty thousand deaths, reportedly first issued by the International Crisis Group in 2014, had been floating around until then. “War in South Sudan Estimated to Have Led to Almost 400,000 Excess Deaths,” *London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine* (blog), September 24, 2018, https://www.lshtm.ac.uk/newsevents/news/2018/war-south-sudan-estimated-have-led-almost-400000-excess-deaths; “U.N. Official Says at Least 50,000 Dead in South Sudan War,” *Reuters*, March 2, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-unrest-un/u-n-official-says-at-least-50000-dead-in-south-sudan-war-idUSKCN0W503Q.


74. By lack of strategic thinking I mean failing to ask the right questions or not knowing how to interpret data in a particular local context.

75. The Khmer Rouge was still given a share of Cambodia’s seat at the UN after it was ousted from power in 1979. Cambodia was isolated until it was finally accepted back into the international community in 1993, regaining its seat at the UN. The Khmer Rouge only came to an end in late 1998, twenty years after the genocide. See Fein, “Genocide by Attrition,” 20–21; Hinton, *Why Did They Kill?*, 6–7, 13–15; Seth Mydans, “11 Years, $300 Million and 3 Convictions. Was the Khmer Rouge Tribunal Worth It?,” *New York Times*, April 10, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/world/asia/cambodia-khmer-rouge-united-nations-tribunal.html.

1. FROM THE TURKIYYA TO THE SECOND CIVIL WAR


11. *Zariba* refers to fortified camps hosting traders, armed retainers, slaves, and camp followers, and from which slave raids were carried out. Johnson, “Sudanese Military Slavery,” 143; Rolandsen and Daly, *A History of South Sudan*, 15.


13. Rolandsen and Daly, *A History of South Sudan*, 14, 15.


24. Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 9–10. The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium was established after the Anglo-Egyptian conquest of Sudan and allowed the British to rule Sudan with Egyptian intermediaries.


developed further along “African” rather than “Arab” lines, since the south was closer to East Africa than to the Middle East. Johnson, The Root Causes, 11; Deng, War of Visions, 96–97.


35. Rolandsen and Daly, A History of South Sudan, 50.

36. Decker, In Idi Amin’s Shadow, 29.


42. Rolandsen and Daly, A History of South Sudan, 45.

43. Governor of Kordofan, “Dinka Administration.”

44. Beswick, Sudan’s Blood Memory, 1–2.


47. Rolandsen and Daly, A History of South Sudan, 58.


49. Former high-ranking SPLA and government official, interview with the author, August 7, 2014.


59. Øyvind H. Rolandsen, “A False Start: Between War and Peace in The Southern Sudan, 1956–62,” *Journal of African History* 52, no. 1 (2011): 109. Torit is located in the region of Equatoria, renamed Eastern Equatoria with the signature of the CPA in 2005. At the time it was the headquarters of the Equatorial Corps. The mutiny has been associated with the beginning of the first civil war, which historians like Johnson and Rolandsen have contradicted, arguing that it started rather in 1963–64.


64. Johnson, 30; Rolandsen, “The Making of the Anya-Nya,” 214.


73. The Upper Nile region comprises the modern-day states of Upper Nile, Jonglei, and Unity, and the region of Bahr El Ghazal encompasses the modern-day states of Lakes, Warrap, Northern Bahr El Ghazal, and Western Bahr El Ghazal.


78. O’Balance, *The Secret War*, 82, 86.


83. Johnson, 31–33, 34.

84. Rolandsen, “A False Start,” 117.
95. The Nuer and Dinka Anyanya units were among the most reluctant parties to the Addis Ababa Agreement. Johnson, “The Nuer Civil War,” 4.
96. Johnson and Prunier, “Foundation and Expansion,” 120.
102. Apart from oil, the south’s main economic asset was water. In 1974, the government launched the project of the Jonglei canal to meet the agricultural expansion of both Egypt and the Sudan. The southern regional government was not involved in the Jonglei scheme and the central government decided everything. The area of the Jonglei Canal saw very little development. Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 48–49; Woodward, *The Unstable State*, 160.
105. Even after the official end of the civil war, ex-Anyanya fighters remained in Ethiopia and were active throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s. Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 42–43.
106. Political representative 2, interview with the author, August 1, 2014.
107. Member of civil society 1, interview with the author, June 30, 2017; member of civil society 2, interview with the author, July 8, 2016.
108. Member of civil society 3, interview with the author, July 4, 2017.


115. Member of civil society 3.

116. Longtime observer 1, interview with the author, January 3, 2018; former high-ranking government official 1, interview with the author, July 11, 2017; South Sudanese intellectual 1, interview with the author, November 21, 2017.


120. Rens Willems and David Deng, “The Legacy of Kokora in South Sudan. Intersections of Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in South Sudan,” briefing paper, South Sudan Law Society, University for Peace, Pax Christi, November 2015, 7; Joseph Lagu, *Sudan: Odyssey through a State: From Ruin to Hope* (Omdurman Sudan: M.O.B Center for Sudanese Studies Omdurman Ahlia University, 2006), 376.


122. Johnson, 51.

123. Forty-year-old displaced man from Pigi Canal county, Jonglei.

124. Former high-ranking government official 1.


129. South Sudanese intellectual 1.


131. Member of civil society 3.


137. Rolandsen and Daly, *A History of South Sudan*, 95–96.


141. High-ranking government official 1, interview with the author, August 5, 2014.

142. Rolandsen and Daly, *A History of South Sudan*, 101.

143. Member of civil society 5, interview with the author, July 4, 2017.


145. Former SPLA commander, interview with the author, August 4, 2014.


149. Political representative 2, interview with the author, August 1, 2014.
154. Political representative 2.
156. Political representative 2.
183. Decker, *In Idi Amin’s Shadow*, 166.
185. Member of civil society 5, interview with the author, July 4, 2017.
188. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 144.
190. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 166.
191. Horowitz, 167, 172, 175, 185.
193. Beswick, Sudan’s Blood Memory, 199; Vaughan, Schomerus, and De Vries, The Borderlands of South Sudan, 5.
194. Beswick, Sudan’s Blood Memory, 140.
195. Beswick, 140.
196. Beswick, 208.

2. THE SPLA AND THE MAKING OF AN ETHNIC DINKA ARMY

5. Two former high-ranking government officials and high-ranking members of IO, interview with the author, February 22, 2017.
10. These problems included unemployment, inflation, and oppression by the state security organization.


19. Madut-Arop, *Sudan’s Painful Road to Peace*, 86.

20. The SPLA tried to broaden its base by recruiting a few soldiers from local communities, who would in turn also recruit others. By 1988, the SPLA had Mundari and Toposa in its ranks. Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 86.


24. Member of civil society 6, interview with the author, August 9, 2014.


27. High-ranking government official 3, interview with the author, November 11, 2010. Later, SPLA zonal commanders such as Riek Machar, in charge of Western Upper Nile in the late 1980s, would also remove cultural taboos among the Nuer by promoting the idea that gun slayings were far more impersonal, distant, and therefore less sacriligious than death by the spear. Jok Madut Jok and Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, “Sudan’s Prolonged Second Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities,” *African Studies Review* 42, no. 2 (1999): 125–45; Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, “Nuer Ethnicity Militarized,” *Anthropology Today* 16, no. 3 (June 1, 2000): 10.

28. SPLA high-ranking officer 1, interview with the author, April 4, 2009; SPLA high-ranking officer 1, interview with the author, October 5, 2010; Pinaud, “We Are Trained to Be Married!,” 375–93.


30. Clémence Pinaud, “Women, Guns and Cattle: A Social History of the Second Civil War in South Sudan” (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2013); Pinaud, “We Are Trained to Be Married!”


34. Two members of civil society 1, interview with the author, November 13, 2015; member of civil society 6, interview with the author, August 9, 2014.

35. Two members of civil society 1; three members of civil society 1, interview with the author, October 15, 2015.

36. Member of civil society 6, interview with the author, August 9, 2014.


38. “Group crystallization and polarization were the result of violence, not the cause.” Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 14.

41. Kühne, The Rise and Fall of Comradeship, 10.
42. Garang had attended school in East Africa and had obtained his bachelor of arts from the United States. He had gained military training both in the Sudan and in America, where he also pursued a PhD in agricultural economics at Iowa State University. Johnson, The Root Causes, 66.
43. The Ethiopians denied Akuot Atem (a Bor Dinka from the Anya Nya II) the opportunity to be chairman of the political wing of the SPLA and proposed that Samuel Gai Tut (the Anya Nya II Nuer leader) and Garang lead the movement instead.
47. Beswick, Sudan’s Blood Memory, 219.
48. “If the presence of ethnic strangers provides an unflattering contrast with one's own group, that is a good reason to emphasize demands for the exclusion of strangers. Homogeneity would remove the irritating comparison.” Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 186.
49. Hutchinson, “Nuer Ethnicity Militarized,” 6. I follow the approach of Brubaker, in Ethnicity without Groups, 10, 12, 19, 54, 67. Brubaker understands an ethnopolitical entrepreneur as a leader who seeks to organize an ethnic group, speaks and acts in its name and uses ethnopolitical rhetoric to reify and shape the identity of this group.
50. Member of civil society 7, interview with the author, October 15, 2015.
51. Nyaba, Politics of Liberation, 47; former SPLA commander, interview with the author, August 6, 2014.
52. Two members of civil society 2, interview with the author, January 30, 2016.
53. Member of civil society 7, interview with the author, October 15, 2015.
54. Former SPLA commander, August 6, 2014.
55. Former government official and high-ranking member of IO 1, interview with the author, July 13, 2014; three members of civil society 1.
56. Three members of civil society 1; member of civil society 7.
57. Former government official and high-ranking member of IO 1.
58. Sixty-year-old displaced man from Ikotos / IO major general, interview with the author, July 8, 2017. The Lango are a people of Lokua language found in Ikotos, in eastern Equatoria.
59. Pinaud, “We Are Trained to Be Married!”
60. Longtime observer 1, interview with the author, January 3, 2018.
61. Member of civil society 4, interview with the author, June 22, 2017.
64. Nyaba, Politics of Liberation, 44, 49.
65. Kerubino Kuanyin was arrested after he tried to organize the overthrow of Garang. So was Arok Thon Arok, who had challenged Garang’s authority and made contact with the Sudanese government. Johnson, The Root Causes, 92.
66. Julia Aker Duany, Making Peace and Nurturing Life: A Memoir of an African Woman About a Journey of Struggle and Hope. (Bloomington IN: 1st Books Library, 2003), 140–41; two former high-ranking government officials and high-ranking members of IO.  
68. Nyaba, 48.  
70. These men had also enrolled mainly because of local grievances or to protect their homes, and their bitterness at the leadership would incur defections from 1991 onwards. Nyaba, Politics of Liberation, 177.  
72. Nuer officers like William Nyanon left the SPLA in 1992, reportedly “because of the poor treatment he received as a Nuer.” Member of civil society 7.  
73. Sixty-year-old displaced man from Ikotos / IO Major General.  
74. Member of Civil Society 4.  
75. Member of Civil Society 1.  
77. Groupness is an event and its intensity can vary depending on events. Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups, 12.  
78. Brubaker, 99.  
79. Former high-ranking government official 1, interview with the author, July 11, 2017.  
81. Member of civil society 4, interview with the author, June 14, 2017.  
82. Sixty-year-old displaced man from Ikotos / IO major general.  
83. Kiir was promoted by Garang to second in command to represent the greater Bahr El Ghazal region in the SPLA leadership after Kerubino Kuanyin Bol tried to organize a coup in 1987–88. Rolandsen, “Another Civil War in South Sudan,” 168.  
84. I still follow the approach of Brubaker, in Ethnicity without Groups, 13.  
86. Member of civil society 8, interview with the author, February 5, 2016.  
87. Former high-ranking government official 1.  
90. Young, The Fate of Sudan, 14, 66, 93–96.  
91. “By delaying in signing, Khartoum will gain $2.5 billion from the oil revenues, which we must prevent by all means possible. Khartoum was unhappy with the Power Sharing and 3 areas protocols. Neither I nor Cdr. Salva had any interest in delaying the peace agreement. I have nothing to gain by dismissing Cdr. Salva.” “Minutes of Historical SPLM Meeting in Rumbek 2004.” (Sudan Tribune, March 10, 2008), http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26320.  
92. Former high-ranking government official 1.  
93. Sixty-year-old displaced man from Ikotos / IO major general.  
94. Young, The Fate of Sudan, 84.  
95. “Minutes of Historical SPLM Meeting in Rumbek 2004.”
98. Pinaud, “Military Kinship, Inc.”
99. “Cdr. James Oath. I greet the gathering. When the movement started you were seven (7) and now you are only two (2)—five died having problems with you (Dr. John) . . . Cdr. Oyai Deng. I want to add my voice of being happy to participate in this meeting. When the movement started, you were seven (7) and now you are only two (2) remaining. Some said that you conspired against those who died and now you are conspiring against yourselves.” “Minutes of Historical SPLM Meeting in Rumbek 2004.”
100. Young, The Fate of Sudan, 196, 303.
102. “To understand the concept of group legitimacy, it is necessary to link it to ownership. Legitimacy goes to one’s rightful place in the country. To be legitimate is therefore to be identified with the territory.” Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 201, 207.
103. “Group entitlement, conceived as a joint function of comparative worth and legitimacy, does this—it explains why the followers follow, accounts for the intensity of group reactions, even to modest stimuli, and clarifies the otherwise mysterious quest for public signs of group status.” Horowitz, 226.
104. Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups, 14.
105. “Cdr. Oyai Deng. . . . I am shocked to hear Cdr. Salva talk here only about Bahr El Ghazal and not the South in general given he is a leader for all.” “Minutes of Historical SPLM Meeting in Rumbek 2004.”
106. Pinaud, “Military Kinship, Inc.”
107. Member of civil society 4.
108. Melson, Revolution and Genocide, 21, 267.
109. “Minutes of Historical SPLM Meeting in Rumbek 2004.”
110. Longtime observer 1; former high-ranking government official 1.
111. Thirty-four-year-old displaced man from Wau, interview with the author, July 7, 2017.

