CHAPTER 10

The Cherished Triad:

S. S. Uvarov's Memorandum of 1832 and the Development of the Doctrine "Orthodoxy—Autocracy—Nationality"

1

A new phase of ideological production began in the early 1830s, which was a turning point in the Russian Empire's foreign and domestic policies. The Peace of Adrianople with Turkey in 1829 had put an end, at least for a time, to Russian striving for dominance over the Orthodox East and the unification of the peoples of this faith under its aegis. The new Emperor Nikolai Pavlovich (henceforth referred to as Nicholas I) fully shared his elder brother's skepticism toward the grandiose notions of their grandmother (see, e.g., Lincoln 1989, 118). However, educated Russian society still cherished the dream of Russia's historical destiny of restoring Greece and therefore had been disillusioned by the lack of mention of Greece and the Orthodox faith in the imperial manifesto that had declared war (see, e.g., Benkendorf 1929, 157–158; cf. Fadeev 1958; Prousis 1994). Now, if the Slavic question remained on the agenda, it had been shifted from the realm of real politics into that of hypothetical schemes, while the Greek question was taken off of the table completely. This was even more the case after the assassination in 1831 of Ioannis Capodistria, the first president of Greece and former Russian state secretary for foreign affairs (see Woodhouse 1973).

Having rejected expansionist plans in the East, the Russian autocracy also adopted a more cautious policy in the West. This path was more likely intended to curtail the influx of foreign influences into Russia than to aggressively pursue its own agenda beyond Russia's borders. When he received word of the revolutions in France and Belgium in 1830, Nicholas I considered the possibility of military intervention in Europe, but the Polish uprising forced him to completely reject such an idea and to preserve the status quo (Shil'der 1903 II, 284–320).

Thus the section of the Holy Alliance's legacy that was based on collective armed defense of existing monarchial regimes was ideologically repudiated, at least until 1848. The moderate isolationism that came to the fore in Nicholas I's foreign policy, however, was by no means connected to a focus on long-awaited internal reforms. On the contrary, under the impact of the same complex of historical events—the July Revolution in France, the Polish revolt, the cholera riots of the summer of 1831—the emperor discarded the reformist plans of the first five years of his reign, in which he had "revived" Russia "with war, hopes, and labors." Even the highly modest recommendations of the "December 6 Commission," which were the culmination of these efforts, were as it turned out essentially shelved (see Kizivetter 1912, 410–502; Lincoln 1989, 92–98).

The rejection of reforms did not mean that the emperor no longer believed in their necessity. In the early 1830s Nicholaevan politics took on its classical form, whose essence the autocrat expressed aphoristically in 1842; while putting the brakes on yet another project for gradual reform, he declared, "There is no doubt that serfdom in its present situation is an evil, the most palpable and obvious to everyone, but to touch on it *now* would be an even more ruinous matter" (Mironenko 1990, 187). This formula is endlessly fruitful and may be applied to many sides of Russian state life: an obvious political evil may not be corrected out of the fear of shaking the very foundations of the existing power. Nicholas I preferred to trust the recommendations of his elder brother the Tsesarevich Konstantin Pavlovich, who wrote to him that "old age (drevnost') is the most reliable protection for government regulations," advising him to leave reform "to the judgment of time" (SbRIO XC, 77).

In implementing this strategic turn in politics, the emperor undoubtedly felt the need for a system of gradual and organic development that, at the same time, occurs under government control. Necessary changes were postponed to

Figure 29 Portrait of S. S. Uvarov. Lithograph by M. Mukhin.

some vague future, but their reliability and solidity would be guaranteed by the very course of events. Thus the responsibility for them was transferred from the authorities to the movement of history; the purely conservative functions of maintaining the state's stability and preserving the fundamental bases of the political order were left to the government.

S. S. Uvarov, who was appointed deputy minister of popular education in early 1832, was able to present the emperor with an outline for this kind of system. His triad of "Orthodoxy—Autocracy—Nationality," which A. N. Pypin aptly labeled the "theory of official nationalism" (Pypin I, 380), was fated to be

empire's state ideology for many decades (on Uvarov and his political philosophy, see Davydov 1856; Schmid 1888; Pypin I; Shpet 1989; Koyré 1929; Durylin 1932; Riazanovskii 1967; Whittaker 1999; Gordin 1989; Kazakov 1989; Tsimbaev 1989; Isambaeva 1990; Shevchenko 1991; Kachalov 1992; Egorov 1996; Shevchenko 1997). The unusually large historical significance of this ideological system lies in characteristic contradiction to the extremely limited circle of sources on whose basis one may try to reconstruct its initial form. Uvarov did not leave any kind of developed exposition of his own political philosophy. The preamble to the first issue of the *Journal of the Ministry of Popular Education*; a circular published on his appointment to the post of minister; several paragraphs from reports on his inspection of Moscow University and documents concerning the activities of the Ministry of Popular Education during his decade-long work there; and two or three oral comments recorded in the diaries of M. P. Pogodin and A. V. Nikoitenko—until very recently this has exhausted the entire corpus of sources (Uvarov 1875; Uvarov, "Ot redaktsii" 1834; Uvarov, "Tsirkuliarnoe" 1834; Uvarov 1864, 2–4; Nikitenko I, 174; Barsukov IX, 235–237).[1]

This kind of practice is quite usual. Having armed itself with an ideological doctrine, the state authorities do not usually put much energy into clarifying its content, preferring a multitude of tautological restatements over interpretation. Thus the institutions of power leave themselves sufficient room for maneuvering when it comes to deciding whether or not any particular manifestation of social life fits its parameters. Furthermore, and in contrast to their opponents, the authorities often make it seem that they do not require particular theoretical explication of their principles insofar as they have the possibility of realizing them in practice, at least ideally. Consequently, and in reference to "Orthodoxy—Autocracy—Nationality," the document that would offer the best explanation would be one that had preceded its imperial approbation; that

1 In the single existing monograph on the theory of official nationalism there is little on Uvarov in distinction from the more prolific Pogodin and Shevyrev (see Riazanovskii 1967), and the single biography of Uvarov says relatively little about his intellectual legacy, but much about his practical activities as minister and his contribution to Russia's educational system (see Whittaker 1999). Even in an article especially dedicated to Uvarov's ideology (Whittaker 1978) the analysis is based primarily on his "liberal" period, most fully expressed in his 1818 speech at Petersburg Pedagogical University (on this see also Pugachev 1964; Isambaeva 1990).

is, in which its author would have been compelled to defend and explain his views. Hence a valuable addition to the known corpus of sources is the report Uvarov gave to Nicholas I, "On Some General Principles that Can Serve as Guide in Administering the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment" that was published by M. M. Shevchenko (see Uvarov 1995). Together with the familiar formulations that were later repeated in the corresponding reports and circulars, it contains a whole series of propositions that let us connect the triad to the time and conditions of their creation. However, this document—as is revealed by Uvarov's note on the copyist's text discovered by Shevchenko—was presented to the emperor on November 19, 1833 (ibid., 70). This was eight months after the start of Uvarov's term as minister, and almost eleven months before the earliest known references to the triad, to be found in a report on his inspection of Moscow University written in December 1832 (Uvarov 1875, 511). Here Uvarov was undoubtedly presenting ideas to the emperor that he had already approved. Shevchenko reported that he was not able to find a signature on this report, and one might have concluded that such a document did not exist. Uvarov wrote most of his works in French, and they were later translated and edited by his assistants; indeed we found a rough draft of Uvarov's letter, in French, in the same archival fond as the document that Shevchenko located (OPI GIM, f. 17, op. 1, № 98, 16–22 ob.). It is a little more protracted and significantly less official than the final version, and differs from it in various important details. Moreover, the draft was written in March 1832, more than a year and a half before the final report was presented to the emperor. We published this document in 1997 (see Uvarov 1997; it will be cited from here on without further references). On its basis we will attempt to reconstruct Uvarov's project for Russia.

