Introduction

Central and Eastern Europe has occupied a significant position in nationalism studies, mainly given the formation of a considerable number of new nation-states after WWI in place of the former empires there, the result of which did not necessarily lead to a stable international order. This region also produced the most prominent early scholars of nationalism, such as Hans Kohn, Ernest Gellner, and Miroslav Hroch.¹ These scholars tended to view nationalism as a typical modern phenomenon and regarded the nation-building of this region as being in some way anomalous or backward under long-term imperial rule. Hans Kohn, for example, emphasized the difference between “nationalism in Western Europe” based on “a rational and universal concept of political liberty and the rights of man” and that of “the East” based on the weakness or total lack of them.² On the other hand, Miroslav Hroch, in developing his argument of the formation phases of the nation, attempted to understand the case of Central and Eastern Europe not as an anomalous type of nationalism, but rather as a movement toward “the legitimate type” of nation.³ After the 1990s, when the USSR, another real empire, collapsed and new nation-states again proliferated, empire entered the sphere of historical study. Empire as a state form, which governs a broad territory with multiple populations, came to attract the concern of historians, and the mechanism of empire itself became a challenging new research target. The Habsburg Empire and the Romanov Empire, having widely ruled

1 R. J. W. Evans, *Austria, Hungary and the Habsburgs: Essays on Central Europe, c.1683–1867* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 101–2.

2 Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 2005 (originally published in 1944)), 457, 560–61, 574.

3 Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations*, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

Central and Eastern Europe, had formerly been regarded as oppressive ancient regimes doomed to be replaced by modern nation-states. But now historians view both empires as interesting historical examples of political entities that ruled diverse societies. An empire had to constantly engage in complicated negotiations with various peoples within its territory, and, as a result, played an important role in the process of its nationalization. Jane Burbank and Mark von Hagen, highlighting “the preeminence of empire as a state form well into the twentieth century,” note that Russia has “a particularly enduring imperial structure.”⁴ Alexei Miller, examining the history of nationalism in the Russian Empire, emphasizes the “complex fabric of interaction between the imperial authority and local communities,” which influenced “nation-making processes.”⁵ Pieter Judson also underlines the notion that “concepts of nationhood and ideas of empire depend on each other” and “developed in dialogue with each other,” proudly adding the remark that, now, historians of the Habsburg Monarchy have taught other historians about how to think about the “typologies of empire and nation.”⁶ As the perspective on empires was considerably neutralized, Central and Eastern Europe became a new front of historical research of nationalism under empire, enriching the understanding of European historical development.

This book makes another contribution to elucidating the nature of emerging nations in this region by shedding special light on the religious factor. The main reason to pay attention to religion is, as R. J. W. Evans demonstrates, to trace “the process” of historical transformation from the pre-modern to the modern imperial era. Evans describes the emerging national consciousness in the territory of the Habsburg Monarchy along the historical transition from the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, including the reaction of the Orthodox Churches.⁷ This anthology, following this approach, widens the geographical range eastward up to the western borderlands of the Russian Empire, and starts with the era of Counter-Reformation in the region. Our main focus is on the dominant

4 June Burbank, Mark Von Hagen, and Anatolyi Remnev, eds., *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 2–3.

5 Alexei Miller, *The Romanov Empire and Nationalism* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2006), 1–2.

6 Pieter M. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 9–10, 14.

7 Evans, *Austria, Hungary, and the Habsburgs*, 103–5.

Christian confessions in the region that interplayed with the rising nationalist sentiment. We do not enter more deeply into the exploration of the essence of these Christian confessions, but instead discuss them as systems of belief that define traditional values, identity, and modes of community organization and interaction. We recognize the critical importance of Christian social and cultural institutions and practices, such as churches, clergy, rites, and ceremonies, in shaping a community's perceptions and behavior.