3. THE WAR ECONOMY AND STATE-MAKING IN SPLA AREAS

3. This process is similar to what is described by Tilly, “State Making as Organized Crime,” 183.


10. See on Blue Nile state Wendy James, War and Survival in Sudan’s Frontierlands: Voices from the Blue Nile (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 16.


13. This strategy consisted of organizing the movement of people into Ethiopian refugee camps and restricting government military activity in the rural areas while attacking militia organizations and the population they were drawn from.


15. Øystein H. Rolandsen, Guerrilla Government: Political Changes in the Southern Sudan during the 1990s (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2005), 71.

16. Member of civil society 6, interview with the author, August 10, 2014.


20. Thirteen members of civil society 1, interview with the author, April 23, 2009.


22. Former SPLA child soldier.

23. Member of civil society 6.


27. Member of SPLM electoral team in 2010, interview with the author, March 28, 2010.

28. SPLA high-ranking officer in 2010, interview with the author, October 5, 2010; seven women from the Joint Integrated Units (JIU), interview with the author, November 9, 2010; political representative 3, interview with the author, November 6, 2010; fourteen members of civil society 1, interview with the author, May 14, 2009; four members of civil society 1, interview with the author, May 21, 2009; member of SPLM electoral team in 2010; Kedini, “The Challenge to Survive,” 29; De Waal, “Starving out the South,” 167; Keen, The Benefits of Famine, 220.
29. Thirteen members of civil society 1.
30. Four members of civil society 1.
32. Four members of civil society 1.
33. Four members of civil society 1.
34. Three members of civil society 1, interview with the author, October 21, 2010.
38. Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery, 269–70.
40. A survey directed for UNHCR during field research in five cities (Juba, Rumbek, Bor, Torit and Malakal) found that 27 percent of female respondents and 29 percent of male respondents had been involved at some point in war-related activities. South Sudan Center for Census SSCCSE Statistics and Evaluation et al., Gender-Based Violence and Protection Survey (Juba, South Sudan: 2010).
42. Member of civil society 6.
43. Thirteen members of civil society 1.
44. Thirteen members of civil society 1.
45. Member of civil society 9, interview with the author, June 15, 2017.
46. Member of civil society 9.
48. Member of civil society 10, interview with the author, July 8, 2016.
49. Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery, 125.
52. Pinaud, “Military Kinship, Inc.”
53. Former SPLA commander, interview with the author, August 4, 2014.
55. The SPLA was involved in Ethiopia’s internal war, which was meant to repay Mengistu for its support but also to continue fighting the war against Khartoum’s militias. Johnson, The Root Causes, 88.
56. Johnson, 147–48; political representative 4, interview with the author, August 1, 2014.
57. Former SPLA child soldier.
59. Member of civil society 11, interview with the author, November 20, 2015.
61. Former SPLA child soldier; former SPLA commander, August 4, 2014.
62. Former SPLA child soldier.
64. Member of civil society 12, interview with the author, August 9, 2014.
67. For example, in 1993, various units of the SPLA-Nasir started attacking one another around Waat, as the Lou Nuer received little support from neighboring forces and were frustrated by the lack of access to food assistance from humanitarian agencies and from their Dinka neighbors, in the context of the removal of a single SPLA administration. Johnson, The Root Causes, 115.
68. Riek Machar simultaneously requested both that the government airlift supplies and ammunition and the UN send relief to Ayod and Waat. Johnson, The Root Causes, 115–16, 150.
70. Two former high-ranking government officials and high-ranking members of IO, interview with the author, February 22, 2017.
71. Rolandsen, Guerrilla Government, 125.
72. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 145.
73. Rolandsen, Guerrilla Government, 115.
74. Rolandsen, 81–82, 109, 116.
75. South Sudanese intellectual 1, interview with the author, November 21, 2017. The National Liberation Council (NLC) and a formal judicial system were also established. Johnson, “The Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Problem of Factionalism,” 69–70; Rolandsen, Guerrilla Government, 115–16.
76. South Sudanese intellectual 1.
77. Former SPLA child soldier; former SPLA commander, August 4, 2014.
81. Nyaba, Politics of Liberation, 162; Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 146.
84. Volker Riehl, Who Is Ruling in South Sudan? The Role of NGOs in Rebuilding Socio-Political Order, Studies on Emergencies and Disaster Relief (Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2001), 4.
85. OLS operated in the south beginning in 1989 following an agreement between the government of Sudan and the rebel movements to allow for the passage of aid to their respective areas.
88. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 152.
90. Rolandsen, Guerrilla Government, 158.
91. In this case, complaints were raised at the 1996 conference supposed to bolster civil administration. Rolandsen, *Guerrilla Government*, 157.


93. Former SPLA child soldier.

94. Former SPLA commander, interview with the author, August 6, 2014.

95. Former SPLA commander, August 4, 2014.

96. Former SPLA commander, August 6, 2014.

97. This practice of taking a commission would continue after 2005.


99. Former SPLA child soldier.


103. The names of these companies would change after the war. Former SPLA commander, August 6, 2014, interview with the author.

104. A respondent recalled how in 1997, a local commander made a fortune by selling about sixty trucks captured in Tonj (Warrap) to Uganda. Individual commanders’ companies rented trucks and cars to relief agencies such as the World Food Program to deliver aid. Former SPLA child soldier; former SPLA commander, August 6, 2014.


111. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*.


117. This included state-building projects such as thirteenth century’s Mediterranean Europe, where King Frederick II made sure that no independent class of merchants could destabilize the landowning aristocracy. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, 142.


119. Thirteen members of civil society 1; former SPLA child soldier.


124. Political representative 2, interview with the author, August 1, 2014.


130. Sixty-year-old displaced man from Ibotos / IO major general, interview with the author, July 8, 2017.

131. Member of civil society 9.

132. South Sudanese intellectual 3.

133. Former SPLA child soldier; forty-year-old displaced man from Yei, interview with the author, June 21, 2017.

134. See, on Khartoum’s interest in Marijuana, Johnson, The Root Causes, 80.

135. Former SPLA child soldier; South Sudanese intellectual 3.

136. Former SPLA child soldier.

137. Former SPLA soldier from Yei, interview with the author, July 4, 2017.


139. Former SPLA child soldier.

140. South Sudanese intellectual 3.

141. Member of civil society 12; former SPLA child soldier; political representative 2.

142. Member of civil society 12; former SPLA child soldier; political representative 2.

143. Sixty-year-old displaced man from Ibotos / IO major general.

144. Member of civil society 9.

145. Member of civil society 9.


147. The national economic commission existed before 1994, officially to “initiate public investment especially in natural resources such as gold, livestock, and fisheries.” Benaiah Yong-Bure, Economic Development of Southern Sudan (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc, 2007), 197; forty-year-old displaced man from Yei.

148. Namutina and Kandi, “W. Equatoria People Denounce Appointment of Corrupt New Governor.” One of Abu-John’s feats included selling in advance the teak plantations of Western Equatoria (Maridi and Ibba) to an Indian tycoon.


152. Former SPLA child soldier.

153. Member of civil society 13, interview with the author, August 9, 2014.


155. Member of civil society 13.


157. Vick, “Ripping Off Slave ‘Redeemers.’” Elijah Majok, a Bor Dinka close to Garang, could have been the head of the SRRA the article referred to. He served from 1989 to 1993, when he was replaced by Justin Yac. He was appointed in 2005 as deputy governor of the Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS) and president of the Bank of Southern Sudan (BOSS).

158. Former high-ranking government official 1, interview with the author, July 11, 2017.


160. Vick, “Ripping Off Slave ‘Redeemers.’”

161. Horowitz writes, “Group entitlement, conceived as a joint function of comparative worth and legitimacy, does this—it explains why the followers follow, accounts for the intensity of group reactions, even to modest stimuli, and clarifies the otherwise mysterious quest for public signs of group status.” Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 226.


163. Former high-ranking government official 1.

164. Walsh, “Sudan’s Great Slave Scam.”

165. Malok was reinstated in February 1999. He had directed the SRRA first from 1989 to 1993. The slave redemption scandal was alleged to have started circa 1994. If Malok was involved, this continued to demonstrate that despite the competition between the two constituencies mobilized by the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, these individuals were capitalists at heart first and identified with similar dominant class interests.

166. Vick, “Ripping Off Slave ‘Redeemers.’”

167. Walsh, “Sudan’s Great Slave Scam.”


169. Vick, “Ripping Off Slave ‘Redeemers.’”

170. Former SPLA commander, August 6, 2014.

171. Pinaud, “Military Kinship, Inc.”


173. Nyaba, Politics of Liberation, 58; former SPLA child soldier.
174. Former SPLA child soldier.
175. For example, Kuol Manyang in Eastern Equatoria or Garang Mabil in Bahr El Ghazal Former SPLA child soldier; Johnson, The Root Causes, 165–66.
176. Member of civil society 10.
181. Member of civil society 12.
184. I follow Diamond’s definition of a dominant class as “a category encompassing those who have similar economic motivation because they have similar economic opportunities . . . dominant if it owns or controls the most productive assets, appropriates the bulk of the most valued consumption opportunities, and commands a sufficient monopoly over the means of coercion and legitimation to sustain politically this cumulative socio-economic pre-eminence. Necessarily, the members of such a class will have ‘controlling positions in the dominant institutions of society.’ They will also have high degrees of class consciousness and social coherence—constituting in the Marxist sense a ‘class-for-itself’—as this is a precondition for the class action necessary to preserve and extend class domination . . . the transmission of this status across generations will be seen as a particular mark of the consolidation of class domination.” Diamond, “Class Formation in the Swollen African State,” 578.
185. Elements of the colonial system persisted as well. Feudalism was based on land tenure (fiefs or administrative units) ruled by lords invested with political power to the service of a military oligarchy, and slavery was founded on the exchange and commodification of people, both of which—land and people—were forms of capital (in the case of people, “slave capital”). Different definitions of feudalism and how they could apply to Africa exist. I borrow from Marc Bloch, Max Weber, and Joseph Strayer. See Jack Goody, “Feudalism in Africa,” Journal of African History 4, no. 1 (1963): 3; Marc Bloch, Feudal Society: Social Classes and Political Organisation, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 1989), 2:167. On the relationship between capitalism and slavery, see Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 46.
188. Keen defines “war systems” as “Wars that actually serve complex functions for a variety of groups.” Keen, Useful Enemies, 236.
189. Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery, 125.
190. Horowitz links group legitimacy to ownership: “To be legitimate is therefore to be identified with the territory . . . group legitimacy provides a foundation for the recurrent psychological denial that another group owns an equal share in the land.” Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 201–2.

4. SPLA VIOLENCE, GROUP-MAKING, AND EXPANSION


7. I use the term “protoconquest” to distinguish the second civil war from the third. I consider this protoconquest the first phase of three, the third phase (2013–) culminating in annihilation.

8. Three members of civil society 2, interview with the author, April 9, 2009; Nyaba, Politics of Liberation, 52.,


10. Thirteen members of civil society 1, interview with the author, April 23, 2009.

11. Member of civil society 14, interview with the author, April 21, 2009.

12. Fourteen members of civil society 1.

13. Member of civil society 15, interview with the author, November 17, 2015.

14. Member of civil society 14.

15. Four members of civil society 1, interview with the author, May 21, 2009; member of civil society 6, interview with the author, August 9, 2014.

16. Four members of civil society 1.


20. Three members of civil society 3, interview with the author, October 21, 2010.

21. Four members of civil society 1.

22. Three members of civil society 2.


25. Political representative 2, interview with the author, August 1, 2014.

26. Member of civil society 16, interview with the author, November 11, 2015. The respondent referred to Mundri, in Western Equatoria.

27. Thirteen members of civil society 1.

28. Fourteen members of civil society 1; four members of civil society 1; three members of civil society 3; thirteen members of civil society 1.

29. Clémence Pinaud, “Are ‘Griefs of More Value Than Triumphs’? Power Relations, Nation-Building and the Different Histories of Women’s Wartime Contributions in


34. Considering the level of coercion and the absence of benefits from the work, this forced labor most paralleled slavery, not other forms of forced labor such as serfdom, clientage, wage-labor, pawnage, or communal work. For a description of those, see Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery*, 5.

35. “Attributing a monetary value to the stock of human capital makes sense only in societies where it is actually possible to own other individuals fully and entirely.” Piketty, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, 163.


37. Member of civil society 17, interview with the author, June 28, 2017.

38. Understanding women as capital does not mean that bridewealth does not fulfill other key social functions—quite the opposite. For a summary of the different views of bridewealth with special reference to the Nuer and women’s autonomy, see Stanley J. Tambiah et al., “Bridewealth and Dowry Revisited: The Position of Women in Sub-Saharan Africa and North India [and Comments and Reply],” *Current Anthropology* 30, no. 4 (October 1989): 414–16.

39. Explaining her use of the phrase “choiceless decision” to explain female fighters’ trajectories in Sierra Leone, Chris Coulter wrote, “Sometimes the only choice was between becoming a fighter/lover or dying, which is not really much of a choice, more a matter of bare survival.” Chris Coulter, *Bush Wives and Girl Soldiers: Women’s Lives Through War and Peace in Sierra Leone* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 146, 150.

40. Government official and member of civil society 1, interview with the author, November 3, 2010.

41. It was practiced in other regions too, such as Upper Nile. Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, *Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War, and the State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 208; high-ranking government official 3, interview with the author, November 11, 2010; Pinaud, “Are ‘Griefs of More Value Than Triumphs’?”, 151–76.

42. Member of civil society 18, interview with the author, November 10, 2010; SPLA lieutenant, interview with the author, November 8, 2010; Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, “Nuer Ethnicity Militarized,” *Anthropology Today* 16, no. 3 (June 1, 2000): 11.