This is the earliest known mention of the triad. Uvarov had just received the position of assistant minister and the assignment to inspect Moscow University. Considering the advanced age and weak health of the minister, Count K. A. Liven, this assignment indicated the emperor's intention to give the ministerial chair to Uvarov if he successfully carried out his mission (see Rozhdestvenskii 1902, 170–223). The newly-appointed assistant minister sent the emperor a memorandum in which he described his "most vital need to open [his] heart" to the monarch, "to throw [himself] to His feet [with] a confession faith" and to lay out his guiding principles. These words were not

merely dutiful formulas or ritual flattery, to which Uvarov was more than inclined. A professional careerist and experienced administrator, he was nonetheless inspired by an exceptionally ambitious project to gradually change the citizens of the empire via the institutions of the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and thus to mold Russia's future. "Either the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment represents nothing or it represents the soul of the administrative corps," he wrote to Nicholas I, clearly unconcerned that his explicit claim to be ideological leader for the entire government apparatus might upset his addressee.[2] Uvarov achieved his goal: the emperor handed him a mandate to carry out his designs.

The fate of the triad was not the only thing that testified to this approval. After a year and a half in the report "On Some General Principles," and ten years later in the report "A Decade of the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment," Uvarov repeated almost word for word several fragments from the letter, including its most important ones. The sentiments expressed in the letter became official doctrine. Uvarov had correctly understood the emperor's cherished aspirations and subtly grasped the current needs of government politics. In Uvarov's opinion, Russia could count on recovery since the religious, political and moral ideals that the supreme power wanted to spread still retained palpable force. Nevertheless, decisive and well-considered actions by the government were required because these ideals had been "dissipated by premature and superficial civilization, fantasy systems, and reckless undertakings; they are disconnected, not unified into a whole, without a center, and, moreover, over the course of thirty years have had to withstand the assault of people and events."

Uvarov's chronology is remarkable. The reference to thirty years unambiguously described the first years of Alexander's reign, which was thus being rejected from start to finish, with all of its hopes, disillusionments, victories, failures, and efforts at change, and in which Uvarov himself had actively participated. To characterize the political style of Alexander and his close associates, Uvarov conceived the formula "administrative Saint-Simonism," which is worthy of adoption by history textbooks. Uvarov's definition does not so much indicate the visionary scope of the innovations of the Alexandrine era as it does

2 N. I. Kazakov's assertions that Uvarov's triad was exclusively intended for departmental use in the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment (Kazakov 1989), challenged by V. A. Mil'china and A. L. Ospovat (1995, 21), thus seem baseless.

their utopian fervor, as well as their armchair activism, based on the conviction that any problem may be solved with the help of abstract schemes, paper projects, and bureaucratic measures.[3] In this sense Arakcheev's military colonies truly differed little from Saint-Simon's phalansteries. By connecting the discredited administrative style with the name of the celebrated utopian thinker, among the last heirs to eighteenth-century theoretical rationalism, Uvarov signaled that he himself intended to follow a totally different intellectual path.

2

In the memorandum only one name is mentioned, and its choice and the very way it is cited deserve thoughtful consideration. Discussing the worldwide consequences of the July Revolution in Paris, Uvarov exclaimed, "Did not one of the authors of the July Revolution, Mr. Guizot, a man of conscience and talent, not recently proclaim from the tribune: 'Society no longer has any political, moral or religious convictions'? This wail of despair, involuntarily bursting from all well-intentioned people of Europe, whatever views they may hold, serves as the single creed (simvol very) that still unites them in today's conditions."

Uvarov wrote his letter in March, and thus was responding to the latest events in Paris. On February 18, 1832, the French Chamber of Deputies was discussing the question of state subsidies for Catholic seminaries. The radical deputy Odilon Barrot, who demanded that such subsidies be sharply curtailed, accused the parliamentary majority—which was by no means disposed in favor of the Catholics, but which had opposed the demand for cuts for political considerations—of having no firm principles. François Guizpot's speech in response, according to the Parisian newspaper "Journal des debats," had imparted "greatness and sublimity" to parliamentary discussions "which it so often lacks" (Journal des debats, 1832, February 17). Guizot declared:

> Recall, gentlemen, what our worthy colleague Odilon Barrot recently said—he complained bitterly about our lack of firm principles, and said, as far as I remember, that for many minds there is already no longer any good or evil,

3 Oleg Proskurin has observed in conversation with the author that the combination of utopianism and castles in the air, together with a high degree of bureaucratic efficiency, was the characteristic feature of the bureaucrat of the Alexandrine era. The model here is Speranskii. Uvarov himself also belonged to this type of government functionary.

> neither truth or falsehood, that people move about without knowing themselves what feeling is guiding them.
>
> Mr. Odilon Barrot is correct, and I consider this evil as serious as he, but I think that he did not explain this in full. The issue is not merely that our political and moral convictions are unstable and impermanent but also that they contradict convictions that are far more definite, … be they shut off in a narrow circle and belonging to a small number of people, but on the other hand more passionate, and, I do not fear to say, more fanatical, than those which we profess. … We are forced to deal both with revolutionary ideas that are still trying to devour society as well as with old counter-revolutionary beliefs that are by no means as weak as we might think at times, but still full of energy and danger. What can we with our moderate views, I ask you, oppose to these two hostile parties whose convictions are filled with fanaticism and therefore unworthy of our trust?
>
> Love for order, which in our day in France truly makes up a universal desire, and the well-known moral instinct for decency and justice. These are our two single strengths, two single beliefs: with love for order and the instinct of a decent person we enter into battle with the dual fanaticisms, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary. (Guizot I, 386–387)

Uvarov interpreted Guizot's speech quite freely, as it by no means represents "a wail of despair." The French orator's partial agreement with the accusations of a lack of firm principles was merely a rhetorical move to contrast the instinctively correct moral feeling of the majority with the infatuated adherence of both left and right doctrinaires to their wild theories. Uvarov, however, was attracted by Guizot's apologia for the golden mean and used his polemical concession to construct his own political model. "There is a huge distance between the old prejudices which do not recognize anything that did not exist at least a half a century ago and the new ones, who ruthlessly destroy everything that they come to replace, furiously attacking the remnants of the past. [But] there is also firm soil, a reliable support, a basis which cannot let you down," he wrote to the emperor in the memorandum. In Europe, according to Uvarov, "well-intentioned" people occupy a similarly reasonable position, but shocked by the dramatic course of historical events and having lost their orientation, their "creed" inevitably became "a wail of despair."

We have no information about what the imperial addressee of Uvarov's letter thought of Guizot's speech. On the one hand, the emperor, enraged and frightened by the July Revolution, would not have sympathized with one of its leaders, but on the other, Guizot had done much to keep popular discontent

within legal limits. Especially important for Russia, he categorically opposed French interference in the Polish crisis, which the Parisian radicals insisted on (ibid., 330–336). Furthermore, we don't know if the mention of Guizot was preserved in the final text, which might have diverged from the draft. In any case, in ascribing despair over the events taking place in his country to one of the French political leaders, Uvarov made Guizot and his ideas politically palatable for his correspondent. This kind of rhetorical device strongly recalls the condescending intonation of Soviet propaganda in relation to progressive figures of the West. As the narrative goes, these were people of "conscience and talent," who while incapable of true understanding of historical dialectics were nevertheless able to attack the evils of the capitalist system sincerely and profoundly. To use a later expression, it was important for Uvarov "to push Guizot through" (that is, through the censorship) in order to endorse his conception of French civilization.

Uvarov, who always followed the cultural and political life of Paris with great interest, must have already been long familiar with Guizot's career, which revealed unexpected parallels with his own. In 1811, when Uvarov had begun his service in the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment, Guizot had founded the journal "Annals of Education," in which he laid out his views on creating a national educational system. In 1816 he had published a treatise, co-authored with P.-P. Royer-Collard, who later became an important figure in post-July France, in which they spoke of the duty of the state to take charge of education and to realize national principles through educational institutions (see Johnson 1963, 110–113). This idea Uvarov promoted strongly. By strange coincidence, in one year, 1821, both Guizot and Uvarov had been removed from educational activity due to their excessive liberalism. Guizot's return to a university professorship in 1828 had been a personal and political triumph. At about that time he delivered his lectures on the history of European civilization and especially in France, to great success. These two courses were published in 1828 and 1829 as separate volumes and, together with much else, contained a general theory of civilization that at the time represented the last word in European historical science.