As Benedict Anderson underlined in his influential book about the shift from the era of universalistic religious communities to particularistic national communities in the process of modernization, we tended to assume that religion is a typical phenomenon of the pre-modern era, while nationalism in place of religion is seen as a crucial indicator of the modern era.⁸ However, Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann sharply criticized the typical "Western discourse of modernity," which assumed that "nationalism belongs to the realm of legitimate modern politics," inevitably accompanied by rationalization and secularization. On that basis, they opened academic dialogue on "a kind of vibrant symbiosis" between "modernizing religion and emerging nationalism," through historical analysis of the formation process of nationalism.⁹ *The Contested Nation*, published in 2008, focused on religion as one of the competing concepts of collective identity to nation, together with class, ethnicity/race, and gender.¹⁰ James C. Kennedy, in this book, prepared a special introductory and methodological paper for analyzing the relationship between religion and nation. According to Kennedy, after the Napoleonic age "traditional religion was 'disestablished'" and marginalized or even excluded from the narratives of nation, which now constituted the main story.¹¹ After the 1980s, however, "the return of the gods" happened in European national historiographies, influenced by two trends: firstly, forging new narratives that included "a

8 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1983), in particular, 12–19.

9 Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann, eds., *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 3, 9. Also see Peter van der Veer, *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India* (Berkeley: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

10 Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz, eds., *The Contested Nation: Ethnicity, Class, Religion and Gender in National Histories* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

11 James C. Kennedy, "Religion, Nation and European Representations of the Past," *ibid.*, 118–19.

new role for religion as a force of resistance against Soviet domination” in Eastern Europe, and secondly, attempting to understand the multireligious society evoked by the appearance of immigrants as religious pluralization. Historians became increasingly convinced that religion was a constituent element of European nations and started to pay further attention to the use of the religious past “in order to ‘sacralise’ nations” and, in reverse, the multiple historical aspects of the ‘nationalization’ of religion.¹² Kennedy, insisting on the necessity of differentiating strictly traditional religion from nation as a distinct entity, analyzed the patterns of the intricate configuration of symbiosis between the two elements. He, in the end, concluded that “confessions did not constitute monoliths from which a nation’s past was constructed, though the parameters of belief clearly delimited what visions of the national past were available.”¹³

Contemplating emerging national consciousness in the region, we shed light on various religious factors and elements, including the Church, the clergy, the religious community, religious thoughts and inspirations, and so on, not because we intend to insist that nationalism in the eastern area of Europe had archaic or primordial features dating from the pre-modern age in contrast to Western nationalism. Instead, we try to elucidate a contingent historical process of nation formation, scanning the sediment of the multilayered dividing lines that strengthened or weakened the solidarity of national communities in Central and Eastern Europe. This approach will promote better understanding of the symbiosis between modernized religion and emerging nations.

For this purpose, we, first of all, need to consider the long-term transformation of religious, political, and social situations in Central and Eastern Europe from the early modern era, especially concerning influences from the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in Western Europe. Some scholars, stressing the importance of the role that Central and Eastern Europe played in the process of religious reform in early modern Europe, lament the lack of sufficient concern by historians about the region. The editors of *Diversity and Dissent*, while admitting the existence of well-elaborated individual academic works on the religious groups based on “impermeable national, linguistic, and confessional boundaries,” accentuate the necessity

12 Ibid., 119–29.

13 Ibid., 132.

to intentionally seek “hybridity, crossover, and interaction.”¹⁴ What these editors particularly emphasize as the characteristic of this region is “multiconfessionalism.”¹⁵ The editors of *Confessional Identity in East-Central Europe* also remark that “an extraordinary multiplicity of religions found support in this region.”¹⁶ This phenomenon was related to the “diversity of ethnic and linguistic communities” and “decentralized political structures” of the region.¹⁷ This feature contrasts with the situation in Western Europe, where the trend in the direction of territorial sovereignty and a confessional state accompanied by social discipline was reinforced in the same period.¹⁸

Under this regional condition, in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which became one of the most powerful states in this region after the Union of Lublin in 1569, the subsequent Union of Brest in 1595–96 changed the religious situation in its territory. The Union of Brest united the local Orthodox Church with the Catholic Church, creating what came to be called the Uniate Church. This Church Union can be seen as a phenomenon of the Counter-Reformation in the region, strengthening territorial solidarity though confessionalization, but, in fact, this measure provoked tensions in the diverse multiconfessional society.¹⁹ Later, at the end of the eighteenth century, when the imperial powers dissolved the political entity of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and swallowed this area, the religious situation of the region was again reorganized.

In this book, the first four chapters discuss these shifts of the religious condition of this region. Chiho Fukushima starts with the impact of the Union of Brest, that is, the attempt to Catholicize the region and the emergence of the Uniate Church, and Barbara Skinner subsequently explains the

14 Howard Louthan, Gary B. Cohen, and Franz A. J. Szabo, eds., *Diversity and Dissent: Negotiating Religious Differences in Central Europe, 1500–1800* (Berghahn Books, 2011), 4.