44. Member of civil society 18.
47. Johnson, The Root Causes, 91; Nyaba, Politics of Liberation, 58.
50. SPLA high-ranking officer, interview with the author, October 5, 2010; member of civil society 18.
53. Nyaba, Politics of Liberation, 70.
57. I certainly do not mean that the lack of a definition for rape within the SPLA was an explanation, but it was an added advantage to the rapists on the ground and to the leadership, who tolerated and facilitated sexual violence through the patronage of marriage aka women’s accumulation. On issues of cultural definition of rape in South Sudan, see Jok, Militarization, Gender and Reproductive Health in South Sudan, 198; Jok, “Militarism, Gender and Reproductive Suffering,” 209.
Training in the Ethiopian camps initially lasted from one year to six months but was hardly sustainable given the demands for new recruits especially after the 1991 split, the SPLA’s ousting from these camps, its relocation to Eastern Equatoria, and the increased forced recruitment to replace deserters. Member of civil society 6.

Member of civil society 2, interview with the author, November 29, 2015.

Cohen, *Rape during Civil War*, 30, 41.

SPLA lieutenant.

Three members of civil society 1, interview with the author, October 15, 2015.

Violence also fostered the groupness of the non-Dinka groups.


“The way relations between ethnic groups play out in any country depends on four main factors: symbolic predispositions, perceived threat, leadership, and organization.” Kaufman, *Nationalist Passions*, 12.

“What is usual in a large-group regression is the reactivation of ‘chosen traumas,’ shared mental representation of a past historical event that has caused the ancestors of a large group to face drastic losses.” Volkan and Fowler, “Large-Group Narcissism,” 217, 218.


The “White Army” was composed mainly of the Lou Nuer youth from the cattle camps in central and eastern Upper Nile. It was made up of multiple armed bands, which rarely came under one united leadership. John Young, *The White Army: An Introduction and Overview* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2007), 9, 16.


Former government official and high-ranking member of IO 1, interview with the author, July 13, 2014; former SPLA commander, interview with the author, August 4, 2014; member of civil society 6.

Former SPLA commander, August 4, 2014.

This included interethnic fighting between the Nuer and the Dinka; the Dinka and the Didjanga; the Toposa, Buya, and Latuko in eastern Equatoria; the Murle and the Dinka in Upper Nile; and between Nuer sections in Upper Nile.


Nuer civilians from Akobo and Ayod joined the attack on Bor; Nuer and Dinka civilians from western Upper Nile and Lakes started raiding each other; and Garang’s SPLA in Pibor encouraged the Murle to start raiding the Nuer in Akobo and Waat districts. Johnson, *The Root Causes*, 114.
The NGO Norwegian People’s Aid reported that by the end of November 1991, up to five thousand Dinka, mainly civilians, had been killed by Machar’s faction. Burr and Collins, *Requiem for the Sudan*, 301.

81. Former SPLA commander, August 4, 2014.
83. Former high-ranking SPLA and government official, interview with the author, August 7, 2014.
84. Member of civil society 7, interview with the author, October 15, 2015.
86. Member of civil society 6, interview with the author, August 10, 2014.
90. Nyaba, 95; Young, *The White Army*, 16.
91. Former high-ranking SPLA and government official.
92. SPLA high-ranking officer.
93. Former government official and high-ranking member of IO; member of civil society 6.
95. This, of course, does not invalidate what Hutchinson collected about women being killed on the basis of their ethnicity. The issue here is nevertheless the scale of this phenomenon and its relative importance compared to other types of violence against women.
98. Member of civil society 18; SPLA lieutenant.
99. SPLA lieutenant. Bridewealth is popularly called “dowry” in South Sudan.
103. According to Max Weber, “the patrimonial ruler is linked with the ruled through a consensual community which also exists apart from his independent military force and which is rooted in the belief that the ruler’s power are legitimate insofar as they are traditional.” Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 4th ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1020.
105. Member of civil society 18.
106. Former SPLA lieutenant colonel, interview with the author, August 7, 2014.
107. Former SPLA commander, interview with the author, August 6, 2014; Pinaud, “Military Kinship, Inc.”
108. The exchange of some bridewealth cattle was still traditionally preferable despite the rise of “credit” marriages. Government official and members of civil society 1; SPLA high-ranking officer; member of civil society 18; Hutchinson, *Nuer Dilemmas*, 81–93, 100–102; former SPLA commander, August 4, 2014.

109. A letter of guarantee of payment stipulated that the soldier would pay for the bridewealth if he survived the war. In the event of his death, children born by his bride would be claimed by his relatives who would pay for her bridewealth. Member of civil society 18; former SPLA commander, August 6, 2014.

110. Among the Dinka, the head of the family (the father) normally paid his son’s bridewealth, assisted by his brothers, extended kin, and friends. Francis Mading Deng, *The Dinka of the Sudan* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1972), 106, 211.

111. Thirteen members of civil society 1; former SPLA commander, August 6, 2014; four members of civil society 2, interview with the author, July 21, 2014.

112. SPLA high-ranking officer; high-ranking government official 3.

113. High-ranking government official 3; government official and members of civil society 1.

114. SPLA high-ranking officer.


117. Former SPLA commander, August 4, 2014.


120. Member of civil society 2, interview with the author, November 11, 2016.

121. Member of civil society 18.

122. Former SPLA commander, August 6, 2014.


125. Fifty-five-year-old displaced woman from Narus, Kapoeta East county, interview with the author, June 27, 2017.

126. The endurance of a foreign ethnic identity was not surprising in an agnatic society.


128. SPLA lieutenant; member of civil society 20, interview with the author, January 29, 2016.

129. Member of civil society 18.


131. Three members of civil society 1.

132. Two members of civil society 3; member of civil society 18.

133. SPLA lieutenant.

134. Member of civil society 18; Pinaud, “Military Kinship, Inc.”

135. Two members of civil society 1, interview with the author, November 13, 2015.

136. The exact number of wives is debated, and Malong is reportedly still currently marrying more, as is Peter Gadet. Two members of civil society 1.

137. Member of civil society 13, interview with the author, August 9, 2014.
138. Member of civil society 8, interview with the author, November 19, 2015.
139. The likes of John Koang (the Upper Nile SPLA governor), Bol Kong, Elijah Hon-top, Peter Gadet (who had about eighty wives, including from Dinka groups), Paulino Matiep (around forty-two wives), Gatluak Gai (around fifty wives), Gordon Kong Chol (over twenty wives), and William Duol Chol (eight to ten wives), accumulated many wives this way, although only a few of them, like Matiep, were reputedly wealthy enough to have their bridewealth paid in full at once. Former SPLA commander, August 6, 2014; government official 1, interview with the author, Juba, July 25, 2014; former SPLA child soldier; member of civil society 21, interview with the author, October 26, 2015; two members of civil society 1, member of civil society 22, interview with the author, November 25, 2015; member of civil society 20.
140. Member of civil society 2.
141. Member of civil society 18.
142. Member of civil society 20. This sends us back to the very capacity and function of “paying”—which endows with prestige the purchaser who uses it to command others. Marcel Mauss, “Les Origines de La Notion de Monnaie,” in Comptes-Rendus Des Séances, vol. 2, tome 1, Supplément à l’Anthropologie (Institut français d’anthropologie, 1914), 8.
143. Member of civil society 20.
145. Member of civil society 2. For example, Koang Biel, notorious as well for his role in coordinating the military campaign against civilians in 2015 in Unity state, is the nephew of the now deceased Gatluak Gai, who opposed Kiir’s government in 2010 and was Paulino Matiep’s bodyguard during the second civil war. Member of civil society 22; forty-three-year-old woman from Mayom county, thirty-eight-year-old woman from Mayendit, and forty-four-year-old woman from Mayom, interview with the author, October 27, 2015.
146. Two members of civil society 2, interview with the author, February 6, 2016.
147. Member of civil society 23, interview with the author, August 9, 2014; member of civil society 13.
148. Member of civil society 20.
149. Pinaud, “The Making of a Military Aristocracy.”
150. Noteworthy is the fact that “rape increases the social status of its perpetrators” among peers. Cohen, Rape during Civil War, 28.
151. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder As Political Instrument (Oxford: James Currey Publishers, 1999), 44.
154. Former SPLA lieutenant colonel; former SPLA child soldier.
155. Government official and members of civil society 1.
156. Inner colonization is defined here following A. Dirk Moses as the “settlement of peoples, usually in frontier areas, loyal to the metropole to ensure security and encourage economic development of semi—or unoccupied land within a national or imperial territory.” Moses, “Empire, Colony, Genocide: Keywords and the Philosophy of History,” in Empire, Colony, Genocide: Keywords and the Philosophy of History, ed. by A. Dirk Moses (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 23.
158. Jok, “Militarization and Gender Violence in South Sudan,” 429.
159. Fifty-five-year-old displaced man from Agoro payam, Magwi county, interview with the author, June 27, 2017.
161. Four members of civil society 1; three members of civil society 3.
162. High-ranking government official 3.
163. I do not subscribe to the thesis that sexual violence was costly to the perpetrator in terms of reputation. Many reports on SPLA human rights violations were published and mostly ignored. On the opportunism/greed argument of rape, see Cohen, *Rape during Civil War*, 47.
164. Former SPLA commander, August 4, 2014.
165. Member of civil society 15.
166. Three members of civil society 2.
167. Member of civil society 14; thirteen members of civil society 1.
168. Member of civil society 15; member of civil society 16.
171. Member of civil society 12, interview with the author, August 9, 2014.
172. I am adding a materialist twist to Donald Horowitz’s conception of group legitimacy: “To understand the concept of group legitimacy, it is necessary to link it to ownership. Legitimacy goes to one’s rightful place in the country. To be legitimate is therefore to be identified with the territory. Georg Simmel shrewdly notes that the ethnic stranger is “no ‘owner of the soil’—soil not only in the physical but also in the figurative sense of a life-substance which is fixed, if not in a point in space, at least in an ideal point in the social environment.” As patrimony confronts equality, group legitimacy provides a foundation for the recurrent psychological denial that another group owns an equal share in the land.” Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 201–2.

5. NATIONALISM, PREDATION, AND ETHNIC RANKING

4. Member of civil society 12, interview with the author, August 9, 2014.
6. The SSDF was an umbrella for armed groups sponsored by Khartoum and united through the Khartoum Peace Agreement in 1997. It included the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), the Equatorian Defence Forces (EDF), the SPLM Bahr El Ghazal Group, the South Sudan Independence Group (SSIG), and the Bor Group, as well as other groups such as Murle, Fertit, and other ethnic militias. Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, 14; John Young, *The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, November 2006), 17.
8. “The Addis Ababa Agreement was a deal between the Southern bourgeoisie and the Northern bourgeoisie . . . the Southern bourgeoisie compromised the interests of the
masses, in return for the jobs that had long been denied to them.” “Stated Position of the Rebels: Background and Manifesto of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM),” *Horn of Africa*, 1985, 41; Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, 46.


11. Brian Da Silva (Department of Agriculture), Roger Winter (USAID), Andrew Natsios (special envoy to President George W. Bush).


13. The Juba Declaration was signed between Paulino Matiep’s SSDF and Salva Kiir’s SPLA. Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, 14.

14. According to Straus, the ideas forming ideologies identifying a specific group of people whose interests are promoted by the state, are the stuff of genocide. These ideas are what he calls “founding narratives.” Scott Straus, *Making and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership and Genocide in Modern Africa* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), x, 63.


21. Two former high-ranking government officials and high-ranking members of IO, interview with the author, February 22, 2017.


23. For example, the state promoted the mostly Dinka SPLA women’s battalion Ketiba Banat in the postwar period, in contrast to its total neglect of the history of camp followers—one of forced recruitment, forced union, abduction, forced labor (including sexual labor), and unpaid bridewealth. See Pinaud, “Are ‘Grievances of More Value Than Triumphs’?”

24. The Juba Declaration was signed on January 9, 2006, a year exactly after the CPA.


30. The leadership had briefly hesitated to anoint Ramciel in Lakes, Dinka land, as the country’s capital.

31. To summarize, the lack of political will (and commitment) on both sides to disarm, the lack of institutional capacity in both northern and southern DDR commissions (who seldom cooperated and coordinated), and the lack of transparency and accountability in the DDR process (amounting to widespread corruption)—hence the lack of monitoring of disarmament—all impeded and slowed down the DDR process. The first phase of the demilitarization process concerned the “special needs” category (women, the elderly, and the wounded/disabled) and was a way to buy time until the referendum and independence of the south.


33. Ernest Renan, when writing about the processes at work in the formation of a nation, insisted that “forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation.” Ernest Renan, “What Is a Nation?,” in Nation and Narration, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990), 11.

34. Member of civil society 3, interview with the author, July 4, 2017.

35. Member of civil society 12.


38. This is typical of ethnic groups considered “primitive,” “backward,” and at the bottom of ethnic ranking. Kaufman also writes of the SPLM during the second civil war that “while the SPLM rhetoric did not refer explicitly to slavery, many of its themes are best understood against the background narrative of past resistance to northern discrimination.” See Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 144; Kaufman, Nationalist Passions, 114.