Following Guizot's example, Uvarov founded the *Journal of the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment,* in 1834. This publication became the transmitter of the new official policy. Its very first issue featured the introductory lecture

from *The History of Civilization in Europe* in which the basic theoretical ideas for both courses were laid out. According to Guizot, it was the development and perfection of civilization that was the key to mankind's progress, because civilization was handed down from generation to generation and thus constituted "the destiny of the human race" (Guizot 1834, 432). Civilization of this or that people combines in itself "the development of social activity and the development of private activity" (ibid., 441); on the one hand, "its establishments, trade, industry, wars, all of the particulars of government," and on the other, "religion … the sciences, literature, the arts" (ibid., 432–433). Its presence is revealed "everywhere where the external position of a person is extended, enlivened, improved, everywhere that the inner nature of a person reveals its splendor and greatness" (ibid., 41). At the same time, while belonging to one people, civilization is also the property of all humanity. For Guizot the existence of one single European civilization is obvious, and he tried to embrace it in one general conception; it goes without saying that, from his perspective, France had the uncontested leading role in this civilization.

In the Russian translation that appeared in the *Journal of the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment,* Guizot's key concept of "civilization" is translated as "civic education" (grazhdanskoe obrazovanie). The publication itself bore the title "The First Lecture of Mr. Guizot from the Course of Lectures He Read On the History of European Civic Education." The issue here was not finding a Russian equivalent. The word "tsivilizatsiia" (civilization) was fairly common at the time and even frequently occurs in the text. At times the translator resorted to using both terms, e.g., "From ancient times and in many countries they use the word *civilization, civil education*" (ibid., 434; the original has only "civilisation"). In one place, an incorrectly chosen pronoun, it seems, indicates incomplete editing: "the existence of European civilization is obvious; a kind of unity is clearly revealed in the civil education of various states of Europe; it [sic][4] follows from almost identical facts" (ibid., 428).

The journal's editors evidently divided the main category of Guizot's historiosophy into two parts, relatively speaking, into "bad" civilization and

4 The feminine pronoun that would grammatically refer back to "tsivilizatsiia" is evidently in error, as the expected referent, "unity," is neuter.

"good" civil education.[5] In his memorandum Uvarov sharply delineated what he understood by the word "civilization." He emphasized that the events of 1830 "had done away with" the idea of social progress that inspired the French historian and had taken unaware "those who believed in the future of peoples most strongly of all" and caused them to doubt "if that which they call civilization is really the path to social good." The rhetoric suggested that even the author of the concept of European civilization should at least to some extent reassess his former views.

The terminological operation performed on Guizot's first lecture turned out to be uncommonly productive. The word "civilization" took on the meaning of social experience that was unacceptable for Russia. "We are forced to use the name *Europe* for something that should never have had any other name than its own: Civilization," is the way F. I. Tituchev (II, 57) later formulated this position. The authorities used this to their advantage, categorizing this term as falling in the sphere of "civil education."

It is very likely that Uvarov personally edited the translation. Publication of the *Journal of the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment* was the most important element of the new minister's plan for spreading his doctrine. As Uvarov instructed his readers in the forward to the first issue, "The Ministry considers its primary and holy duty to give … a useful direction for readers of our Journal and to satisfy the just desire of true sons of the Fatherland to know how they can better facilitate the lofty objectives of the Father of Russia" (Uvarov 1834, VII). The coincidence of mentioning Guizot in the letter to the emperor and the appearance of his lecture in the first issue of his journal was hardly accidental. Two notes to the lecture demonstrate that Uvarov took part in preparing

5 In a letter to the author of January 6, 1998, Z. Bauman wrote: "[I have] one note concerning the dual Russian translation of "civilization." It follows from your research that Uvarov drank his fill of German milk and even looked at the Germans through French eyes. Before he happened to read Guizot, the image of the process Guizot was writing about had already formed in his mind as Bildung, and this concept is best translated into Russian as *obrazovanie* (education). By the way, in Guizot's time 'civilization' was similar in spirit to 'education.' This concept (like the concept of culture) was born in the late eighteenth century to describe not a condition but an activity, task, creation, reworking, formation. It was only after many years that civilization, like culture, was considered something finished (something like 'developed socialism') and they forgot the initial idea of the concept. Hence in explaining what the matter was about, Uvarov (or the translator), it seems, was correct." Cf. Fevr 1991, 270–281.

this publication. In both cases the commentator's dissatisfaction is caused by similar passages. Guizot's statement that traces of French civilization "are visible in all of the monuments of European literature" was accompanied by the important proviso: "Everywhere the action of this influence is decreasing. Now every people is creating its own literature just as the civil education of every people must be achieved to meet its own requirements" (Guizot 1834, 440). An even more irritated response was provoked by Guizot's assertion that "there is practically no great idea and no great principle of civil education that France has not spread everywhere." In the editors' opinion, most likely directly Uvarov's,

> the author has been carried away by the one-sidedness characteristic of French writers. This will continue until that time when France ceases to regard itself as the focus of global enlightenment. But was it so long ago that France itself became familiar with the country nearest to it, Germany, and was she in a condition to make use of the fruits of its all-encompassing learning? After this it is unforgivable for us Russians to take the opinions of French writers as the single standard. We have before our eyes all of the countries of Europe, including our very own Fatherland that is so little known by foreigners, but nevertheless acquiring more and more influence on their fate. The civil education of the Slavic peoples was not part of Mr. Guizot's plan at all. … For a true, complete picture, of course, we will have to wait for a long time for a skilled artist who must necessarily know all of Europe. (Ibid., 430)

The reference to France's acquaintance with Germany's "all-encompassing learning" refers to Madame de Stäel's *On Germany* that came out in 1811. The goal of this book had been to acquaint what, in the author's opinion, was egocentric French culture with the treasures of the German soul. Uvarov had known Madame de Stäel in Vienna in 1807–1809 at the time she was beginning to work on her book (see Durylin 1939). But the most important aspect of these two notes lies elsewhere. Guizot's Francocentric view of European civilization is contrasted here to the notion of Europe as the amalgamation of national cultural worlds. Russia and the Slavic peoples as a whole only appear in this argument after Germany. Putting his main emphasis on Russian nationality, Uvarov unavoidably had to turn to those thinkers who were first to consciously challenge France's cultural hegemony.

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The connection of Uvarov's triad with the political theory of German Romanticism was first explored more than seventy years ago by Gustav Shpet who, very generally and in many ways by guesswork, indicated the dependence of Uvarov's ideas on the Romantics, and in particular on the "state doctrine" of the German historian Heinrich Luden (Shpet 1989, 245–246; cf. Luden 1811). And indeed, in the very broad circle of sources for Uvarov's doctrine, which encompasses a wide spectrum of European anti-revolutionary philosophy from Joseph de Maistre to Burke and Karamzin, the political doctrine of German Romantics plays a leading role.

Uvarov's main source was evidently the books and lectures of Friedrich Schlegel. Uvarov lived in Vienna from 1807 to mid-1809, at the same time as Schlegel. He became acquainted with his brother, August Schlegel, who accompanied Madame de Stäel and was her consultant in writing *On Germany*. Fifteen years later, in 1823, August wrote to Uvarov, who had by that time become president of the Imperial Academy of Sciences: "Your Excellency once deigned to encourage my scholarly efforts with the attention with which you favored me with in Vienna, when I had the honor of being acquainted with you" (OPI GIM, f. 17, op. 1, № 86, 293). In his Vienna diary, large portions of which were published by S. N. Durylin, Uvarov wrote, "I have heard that Madame de Stäel has earnestly extolled Mr. F. Schlegel's intellect, but I do not know him well enough to be convinced of the justice of this praise. The exterior of a German writer is so hard to penetrate that one must be very convinced of the benefits to try and pierce it" (Durylin 1939, 236).

