The dramatic changes that took place in Eastern Europe in 1989 and early 1990 as a result of glasnost and perestroika seemed to confirm earlier signs that the grip of Moscow was easing. Mikhail Gorbachev, recognizing the internal problems facing the Soviet Union, not only in terms of economics, but of political cohesion, is apparently trying to reshape the Soviet Union's external power relationships in order to devote more energy and resources to revitalizing the Soviet domestic political-economic system. Part of this reshaping includes a changed Soviet military posture in Europe and a more accommodating relationship with the United States. As a result, the perception regarding the Soviet military threat has receded in the minds of most Europeans and many Americans. Additionally, most believe that there is now an arms control momentum, including a drive to reduce conventional forces in Europe. These developments have serious implications for the U.S. military.

Setting the stage for all of these security issues was the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) Treaty between the United States and the USSR. Signed in 1987, this treaty not only is intended to destroy an entire class of weapons, but it established procedures for inspections and provided a precedent for a multitude of contacts and exchanges between U.S. and Soviet military officers and defense specialists. At the same time, it changed the security equation between the United States and the Soviet Union, with implications for U.S. military force posture. With critical elements of its operational forces stationed in Europe, the U.S. Army is perhaps the branch of service that is most directly affected by these emerging strategic changes.

In an attempt to come to grips with these issues, General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, sought the views of a variety of specialists and defense authorities in government and academia. Equally important, the U.S. Army reached beyond the "beltway" to tap the resources in the U.S. Midwest. The result was a workshop entitled, "U.S. National Security Strategy: New Challenges and Opportunities." The focus of the
workshop was to explore the implications for U.S. national security of the changing strategic landscape, with particular emphasis on how it affected the U.S. Army. Additionally, the workshop was intended to stimulate public discussion and awareness of the important issues evolving from these strategic changes. The workshop, sponsored jointly by the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society and the U.S. Army, with support from the National Strategy Forum, was held between September 30 and October 2, 1988, in Chicago. George Washington University, Washington, D.C., provided invaluable administrative support.

The final report of the workshop was submitted to General Vuono in August 1989. It included copies of all the papers and an executive summary. These papers have been extensively revised by their authors and are included in this book. In addition, three other contributions are included herein that were not part of the workshop: Chapters 1, 12, and 15. The need for introductory and concluding chapters is self-evident. The addition of an Air Force perspective is important for a more comprehensive view of the post-INF era. However, the workshop and this book are not intended as final words on the changing strategic environment and U.S. military posture. Rather, the intent is to generate serious thinking on the emerging security issues, to develop a research agenda, and to help identify the shape of the strategic environment in which the U.S. Army will operate in the 1990s.

All of the answers are not here, but we believe that many of the most important questions are. Workshop participants and contributors to this book struggled with these questions in their search for answers. We believe that they have set out directions and an agenda critical in responding to the changing strategic landscape. This is particularly important for policymakers and strategists, as well as scholars. We also believe that this book provides important insights for professional military officers and those involved in national security studies at the graduate level.

This study was undertaken during a period of uncertainty and transition in Europe (particularly in divided Germany) and the Soviet Union. The fluidity of the political environment and the nature of the changes taking place make it extremely difficult to predict the precise contours of the strategic landscape. Yet even in such circumstances, force structures must be designed and strategic options thought out completely. Those concerned with such issues do not have the luxury of waiting until political directions are clear. Fortunately, the focus of this study is primarily on long-range strategic issues and force structures, regardless of the politics of the moment, since it is likely that changes in the European environment will continue even as this book is being published.

At the same time, U.S. military operations in Panama have highlighted a possible future role of the U.S. Army as a quick-reaction crisis intervention force that can augment friendly forces and draw upon a strategic reserve of resources positioned in the continental United States. These operations have
also highlighted the political and military difficulties inherent in Third World intervention operations and demonstrated anew the need for sound planning and effective interservice cooperation. These difficulties were apparent even in Panama, despite some thirteen thousand U.S. Army forces already in place, a domestically and internationally unpopular leader to be overthrown, and a treaty that could be construed as permitting U.S. intervention.

Part 1, "Introduction," consists of two selections, one of which is written by General Carl E. Vuono; both provide a broad overview of the changing strategic landscape and how the U.S. Army intends to respond. Part 2 focuses on the domestic environment and security issues with two selections, one addressing public opinion and the other on Congress and the defense budget. These chapters examine the constraints on responding to security issues and the reshaping of military posture imposed by a democratic system. Part 3 shifts the direction to specific issues in Europe. The selections range from an examination of the Gorbachev phenomenon and the changing dynamics within NATO to the conventional force balance and U.S. and European force structures. Part 4 extends the view beyond Europe, examining conventional conflicts in non-European areas and unconventional conflicts. Part 5 comes to grips with the impact of the new landscape on maritime strategy and the changing dimensions of air strategy. Part 6 focuses on the new challenges posed to the education and training of U.S. Army officers and Army reserve forces. The last part, "Conclusions," summarizes the major points made in the book, draws conclusions regarding the strategic landscape in the 1990s, and raises critical questions regarding national security strategy and U.S. Army force posture.

We are indebted to General Carl E. Vuono, U.S. Army, for the strategic vision that inspired this project, and to Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Allard and Lieutenant Colonel Rolland Dessert, U.S. Army, for their critical role in bringing together various administrative and logistical elements that made for a successful workshop and publication. We wish to convey our special appreciation to Colonel Raul H. ("Roy") Alcala, U.S. Army, for his innumerable contributions to our project and, more generally, to Army strategic thought.

Robert L. Vitas, once our student and now our colleague, rendered invaluable assistance in organizing the workshop and preparing the final report. We appreciate the continuing interest of Eugene P. Visco, Department of the Army, in our project, and note with gratitude the contribution of resources and expertise of the National Strategy Forum. Also, we wish to thank the Institute for Technology and Strategic Research of the School of Engineering and Applied Science, George Washington University, whose fiscal guidance and administration contributed greatly to the success of this project. Finally, and very importantly, without the support and assistance of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, especially its chairman, Charles C. Moskos, we could not have undertaken this project.
Despite the considerable assistance in organizing and conducting the workshop just noted, the final responsibility for material included and omitted and for strategic judgments expressed rests with the editors. This is particularly true of the assessments and conclusions that appear in Chapter 1, "U.S. National Security Strategy: The Next Decade," and Chapter 15, "Challenges and Requirements for the Future."

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