40. Johnson, A New History for a New Nation, 164.

41. Rolandsen and Daly, A History of South Sudan, 149–50.

42. Young, The Fate of Sudan, xx.
43. Rolandsen and Daly, *A History of South Sudan*, 144.
44. Khartoum supported rebellions in the south after the April 2010 elections and with the renewal of the war in South Kordofan in the summer 2011.
45. Rolandsen and Daly, *A History of South Sudan*, 141.
47. On war systems, see Keen, *Useful Enemies*, 238.
51. Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, 97.
52. The SPLM/A and Khartoum could not agree on proposals by international bodies defining Abyei’s borders. Rolandsen and Daly, *A History of South Sudan*, 137–38, 146–47.
53. Heglig is an oil-rich contested border point between Abyei and South Kordofan. See Joshua Craze, “Unclear Lines: State and Non-State Actors in Abyei,” in *The Borderlands of South Sudan*, ed. Vaughan, Schomerus, and De Vries, 47, 56.
54. Two former high-ranking government officials and high-ranking members of IO. More research is needed on the relationship between Kiir’s faction and the SPLA-North. But Kiir’s faction seems to have instrumentalized the SPLM/A-North to serve its own separatist and nationalist aims. See Nyaba, *The State We Aspire To*, 31.
55. Former high-ranking government official 1, interview with the author, July 11, 2017.
56. Two former high-ranking government officials and high-ranking members of IO.
58. Former high-ranking government official 1.
59. Former high-ranking government official 1.
60. Two former high-ranking government officials and high-ranking members of IO.
64. Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, 15.
give just one example, the South Sudanese government paid the firm Independent Diplo-
matt to focus on the country’s relationship with the U.S., the EU, the UN, and the African
Union from 2009 to January 2014. Ted Dagne, one of the SPLM/A’s most well-known
advocates in Washington DC and a former staffer on the U.S. Congressional Research
Service, also advised Kiir throughout the CPA period. He wrote the letter to the seventy-
article/2012/07/11/us-south-sudan-midwives-idUSBRE86A0GC20120711.

67. David Deng, The New Frontier: A Baseline Survey of Large-Scale Land-Based Invest-
ment in Southern Sudan (Norwegian People’s Aid, March 2011), http://reliefweb.int/sites/
reliefweb.int/files/resources/6F0B144DA275260B8525785C0069DB6A-Full_Report.pdf.

68. The SPLA already resorted to these metaphors during the war. For example, it
opened its 1994 National Convention by describing the period pre-NC as “childhood.”
Øystein H. Rolandsen, Guerrilla Government: Political Changes in the Southern Sudan
during the 1990s (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2005), 122.

69. This racist attitude is exemplified in a scene from the documentary State Build-
ers about the CPA period, featuring Lise Grande, the UN Coordinator for South Sudan.
Grande is approving the final draft of a UN brochure about South Sudan, the “key mes-
gage [of which] is that in South Sudan, people are young, rural, poor, uneducated and lack
basic services . . . Our brand is that 15-year-old girl who has a greater chance of dying in
childbirth than finishing school.” Quito, “Branding the World’s Newest Country.”

70. On the topic of South Sudan’s international relations in the CPA period, see Gérard
Prunier, “Sudan’s Regional Relations,” in Sudan Handbook, ed. John Ryle et al. (Wood-

71. Young, The Fate of Sudan, 133; Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining
Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 22. In the
south, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) became after 2011 the UN Mission in South
Sudan (UNMISS).

72. States going through a process of democratization are more vulnerable to ethno-
nationalism, where “ethnonationalist movements claim the state for their own ethnos.”
Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, 502.

73. Levene argues that the exportation of the very concept of the nation-state after
World War II and the related wave of decolonization has been associated with the global-
ization of genocide. Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, vol. 1, 17, 155, 164;
Young, The Fate of Sudan, 4–8; Kaufman, Nationalist Passions, 41; Mann, The Dark Side
of Democracy, 22.

74. Young, The Fate of Sudan, 4–8; Naseem Badiey, The State of Post-Conflict Recons-
truction: Land, Urban Development and State-Building in Juba Southern Sudan (Wood-

75. Sudan was the third largest recipient of U.S. aid after Afghanistan and Iraq and a
large portion of that aid went to the south. Wolfram Lacher, South Sudan: International
State-Building and Its Limits, SWP Research Paper (Berlin: German Institute for Interna-
tional and Security Affairs, February 2012), 12.

76. South Sudan: Options in Crisis: Hearings Before the United States Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, 114th Cong. 2nd (2016) (Statement of Kate Almquist Knopf: “U.S.
Options as South Sudan Leaders Fail the Peace”), 6.

77. Global Humanitarian Assistance, Resource Flows to Sudan: Aid to South Sudan
79. Rolandsen and Daly, A History of South Sudan, 137.
80. International oil companies and petty traders from neighboring countries (especially Uganda and Kenya) dominated the economy. Young, The Fate of Sudan, 11–12.
81. Rolandsen, Guerrilla Government, 148; Young, The Fate of Sudan, 164.
82. Diplomat 1, interview with the author, July 23, 2014.
83. High-ranking officer from the Ethiopian Army, interview with the author, July 10, 2014.
84. Nyaba, The State We Aspire To, ix, 141.
85. This did not mean the SPLA was not still corrupt. But South Sudan’s case illustrated that “as the state becomes wealthier, especially in a rapid or sudden fashion, its centrality in the process of dominant-class formation will increase.” Larry Diamond, “Class Formation in the Swollen African State,” Journal of Modern African Studies 25, no. 04 (1987): 578.
86. Lineage-based societies have adapted remarkably well to new bureaucratic environments. Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou, Criminalization of the State in Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 39.
88. Member of civil society 10, interview with the author, February 3, 2016.
89. This is inspired from Ernest Harsch’s reflections on the role of corruption: in some countries, it “is the cement that holds together the entire system of political and class domination.” Ernest Harsch, “Accumulators and Democrats: Challenging State Corruption in Africa,” Journal of Modern African Studies 31, no. 1 (March 1, 1993): 37.
90. According to the Sudd Institute, a Juba-based think tank, less than 17 percent of the national budget was transferred from Juba to the state capitals. Once in the capitals, most of the state revenues stayed there and never reached the county level: only about 10 percent reached rural areas. Edward Thomas, South Sudan: A Slow Liberation (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2015), 143–46; Anne Walraet, “South Sudan: Violence as Politics,” in Africa’s Insurgents. Navigating an Evolving Landscape., ed. Morten Boás and Kevin C. Dunn (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2017), 207.
97. Since 2005, only one top official, the SPLM secretary general Pagan Amum (one of the “Garang boys”), was tried (in March 2012), in a court in Juba—and not through the SSACC. He was acquitted. Ngor Arol Garang, “South Sudan: SPLM’s Amum Acquitted


99. The corruption of the elite was demonstrated by the “dura saga” (dura means sorghum) scandal that surfaced in 2008. It was, a Juba resident recalled, “a gold rush, except for grain . . . Most people opening companies were instigated by top people. These guys would take a cut . . . Everyone who came from Riek Machar or Salva Kiir with a letter was given registration to deliver maize and dura to hungry people.” High-ranking government official 2, interview with the author, July 26, 2014.

100. High-ranking government official 2.


106. The three rebel groups are the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army, the South Sudan Defense Forces, and the South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army. Walraet, “South Sudan: Violence as Politics,” 205–6.


108. They included Pagan Amum, Nhial Deng Nhial, Deng Alor Kuol, Majak D’Agoot, Yassir Arman, Malik Aggar, and Adbalaziz al-Hilu, as well as others from the old Leadership Council.


110. Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, 77.


115. Nyaba also mentions the importance of the slave-redemption scandal in coalescing the anti-Garang coalition behind Bona Malual. Nyaba, *The State We Aspire To*, 19, 30.

116. Former SPLA commander, interview with the author, August 6, 2014; Nyaba, *The State We Aspire To*, 15.


118. South Sudanese intellectual 1, interview with the author, November 21, 2017.

119. Because the JCE is an official “council,” I call it an “organization”—not a “club” or “group” or just a “network” (even if it is also a network of Dinka people from various backgrounds), like in the case of the Hutu Power groups that were not as institutionalized before 1993 as the JCE was as an ethnic organization throughout the CPA period. Hutu groups, by contrast, were present in a variety of former opposition political parties and came together in their ideology of Hutu ethnic domination. The process seems to have gone the other way with the JCE: it was an ethnic organization first that later infiltrated the SPLM party-state. See Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis. History of a Genocide*. (London:


121. Former high-ranking government official 1.


124. Member of civil society 17, interview with the author, June 28, 2017.


126. Nyaba, *The State We Aspire To*, 130, 175; on the topic see Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, 292–93.


129. Member of civil society 4.


134. The competition between Kiir and the Garang factions kept them so busy that they devoted little attention to the CPA implementation. Kiir took advantage of the SPLM’s reorganization to place his followers in key roles, which made political figures like the Nuer Angelina Teny (Riek Machar’s wife) and the Equatorian Joseph Bakassoro decide to run independently in the upcoming elections. International Crisis Group, *Beyond the Crisis*, 4–5, 7; Nyaba, *The State We Aspire To*, 166; two former high-ranking government officials and high-ranking members of IO.


138. Former high-ranking government official 1.

139. South Sudanese intellectual 2.

140. Two former high-ranking government officials and high-ranking members of IO.


144. Straus mentions how “founding narratives” create an “implicit moral hierarchy between, on the one hand, a primary population whom the state should benefit and protect and, on the other hand, secondary populations to whom the state should pay less attention and who should not rule.” Scott Straus, Remaking Rwanda State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 57.

145. Member of civil society 4.

146. Member of civil society 23, interview with the author, August 9, 2014.

147. Nyaba, The State We Aspire To, 53, 56, 157n23.

148. Oil production would only restart in April 2013, at a slower pace since installations had been damaged by this halt. De Waal, “When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent,” 364–65.


150. Thomas, A Slow Liberation, 143.


152. Former high-ranking government official 1.


154. Former high-ranking government official 2, interview with the author, August 18, 2014.

155. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 138.

156. Former high-ranking government official 2.

157. The position of the non-Dinka rivals was like that of the Jews and the Armenians—they were also despised by the dominant group, who felt that sense of “moral outrage” when they moved up in society. Melson, Revolution and Genocide, 20.

158. Former high-ranking government official 3, interview with the author, August 18, 2014.

159. These newcomers included Alieu Ayeny Alieu, Telar Ring Deng, Michael Makuei, the Nuer Dr Riak Gai Kok (former NCP leader in the South), and Abdallah Deng Nhial (from Gogrial and close to the northerner Hassan Al-Turabi). Johnson, “Briefing: The Crisis In South Sudan,” 303, 304.


162. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 138, 226; Mahmood Mamdani, A Separate Opinion (AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, October 20, 2014), 6.

163. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 138, 216, 226; diplomat 2, interview with the author, August 18, 2014; IO member 1, interview with the author, August 18, 2014.

164. High-ranking government official 2 and wife, interview with the author, July 24, 2014.


167. “[Indiscipline in the party] will take us back to the days of the 1991 split . . . [and] we all know where the split took us . . . this could jeopardize the unity and independence of our country and we must guard against such things. My dear comrades, I am not prepared to let this happen again.” See “South Sudan’s New War Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces” (Human Rights Watch, August 2014), 18; “National Conference of SPLA Board—President’s Salva Kiir Speech” YouTube video, 31:46, posted by “South Sudan,” December 15, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5y3bp6Oehis.


169. Former high-ranking government official 2; Human Rights Watch, South Sudan’s New War Abuses, 22.

170. This was reminiscent of other pregenocidal situations. Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, vol. 1, 74; Melson, Revolution and Genocide, 272.


172. Genocides are subject to processes of both escalation and restraint. Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations, 10.

173. I take inspiration from Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups, 12.

6. THE MAKING OF A VIOLENT ETHNOCRACY

1. Øystein H. Rolandsen and M. W. Daly, A History of South Sudan: From Slavery to Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 137.


3. A few of the SSDF militias remained aligned with Khartoum and continued to undermine the SPLA’s control of the territory and demilitarization efforts, but they were a minority. Small Arms Survey, Armed Groups in Sudan, 3.


6. Former SPLA commander, interview with the author, August 6, 2014.

7. Former SPLA commander, August 6, 2014.


10. Former high-ranking SPLA and government official, interview with the author, August 7, 2014.

11. Young, The South Sudan Defence Forces, 28, 40.


14. I do not mean to say here that Garang wanted the SPLA to be ranked again, since he died before the Juba Declaration and too soon to have any impact on it.

15. Former SPLA commander, August 6, 2014.

16. Member of civil society 10, interview with the author, February 3, 2016.


19. Procurement and logistics officers were in particularly privileged positions. Peter Adwok Nyaba, *South Sudan: The State We Aspire To* (Cape Town: Centre for Advanced Study of African Society, 2011), 132.

20. Former SPLA commander, August 6, 2014.


28. High-ranking officer from the Ethiopian army.


32. Nyaba has been the most explicit in the case of Malakal and Jonglei: “The cattle-theft afflicting Malakal has been traced to security and law enforcement agents.” Some of the raiding militias were affiliated with the “roving bandits” of the post-2010 elections who received weapons from Khartoum. See Nyaba, *The State We Aspire To*, 57; Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, 309–10; Small Arms Survey, *My Neighbour, My Enemy: Inter-Tribal Violence in Jonglei*, Human Security Baseline Assessment (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, October 2012), 4.


34. Former government official and high-ranking member of IO 1, interview with the author, July 13, 2014.

35. High-ranking government official 1, interview with the author, August 5, 2014.

36. Former government official and high-ranking member of IO 1; diplomat 1, interview with the author, July 23, 2014.

37. Aid worker 2, interview with the author, August 4, 2014.


41. Former government official and high-ranking member of IO 1.


49. High–ranking officer from the Ethiopian army.


53. Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, 296.

54. Member of civil society 3, interview with the author, July 4, 2017.

55. Thirty-six-year-old displaced man from Ikotos / IO major general, interview with the author, July 8, 2017.

56. Former SPLA soldier 1, interview with the author, July 4, 2017.

57. Thirty-six-year-old displaced man from Wonduruba payam in Lanya county, interview with the author, June 20, 2017.

58. Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, 298.