The guarded nature of this comment does not contradict the intense interest with which Uvarov followed the work of the German thinker. It was precisely in 1808 that Schlegel's book *On the Language and Wisdom of the Indians* came out; in it the author demonstrated that Indian history, mythology, language, and literature not only lay at the basis of all European culture, but also infinitely surpassed all of Europe's achievements in its inner perfection (see Schlegel 1808; cf. Schwab 1950; Wilson 1964). Uvarov sent a copy of this book to Karamzin in Petersburg and recommended it to Zhukovskii (see Gillel'son

6 For a more detailed discussion of the ideas in this section, see Zorin 1996.

1969, 51). More importantly, he himself was deeply taken by the idea of developing Eastern studies, which from the start took on a distinct political coloration. One year after returning to Petersburg, he proposed "A Project for an Asian Academy," which served as the basis of his career in scholarship. Extensively citing Schlegel's work, Uvarov planned to turn the Russian capital into an international center of Oriental studies. In the project he not only based his ideas on the geographical position and political interests of Russia, but also on the necessity of returning modern civilization to its genuine roots (see, e.g., Riazanovskii 1960; Whittaker 1978).

Nine years later Uvarov wrote to Speranskii, "The establishment and spread of *Eastern languages* should also help spread healthy ideas about Asia in its relationship to Russia. Here … is a new source of national politics that should save us from premature decrepitude and from European contagion" (Uvarov 1896, 158). Friedrich Schlegel was among the European luminaries who received the projects' plans, and he responded sympathetically. He answered Uvarov in April 1811, "The plan fully accords to the greatness of the capital of the Russian Empire as well as to the many supplementary means that you have at your disposal. If such an undertaking actually comes into being, it would allow us to hope for the embodiment of everything that for the time being is impossible to realize in any of the remaining capitals on the European continent" (OPI GIM, f. 17, op. 1, № 86, 298–299 verso). He clearly fully approved of the project's political direction.

Schlegel promised Uvarov to help propagate his idea in Austria and Germany. Soon Schlegel sent Uvarov his "Course of Lectures on Most Recent History," delivered in Vienna in 1810 and published a year later. "Of course, in these lectures I mostly oriented myself towards my German audience. But I hope that this work will not be totally devoid of general interest for all enlightened peoples. I would be very happy if this attempt attracted the attention of such an enlightened expert of the sciences and history [as you are]," he wrote in an accompanying letter (ibid., 300). Here the German philosopher's political philosophy was developed on the basis of extremely wide-ranging historical material. Uvarov also sent this book to Karamzin, presuming that the work of his German colleague would be useful for the historiographer, who was laboring at the time on his *History of the Russian State.* Karamzin was skeptical towards Schlegel's work, however, seeing in his

nationalistic imaginings a pursuit "of the phantom of new ideas" and "historical mysticism" (Gillel'son 1969, 52).

Uvarov, like Karamzin, was an educated conservative and at this time belonged to the same wing of Russian social thought. The enthusiasm that Schlegel's "historical mysticism" inspired in him reflected an important generational break in the development of Russian conservatism. This break had incalculable influence on the formation of national consciousness, and, in the future, on the entire spirit of official Russian imperial ideology. As often happens, chance biographical factors here turned out to be inseparable from deep historical processes. The time in which Uvarov and Schlegel came together was a very unique period in Austrian history. The atmosphere of these months was greatly determined by the expectation of a military clash with Napoleon. The anti-Napoleonic coalition that had come together in Vienna at that time bizarrely united almost totally opposing forces: remnants of the French ancient régime, the aristocratic emigration, and young German nationalists. Uvarov himself later wrote about the fact that "this crusade united all of the independent salons and all of the peoples that were not drawn into the orbit of the great captain," and that these allies were not welded together "by any common creed apart from [the desire of] bringing down the imperial tyranny [of Napoleon]" (Uvarov 1848, 96–97).

Due to his philosophical system, Schlegel was the natural leader of this strange alliance. He had been invited to Vienna by I.-F. Stadion, the head of the hawks at the Austrian court, to give a course of public lectures on history that was meant to help cultivate national self-consciousness on the part of the German public. These public lectures, which were the basis for the book he sent to Uvarov, did not take place in Vienna in 1809 due to the war; instead, they were delivered the year after the defeat. With the start of military action Schlegel received the position of court secretary and was attached to army headquarters. There, he published the newspaper "Őesterreichische Zeitung" and published proclamations in which he tried to convince the Germans that Austria was waging war on their behalf and that only thanks to Austria would Germany obtain independence and freedom (Langsam 1936, 40–64).

At the heart of Schlegel's political views of these years lay the conception of the nation as an integral personality, a unity based on blood relations and secured by common customs and language. In his *Philosophical Lectures of*

1804–1806, which presented the fullest and most detailed exposition of his system, he says:

> The notion of the nation presumes that all of its members compose a single personality. For this to be possible, they must all have the same origin. The older, purer and less mixed with other races, the more a nation will have common customs. And the more of these common customs and the more attachment to them it manifests, the greater the degree to which a nation will be formed from this race. In this connection language has supreme importance because it serves as unconditional proof of common origins and binds the nation with the most vital and natural links. Together with the commonality of customs, language is the strongest and most reliable guarantee that the nation will live for many centuries in indissoluble unity. (Schlegel II, 357–358)

Schlegel divided the ethnos ("race") into a natural community and a "nation" that arises on the basis of an ethnos as a political formation. This collective personality should also develop into a state. Schlegel's ideal of a national state was the medieval limited monarchy in which the unity of the national organism was guaranteed by its division into corporations. In the philosopher's opinion, the national rebirth and unification of Germany should occur around Austria, which had best preserved medieval state institutions: the ancient aristocracy, the dynasty of Hapsburgs, and the Catholic Church. In 1803, at the dawn of his interest in national ideas, he complained in his *Journey to France* that the world capital of Catholicism was located in Italy and not in Germany. Now he was ready to reconcile himself to this insofar as he saw the Hapsburgs as the natural leaders of the Catholic world (ibid.; cf. Meineke 1970). These ideas obviously depend on Herder's philosophy, on the one hand, and on Rousseau and the ideologists of the French Revolution, on the other. In distinction from Herder, Schlegel shifts the emphasis in the concept of the "nation" from cultural and religious factors to political ones. On the contrary, Schlegel also parted company from the French in that he saw the nation not as participants in a social contract, but as the product of organic development. Accordingly, he understood the state in natural-historical terms as the spontaneous expression of a people's history.

At this period Schlegel's interpretation of the national state was quite unusual. In the Europe of the early nineteenth century, this idea was primarily associated with liberal thought and served as a fighting slogan for destroying or

reforming the dynastic limited monarchial regimes that predominated. Understanding the nation as the basis for the state system helped with the demand to end class distinctions, the formation of popular representative institutions, and so on. One of the most noted reformers of the time, the Prussian statesman H.-F. Stein, wrote at the end of 1812, "At this moment of great changes I do not care at all about any dynasty. My desire is that Germany become great and strong, and acquire its freedom, independence, and nationality (Nationalität)" (Stein III, 818).

This was also the time when Stein, with the help of the Russian court, was trying to unify all forces in Germany in order to promote a spirit of nationalism and anti-French attitudes among Germans. Uvarov also played a certain role in these plans. From his time in Vienna he had preserved profound support for a German national revival; Stein even found it necessary to give him lessons in Russian patriotism. In September 1812, almost immediately after the Battle of Borodino, Stein wrote with some surprise to his wife in Vienna from Petersburg, "Uvarov just returned to the city from his village near Moscow. As always, he is amicable, obliging, helpful, and very much sympathizes with Germany, but he doesn't like it here and I try to reconcile him with his motherland insofar

Figure 30 Portrait of Karl Freiherr vom Stein. Sketch by S. S. Uvarov.

as, for the time being, he has to remain here and live among his countrymen, and insofar as he can be of use to his motherland with his knowledge and his most highly creditable way of thinking" (ibid., 751).

