

## 9 Oratory and rhetoric

A.H. Sommerstein

In S&B ch.5 it was repeatedly seen how the various obligatory and optional oaths that were ubiquitous in Athenian lawcourt practice might be exploited for rhetorical purposes.<sup>1</sup> In this section I want to cover two topics which are also connected, but a little less closely, with the working of the courts: discussions of the forensic exploitation of legal oaths by teachers and theoreticians of rhetoric, who were naturally as aware of the possibilities they offered as were its actual practitioners,<sup>2</sup> and three or four ways of using oath-language which, from the 370s or 360s onwards, become standard features of the orator's technique.

A fascinating example of what an orator can do with an oath-procedure appears to lie behind a passage, at first sight decidedly enigmatic, in the so-called *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (1432a5–11), usually ascribed to Anaximenes of Lampascus, a contemporary of Aristotle:

And it is possible to smuggle through a piece of testimony in this kind of way: "Testify for me, Callicles."<sup>3</sup> – "No, by the gods, I won't, because I tried to stop that man doing what he did." And in this way, though he has given false evidence in the course of refusing to testify, he will not be liable to a prosecution for false testimony. Accordingly, when it is to our advantage to smuggle testimony through, we will make use of it in this way; but if our opponents do anything of the sort, we will expose their skulduggery and tell them to put it into writing and testify to it.

What is going on here? As often happens in the Aristotelian corpus, the argument has been presented very sketchily and needs to be fleshed out. The idea seems to be that one can "smuggle through a piece of testimony" by pretending that a witness is hostile when he is actually friendly. As discussed in S&B §5.10, it was often considered a good ploy to call a witness who was expected to be uncooperative, put to him a statement that he would not be able to accept, and force him to resort to the *exōmosia*, swearing that he did not know this statement to be true. In the case imagined here, Callicles is either a friend of the prosecutor who calls him to testify (a fact unknown to the defence), or else the prosecutor has paid

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1 Various other forms of rhetorical exploitation of oaths, particularly that of presenting one's opponents or enemies as perjurers, are valuably discussed by Martin 2009.

2 Though one practitioner who became a teacher, Isocrates, seems to have refused on principle ever to use oaths for such purposes (see ch. 15). For what it is worth, there are also no oaths in the (much smaller) surviving remains of the works of Isocrates' own teacher, Gorgias.

3 Or "Lysicles" (the manuscripts and other textual witnesses are divided).

him. He calls Callicles to the stand and asks him to testify to some such statement as “I encouraged the defendant to commit [whatever crime he is accused of], and he did so”. Since this is self-incriminating, the defence will expect Callicles to refuse to confirm it, and indeed he does refuse. The trick lies in the way he does so. For (by prior collusive arrangement, of course) what he says is “No, I won’t testify, because *I tried to stop that man doing what he did.*” The italicized statement is (we are to understand) false, but because it has been made, not as part of a witness statement, but in the process of *refusing* to make a witness statement, Callicles is not liable to be sued for giving false testimony – because he has not given any testimony at all! Of course he had no business making a statement like that to the jury if he wasn’t actually a witness; but (he will claim, if challenged) it just slipped out by accident. He then takes the *exōmosia*. Thus the prosecutor, by calling Callicles, has managed to put *two* false statements in front of the jury – that the defendant had committed the crime with Callicles’ encouragement, and that he had committed it despite Callicles’ dissuasion – without incurring any liability, whether religious or legal. Moreover, while Callicles will have denied the first statement (or at least denied knowing it is true), he will not have denied the second. To take a concrete (if slightly different – and purely imaginary) example, elaborating on a rhetorical trick that in modern times has become proverbial:

X falsely accuses Y of beating his wife.

X prepares a witness statement for Z: “Y beats his wife regularly.”

Z, called to the stand, says “No, I can’t testify to that; actually Y has stopped beating her.”

Z swears that he does not know the prepared statement to be true.

X has thus got Z to tell the jury, falsely, that Y has in the past beaten his wife (and is thus guilty as charged) without either committing perjury or giving false testimony.

As Anaximenes says, the expert rhetorician will not only be able to use this ploy effectively himself but will also be alert at detecting it when used by others. The tell-tale feature will be the calling of a witness *who is unknown to the opposition* and who rejects the statement put to him. The recommendation to “tell [the party calling the witness] to put [his allegedly impromptu statement] in writing and testify to it” is a little over-compressed. For one thing, while it is the prosecutor who would put Callicles’ statement in writing, it is Callicles himself who would “testify” to it; more importantly, by the time the opposition speak, it is too late to ask the prosecution to draft witness statements and get them confirmed. Rather, the defence will say something like this (the following passage is of my own composition):

Either what Callicles has said to you here is true, or it is not. If it is true, why did he not go to the prosecutor and tell him straight away, why did the prosecutor not draft a statement based on what Callicles had said, and why did Callicles not testify to that statement, instead of taking a course that opportunely shields him from any risk of prosecution for false testimony? There can be no reason; therefore what he has said to you is a lie.