59. Numerous sources have pointed out that the project emerged in 2010, contrary to the widespread assumption that these militias were recruited in 2012 or 2013. Some even went back as far as 2009, referencing Malong’s initiative to recruit in Northern Bahr El Ghazal. This contradicts findings from the African Union Commission of Inquiry, which dated the recruitment to April 2012 at the time of the fighting in Heglig. Former SPLA commander, August 6, 2014; member of civil society 6; AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, *Final Report—Executive Summary*, 23.

60. Research shows that contact with movement organizers, the framing of issues resonating with symbolic predispositions (group narratives), and networking are all key in government-led and mass-led mobilization. Stuart J. Kaufman, *Nationalist Passions* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 49–51, 53.
61. Former SPLA commander, August 4, 2014.

62. Events included the SAF bombing of Kir Adem, Majok Yinh Thiou, and Warguit in November/December 2010 and then in 2012; the fighting around Heglig in April 2012; and the SAF/SPLA clashes in Aweil East in September 2012.

63. Former high-ranking government official 1, interview with the author, July 11, 2017.

64. Nyaba, *The State We Aspire To*, 157.

65. Malong used to travel on UNMISS flights to Juba. The fact he no longer did meant that the UN had even less insight into the evolution of the political situation both in Northern Bahr El Ghazal and in Juba. Aid worker 3, interview with the author, August 9, 2014.

66. Former high-ranking government official 3, interview with the author, August 18, 2014.

67. IO member 1, interview with the author, August 18, 2014.

68. Two members of civil society 1, interview with the author, November 13, 2015.

69. IO member 1; thirty-year-old displaced man from Aweil, interview with the author, June 23, 2017.

70. Wol Anyaak is from Yirol, eastern Lakes. One of the very few reports published on Mathiang Anyoor since the writing of this book also posited that General Santino Deng Wol, the SPLA division 3 commander, had been the one to recruit these men into Pantit’s training camp. Alan Boswell, *Insecure Power And Violence. The Rise and Fall of Paul Malong and the Mathiang Anyoor* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, October 2019), 4.

71. Thirty-year-old displaced man from Aweil; member of civil society 6.

72. Thirty-year-old displaced man from Aweil.


74. This is neither surprising nor exceptional. For example, during the second half of 1941, “to maintain secrecy, Heinrich Himmler and his key subordinates generally avoided written orders and certainly dispensed with detailed blueprints setting out their plans for the Jews.” Richard Breitman, “Himmler and the ‘Terrible Secret’ among the Executioners,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 26, no. 3/4 (1991): 431–32.

75. Thirty-year-old displaced man from Aweil.

76. Twenty-seven-year-old displaced man from Wau payam, Ayod county, Jonglei, interview with the author, July 5, 2017.

77. South Sudanese intellectual 2, interview with the author, July 11, 2017; Former SPLA Commander, August 4, 2014.

78. Twenty-seven-year-old displaced man from Wau payam, Ayod county, Jonglei.

79. The name “Tiger” was a reference to the battalion Salva Kiir had commanded in the last war. De Waal, *The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa*, 104; member of civil society 6.

80. Two former high-ranking government officials and high-ranking members of IO, interview with the author, February 22, 2017.

81. South Sudanese intellectual 2. The only difference between Titweng and Geluen was the geographic area they covered during the second civil war. Titweng was deployed to the north against government incursions and Geluen to the south against Nuer raiders. Also see Thomas, *A Slow Liberation*, 206; Safer World, *Informal Armies*, 21; Naomi Pendle, “[‘They Are Now Community Police’: Negotiating the Boundaries and Nature of the Government in South Sudan through the Identity of Militarised Cattle-Keepers],” *International Journal On Minority And Group Rights*, no. 22 (2015): 410–34.
82. Member of civil society 6.
83. South Sudanese intellectual 2; member of civil society 6.
85. IO member 1.
86. Former high-ranking government official 3.
87. Former high-ranking government official 3.
88. Member of civil society 6.
89. South Sudanese intellectual 2; Pendle, “They Are Now Community Police;” 432.
91. Diplomat 2, interview with the author, August 18, 2014; IO member 1.
92. Member of civil society 6.
93. Former high-ranking government official 3.
95. International Crisis Group, *South Sudan: Jonglei—We Have Always Been at War,* Crisis Group Africa Report (International Crisis Group, December 22, 2014), 10; two former high-ranking government officials and high-ranking members of IO; thirty-year-old displaced man from Aweil.
97. Thirty-year-old displaced man from Aweil.
99. International Crisis Group, *South Sudan: Jonglei—We Have Always Been at War,* 10.
103. Nyaba, *The State We Aspire To*, 150, 171.
105. “The Honduran city of San Pedro Sula had the world’s highest murder rate, with 159 murders per 100,000 inhabitants in 2011. The figures from Akobo and Pibor correspond with a yearly murder rate of about 1,218 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, more than seven times that of San Pedro Sula,” David Deng, “South Sudan: Murder Rates at Wartime Levels In Jonglei,” *New Sudan Vision*, September 21, 2013, http://www.newsudanvision.com/commentary-archive/2751-david-k.
108. Member of civil society 24, interview with the author, July 24, 2014.
109. It should be noted that Equatorian groups also have cattle, but some more than others and overall much less and with smaller herds than the Dinka—not to mention compared to herds aggrandized through cattle raids.


111. Historically, conflicts have followed droughts. United Nations Development Program, Factsheet: Climate Change, Food Insecurity and Resilient Livelihoods in South Sudan (United Nations Development Program, June 28, 2017); BRACED, Building Climate Resilience in Fragile Contexts: Key Findings of BRACED Research in South Sudan; Improving Resilience to Climate Change in South Sudan. (BRACED, February 19, 2018), 23–24, 29–30.


114. Member of civil society 4, interview with the author, June 14, 2017.


116. “To understand the concept of group legitimacy, it is necessary to link it to ownership. Legitimacy goes to one’s rightful place in the country. To be legitimate is therefore to be identified with the territory.” Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 201; member of civil society 3; Leonardi, “Paying ‘Buckets of Blood,’” 221; Naseem Badiey, The State of Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Land, Urban Development and State-Building in Juba Southern Sudan (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2014), 159.

117. To be fair, discourses of indigenous autochthony were practiced by other communities, or by the Dinka in other areas that they had typically inhabited side by side with communities. But this Dinka group entitlement discourse, in these traditionally non-Dinka areas of Equatoria, was different. See Badiey, The State of Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 19.

118. Some were returning from neighboring Kenya Kakuma’s camp and stopping on their way to Jonglei to settle in Eastern Equatoria. To be sure, Jonglei was insecure. But the Dinka settlers’ discourses cannot be ignored.


121. Thirty-four-year-old displaced man from Wau, interview with the author, July 7, 2017.


124. Former SPLA lieutenant colonel, interview with the author, August 7, 2014.

125. Former SPLA lieutenant colonel. The most densely populated county was Juba, which reflected the postwar rush to settle in the capital, near the increasingly Dinka state. Juba was closely followed by the overwhelmingly Dinka counties of Aweil East in Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Gogrial West in Warrap, and Bor South in Jonglei. In fifth position
came the Nuer county of Nasir in Upper Nile, quickly followed by another Dinka county of Warrap (Twic), and Yei (Central Equatoria), where a lot of Dinka soldiers had settled. And yet according to Nyaba, Aweil was undercounted during the census. IMU OCHA SS, 5th Sudan Census 2008—Total Population Figures by County, SS-0041 (12–29–2009: IMU OCHA SS, n.d.); Nyaba, *The State We Aspire To*, 70.

126. See Pinaud, “Military Kinship, Inc.”

127. “Rarely will it be possible, without the application of considerable coercion, to maintain a system of ethnic stratification.” Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 35.


129. Member of civil society 25, interview with the author, April 2, 2010.

130. Aid worker 3.

131. Member of civil society 13, interview with the author, August 9, 2014.

132. Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, 169, 175.

133. Kiir postured an interest in resolving postreferendum issues but focused entirely on oil revenue sharing with the NCP. He continued to strongly advocate for separation based on his own personal views, while Pagan Amum implied that the SPLM did not support secession Young, *The Fate of Sudan*, 186–93.


135. Member of civil society 13.

136. For example, Nuer and Equatorian members of the South Sudan Law Society were beaten and harassed for wanting to represent Pagan Amum during his trial for corruption in 2012. Member of civil society 24.

137. In December 2012, protests started over the shooting of civil society activists who opposed the relocation of the county capital Wau to the town of Bagari, which threatened to marginalize non-Dinka communities. The SPLA shot the protesters, and several hundred Dinka youths quickly descended on Wau. They came to avenge the killing of six Dinka farmers killed in Farajallah by unknown persons—murders most likely staged by government security agents. Amnesty International, *South Sudan: Civil Unrest and State Repression*, 11–12.


142. This was a problem back in the last war as well: according to a U.S. official, the level of violence against the Dinka in 1986–88 was “acceptable.” Keen wrote that “there was nothing 'acceptable' about the catastrophe that befell the Dinka in 1986–1988.” David Keen, *The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan*, 1983–1989, 2nd ed. (Oxford: James Currey, 2008), x.


148. This was also reminiscent of other contexts such as the Ottoman Empire under the CUP’s Young Turks before the Armenian genocide. Straus, *Making and Unmaking Nations*, 69–71.


151. “The fear of extinction is actually a projection. Projection is a psychological mechanism by which unacceptable impulses felt by oneself are imputed to others, often the very targets of those impulses . . . backward groups are overwhelmingly initiators and advanced groups are targets of ethnic riot behavior.” Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 180.

152. “The more prejudiced group members are, the more likely they are to perceive a threat from the disliked group.” Kaufman, *Nationalist Passions*, 45.

153. For example, during this period the SPLA outsourced to a local militia (the Arrow Boys) security against incursions by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) into Western Equatoria. De Waal, *The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa*, 97.


155. Diplomat 2; IO member 1.

156. Kiir relied on Uganda, Egypt, rebel groups such as the Darfuri JEM, SPLM/A-North, the Congolese M23, and mercenaries such as Blackwater’s Erik Prince.
7. CIVIL WAR AND THE FIRST GENOCIDAL PHASE


3. They were called the political detainees, and once released months later, they formed the nonaligned group of the “former political detainees.” They included Oyay Deng Ajak, Gier Choung, Majak D’Agoot John Luk Jok, Cirino Hiteng, Madur Biar, Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth, Deng Alor Koul, Madut Bier, and Kosti Manibe, arrested on December 17. On December 19, the SPLM secretary general Pagan Amum and Peter Adwok Nyaba, an ex-minister, were arrested. Human Rights Watch, South Sudan’s New War Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces, 19.

4. General Peter Gadet, who commanded the SPLA’s Division Eight, defected and joined the SPLA/IO. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 164.


6. Former high-ranking government official 2, interview with the author, August 18, 2014.

7. The African Union came to the same conclusion. See AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 27, 125.

8. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 126, 129, 131.

9. See, for a description of timing, Human Rights Watch, South Sudan’s New War Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces, 22.

10. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 124, 210, 238.


12. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 184–85.

13. See AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 182.

14. Member of civil society 6, interview with the author, August 10, 2014; former high-ranking government official 3, interview with the author, August 18, 2014. Riek Machar’s wife Angelina Teny also reported that targeted killings of Nuer in Juba started on December 11, 2013. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 130. The best chronology so far on the fighting within Tiger and the SPLA in Juba is in Human Rights Watch, South Sudan’s New War Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces, 23.


17. Pendle, “‘They Are Now Community Police,”’ 433; former high-ranking government official 3; AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 26.

18. The Dut Ku Beny were nicknamed the “Luri boys” for their training on Salva Kiir’s farm in Luri near Juba. Human Rights Watch, South Sudan’s New War Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces, 26.

20. Government official 1, Juba.

21. NSS or Presidential Guards were reportedly the ones delivering the guns. Mahmood Mamdani, *A Separate Opinion* (AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, October 20, 2014), 18.


24. Government official 1, Juba.

25. Major General Marial Chanuong had ordered the disarmament of Tiger’s Nuer contingent on the 15th, and he continued to command the reinforced Tiger on the 16th. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, *Final Report*, 121, 139; Human Rights Watch, *South Sudan’s New War Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces*, 29. The SPLA major general Bol Akot commanded the commandoes. Mamdani, *A Separate Opinion*, 17–18. Some elements of Mathiang Anyoor were already part of Dut Ku Beny and integrated in Tiger. If some civilians took up arms, some of them may have been from the group of dormant recruits planted throughout Juba in the earlier months. Human Rights Watch, *South Sudan’s New War Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces*, 24.


27. General Salva Matok commanded operations in Maharat; General Bol Akot in Gudele and Mia Saba; General Garang Mabir in Mangaten; General Marial Chinuong in Khor William. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 140.


29. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, ”Final Report,” 140–42.

30. Government official 1, Juba.

31. “Another witness, JWX testified that he saw a captain gathering Nuer soldiers, tying their hands behind their backs, killing them and saying that “they wanted to kill Nuers in the open so that everybody sees what will happen to whoever tries to fight the Dinka government.””AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, ”Final Report,” 141.

32. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 142, 211.

33. Government official 1, Juba.


36. Former SPLA commander, interview with the author, August 4, 2014.


40. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, *Final Report*, 211.

41. Not every Dinka was either a passive bystander or an active perpetrator—for example, one of the Dinka soldiers present at the site of the Gudele police station killing hid a survivor in his own home. This was unfortunately an exception. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 141, 142, 145; Human Rights Watch, *South Sudan’s New War Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces*, 22.

42. Human Rights Watch, *South Sudan’s New War Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces*, 27, 44.

43. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, *Final Report*, 136, 140, 219. Also see Human Rights Watch, 23n25.
44. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 176; Human Rights Watch, South Sudan’s New War Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces, 31.

45. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 176, 210–11.

46. Government official 1, Juba.

47. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 114.

48. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 145, 148, 149; Human Rights Watch, South Sudan’s New War Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces, 38; AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report—Executive Summary, 211.

49. On this topic see Human Rights Watch, South Sudan’s New War Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces, 26–27.

50. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 225.

51. Member of civil society 10, interview with the author, February 8, 2016.

52. The White Army had been part of South Sudan’s military landscape for decades but was not a single cohesive force. See, on the White Army, Ingrid Marie Breidlid and Michael J. Arensen, “Anyone Who Can Carry a Gun Can Go”: The Role of the White Army in the Current Conflict in South Sudan, PRIO Paper (Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 2014); John Young, The White Army: An Introduction and Overview (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2007).

53. Former high-ranking SPLA and government official, interview with the author, August 7, 2014.


55. Former SPLA Commander, August 4, 2014.

56. Former high-ranking SPLA and government official.

57. Former high-ranking SPLA and government official.

58. Government official 1, Juba.

59. Paul Malong, then only officially governor of Northern Bahr El Ghazal but instrumental in the recruitment of Tiger/Dut Ku Beny and Mathiang Anyoor since independence, gave orders at the NSS compound and was seen traveling around Juba during the massacre. Human Rights Watch, South Sudan’s New War Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces, 26.

60. Government official 1, Juba.

61. Mamdani, A Separate Opinion.


63. Thirty-four-year-old displaced man from Wau, interview with the author, July 7, 2017.

64. Juba resident, interview with the author, July 26, 2014.

65. Member of civil society 3, interview with the author, July 4, 2017.

66. Former SPLA soldier 1, interview with the author, July 4, 2017.

67. This interpretation would have to be reconciled with the number of high-ranking commanders and officials seen coordinating the massacre on the ground. On Rwanda and the role of local networks and politics in driving genocidal violence, see Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power and Race in Rwanda. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Lee Ann Fuji, Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009). On the Holocaust and the role of local SS and police officers in anticipating orders, see for example Jürgen Matthäus, “Controlled Escalation: Himmler’s Men in the Summer of 1941 and the Holocaust in the Occupied Soviet Territories,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 21, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 228, 232–33.

68. Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations, xi.

69. The capacity of the military elite to adapt is exemplified by the cases of Western and Central Equatoria in 2014–15. See chapter 9 on the rotations of SPLA soldiers from these states in 2014.

71. High-ranking government official 2 and wife.


73. Political representative 4.

74. Member of civil society 24, interview with the author, July 24, 2014.

75. The estimate of thirty thousand Nuer is from Human Rights Watch, *South Sudan’s New War Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces*, 28.

76. Political representative 4.

77. See on the topic Human Rights Watch, *South Sudan’s New War Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces*, 35.

78. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, *Final Report*, 134.


80. Twenty-seven-year-old displaced man from Wau payam, Ayod county, Jonglei.

81. Member of civil society 3.

82. Member of civil society 1, interview with the author, June 30, 2017.


84. Human Rights Watch, *South Sudan’s New War Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces*, 20, 21.

85. Former SPLA soldier 1.


87. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 161–62.

88. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 155, 161; Human Rights Watch, *South Sudan’s New War Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces*, 55.

89. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, *Final Report*, 163, 221.

90. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 155, 165, 166.

91. It also distributed guns to all other ethnic groups but the Nuer in Melut county. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 189, 191.

92. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 185, 191.

93. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, *Final Report—Executive Summary*, 212.


### 8. **THE SECOND PHASE OF THE GENOCIDE IN UNITY STATE**


4. Human Rights Watch, 57; thirty-two-year-old displaced woman from Guit county, interview with the author, October 26, 2015.

5. Sixty-year-old man from Ding Ding, Rubkona county, interview with the author, February 1, 2016.


7. These county commissioners were Steven Taker, Khor Gatmai, Wal Yach, and Koang Biel.
9. Human Rights Watch, South Sudan’s New War Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces, 63, 65.
10. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 177. Steven Taker, a government official, pretended to be a rebel on the radio and asked civilians to come out of hiding. Once they did, they were killed. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 177, 181; Human Rights Watch, South Sudan’s New War Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces, 64.

11. Member of civil society 20, interview with the author, February 3, 2016.
12. Member of civil society 20.
13. Gadet was replaced with Simon Maguet Gai. Member of civil society 20, interview with the author, February 3, 2016.
14. Member of civil society 20.
15. Aid worker 4, interview with the author, October 12, 2015.
16. IO was defeated due to lack of weapons, ammunitions, and recruits. IO had secured support from Sudan, but supplies were insufficient. Craze, Tubiana, and Gramizzi, A State of Disunity, 13.
20. Member of civil society 23, interview with the author, November 5, 2015.
23. Taban Deng was with Machar in the last civil war but sided with Kiir after 2005, retaining Unity’s governor seat until he was dismissed by Kiir in July of 2013 (his seat was given to Bul Nuer Nguen Monytuil) after becoming closer to Machar again. He joined IO in December 2013 but he would later rejoin the government again in July 2016. See, on Taban Deng, Craze, Tubiana, and Gramizzi, A State of Disunity, 28.
25. The other Nuer sections are the Leek Nuer in Rubkona county, the Jikany Nuer in Guit county, the Jagei Nuer in Koch county, the Haak Nuer in Mayendit county, the Dok Nuer in Leer county, and the Nyuong Nuer in Panyjaar county. Member of civil society 10, interview with the author, February 8, 2016.
26. Member of civil society 25, interview with the author, February 9, 2016.
27. Human Rights Watch, “They Burned It All,” 1.
28. Joseph Nguen Monytuil, a Bul Nuer, was the state governor. A former member of the South Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army (SSLM/A), he was the brother of Bapiny Monytuil, formerly in the Sudanese Armed Forces as Puljjang’s superior. The SPLA Division 4 operations commander in Unity was a Bul Nuer, Matthew Puljjang, formerly in Matiep’s SSDF and known for recruiting men and boys. Tayeb Gatluak Taitai, another Bul Nuer also formerly in the SSDF as Matiep’s deputy, was the SPLA Division 4 commander. Human Rights Watch, 37; Craze, Tubiana, and Gramizzi, A State of Disunity, 12, 34.
29. Member of civil society 26, interview with the author, November 22, 2015.
33. The PKM is a machine gun. Member of civil society 20; Human Rights Watch, 5, 22, 37.
34. Member of civil society 20.
35. Two members of civil society 3, interview with the author, October 24, 2015.
36. Aid worker 6, interview with the author, October 11, 2015.
38. Four displaced women from Leer, interview with the author, October 24, 2015; member of civil society 22, interview with the author, November 25, 2015.
39. In May 2015, Koang Biel was accused of supporting IO for agreeing to transport the wounded out of Koch. Afterwards, he would become much more involved in coordinating massacres. Aid worker 7, interview with the author, November 23, 2015.
40. This is not to say that the IO did not loot, but it did not have the same capacity or rationale, and practiced instead subsistence looting.
41. Member of civil society 2, interview with the author, July 13, 2016.
42. Member of civil society 22.
43. Member of civil society 23.
44. Twenty-one-year-old male gunshot wound victim from Leer county, interview with the author, October 25, 2015.
45. Twenty-three-year-old displaced woman from Mayendit county, interview with the author, October 26, 2015.
46. Forty-year-old displaced woman from Koch county, interview with the author, November 19, 2015.
47. Aid worker 6.
49. Member of civil society 26.
50. Member of civil society 25.
52. Four displaced women from Leer.
54. “Ethnic defection is a process whereby individuals join organizations explicitly opposed to the national aspirations of the ethnic group with which they identify and end up fighting against their coethnics. The process of ethnic defection implies a disjunction between ethnic identification and political support for ethnonational goals, without requiring a shift in a person’s self-identification.” Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Ethnic Defection in Civil War,” Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 8 (August 2008): 1045. For some Bul Nuer perpetrators, self-identification temporarily shifted when they identified themselves as Dinka to their victims.
55. Member of civil society 27, interview with the author, February 3, 2016; member of civil society 25.
56. The very southern tip of Unity (Panyjaar county) was protected by large swaths of swamps.
57. IO inadvertently made it easier for Biel to recruit the Jagei Nuer when the IO Koch county commissioner Nhial Kam (in Buaw) told them to return the cattle they had raided in Leer and as a result became unpopular.
60. Member of civil society 22.
61. Twenty-year-old male gunshot victim / cattle herder and SPLA-affiliated youth from Rubkon, interview with the author, November 20, 2015.
62. Aid worker 3, interview with the author, August 9, 2014.
63. Member of civil society 23.
64. Member of civil society 23.
65. Member of civil society 8, interview with the author, November 26, 2015.
66. In late September 2015, attacks on Leer were perpetrated by SPLA soldiers and youth from Mayom as well as Koch and Leer youth. The Koch youth were sent as reinforcements to the soldiers and youth from Leer and Mayom. They were rewarded with loot for their reinforcement and played a key role in perpetrating violence.
67. Eighteen-year-old female gunshot victim from Koch.
68. Member of civil society 23.
69. Eighteen-year-old female gunshot victim from Koch.
70. Wal Yach, the Leer county commissioner, “is controlled by Koang Biel,” another Nuer woman from Leer recalled. “Wal Yach and Koang Biel said it was Leer people raiding the cattle of Koch when in fact it was Bul Nuer.” Eighteen-year-old displaced woman from Leer county.
72. Member of civil society 23.
73. I insist on the fact that this is a self-depiction, unlike references to the victims calling their perpetrators Dinka.
74. Twenty-one-year-old male gunshot victim from Leer county.
75. Eighteen-year-old female gunshot victim from Koch.
76. Eighteen-year-old displaced woman from Leer county, interview with the author, November 9, 2015.
77. Twenty-seven-year-old displaced man from Leer county, interview with the author, November 9, 2015.
78. On ethnic miscuing in general, see Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 49.
79. Twenty-one-year-old male gunshot victim from Leer county.
80. Yet diffusing responsibility by miscuing did not really work. If Nuer victims occasionally called Nuer perpetrators “Dinka Jagei” or “Dinka Bul,” they also used another expression—Nuer Weo, literally meaning “Nuer money”—to designate the “Nuer who have been sold, and/or who are getting money for the killing of Nuer in Juba in December 2013.” Member of civil society 25.
81. Eighteen-year-old female gunshot victim from Koch.
82. Member of civil society 7, interview with the author, October 15, 2015.
83. Member of civil society 23.
84. Eighteen-year-old female gunshot victim from Koch.
85. Forty-year-old displaced woman from Koch county.
86. United Nations Office of the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator for South Sudan (UNOCHA), Crisis Impacts on Households in Unity State, South Sudan, 2014–2015: Initial Results of a Survey (Office of the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator for South Sudan, UNOCHA, January 2016), 10. UNOCHA reported that in about one quarter of the population of Unity state, “on average, there were 10 people per household in 2014 and 8 people per household in 2015.” This was still an average. Indeed, 58 percent of households recorded an average decrease of nearly five people over the year 2014–15. UNOCHA, 15–16.
87. Member of civil society 23.
88. Member of civil society 28, interview with the author, November 19, 2015.
89. Member of civil society 8.
90. Eighteen-year-old displaced woman from Leer county.
91. Twenty-two-year-old displaced woman from Leer county, interview with the author, November 22, 2015; fifteen displaced men, women, and children from Rubkuai, Mayendit county, interview with the author, November 22, 2015.
92. Fifty-five-year-old displaced man from Koch county, interview with the author, November 23, 2015.
93. Aid worker 8, interview with the author, October 8, 2015.
94. Member of civil society 23.
95. Two members of civil society 3.
96. Four displaced women from Leer.
97. Twenty-four-year-old displaced woman from Leer county, interview with the author, October 26, 2015.
98. Twenty-seven-year-old displaced man from Leer county.
99. The expression “genocide by attrition” was forged by Helen Fein, in reference to “a public health crisis threatening the lives of members as well as their ability to procreate. This outcome was a consequence of policies that we infer were ‘committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious groups such,’ as Article 2 of the Genocide Convention puts it, also ‘causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group’ and ‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.’” Helen Fein, “Genocide by Attrition 1939–1993: The Warsaw Ghetto, Cambodia, and Sudan: Links Between Human Rights, Health, And Mass Death,” Health and Human Rights 2, no. 2 (1997): 32.
100. Human Rights Watch, “They Burned It All,” 31, 32–33.
102. Thirty-year-old displaced woman from Guit county, interview with the author, October 26, 2015.
103. See UNOCHA, Crisis Impacts on Households in Unity State, 24.
104. Sixty-year-old male gunshot victim from Leer county, interview with the author, February 3, 2016.
105. Thirty-five-year-old displaced woman from Rubkona county, interview with the author, October 27, 2015.
106. Twenty-three-year-old displaced woman from Leer county, interview with the author, October 26, 2015.
107. UNOCHA, Crisis Impacts on Households in Unity State, 12. The Integrated Phase Classification describes the severity of food emergencies. For a description of the five phases, see: http://fews.net/IPC. Alex De Waal also wrote that “some international officials successfully argued that those who died from drowning (escaping massacre and seeking refuge and sustenance) should be excluded from the numbers—which brought the death rate below the threshold for declaring famine. In January 2017, this assessment was revised and the UN declared famine.” Alex De Waal, Mass Starvation: The History and Future of Famine (Cambridge: Polity, 2018), 31.
108. Two members of civil society 3.
110. Aid worker 6.
111. Member of civil society 2, July 13, 2016.
112. Member of civil society 23.
114. “Each act of sexual abuse committed with intent to destroy the (usually) women of a group defined by its nationality, ethnicity, religion, and/or race is therefore legally an act of genocide. Rapes undertaken as part of a genocide in fact are thus genocidal in law, as the Rwanda Tribunal recognized in Akayesu . . . Rape in war is a war crime. It is not genocidal until it is part of an aim to destroy a people as such on one of the listed grounds.” Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Genocide’s Sexuality,” Nomos, Political Exclusion And Domination, 46 (2005): 327. MacKinnon first coined the concept of genocidal rape in “Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace,” in On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993, ed. Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (Basic Books, 1993). She was the first to argue the concept of rape as genocide in a court in the case of Kadic v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), 70 F. 3d 232 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied 518 U.S. 1005 (1996). She and her co-counsel won the case, establishing genocidal rape in international law. Also see International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), “The Prosecutor vs. Jean-Paul Akayesu,” Case No. ICTR-98–44-T (1998), Trial Judgment Para. 731: “Rape and sexual violence . . . constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such . . . These rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of the process of destruction.”