These sentiments were not a momentary flirtation for Uvarov. In practically all of his letters to Stein from 1812–1814, one can trace his profound worry over Germany's future and his hope that "the precious flower of nationality (Nationalität) and freedom must rise up from within itself" (OPI GIM, f. 17, op. 1, № 86, prilozh. 1). At the end of 1813, after the Battle of Leipzig, Uvarov criticized the policy of the Austrian court and at the same time wrote to Stein, "The spectacle of Prussia may serve to console us for everything. This people should become the first in Europe. It is a complete and universal renaissance. I am convinced that it will produce results that are great in all respects. One can't praise a people enough that awakens in this way" (ibid.). Against this background, Uvarov's pessimism about contemporary Russian reality is especially striking:

> I will not hide from you that a trip abroad is my greatest wish, which I have cherished for a long period of time. Everything makes me prize this idea, not only those real torments connected with the work I am now occupied with; I find this work itself more and more *thankless* or, more accurately, more and more *hopeless*. … This is demeaning and almost useless labor. When I think about all of the failures in my life, the idea occurs to me that I will never put down roots here and will always remain an *exotic* plant; against my will I come to the thought that I should have been born your *fellow countryman,* or perhaps Your *son*—but this is a dream, I renounce it and want to renounce it. (Ibid., 12 verso, 18 verso)[7]

Quite an unusual psychological picture arises before us: a young Russian nobleman and bureaucrat of very high rank, a man of letters who speaks, thinks, and writes primarily in French, who, at the same time, considers himself a German nationalist. In Vienna Uvarov came into contact with the most popular and forward-looking ideology of his day and was completely captivated by it. Furthermore, having obtained it from German sources, he considers the only suitable place for its embodiment to be Germany for the foreseeable future. As

7 Two of the surviving eight letters from Uvarov to Stein have been partially published in: Peretts III, 692, 697; Uvarov 1871a.

appropriate for someone of his circle and upbringing, he was likely convinced that Russia was not ready for it, and even the "grand spectacle that the Russian nation demonstrated to the world and to posterity"—as Schlegel wrote to him in January, 1813, (OPI GIM, f. 17, op. 1, № 86, 301 verso)—could not persuade him otherwise. The combination of aristocratic and national spirit that Uvarov had assimilated from Schlegel made Germany seem far more natural a field for his ideas than his own native land.

Yet as an outsider to German nationalistic issues, Uvarov perceived quite dissimilar and in some cases even opposing phenomena as compatible. For him, ideas of "freedom of the press and trade, enlightenment in its true sense, a tolerant spirit of rule, the elimination of obsolete forms" as well as "hatred for despotism and a broadminded (liberal'nyi) taste for the Beautiful and True," about which Uvarov wrote Stein (ibid., prilozh. 17 verso), easily got along with Schlegel's imperial conception. He was so blind to the differences between the political programs, or, more broadly speaking, between the nationalisms of Schlegel and Stein, that he confidently recommended Schlegel to Stein as the leading organizer of the anti-Napoleonic front of German intellectuals who could "be of great service" organizing education in Prussia (ibid., prilozh. 2). Despite Uvarov's expectation that Stein would like his plan, Stein was by no means enthralled by the proposal, and, it seems, did not even consider it necessary to respond.

Still, Schlegel and Stein's political projects did have one common feature at this stage—neither led to any appreciable results. The campaign of 1809, in which Schlegel was the main ideologist, ended in failure. It was not able to convince public opinion in the German principalities that the Austrian Empire stood for pan-German interests, and no one followed Schlegel and Stadion except the rebellious Colonel Schiel. Neither did Stein's intention to create a federation of German states under Prussia's patronage come to pass after the Napoleonic wars. The allied rulers rejected the national principle of state building, casting its lot in favor of legitimism. Metternich, who took the reins of Austrian politics into his hands, and who had tremendous influence on European life, sharply rejected nationalist ideas, seeing them as a threat to the principles on which any empire was built. That Stein's reforms provided the basis for Prussia's rapid development as well as, ultimately, the nucleus for Germany's unification, was something that, naturally, Uvarov could not have foreseen.

The further course of European history, the rebellions and other shocks of the late 1810s and 20s, and the interventions of the Holy Alliance all testified that the principles of legitimacy and nationalism were coming into ever greater conflict. These historical cataclysms are what Uvarov has in mind when he characterizes events since his retirement from the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment in 1821 as being "of huge importance" but as having "utterly ruinous influence on the development of enlightenment in our Fatherland … and even more so in all of the countries of Europe." The revolutions of 1830 decisively forced those loyal to the old order into a completely defensive position. In this situation such a committed supporter of historical compromise as Uvarov hardly had any other choice but to turn his gaze to Russia. In many respects Russia could seem an even more fitting place than Germany to realize a nationalist-imperial utopia. Indeed it had a unified state, and the center of the reigning religion was located within the empire, thus freeing a proponent of the idea of a national religion from the difficulties that Schlegel faced. True, the concept of nationality ("narodnost'") still required definition and development, but it was this very circumstance that could be remedied with the help of a well-regulated system of education.

4

"Our common duty consists in accomplishing the people's education in accord with the Supreme objective of the Most August Monarch, in the combined spirit of Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality," Uvarov wrote in a circular that was distributed to school districts (okrugi) on March 21, 1833, in connection with his appointment as minister of popular education (Uvarov, "Tsirkuliarnoe" 1834, il). Naturally, Orthodoxy headed the list. Thus in his memorandum to the emperor, Uvarov had begun his description of the triad with a discussion of its religious component:

> Without a people's religion, the people, like an individual person, are doomed to destruction; to deprive them of faith is to remove their heart, their blood, their insides; this means to put them on the lowest level of the physical and moral order, this means to betray them. Even national pride rebels against such an idea; a person who is devoted to the Fatherland will just as little agree with the loss of one tenet of the reigning church as he would to stealing one of the pearls from the crown of Monomakh.

This passage apparently seemed so successful to Uvarov that he included it almost without change in his report "On Some General Principles" (Uvarov 1995, 71) a year and a half later and again eleven years later in his review of the ministry's activities under his leadership (Uvarov 1864, 32). But even the strongest expressions that the author used could not hide his obvious confessional indifference. Despite the rhetorical emphasis, Uvarov intentionally does not mention the divine nature of Orthodoxy; Orthodoxy is significant for him not for its truth but for its tradition. His characteristic comparison to the crown of Monomakh clearly suggests his—perhaps only half-conscious—desire to legitimize the church through the symbolism of state power and national history.

An examination of the French original reveals an even more expressive picture. Orthodoxy is not mentioned *even once*. French offered at least three usual ways to refer to Russia's religion and church: "orthodoxie," "église grecque," and "chrétiennité orientale." Uvarov, however, consistently uses the formulas "religion nationale" and "église dominante." The phrase "religion nationale" is used in listing the elements of the triad itself. Where "Orthodoxy" figures in the triad in the Russian version of the report "On Some General Principles," the corresponding place in the French has "love for the Faith of our ancestors" (Uvarov 1995, 71). It seems clear that it is decidedly all the same to Uvarov what precise faith and which church is meant, as long as they are rooted in national history and the state's political structure. Uvarov's own personal religiosity also seems to have had certain provisions. M. D. Buturlin cited with indignation one of his French witticisms about the clergy that made the rounds of St. Petersburg: "That caste is just like a sheet of paper thrown on the ground—however much it is trampled one is unable to crush it" (Buturlin 1901, 411; Buturlin cites it in Russian). We may surmise that Uvarov assigned Orthodoxy a functional role as a religious principle, insofar as it was subordinated to the state principle of Autocracy. However, Autocracy is treated in the memorandum to a great extent in a similar way.