15 Ibid., 3.

16 Maria Craciun, Ovidiu Ghitta, and Graeme Murdock, eds., *Confessional Identity in East-Central Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 1.

17 Ibid., 14, 17; Louthan, Cohen, and Szabo, eds., *Diversity and Dissent*, 4.

18 Heinz Schilling, *Religion, Political Culture and the Emergence of Early Modern Society: Essays in German and Dutch History* (Leiden: Brill, 1992); John M. Headley, Hans J. Hillerbrand, and Anthony J. Papalas, eds., *Confessionalization in Europe, 1555–1700: Essays in Honor and Memory of Bodo Nischan* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).

19 Barbara Skinner, *The Western Front of the Eastern Church: Uniate and Orthodox Conflict in Eighteenth-century Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009). See also the article in the above-mentioned compilation; Mikhail V. Dmitriev, “Conflict and Concord in Early Modern Poland: Catholics and Orthodox at the Union of Brest,” in *Diversity and Dissent*, eds. Louthan, Cohen, and Szabo, 114–36.

fate of the Uniates prior to the reunion of the Uniates by the Russian imperial authority into the Orthodox Church in 1839, that is, the attempt to enforce Orthodoxy in the region. Zita Medišauskienė, exploring the religious rhetoric used in the 1863–64 Uprising, describes overlapping religious and secular motivations: the counter-attack by the dissolved Commonwealth on the expanded Russian Empire, which interconnected with the religious counter-attack by Catholicism on the Orthodox Empire. While suppressing the uprising, as Yoko Aoshima shows, the Russian Empire reacted also by mixing Orthodox and secular imperial aspects, which in turn strengthened the Orthodox identity of the Russian imperial core. These first four papers demonstrate how the religious changes created the historical context of this region in the long term. Here, we should remind ourselves of Brian Porter-Szűcs's assertion that "resistance to imperial rule as a Catholic lined up only imperfectly and sporadically with resistance to imperial rule as a Pole" up to the end of the nineteenth century.²⁰ Indeed, we need to be aware of the discrepancy between religious and nationalistic reactions, and, as Porter-Szűcs explores the case of Catholicism and Polish nationalism, we should elucidate the mechanism that connects the two factors in broader historical context.

Another reason to focus on the religious factor is to consider the impact of the enhancement of imperial powers, which tended to be linked with a universal religion. As we have mentioned above, the study of empires has rapidly developed in recent times: a broad regional overview of various social relations now underpins views of the imperial situation, where once individual nations were treated separately.²¹ From this perspective, imperial institutional frameworks and ruling imperial elites are seen to have not only suppressed national movements, but also to form the condition in which nations would generate.²² Researchers are ceasing to assume various

20 Brian Porter-Szűcs, "The Birth of the Polak-Katolik," *Sprawy Narodowościowe (Seria nova)* 49 (2017), 1–12 (here, 3); Brian Porter-Szűcs, *Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity, and Poland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

21 I. Gerasimov, S. Glebov, A. Kaplunovski, M. Mogilner, and A. Semyonov, "Languages of Self-Description of Empire and Nation as a Research Problem and Political Dilemma," *Ab Imperio* 1 (2005): 23–32.

22 Other than the works cited above, see also Kimitaka Matsuzato, ed., *Imperiology: From Empirical Knowledge to Discussing the Russian Empire* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2007); Ilya Gerasimov, Jan Kusber, and Alexander Semyonov, eds., *Empire Speaks Out: Languages of Rationalization and Self-Description in the Russian Empire* (Leiden: Brill, 2009); Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller, eds., *Nationalizing Empires* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2014); Valerie A.

nations to be self-evident historical actors and are starting to pay attention to the incidental process of forming cultural solidarities among complicated dividing lines, which are based not only on ethnicity and confession, but also on legal estate, economic class, occupation, gender, and so forth, during the interaction within the imperial framework.²³