116. Forced cannibalism may have been a dehumanizing yet meaningful act of revenge for past humiliations. A thirty-two-year-old woman reported to the AU investigators that Nuer civilians were forced to “eat the flesh of dead people”: “They were told that you always say Dinka eat people, so now you eat.” AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report, 180–81.


118. The women raped by one single perpetrator were often abducted after the rape and used to carry loot. There was little chance for them to escape their captor, since the SPLA controlled the road from Leer to Mayom. Biel himself held a few of them in his compound in Koch town, most likely abducted from Mayendit and Leer. Yet abducted women—raped by a single perpetrator before their capture—were the minority of the victims of sexual violence. Human Rights Watch, “They Burned It All,” 4–5, 25; Aid worker 7.

119. Sixty-year-old displaced woman from Koch county.

120. Eighteen-year-old displaced woman from Guit county, interview with the author, November 19, 2015.

121. Members of civil society 3, interview with the author, October 24, 2015.

122. Eighteen-year-old female gunshot victim from Koch.

123. Four displaced women from Leer.

124. Sixty-year-old displaced woman from Koch county.


126. Two members of civil society 3.

127. Aid worker 9, interview with the author, October 23, 2015.

128. The vast majority of households who reached the POC were female-headed in 2015, nearly double than in 2014. UNOCHA, Crisis Impacts on Households in Unity State, 19, 26.

129. UNOCHA, Crisis Impacts on Households in Unity State, 20.

130. Four displaced women from Leer.


132. Eighteen-year-old displaced woman from Guit county.

134. Thirty-five-year-old displaced woman from Juach, Rubkona county, interview with the author, November 23, 2015.
135. Observer 1, interview with the author, October 8, 2015.
136. “Girls are not allowed to marry other than from Guit, Mayendit, Rubkona and Leer. Others such as Koch and Mayom are forbidden.” Eighteen-year-old displaced woman from Leer county.
137. Eighteen-year-old displaced woman from Rubkona county, interview with the author, October 26, 2015.
139. Member of civil society 8.
140. Member of civil society 2, interview with the author, November 11, 2016.
141. Member of civil society 2, July 13, 2016.
142. “Dowry” popularly refers to bridewealth in South Sudan. Twenty-year-old displaced man from Leer county, interview with the author, November 9, 2015.
143. Thirty-eight-year-old male gunshot victim from Rubkona county, interview with the author, February 3, 2016.
144. Aid worker 10, interview with the author, November 22, 2015.
145. Thirty-eight-year-old male gunshot victim from Rubkona county.
146. Twenty-seven-year-old displaced man from Leer county.
147. Aid worker 11, interview with the author, November 19, 2015.
149. Group discussion with Bentiu town residents, January 30, 2016.
150. Specifically in violation of article 162, section 1, stating that South Sudan is composed of ten states. The council of states was the one that should have officially requested a change of number, boundaries, and state capitals from the president, not the other way around, by imposition.
151. “When you have a state, you don’t wait for the center to give you money.” Heard from the presidential legal adviser by the author at Juba University during the “Public Interest Debate on the Presidential Decree, Order Number 36/2015 for the Decentralized Government of South Sudan” (October 8, 2015). Speakers were the presidential legal adviser in the Office of the President, Hon. Lawrence Korbandy Kodis; the former president of the Southern Sudan Supreme Court and chairman of the Jieng Council of Elders, Justice Ambrose Ring Thiiik; Dr. Lam Akol, the chairperson of SPLM for Democratic Change (SPLM-DC) and leader of the national alliance of opposition political parties; and Mr. Edmund Yakani, the executive director of Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO).
152. Michael Makuei, the minister of information and known to be a Dinka hardliner, also expressed his opposition to the peace agreement.
153. Two members of civil society 2, interview with the author, February 6, 2016.
154. Member of civil society 27.
155. Aid worker 12, interview with the author, February 9, 2016.
156. Two members of civil society 3.
157. Member of civil society 25.
159. This book does not address in depth this fourth phase of the genocide, for lack of fieldwork in that region. For more on violence against the Shilluk, see Joshua Craze, *Displaced and Immiserated: The Shilluk of Upper Nile in South Sudan’s Civil War, 2014–19* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, September 2019).

160. “Violating other men’s women is planting a flag; it is a way some men say to other men, “What was yours is now mine.” . . . As often happens when men plant flags, someone was already living there.” Catharine A. MacKinnon, *Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 170–71.

161. Human Rights Watch, “*They Burned It All,*** 18, 36, 37–38. Mayendit was protected by water, though cattle was looted from Rubkai.

162. Four displaced women from Leer.

163. These county commissioners were Wal Yach of Leer, Biel of Koch, Salam Maluett of Rubkona, Kawai Cheng of Guit, and Bul Ma Yah of Mayom, as well as Khor Gatmai of Mayendit.

164. Member of civil society 23.

165. In 2015 alone, Biel married two more wives, and Salam Meluett, the Rubkona county commissioner, five more. Member of civil society 22; member of civil society 25.

166. Member of civil society 8.

167. This distribution of the loot created such resentment among troops that it led to sporadic in-fighting in Koch, Leer, and Mayendit.

168. Interviewees placed the amount of cattle given to Biel after each raid at between 10 and 30 heads. Member of civil society 22; member of civil society 23.

169. Member of civil society 23, interview with the author, November 16, 2015.

170. I am here accounting for a potentially very low cattle price. In reality, prices vary even throughout Unity—where cattle are scarce, prices rise, and vice-versa.

171. Twenty-year-old male gunshot victim / cattle herder and SPLA-affiliated youth from Rubkona; four displaced women from Leer.

172. The SPLA was trying to get medicine for its livestock to Koch.

173. Dinka SPLA soldiers often thought taking looted cattle to Lakes or Warrap was too burdensome: “For the Dinka soldiers operating now in Unity state,” women from Leer explained, “taking the cattle back to Warrap or Rumbek [Lakes] is difficult. So they sell them back in Bentiu, Guit, Koch, Tharjaat, and Mayom. The cows travel, they are taken from Koch, to Buaw, to Wankei, and finally Mayom.” Two members of civil society 3.

174. Two members of civil society 3.

175. Two members of civil society 2.

176. Two members of civil society 3.

177. Member of civil society 23.

178. Member of civil society 11, interview with the author, November 20, 2015; two members of civil society 2; member of civil society 25.

179. Member of civil society 8.

180. A common route for the cattle was “from Leer-Koch-Bentiu-Mayom-Warrap-Rumbek-Mundri.” Member of civil society 16, interview with the author, November 11, 2015.

181. “After Dec 2013, the elite moved its cattle from Lakes to Mundri. In July/August 2015, they had to take all Salva’s personal cattle into trucks to bring it back from Mundri to his home state.” Member of civil society 16.

182. Member of civil society 15, interview with the author, November 17, 2015.


184. Thirty-six-year-old displaced man from Wonduruba payam in Lanya county, interview with the author, June 20, 2017.

185. Two members of civil society 4, interview with the author, June 27, 2017.
186. Forty-seven-year-old displaced man from Amadi village, Mundri West county, WES, interview with the author, July 5, 2017.
187. Member of civil society 29, interview with the author, June 27, 2017.