Back in 1814 in his brochure *Alexander and Bonaparte*, Uvarov had expressed the unfulfilled hope that on the ruins of Napoleon's empire, kings and nations would perform "a mutual sacrifice of autocracy and popular anarchy" (Uvarov 1814, 14). In an 1818 speech at the Petersburg Pedagogical Institute's gala meeting—which had no small public resonance—he sympathetically referred to Thomas Erskin, who called political freedom "God's

ultimate and most beautiful gift" (Uvarov 1818, 41; cf. Pugachev 1967, 43–44). Of course, these hopes relate to the period of Uvarov's liberalism. The petulant N. I. Grech even wrote that for his speech in the Pedagogical Institute, Uvarov "would later have had himself imprisoned in the fortress" (Grech 1903, 365). But even in the 1830s, already under the new emperor, Uvarov's apologia for autocracy suggests a characteristic uncertainty:

> The strength of autocratic power represents the necessary condition for the existence of the Empire in its current form. Let political dreamers (I will not speak of sworn enemies of this order) who are off their heads due to false notions, who think up schemes about how things should be in the ideal, be shocked by appearances, enflamed by theories, animated by words; we can answer them that they do not know the country and are mistaken about its position, its needs, its desires. … If it accepted the chimaera of limited monarchy, equal rights for all estates, national representation in the European manner, and a pseudo-constitutional form of rule, the colossus would not last two weeks, and what's more, it would collapse even before these false transformations would be completed. (cf. Uvarov 1995; Uvarov 1864, 33)

In this letter Uvarov did not simply address an absolute ruler. He wrote to a monarch who deeply believed in his divine anointment. But still Uvarov said not a word about the providential nature of Russian autocracy or about its absolute merits. Autocracy was merely "the necessary condition for the existence of the Empire," and what is more, "in its current form"—at least not excluding the suggestion that sometime in the future an autocratic monarch would no longer be needed in Russia. Imperial power is legitimized here not by divine sanction but by the "conditions," "needs" and "desires" of the country; that is, it represents primarily "Russian power," just as Orthodoxy is interpreted primarily as Russia's faith. Thus the two first members of the triad appear as kinds of attributes of national existence and national history, and thus are rooted in the third member—the notorious concept of "Nationality" (narodnost'—on the early history of the concept see Azadovskii I, 190–200; Lotman and Uspenskii 1996, 506–508, 555–556).[8]

8 Translator's Note: The precise meaning of the Russian the word "*narodnost'*," from *narod*, people or nation, was hotly debated by Russian intellectuals during the nineteenth century, and this and the adjectival form *narodnyi* may be translated, depending on the context, as referring to "the people," "the folk," "the nation," or as "popular." There also are many places, however, where more than one of these meanings might be applicable.

If, according to Uvarov, autocracy was a "conservative principle," nationality presumes neither "*movement backward*" nor "*immobility*"; "the state organization must and should develop like the human body," and it is precisely this principle of nationality that guarantees the continuity of this development, at the same time allowing it to preserve the "main elements" that are inherent to the national personality. The responsibility for supporting and spreading this principle lies with the government and "in particular" on the system of popular education that it creates. Uvarov had already been casting about for such an evolutionary metaphor in his speech of 1818: "In this case the theory of government resembles the theory of education. That which can perpetuate physical or moral infancy is not worthy of praise; that government is most wise that can facilitate transitions from one age to another and, while submitting to the law of necessity, grows and matures together with the people or with the individual" (Uvarov 1818, 52). Now Uvarov tried to fill this scheme with concrete content. In the more or less distant future the development of Russian nationality would unavoidably have to create the necessary state institutions. Therefore the corresponding governing bodies—first and foremost, the ministry of popular enlightenment, under the watchful eye of its newly-appointed leader—had to establish control over the direction of this evolution. Uvarov fully understood the complexities connected with introducing such a contemporary and two-edged category as nationality as the basis for the empire's state ideology. As an observer of the national revolutions in Europe, he recognized that historically the principles of autocracy and nationalism could clash; however, he presumed that "whatever these quarrels (altercations) might be that had to be overcome, they lived a common life and could enter into alliance and conquer together." And in his memorandum he undertook to sketch out a strategy for this future victory in Russia.

5

In creating his tripartite formula, Uvarov could not help recalling F. Schlegel's well-known patriotic triad—common descent ("race"), customs, and language—as well as that of Shishkov—faith, education, and language. Both of these constructions had been created at about the same time, on the basis of the same Rousseauian—Herderian tradition, and in comparable circumstances; both Schlegel and Shishkov stood on the threshold of a decisive military clash of

their peoples and empires with Napoleonic France and were trying to promote a nationalist version of traditional values. The disagreement between the two authors on the first plank of their triads was mostly due to specific political circumstances. A strong emphasis on faith was just as unacceptable in Germany, which was divided into Catholic and Protestant regions, as the demand for common descent would have been in the Russian Empire. From time to time nationalistically-oriented thinkers might dream of converting national and religious minorities to Orthodoxy, but they could not expect them to blend into one "race" with the Slavic majority. The second elements in both formulas were considerably closer to one another. "Customs" and "education" are closely related notions, especially if one agrees with Rousseau's conception of national upbringing that consists in cultivating folk traditions. Still, the difference between the German and Russian thinkers' approach is obvious. Shishkov, who was in many ways a man of the eighteenth century, believed in the limitless power of education and that it could transform individuals into members of the national body, or, on the contrary, cast them out. In contrast, the Romantic Schlegel trusted in the completely supra-personal and unconscious mechanism of tradition. However, the main difference between the two triads was in the subject being defined. While Schlegel was listing elements that ensured unity of the German nation, Shishkov was talking about the forces that could make inhabitants of his country feel themselves part of the state organism. Shishkov's mission was to indicate the natural sources of patriotic feeling. For this reason his speech in the "Colloquy," in which he laid out his understanding of the basic pillars of national existence, was entitled "Treatise on Love for the Fatherland."

Schlegel's understanding of the nation as the basis for an ideal empire was unacceptable for Shishkov not only because of national and confessional problems.[9] The category of nationality in its Romantic recension could not even be applied to the properly Great Russian part of the population. The social and cultural division that separated the highest and lowest estates in the first half of the nineteenth century was insuperable. To find any common customs, say, among the Russian nobility and peasantry, was truly impossible. The issue was no more encouraging as concerned language; suffice it to say that the very

9 On the policies that Uvarov proposed implementing that concerned non-Slavic and Orthodox ethnic and religious groups, see Uvarov 1864, 35–70; cf. Whittaker 1999, 215–240.

document that declared nationality the foundation of Russian statehood was written in French. As for ancestry, the great majority of ancient Russian aristocrats traced their genealogy back to Germanic, Lithuanian, and Tatar stock. There was nothing at all unusual in this; in traditional societies the elite often insisted on their foreign extraction in order to justify a way of life that differed from that of the rest of society. Thus in France, for example, the ideologist of noble privilege A. de Boulainville insisted on the German pedigree of the French aristocracy, so that his radical opponent from the third estate, the Abbé Sieyès, could propose that all aristocrats take themselves off to the Teutonic forests (Greenfeld 1992, 170–172).

Nevertheless, almost everywhere ideas of national unity were directed at breaking down the class divisions that threatened the national organism's integrity. In the final analysis, the issue had to do with transforming traditional



Figure 31 Monument to Ivan Susanin by V. I. Demut-Malinovskii (1838). Drawing by V. M. Vasnetsov.

imperial structures into institutions of the national state. It is precisely in this sense that nationality was understood in Decembrist and quasi-Decembrist circles in the later 1810s and early 1820s; the same applies to the Slavophiles in the 1830s-1850s, right up until the era of the Great Reforms (see Syroechkovskii 1954; Tsimbaev 1986; Egorov 1991). Uvarov advocated the same slogan in order to preserve the existing order of things indefinitely. This kind of change in mission demanded a profound rethinking of the very category of nationality, and in his memorandum such a reconsideration was realized with exceptional inventiveness and even a distinctive elegance. Unable to base his understanding of nationality on objective factors, Uvarov decisively shifts his focus onto subjective ones. His argumentation belongs completely to the sphere of historical emotions and national psychology. Russia "still retains religious convictions, political convictions, moral convictions in her breast [which constitute] the single pledge of her happiness, the remnants of her nationality, the precious and final guarantees of its political future." In the words of the author of the memorandum, "several years of special studies" (it is hard to say from the known facts of Uvarov's biography what exactly these were) allowed him to "assert that the three great linchpins of religion, autocracy, and nationality constitute the cherished legacy of our fatherland." Thus the basis for nationality turns out to be convictions. Simply put, a Russian is someone who believes in his church and his sovereign.

Having defined Orthodoxy and autocracy in terms of nationality, Uvarov now defines nationality in terms of Orthodoxy and autocracy. In formal logic this kind of maneuver is called a vicious circle, but ideology is built on qualitatively different laws, and this risky rhetorical pirouette turns out to be the weight-bearing element of the entire new official construction. This line of reasoning had serious long-term consequences for Russian state ideology. If only those Russians who profess "the national religion" may be members of the reigning church, then Old Believers and sectarians among the lower levels of society are excluded as well as converted Catholics, deists, and skeptics in the higher ones. In exactly the same way, if nationality necessarily presumes acceptance of autocracy, any constitutionalist or republican automatically forgoes the right to be a Russian. This approach is uncannily similar to the model of the "Soviet person" developed by the communist regime, as someone to whom a strictly prearranged set of views and convictions is ascribed. A "non-Soviet

person" in this ideological system cannot be considered part of "the people" and is declared to be a "renegade" (otshchepenets). In the early nineteenth century the term used for this phenomenon was "izverg" (monster or outcast).