In the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle, oaths (by which is meant oath-challenges, on which see S&B §5.11) are listed among the “artless proofs” (*atekhnoi pisteis*) alongside laws, witnesses, contracts, and tortures (i.e. torture-challenges). What “artless proofs” have in common is that they are all types of *evidence*,<sup>4</sup> as opposed to “artful proofs” (*entekhnoi pisteis*) which are types of *argument*. Aristotle gives an elaborately structured discussion (1377a8–b10) of the arguments which can be used by a party (i) refusing to give the opposition the opportunity of taking an oath, (ii) refusing to accept a challenge to swear, (iii) accepting such a challenge (or offering one’s own oath), and (iv) issuing one. All four possibilities are considered on an equal basis, with no apparent awareness that (iii) and (iv) are almost the only ones to appear in actual lawcourt practice and that those who reject oath-offers or oath-challenges made by their opponents normally say nothing about it.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, advice is given not only to those whose opponents are prepared to swear an oath that contradicts one they have previously sworn, but also to those who are in the same position themselves – to whom the only worthwhile advice would in fact be “don’t do it, or if you must, don’t draw the jury’s attention to it”.

To turn now to my second topic. Orators, like other speakers, frequently use informal, and sometimes formal, oaths to add force and emphasis to their statements. But sometimes laying emphasis on the truth of a statement can be an ironical device serving to convey to the listener the suggestion that the statement is probably *not* true; the Greek particle *dē* “truly” was frequently used in this way,<sup>6</sup> as once was English “forsooth” (which meant literally “in truth”). In general

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<sup>4</sup> Laws were items of evidence on the same footing as witness-statements, contracts or challenges; in a private suit, any law that either side wished to have read in court had to be specified at the arbitration hearing and sealed in the evidence jar (*echinos*). The jury, though sworn to decide the case according to the law (see S&B §5.4), were neither assumed nor expected (as a modern judge theoretically is) to have a complete knowledge of the law: if a litigant lost his case through failing to cite a law which would have been decisive in his favour, that was his fault, not the jury’s, just as if he had lost through neglecting to call a vital witness.

<sup>5</sup> Likewise detached, to an even greater extent, from forensic reality is the treatment of torture-challenges (1376b31–1377a7), where much more space is given to arguments against the reliability of torture (hardly ever found in actual speeches) than to those in its favour (which are very common).

<sup>6</sup> See Denniston 1954, 229–36.

the ironical use of oaths was not common in Greek, because (as the practice of “sidestepping” makes clear in another way – see ch.10) it was the wording of an oath, not the intention behind it, that was binding on the swearer. In one context, however, oaths *could* safely be used with an ironical significance: if a speaker put them into someone else’s mouth. And this became a convention and a cliché in what is called the oath of the “imaginary objector”.

It was commonplace for a speaker to anticipate, and refute in advance, a point that might be raised by his opponents – usually, of course, presenting that point in a highly tendentious way, setting up a straw man that would be easy to demolish. This was already a regular device in the fifth century, as some examples from drama show. In Euripides’ *Trojan Women*, produced in 415, Helen, captured at the fall of Troy, is speaking for her life in front of her husband Menelaus, and arguing that her elopement with Paris was not her fault but that of the goddess Aphrodite. She continues (*Tro.* 951–5):

At this point you might have a plausible argument against me: when Alexandros [Paris] died and went below the earth, since I was no longer bound in a union that a goddess had made, I should have left my home and gone to the Greek ships. Well, that is precisely what I kept trying to do!

Still earlier, in Euripides’ *Telephus* (produced in 438), the disguised Telephus uses a very simple form of the trope when arguing that Telephus and the Mysians had been justified in resisting a Greek attack: “Someone will say ‘they shouldn’t have done’” (Eur. fr. 708) – to which Aristophanes, imitating/parodying Telephus’ speech and applying it to Sparta’s decision to declare war on Athens in 431, adds “... well then, say what they *should* have done!” (Ar. *Ach.* 540). In actual oratory the “anticipated objection” was at first usually signalled by a phrase like *eipoi tis an* “someone may say”; the following is an example from one of the earliest surviving speeches ([Lys.] 20.16–17):<sup>7</sup>

This man shows in many ways that he is loyal to you; in particular, if he had wanted to make any revolution against the mass of your people, he would never have left the country only eight days after becoming a member of the Council [i.e. the Four Hundred]. But *someone may say* (*eipoi an tis*) that he sailed off for gain, like some men who took to making plundering raids. Well, no one can show<sup>8</sup> that he is in possession of any of your [public] property; in fact they accuse him of anything rather than his conduct in office.

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<sup>7</sup> This speech is too early to have been the work of Lysias; it appears to date from soon after the first restoration of democracy in 410.