Among such research, work on the Russian Empire, in particular, casts a strong spotlight on religion. Robert Crews and Paul Werth, to name but two historians, have developed a theory of the confessional state, according to which the Russian Empire pursued discipline and control of its population through respective religious institutions as mediating organizations.²⁴ To govern the empire, the government itself drew, redrew, and utilized the religious dividing lines. Imperial studies have illustrated the mechanism of imperial rule based on religious institutions, on the one hand, and the solidarity of religious groups on the other—for example, in 2006 *Ab Imperio* featured religious groups in the Russian Empire.²⁵ However, we should again remember the fact that the official imperial religion was Russian Orthodoxy and then rethink the meaning of the official religion in its rulings and its impact on national formation, especially in its western borderlands, which was the area influenced by Western nationalism ahead of other regions as well as by strong traditional Catholicism. Mikhail Dolbilov and Darius Staliūnas pioneered the research of confessional matters in the western borderlands, elucidating the dynamic function of the imperial power, which utilized religious issues for the purpose of integrating the western border regions into the empire.²⁶

Kivelson and Ronald Grigor Suny, *Russia's Empires* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

- 23 Gerasimov, Glebov, Kaplunovski, Mogilner, and Semyonov, "Languages of Self-description of Empire," 24.
- 24 Robert Crews, "Empire and the Confessional State: Islam and Religious Politics in Nineteenth-Century Russia," *The American Historical Review* 108, no. 1 (2003), 50–83; idem, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Paul W. Werth, *The Tsar's Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
- 25 The thematic forum of the "History" section in issue 3 was "Cordi Nobis Est Religio, non Natio" (Religion, not nation, is in our heart). I. Gerasimov, S. Glebov, A. Kaplunovski, M. Mogilner and A. Semyonov, "Searching for a Mode of Description of the Community of Solidarity, Social Action and Collective Loyalty," *Ab Imperio* 3 (2006): 17–22 (here, 19–20).
- 26 Mikhail Dolbilov, *Russkii krai, chzhaia vera: Etnokonfessional'naia politika imperii v Litve i Belorussii pri Aleksandre II.* (Moskva: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2010);

We push forward with this endeavor to further explore how the populations reacted toward the pressure of the empire. Barbara Skinner demonstrates that the effort by the imperial power to support Orthodoxy in this region in order to remove the Polish/Catholic influence caused confusion to the daily religious life of the region. Zita Medišauskienė shows that protests to this Orthodox/imperial pressure was slightly different among the Catholic populations according to ethno-linguistic lines: Polish nationalists exploited religious rhetoric to legitimate the pursuit for their own state, but for Lithuanian people, protecting their Catholic faith itself was the aim of the 1863–1864 Uprising. Vilma Žaltauskaitė clarifies this divergence of nations among Catholics, focusing on Catholic priests from the Lithuanian-speaking region. In contrast, Aliaksandr Bystryk demonstrates that Catholicism did not contribute to the consolidation of Belarusian nationalism, given the religious divide between the Orthodox and the Catholic among Belarusian-speaking people. Likewise, Bystryk points out that Catholic discourse in the Belarusian language emphasized religious aspects more than nationalism. Meanwhile, Yoko Aoshima argues that the imperial government, perceiving the resistance from Catholics and from Poles to overlap, reacted by bolstering Orthodoxy in the region, especially targeting Belarusian-speaking people, whom the government believed to be Orthodox and, as such, Russians. This experience in the western borderlands, according to Aoshima, fostered the further entrenchment of Orthodox identity in the Russian Empire as a whole.

Compared to the Russian Empire, studies of the Habsburg Empire often emphasize civic institutions and the linguistic context, rather than the confessional strategy of the Habsburg Empire. As such, reactions from the various populations in terms of religion are not frequently taken into

Mikhail Dolbilov and Darius Staliūnas, *Obratnaia uniia: iz istorii otnoshenii mezhdru katolitsizmom i pravoslaviem v Rossiiskoi imperii 1840–1873* (Vilnius: Lietuvos istorijos instituto leidykla, 2010). Also see Alexei Miller, *The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century*, trans. Olga Poato (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003); Alexei Miller and Alfred J. Rieber, eds., *Imperial Rule* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004); Mikhail Dolbilov and Alexei Miller, eds., *Zapadnye okrainy rossiiskoi imperii* (Moskva: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2006); Darius Staliūnas, *Making Russians: Meaning and Practice of Russification in Lithuania and Belarus after 1863* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007); Theodore R. Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914* (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008).

account in commentary on the modern era.²⁷ Therefore, the question of how Catholicism as a symbol of the Habsburg dynasty influenced the nationalization of peoples in later years is still open to further exploration.²⁸ In this book, Taku Shinohara demonstrates how Czech intellectuals, including the Catholic clergy, employed traditional Catholic ceremonies and baroque social codes in order to create a new Czech national culture. Likewise, Dominica Rank explores how the Polish national movement took over the religious and dynastic frame in Galicia.