This parallel forces us to look again at Shishkov's conception of the people's body. Long before Uvarov, Shishkov had been interested not so much in the objective criteria of a nation's unity as in the ideological instruments capable of unifying that people in a general burst of enthusiasm that would transcend class and other barriers. To many contemporaries of Uvarov and Shishkov, as to subsequent researchers, it has seemed that their ideological constructions had a direct link. For example, D. N. Sverbeev (1871, 178), wrote that

> Shishkov did not define for himself the three main ideas of his whole life, even less put them into words, but he, nevertheless, so to speak unconsciously, was first to embody in himself the three-part Russian creed "Orthodoxy—Autocracy—Nationality," which then became both the program for Emperor Nicholas I' reign and Count Uvarov's motto, and, finally, the banner of the late Slavophiles.

However, beyond the external resemblance, the two ideological systems hide much more profound differences. Shishkov and his like-minded colleagues were promoting a program for national mobilization. Designed for a period of military action, it did not propose anything for peacetime except maintaining the regime of mobilization with all of its excesses indefinitely. The issue concerned the total isolation of Russia, a "wall" that had to be erected between piety and depravity and a struggle against hostile influences and all those who would give in to it and cease being part of the people's body. As noted, it was no accident that with the end of the war, both Shishkov and Rostopchin were removed from their posts.

In contrast, Uvarov was active not in the pre-war but in the post-war situation, and he needed to craft an ideological strategy for peaceful evolutionary development. At the same time, he by no means strove to unconditionally isolate Russia from the West. Uvarov scrutinized and reinterpreted Guizot's parliamentary speech so passionately and subjectively precisely because it would help him tackle his main task. The issue was to create an ideological system that would preserve the possibility of Russia belonging to European civilization, outside of which Uvarov neither conceived of himself nor of his work as minister of popular enlightenment. At the same time, such a system

would protect the country from that civilization by means of an impermeable barrier. In Uvarov's formulation the dilemma consisted of "how to march in step with Europe and not move away from our own place,… what art we must master in order to take from enlightenment only what is necessary for a great empire and to firmly reject that which contains the seeds of disorder and shocks?" For many decades the Russian authorities would ask themselves how to appropriate the achievements of Western civilization and not the system of social values that had given rise to them.

Uvarov was also completely lacking in Shishkov's missionary zeal. He by no means desired a fundamental break with the upper classes' education and lifestyle, including the use of the French language that had so infuriated Shishkov. He simply desired the establishment of Orthodoxy and autocracy as objects of obligatory veneration for all subjects of the Russian Empire. As M. M. Shevchenko justly remarked, in his formula "Uvarov essentially paraphrased the ancient military motto 'For Faith, Tsar and Fatherland!'" (Shevchenko 1997, 105). However, the very nature of the paraphrase reveals the kernel of Uvarov's approach. The concrete, emotionally palpable patriotic symbols for which a soldier must go into battle are here replaced with the historical institutions of national existence and abstract principles. The task of the entire system of popular education became the clarification and affirmation of these principles and these institutions, as Uvarov wrote, "not in the form of panegyric speeches to the government, which it does not need, but as the conclusions of reason, as incontestable fact, as political dogma that guarantees the tranquility of the state and which is the birthright of one and all." Thus the ideological guarantee of state politics was translated from a "hot" register into a "cold" one, transforming mobilizational slogans into a program of routine bureaucratic and educational work. The memorandum also interpreted the sources of danger that were menacing the empire as well as the measures proposed to eliminate them in an analogous way.

6

Uvarov began his letter to the emperor with recollections of his previous career in the Ministry of Popular Education. In 1811, thanks to his marriage to the daughter of the then minister, Count A. K. Razumovskii, he received the brilliant appointment (for a twenty-five-year-old) to the post of administrator of

the St. Petersburg educational district. In this position he showed himself to be energetic and able (see Whittaker 1999; cf. Shpet 1989), about which Nicholas I was naturally well-informed. The emperor also knew about the reasons for Uvarov's departure in 1821 that provided the basis for somewhat paradoxical parallels with the circumstances of his new appointment.

Uvarov was to begin his new responsibilities by making an inspection of Moscow University. The review of this institution of higher learning that had given serious grounds for suspicion—there had recently been arrests from among the students—clearly suggested a forthcoming change of government course (see Herzen VIII, 135–148). In recent history this situation had a well-examined precedent. In 1819 the task of carrying out an inspection of Kazan University had been entrusted to M. L. Magnitskii. The result was not only the decimation of the university but the start of repressions throughout Russia's educational system, which did not spare Uvarov's beloved St. Petersburg University. On the initiative of Magnitskii's henchman, D. P. Runich, its leading professors were ousted—K. I. Arsen'ev, A. I. Galich, and E. Raupakh. Uvarov unsuccessfully tried to oppose these persecutions and was forced to retire (see Sukhomlinov II, 382–386; Whittaker 1999, 88–99), although several of the fired professors were quickly accepted into military educational institutions under the administration of Grand Prince Nikolai Pavlovich. The future emperor did not conceal his dislike for Magnitskii and Runich, to whom he once ironically asked to accept his gratitude for their concern with the cadres of the Engineering School (Grech 1930, 381; sf. Shil'der 1903 II, 60–62). As N. I. Grech wrote, banishing Magnitskii from Petersburg was "the single matter that Nikolai Pavlovich permitted himself [to get involved with] before he ascended to the throne" (Grech 1930, 383–384).

In 1831, a year before Uvarov's memorandum, Magnitskii tried to escape his political disfavor. Together with the well-known mystic of the Alexandrine era, Andrei Golitsyn, he submitted two closely connected denunciations to Nicholas I that allegedly exposed a global conspiracy of the Illuminati. In their opinion, this conspiracy was coordinated from abroad and had sunk deep roots in Russia (see Shil'der 1898/1899; for more detail, see Gordin 1999). They declared Speranskii—once a patron and friend of Magnitskii, who had at that time been leading the effort to compile a law code for the Russian Empire—the inspiration for and organizer of the Illuminati's activity in Russia. The

immediate cause for the denunciations was probably the newly-minted proposals of the commission of December 6 (see Gordin 1999, 252–255). However, Golitsyn and Magnitskii wrote about affairs of twenty years prior. Apparently the two disgraced bureaucrats wanted to attract attention to themselves by demonstrating that they were conversant with past events. In one denunciation it said that Speranskii "was accepted to a high rank of Illuminism" during the Erfurt Congress and that "Weishaupt was ordered by Napoleon to pay attention to state secretary Speranskii" (Shil'der 1898/1899, № 12, 524, 534). In 1831, after the Polish uprising that echoed the July Revolution in France, the Polish question again became topical. In Magnitskii's words, "the hurried and unripe Polish revolt at the very beginning of a great rebellion that apparently was supposed to embrace Europe again is a clear sign" of the activity "of the all-destructive union of the Illuminati" (ibid., № 1, 87). However, here too the informers' argument was based on peripeties of a bygone era.