9. THE THIRD PHASE OF THE GENOCIDE IN EQUATORIA

1. Member of civil society 3, interview with the author, July 4, 2017.
2. Martin Kenyi and Alfred Ladu Gore were some of the Equatorian members of IO. Member of civil society 3.
3. Member of civil society 3.
5. Member of civil society 3; IO commissioner for Kajo Keji county, interview with the author, July 2, 2017.
6. Member of civil society 5, interview with the author, July 4, 2017.
7. Former SPLA soldier 1, interview with the author, July 4, 2017.
10. Member of civil society 5.
11. Former SPLA soldier 1.
12. Member of civil society 3.
13. Former SPLA soldier 1.
15. Observer 2, interview with the author, June 18, 2017; fifty-five-year-old displaced man from Agoro payam, Magwi county, interview with the author, June 27, 2017; two members of civil society 4.
16. Two members of civil society 4.
18. Forty-seven-year-old displaced man from Amadi village, Mundri West county, WES.
20. The Arrow Boys also reportedly forcibly enrolled men. Member of civil society 30.
27. Member of civil society 17, interview with the author, June 28, 2017; two members of civil society 4.
28. Thirty-five-year-old displaced man from Yei, former SPLA and IO soldier, interview with the author, June 15, 2017; member of civil society 17.
29. Member of civil society 2, interview with the author, July 15, 2016.
30. Member of civil society 20, interview with the author, July 13, 2016.
31. Member of civil society 2, interview with the author, July 8, 2016.
34. Member of civil society 2, July 8, 2016; Juba resident, interview with the author, July 13, 2016.
35. Member of civil society 2, July 15, 2016.
36. Member of civil society 20.
37. Member of civil society 3.
38. Member of civil society 3.
39. Two members of civil society 6, interview with the author, February 2, 2016. The local opposition was especially strong in Wunduruba, the scene of extreme violence in September 2015 under the rule of a Dinka unit led by Major-General Bol Akot, and in Lobonok in January 2016. Member of civil society 3.
40. Thirty-five-year-old displaced man from Yei former SPLA and IO soldier.
41. Member of civil society 15, interview with the author, November 17, 2015.
42. Member of civil society 15.
43. Member of civil society 30, interview with the author, February 15, 2016.
44. Member of civil society 15.
45. Member of civil society 2, July 8, 2016.
46. Longtime observer 1, interview with the author, June 1, 2016.
47. IO also wanted to consolidate its influence to be in a position of strength—this was most likely wishful thinking given the overwhelming military superiority of the government. As for these rebel satellite groups, they pursued their own goals in formalizing ties with IO, such as being included in future demilitarization plans.
49. Two members of civil society 4.
50. Two members of civil society 4.
51. Member of civil society 15.
52. On the formation of these rebel groups, see Sarah Vuylsteke, *Identity and Self-Determination: The Fertit Opposition in South Sudan* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, December 2018), 7.
53. Member of civil society 2, July 12, 2016.
54. Member of civil society 32, interview with the author, July 8, 2016.
56. Member of civil society 20.
57. CTSAM, the Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangement Mechanism, is the international monitoring body of the agreement.
60. Member of civil society 2, interview with the author, July 10, 2016; Juba resident, July 13, 2016.
62. Member of civil society 31, interview with the author, July 14, 2016.
63. Member of civil society 2, July 15, 2016.
70. Amnesty International, “‘We Did Not Believe We Would Survive,’” 13.
72. Member of civil society 30, interview with the author, July 13, 2016.
73. Six midwives.
74. Member of civil society 31.
75. Juba resident, July 14, 2016.
76. Member of civil society 2, July 13, 2016.
77. Twenty-five-year-old displaced woman from Juba town, interview with the author, June 19, 2017.
78. Member of civil society 3.
80. The SPLA destroyed the houses of officers such as Peter Bol Koang, a Lou Nuer from Lankien (Jonglei); they attacked the office in Bilpam HQ of Charles Lam, another prominent Nuer; and they arrested the half Bul Nuer, half Dinka SPLA division commander Stephen Buay for trying to curb looting. Member of civil society 2, July 10, 2016; nineteen-year-old, twenty-six-year-old, and thirty-two-year old displaced women from Bentiu town.
81. Taban Deng, on July 13, pulled the rug out from under Machar’s feet by defecting to the government and becoming the Nuer vice-president instead of Machar. Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth, another Jikany Nuer from Upper Nile, also defected from IO. Member of civil society 2, July 12, 2016.
82. For example, a Nuer civilian explained how “the JCE approached Dhieu Mathok and the son of John Garang to defect from Riek Machar to Salva Kiir. Dhieu Mathok refused and one day later, he was tortured.” Member of civil society 2, July 15, 2016.
83. Member of civil society 5.
84. Forty-year-old displaced man from Yei, interview with the author, June 21, 2017.
85. Member of civil society 4, interview with the author, June 14, 2017.
86. Twenty-year-old displaced woman from Gilmun, Yei county, interview with the author, June 15, 2017.
87. Fifty-five-year-old displaced man from Agoro payam, Magwi county.
88. Nineteen-year-old displaced woman from Bentiu town et al.
89. Troops came from Torit, Juba, and Lobonok. They were mostly Dinka from Bahr El Ghazal but also included some Nuer, Acholi, and Latuko soldiers. The SPLA had once again capitalized on in-group competition (just like in Unity) and co-opted Acholi soldiers, especially from Abau and Panyakwara clans, who hoped to capture land from the Acholi of Pajok. Sixty-five- and seventy-six-year-old displaced men from Pajok payam, Magwi county, July 7, 2017; aid worker 13, interview with the author, June 14, 2017.
90. Fifty-five-year-old displaced woman from Narus, Kapoeta East county, interview with the author, June 27, 2017; member of civil society 17.
91. Member of civil society 17.
92. Twenty-four-year-old displaced man from Kenyi payam, Lanya county, interview with the author, June 19, 2017. For example, the Kakwa David Lokonga from Lasu, Yei county, was an SPLA colonel appointed commissioner and then governor of Yei river state. But a former Kakwa SPLA soldier who had been rotated to Greater Upper Nile explained, “Lokonga does not coordinate attacks like Koang Biel (I know about Koang Biel). Lokonga just wants money from the Dinka—he’s small minded.” Former SPLA soldier 1; member of civil society 5.
93. Only an official letter allowed civilians to come out of these garrison towns, just like in Unity state. Thirty-two-year-old and seventy-seven-year-old displaced men from Pajok payam, Magwi county, interview with the author, July 7, 2017.
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94. Thirty-five-year-old displaced man from Pajok village, Magwi county, interview with the author, June 27, 2017.
95. Member of civil society 1, interview with the author, June 30, 2017.
96. The SPLA also took Kaya in the summer of 2017. Observer 2; twenty-four-year-old displaced man from Kenyi payam, Lanya county; twenty-nine-year-old year old displaced man from Paiwa Sowa, Yei county, thirty-seven and forty-two-year-old displaced men from Tore payam, Yei county, twenty-year-old displaced man from Kupera payam, Yei county, twenty-three-year-old displaced man from Ngulumbi payam, Morobo county, thirty-one-year-old displaced man from Manyome payam, Morobo county, interview with the author, June 29, 2017.
97. Sixty-five and seventy-six-year-old displaced men from Pajok payam, Magwi county.
98. Member of civil society 1.
100. Seventeen-year-old displaced woman from Mongo village, Yei county, interview with the author, June 17, 2017.
101. Thirty-year-old displaced woman from Kupera village, Yei county, interview with the author, June 17, 2017.
102. The SPLA controlled Mere, Kala, Kaya, Morobo, Lanya, Kajo Keji, Nimule, the road coming to Livolo, and the road from Nadapale, Nimule, and Yei. IO controlled Pageri, Moli, Loa, Kit, and Aru junction. Six midwives.
103. Member of civil society 4.
104. Member of civil society 4.
106. Seventeen-year-old displaced woman from Mongo village, Yei county; thirty-year-old displaced woman from Kupera village, Yei county; thirty-five-year-old displaced woman from Tore payam, Yei county, interview with the author, June 17, 2017.
107. Thirty-five-year-old displaced woman from Ronyi village, Yei county, June 17, 2017.
108. Two members of civil society 5, interview with the author, June 16, 2017.
109. Member of civil society 3; forty-year-old displaced man from Pigi Canal county, Jonglei, interview with the author, July 5, 2017.
110. Twenty-nine-year-old displaced man from Bereka village, Lanya county, interview with the author, June 20, 2017.
111. Its recruits were younger, paid, given new better weapons and uniforms, and higher ranks than SPLA soldiers from Division 2. Former SPLA soldier 1; forty-year-old displaced man from Pigi Canal county, Jonglei; sixty-year-old displaced man from Ikotos / IO major general, interview with the author, July 8, 2017; former SPLA soldier 1.
112. Twenty-nine-year-old displaced man from Bereka village, Lanya county, interview with the author, June 20, 2017; thirty-four-year-old displaced man from Logwili village, Lanya county, interview with the author, June 20, 2017. This would be slightly different in Magwi, Eastern Equatoria, in April 2017.
113. Thirty-five-year-old displaced woman from Ronyi village, Yei county; twenty-three-year-old displaced woman from Magalatore village, Kajo Keji county.
114. Twenty-year-old displaced woman from Ombazi village, Yei county, interview with the author, June 16, 2017.
115. Thirty-year-old displaced woman from Kayaya village, Yei county, interview with the author, June 16, 2017.
116. Thirty-year-old displaced woman from Jombo village, Yei county, interview with the author, June 17, 2017.
117. Thirty-three-year-old displaced woman from Jombu village, Yei county, interview with the author, June 17, 2017; observer 2.
118. Thirty-year-old displaced woman from Kupera village, Yei county.
119. Twenty-nine-year-old displaced man from Bereka village, Lanya county.
120. Thirty-year-old displaced man from Aweil.
121. Member of civil society 1; thirty-four-year-old displaced man from Logwili village, Lanya county; forty-year-old displaced man from Yei; IO commissioner for Kajo Keji county; member of a civil society organization in Yei, interview with the author, July 4, 2017; forty-five-year-old displaced man from Yei town, July 6, 2017. For more on the state of Mathiang Anyoor after Malong’s dismissal, see Alan Boswell, Insecure Power and Violence: The Rise and Fall of Paul Malong and the Mathiang Anyoor (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, October 2019), 11–14.
122. Member of civil society 4.
123. Forty-five-year-old displaced man from Yei town, 45.
125. IO commissioner for Kajo Keji county.
126. Member of civil society 3.
127. Thirty-four-year-old displaced man from Logwili village, Lanya county.
128. Member of civil society 17; twenty-nine-year-old displaced man from Paiwa Sowa, Yei county et al.
130. Seventeen-year-old displaced woman from Mongo village, Yei county.
131. Twenty-year-old displaced woman from Gimunu, Yei county.
132. Twenty-three-year-old displaced woman from Magalatore village, Kajo Keji county.
133. Seventeen-year-old displaced woman from Mongo village, Yei county.
134. Forty-year-old displaced man from Yei.
135. Thirty-year-old displaced woman from Yei town (Shilluk), interview with the author, June 19, 2017. If this Shilluk woman had been found by her Dinka attackers in Upper Nile, she would most likely not have been spared rape and/or death. On annihilating violence against the Shilluk as a group by Dinka militias and the SPLA, see Joshua Craze, Displaced and Immiserated: The Shilluk of Upper Nile in South Sudan’s Civil War, 2014–19 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, September 2019), 52–53, 55, 67.
136. Thirty-five-year-old displaced woman from Ronyi village, Yei county.
137. Member of civil society 9, interview with the author, June 15, 2017.
138. Member of civil society 4.
139. Thirty-five-year-old displaced woman from Lomuku village, Yei county, interview with the author, June 16, 2017.
140. Translator from Mangalatore, Kajo Keji county, interview with the author, June 17, 2017; twenty-three-year-old displaced woman from Kerua village, Kajo Keji county, interview with the author, June 17, 2017; twenty-nine-year-old displaced man from Bereka village, Lanya county.
141. Thirty-year-old displaced woman from Kupera village, Yei county.
142. Thirty-five-year-old displaced woman from Lomuku village, Yei county.
143. Member of civil society 4.
144. Two members of civil society 5.
145. Two members of civil society 5.
146. Armed to their teeth, SPLA soldiers regularly shot their guns in the air in villages they occupied. They engaged the IO with tanks and weapons such as RPGs, mounted machine guns, AK47, and PKMs, and wore belts of ammunition and grenades. Twenty-four-year-old displaced man from Kenyi payam, Lanya county; twenty-three-year-old displaced woman from Ombashi village, Yei county, interview with the author, June 19, 2017.
147. Twenty-five-year-old displaced woman from Juba town.
149. Author observations in Imvepi Reception Center, Uganda, June 19, 2017.
150. Psychological aid worker.
151. Twenty-year-old displaced woman from Ombazi village, Yei county.
152. Twenty-year-old displaced woman from Gimunu, Yei county.
153. Thirty-five-year-old displaced woman from Tore payam, Yei county.
154. I am inspired here by Catharine A. MacKinnon: “Presumably, where humanity was found, survival did not come at a sexual price.” MacKinnon, “Genocide’s Sexuality,” Nomos, Political Exclusion and Domination, 46 (2005): 324.
155. Six midwives.
156. Thirty-five-year-old displaced woman from Tore payam, Yei county.
157. Thirty-five-year-old displaced woman from Ronyi village, Yei county.
159. Twenty-five-year-old displaced woman from Gimunu, Yei county, interview with the author, June 15, 2017.
160. Thirty-five-year-old displaced man from Yei, former SPLA and IO soldier.
161. Thirty-year-old displaced woman from Jombu village, Yei county, interview with the author, June 17, 2017.
162. Twenty-three-year-old displaced woman from Magalatore village, Kajo Keji county; six midwives; twenty-five-year-old displaced woman from Jigomoni village, Yei county, interview with the author, June 16, 2017.
163. Thirty-year-old displaced woman from Kupera village, Yei county.
164. Thirty-year-old displaced woman from Kupera village, Yei county; twenty-year-old displaced woman from Ombazi village, Yei county.
165. Six midwives.
167. Thirty-year-old displaced woman from Jombu village, Yei county.
168. Member of civil society 1.
169. Eighteen-year-old displaced woman from Morsaq village, Yei county, interview with the author, June 17, 2017.
171. Thirty-year-old displaced woman from Jamara village, Yei county, interview with the author, June 16, 2017.
172. Thirty-year-old displaced woman from Kendila village, Morobo county.
173. Twenty-year-old displaced woman from Gimunu, Yei county.
174. Member of civil society 9; sixty-nine-year-old displaced man from Lawaje boma, Pajok payam, Magwi county, interview with the author, July 7, 2017.
175. The argument that gang-rape reinforces group cohesion has been made in other non-genocidal contexts by Dara Kay Cohen, Rape during Civil War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016).
176. Twenty-year-old displaced woman from Ombazi village, Yei county.
178. Twenty-year-old displaced woman from Gimunu, Yei county.
179. Twenty-five-year-old displaced woman from Gimunu, Yei county.
180. Thirty-five-year-old displaced woman from Ronyi village, Yei county; six midwives.
181. Twenty-year-old displaced woman from Gimunu, Yei county.
182. Thirty-five-year-old displaced man from Pajok village, Magwi county.
183. Twenty-nine-year-old and twenty-seven-year-old displaced women from Kit, Magwi, interview with the author, June 27, 2017.
184. Fifty-five-year-old displaced man from Agoro payam, Magwi county; member of civil society 17.
185. Twenty-four-year-old displaced man from Kenyi payam, Lanya county.
186. Former SPLA soldier 1.
188. “Genocide is actually more continuous with discrimination than with war: it is a violent practice of discrimination.” MacKinnon, “Genocide’s Sexuality,” 329.
189. This form of ethnic ranking was immutable unless members from the victim group miscued by becoming scarified too. But given the urgency of their escape, miscuing was not an option.
190. Member of civil society 5.
191. “They confiscated my documents—certificates, diplomas. When I asked why take it, the man said, ‘We’ll give it back to you once you return.’ They took my motorbike too. They also took my passport as well.” Thirty-year-old displaced male from Iwere payam, Magwi county, interview with the author, June 30, 2017.
192. Thirty-five-year-old displaced man from Pajok village, Magwi county.
193. Member of civil society 31, interview with the author, July 10, 2017.
194. Thirty-year-old displaced man from Aweil.
195. Twenty-nine-year-old displaced man from Paiwa Sowa, Yei county et al.
196. Member of civil society 17.
197. For example, in January 2015 in Mundri, Kiir called Dinka cattle herders to return to Lakes and Warrap with their cattle, but they refused. Two members of civil society 4.
198. Twenty-year-old displaced woman from Gimunu, Yei county.
199. Seventeen-year-old displaced woman from Mongo village, Yei county.
200. Twenty-three-year-old displaced woman from Ombashi village, Yei county.
201. Seventeen-year-old displaced woman from Mongo village, Yei county.
202. Twenty-five-year-old displaced woman from Juba town.
203. For example, in Lanya (Wonduruba), victims spotted mixed units containing perpetrators from the Bor Dinka, Dinka Padang, and the Dinka from Bahr El Ghazal. Thirty-six-year-old displaced man from Wonduruba payam in Lanya county; thirty-three-year-old displaced woman from Jombu village, Yei county; sixty-nine-year-old displaced man from Lawaje boma, Pajok payam, Magwi county.
204. Cattle herders included sections from Lakes but also from Bor. Thirty-four-year-old displaced man from Logwili village, Lanya county.
205. For example, the Dinka Padang civilians settled in Yei. Observer 2.
206. Thirty-four-year-old displaced man from Logwili village, Lanya county.
207. Twenty-nine-year-old displaced man from Bereka village, Lanya county.
208. Thirty-year-old displaced man from Aweil.
211. Member of civil society 4.
212. Member of civil society 13, interview with the author, August 9, 2014.
213. Thirty-year-old displaced man from Aweil.
215. IO commissioner for Kajo Keji county; six midwives.
216. Forty-five-year-old displaced man from Yei town.
217. Twenty-four-year-old displaced man from Kenyi payam, Lanya county; thirty-six-year-old displaced man from Wonduruba payam in Lanya county.
218. Thirty-six-year-old displaced man from Wonduruba payam in Lanya county.
219. Twenty-nine-year-old displaced man from Bereka village, Lanya county.
220. Twenty-three-year-old displaced woman from Magalatore village, Kajo Keji county.
221. Eighteen-year-old displaced woman from Morsaq village, Yei county.
222. Twenty-five-year-old displaced woman from Jigomoni village, Yei county.
224. Twenty-nine-year-old displaced man from Bereka village, Lanya county; member of civil society 3.
225. Member of civil society 3.
226. Thirty-four-year-old displaced man from Logwili village, Lanya county; member of civil society 3.
227. Member of civil society 1.
228. Sixty-five and seventy-six-year-old displaced men from Pajok payam, Magwi county.
229. Central Equatoria had diamonds and, like Eastern Equatoria, gold, uranium, and mercury. Member of civil society 9.
230. IO commissioner for Kajo Keji county.

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2. Member of civil society 3, interview with the author, July 4, 2017.
4. Thirty-five-year-old displaced woman from Lomuku village, Yei county, interview with the author, June 16, 2017.
5. Thirty-four-year-old displaced man from Wau.
6. Thirty-year-old displaced woman from Yei town (Shilluk), interview with the author, June 19, 2017.
7. Thirty-two-year-old displaced woman from Malakal town.
8. Thirty-two-year-old displaced woman from Malakal town.
10. Thirty-year-old displaced woman from Yei town (Shilluk), June 19, 2017.
15. Thirty-two-year-old displaced woman from Malakal town. On the local competition for land in Upper Nile between local Padang Dinka militias sub-contracted by the SPLA, and their conflictual relationship with Mathiang Anyoor, see Craze, *Displaced and Immiserated*, 42, 45-46, 73.
16. Two twenty-five-year-old displaced women from Bor, Jonglei, interview with the author, July 6, 2017.