The third reason to focus on religious factors is to promote understanding of the multifaceted nature of nations in the region. Tara Zahra, exploring the social history of the Bohemian lands in the late nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century underlines “indifference to nationalism” with focus on bilingualism of local peoples.²⁹ “Many individuals,” according to the author, “identified more strongly with religious, class, local, regional, professional, or familial communities, or even with the Austrian dynasty, than with a single nation.”³⁰ Agreeing principally with this assertion, we explore how the multilayered identification was related to the newly emerging national consciousness. For example, we look at how religious bias was entrenched in the mind of a seemingly modernized person. Hajime Konno, examining the case of Max Weber, who stressed disenchantment to be a sign of modernization, shows that religious bias was deeply mixed with an individual’s nationalistic mentality. Kenshi

27 Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (London: Methuen, 1977); Miroslav Hroch, “Iazyk kak instrument grazhdanskogo ravenstva,” *Ab Imperio* 3 (2005): 21–34; Pieter M. Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Tomasz Kamusella, *The Politics of Language and Nationalism in Modern Central Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Historians of the Russian Empire also looked at their own subject from this perspective and achieved significant results. For instance, see various papers in *Ab Imperio* 2 (2005).

28 Headley, Hillerbrand, and Papalas, eds., *Confessionalization in Europe, 1555–1700*, xxi; Louthan, Cohen, and Szabo, eds., *Diversity and Dissent*, 6; Cynthia Paces and Nancy M. Wingfield emphasized the close relationship between religious and political symbolism with focus on the Bohemian lands. Cynthia Paces and Nancy M. Wingfield, “The Sacred and the Profane: Religion and Nationalism in the Bohemian Lands, 1880–1920,” in *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe*, eds. Pieter M. Judson and Marsha L. Rozenblit (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 107–25.

29 Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900–1948* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 4.

30 Ibid.

Fukumoto pays attention to a curious case in which multireligious organizations under the aegis of the imperial government dealt more effectively than national organizations with the serious modern urban problems of the industrialized city of Łódź.

Among the same religious and historical groups, different national consciousnesses could emerge, as in the case of Lithuania. Lithuania, which constitutes one of the focuses of this book, is a unique historical example. It shared with Poland the same early modern state as well as religion, but nevertheless somehow promoted different national ideas from Poland. As Vilma Žaltauskaitė shows, one of the important promoters of national consciousness, among others, was the Catholic clergy. Olga Mastianica-Stankevič, in her contribution, scrutinizes the process of nationalization in Lithuania, highlighting the attempt by Catholic intellectuals to involve the culturally Polonized Lithuanian nobility in the national movement and to create together with the nobility a new Lithuanian intellectual class.³¹

We do not include the period after WWI in the scope of our volume. There are ample studies on the function of religion during the communist era in Central and Eastern Europe. Scholars take particular note of religion because, while religion was prohibited or restricted under the communist regimes, it at the same time functioned as the basis of national solidarity.³² Furthermore, this concern has led to studies of the relationship between religious revival and nation-building in the post-Soviet era.³³ These types of comparative studies from a socio-political standpoint are usually based on established nation-states. Our book, instead, attends more to the process of creating the context surrounding religion and nation that would be the foundation for the characteristics of later nation-states in the region. In this regard, all of the papers in our volume reveal the critical functions of religion in shaping the modern nationalizing period in Central and Eastern

31 When we say “Lithuania,” needless to say we do not intend to conduct a teleological research of its nation-building process based on the current Lithuanian state. Our aim is to analyze how the various dividing lines intersected, encompassing “Lithuania” and other names in this region. Darius Staliūnas, ed., *Spatial Concepts of Lithuania in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2016).

32 Peter F. Sugar, *East European Nationalism, Politics and Religion* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999); Pedro Ramet, ed., *Religion and Nationalism in soviet and East European Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989).

33 Greg Simons and David Westerlund, eds., *Religion, Politics and Nation-Building in Post-Communist Countries* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2015).

Europe and analyze how religious factors appeared in, and impacted on, various concrete social phenomena, which shaped the national base of this region in later years. We hope that this volume evokes a new vision of the historical transformation of the region that enriches general theories of nationalism.

Yoko Aoshima