Magnitskii asserted that among Speranskii's papers were "especially important constitutional projects for Russia and especially one, written in Czartoryski's hand, as well as an introduction to the extensive and grand work that Speranskii wrote while returning from Erfurt where he had been with the sovereign and from where, it seems, he came back with *various* foreign impressions" (ibid., № 1, 82). The connections between the Illuminati and the Poles were proved by the fact that "their first action" in 1794 was the liberation of Tadeusz Kościuszko, who led the uprising against Russia. Moreover, their weapon within Russia already in the nineteenth century was the lodge of the Polish aristocrat Tadeusz Grabianka. The lodge counted members such as Speranskii and F. P. Lubianovskii and influenced the emperor through his favorite M. A. Naryshkina, who was Polish by birth (ibid., № 2, 292–293, 298). Magnitskii and Golitsyn calculated that the emperor, whose reign had begun with the revolt on Senate Square and who five years later faced revolutions in France and Belgium, the Polish uprising, and student conspiracies, could hardly remain deaf to this sort of warning. They therefore revived the old constructions of Abbé Barruel that had been so effective in 1812 for denouncing Speranskii, and again in 1824 when Fotii was able to unseat Aleksandr Golitsyn. Curiously, Magnitskii, who had been sent into exile on account of the first intrigue was, like Andrei Golitsyn, an active participant in the second one. Neither Nicholas I nor Uvarov was immune to ideas about a multi-pronged

conspiracy coordinated from abroad. However, the mythology of an eschatological clash between good and evil, so natural in the overwrought atmosphere of Alexandrine mysticism, did not arouse anything in either man except irritation and repulsion. In Uvarov's memorandum the carriers of the revolutionary spirit were not the prevailing servants of "Satan's synagogue" but "minds dimmed by false ideas and prejudices worthy of pity." Uvarov clearly distinguished between "the sworn enemies of the empire," with whom one could only handle with repressive measures, and "political dreamers" who were "confused by false notions" and whom the authorities could still return to the lap of national life.

Uvarov's triad was designed to perform this task, as it represented, in B. A. Uspenskii's persuasive hypothesis, a polemical reversal of the most famous tripartite political formula, the French Revolutionary slogan "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" (Uspenskii 1999). If in Barruel's scheme "Liberty" corresponded to the conspiracy by "sophists of atheism," for Uvarov "Orthodoxy" was called on to oppose it. The answer to the conspiracy on the part of "sophists of rebellion" that preached "Equality" became "Autocracy." Against the conspiracy of "the sophists of anarchy" that challenged the foundations of society and patriotic feeling, "Nationality" was put forward as a replacement for "Fraternity," which was equally objectionable for a Russian monarchist due to its cosmopolitan and Masonic implications (see Ozouff 1988).

After a short investigation that established the complete falsity of their accusations (see Gordon 1999), both Golitsyn and Magnitskii were sent into exile. Uvarov was left to decide how to battle freethinking and the revolutionary threat. In the start of 1832 he found himself in the situation that Magnitskii had been in thirty years earlier—he was expected to come up with a complex of measures that would eliminate the rabble-rousing that had infiltrated higher education. However, the role of fanatical obscurantist did not at all appeal to him; thus, he needed to be assured once again that the emperor did not expect anything of this kind from him and had not chosen him to carry out a pogrom in Russia's oldest university in the fashion of his unfortunate predecessor. "It is precisely in the sphere of popular education that we need first of all to revive faith in monarchist and national principles, and to restore it without shocks, without haste, without violence. Enough ruins surround us—[we are] able to destroy, but what have we built"? he wrote to Nicholas I in his memorandum.

"Ruins" was not merely a metaphor here; Magnitskii had proposed that they not limit the punishment of Kazan University to a purge but give it over for "public destruction" (Zagoskin II, 309).

In the report on his inspection, Uvarov recommended that they fight "against the influence of so-called *European ideas*" not by the use of repression but by instilling young people "with a penchant for other concepts, other occupations and principles, increasing where we can the number of *intellectual levees"* that could direct the energy of the young generation's minds into a channel the government needed (Uvarov 1875, 517). In the late 1810s Uvarov proposed that the study of the East could save Russia from the "European infection." Now he had in mind constructing "intellectual levees" (umstvennye plotiny) capable of changing the natural flow of ideas, "inculcating into young people the desire to become better acquainted with the fatherland's history, paying greater attention to our nationality in all of its diverse manifestations." "It is unquestionable," he continued, "that this kind of affinity for works that are continuing, substantial, inoffensive, will serve as a kind of support against the influence of so-called *European ideas*" (ibid.). Encouraging study and research in the field of Russian history was basically the only positive proposal that Uvarov was able to put forward. The past was ordained to replace the empire's perilous and uncertain future, and Russian history, with its deeply rooted institutions of Orthodoxy and autocracy, was to become the single repository of nationality and the ultimate alternative to Europeanization.

7

In suggesting that loyalty to the church and to the throne were the main features of Russian nationality, Uvarov was forced to presume that these feelings unite "the incalculable majority" of his countrymen (Uvarov 1995, 71), at the same time as

> the senseless passion for innovations without restraint or reasonable plan, [and leading] to unexpected destructive consequences, characterizes an extremely insignificant circle of people in Russia and serves as the credo for a school that is so weak that it not only cannot increase the number of its adherents but loses several of them daily. One may assert there is no doctrine less popular in Russia, because there is no system that would offend so many

> ideas, be hostile to so many interests, be so fruitless and surrounded by mistrust to any greater extent.

In such a situation and social dynamic it would seem that the government had nothing to worry about. Nonetheless Uvarov prepared for a difficult struggle, the prospectives for which he was by no means inclined to be optimistic. Despite what he said, literally two paragraphs previously, among the factors that threatened the final victory of his mission was "the universal state of people's minds, and, in particular, that of the generation that is graduating today from our bad schools and for whose moral neglect we, perhaps, should reproach ourselves, a lost generation, if not an antagonistic one, a generation of ignoble beliefs, bereft of enlightenment, grown old before it had a chance to enter life, withered away by ignorance and fashionable sophisms, whose future will bring no benefit to the Fatherland."

Defeatist notes resound in Uvarov's letter. His mission as he himself conceived it was, on the one hand, rooted in the nature of national existence, and on the other—infinitely lonely and Sisiphean. Uvarov wrote that he would defend the "breach" which the emperor had commanded him to fill "until the last," but expressed misgivings that he would be "overcome by the force of circumstances." An influential statesman summoned to formulate and implement a new system of state consciousness, he felt himself, as before, an "exotic flower" unable to put down roots in his native soil, as he had characterized himself eighteen years earlier in the letter to Stein. This situation seems quite paradoxical. Given the Russians' love for the native principles of national life that Uvarov postulated, where could that generation—whose disposition was described in terms that today almost seem like quotations from Lermontov's poem "Thought" (Duma), written six years later—have come from, and why did the task of raising future generations in the spirit of Russian nationality seem so dangerous and unattainable to the future minister?

Of course, a significant measure of the responsibility for such a situation predates Uvarov. Rather, it lies with the state's ideological apparatus, whose permissiveness and lack of well-considered policy had allowed the evil to penetrate so deeply. Yet the main reason for the spread of anti-national tendencies lies elsewhere. The very metaphor of "intellectual levees" suggests that Uvarov was trying to partition off a current of thought that he himself felt was natural.

In his opinion, Russia had for the moment "avoided the humiliation" like that which Europe suffered after the July Revolution. But the very phrase "has not arrived at that point of disgrace" (n'a pas arrive à ce point de degradation) indicates that he clearly discerned an analogous evolution for Russia. Also very pessimistic were Uvarov's sense of the fragility of the Russian government's mode of being and his above-cited assertion that if reforms began, the empire would not be able to last even two weeks (cf. Shevchenko 1997, 105). Apparently, while Uvarov saw the European path of development as ruinous for Russia, he simply could not envisage any alternative.

As one of the most authoritative scholars of nationalism, Benedict Anderson, has written, in Russia, "'official nationalism'—[the] willed merger of nation and dynastic empire— … developed *after*, and *in reaction to*, the popular national movements proliferating in Europe since the 1820s. … It was only that a certain inventive legerdemain was required to permit the empire to appear attractive in national drag" (Anderson 1994, 68–87). Consequently, in historical practice the experience of Western nation-states inevitably served as the measure for any realization of this very "nationalism." The intellectual drama of Russian state nationalism consisted in the following: the key notion of "nationality" or "nationalism" (nationalité, Volkstum) had been developed by Western European social thinkers to legitimize the new social order that was replacing the traditional confessional and dynastic principles of the state system; but Uvarov's triad declared that precisely those institutions that nationalism had been summoned to destroy were the cornerstones of Russian nationality—the reigning church and imperial absolutism. In fulfilling the Russian monarchy's political mandates, Uvarov attempted to unite the contradictory demands of the time and to preserve the existing order, but his European education proved stronger than the traditionalism he had adopted. Nationalism thus predominated over both Orthodoxy and autocracy, turning them into ethnographically ornamental components of national history.