<sup>8</sup> Or perhaps “That means that no one can show ...”, in which case the point would be that the implicit accusation of piracy is a red herring to divert attention from the prosecution’s lack of

The sole example in the earlier orators of the use of an oath in an “anticipated objection” comes in an *ekklēsia* speech (or what purports to be one), that of Andocides in 392/1 supporting the proposals for ending the Corinthian War that had emerged from the conference at Sparta to which he had been one of the Athenian delegates. At one point in this speech (Andoc. 3.13–16), he asks what valid reason Athens could have for continuing the war:

So that our city may have her freedom? But she already has it. Or so that we may build walls? We get that right by the peace treaty. Or to have the right to construct warships, and to repair and retain the existing ones? That is provided for too, because the agreement says that the cities are to be autonomous. Or to recover the islands of Lemnos, Scyros and Imbros? It is explicitly stated that these shall belong to Athens. Well then, to regain the Chersonese, and the colonies, and land abroad owned by Athenians, and debts owed to them? But our allies and the Great King won't agree to all that, and we can't gain it in war without their aid. Or, *by Zeus*, must we fight until we have imposed our will on the Spartans and their allies? But I don't think we have the resources for that, and if we do succeed in it, what can we expect the barbarians [i.e. the Persians] to do to us on the morrow of our success?

The function of “by Zeus” (*nē Dia*) here seems to be not so much to signal that this is a suggestion by an imaginary opponent (for so too are the five that precede it) as to mark it as the climax of the series.

Lysias, whose speech-writing activity seems to have ended about 380, never uses oaths in imaginary objections<sup>9</sup> (indeed he does not use imaginary objections much at all); they first appear in the mid to late 370s, in the speech *On the Estate of Nicostratus* by the outstanding speech-writer of the next generation, Isaeus. The “someone may say” trope has by now passed through two further stages of development. In the first place, the words of the imaginary objector (whether presented in direct or in indirect speech) came frequently to be reinforced by an oath. When first used, this formula may have been designed to indicate that the imaginary objector was making his point very earnestly and that *prima facie* it had considerable plausibility; but very soon it became simply a signal that the statement being made was an imaginary objection, being set up for a crushing refutation. Once this convention was established, the phrase “someone may say” was redundant, and from now on it is usually omitted;<sup>10</sup> and this stage has already been reached in *On the Estate of Nicostratus*:

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evidence to support their actual charges. The speaker, of course, may himself be trying to divert attention from the fact that he has made no attempt to rebut the accusation.

<sup>9</sup> Neither, unsurprisingly, does Isocrates (see n. 2 above).

<sup>10</sup> It is, however, retained in several passages (e.g. Dem. 20.3, 21.222, 23.64), including the only

Consider the greatest point, the one that testifies most strongly to Chariades' shamelessness. When his [supposed] adoptive father<sup>11</sup> died, he did not take up the body, did not cremate it, did not collect his ashes, but left all these tasks to be performed by those not related to the deceased: how utterly impious must he be, then, after having performed none of the customary rites over him, to claim to be the heir to his estate? "*But, by Zeus, after having done none of these things, he administered Nicostratus' estate.*" But you have already had testimony about that,<sup>12</sup> and most of it he himself does not deny (Isaeus 4.19–20).

It is entirely typical that the speaker insinuates part of his own case ("after having done none of these things") into a sentence (it is hardly ever more than one sentence) that he has put into the mouth of an opponent.

In the speech *On the Chersonese* (8.15–17) Demosthenes strings together three oaths of this kind in quick succession. He has argued that if Philip of Macedon lays siege to Byzantium, the Byzantines are certain to seek Athenian help:

And then, if we are not able to send an expedition from Athens, and there is no adequate assisting force in being in the region, there will be nothing to save them from destruction. "That's because, *by Zeus*, they are out of their wits and incredibly stupid." So be it, but all the same they need to be saved because that's in our city's interest. And, what's more, it's not yet clear to us that he [Philip] won't enter the Chersonese – to judge by the letter he sent to you, where he says he'll defend himself against those living in the Chersonese. If we have the force that's in existence, it will be able to come to the aid of that country and to do some harm to Philip's territory; but once it's disbanded, what shall we do if he enters the Chersonese? "We'll put Diopieithes<sup>13</sup> on trial, *by Zeus*." And how will that help the situation? "We can send an expedition from here." And if the wind won't let us? "But, *by Zeus*, he won't attack." And who's going to guarantee that?

Altogether there are about eighty instances of this use of *nē Dia*.<sup>14</sup> The great majority are in the Demosthenic corpus, where they occur in speeches of all types, forensic and political, and from all periods of Demosthenes' activity;<sup>15</sup> there are

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two occasions when the trope is used in speeches attributable to Apollodorus son of Pasion ([Dem.] 49.64, 52.26).

**11** Chariades claims that Nicostratus had adopted him by will; his opponents say this will is a forgery.

**12** Not in the surviving speech; this is, however, supplementary to the main speech or speeches delivered by the actual claimants, Hagnon and Hagnotheus, and they had doubtless called witnesses on the matter referred to.

**13** The Athenian general commanding forces in the region.

**14** On two occasions (Isaeus 4.24 and Dem. 8.17) the objector's statement is negative and the formula is *ma Dia*.

**15** In addition to the two that appear in speeches by Apollodorus (see n.10 above), they are also found in two other speeches in the corpus that are universally agreed to be spurious: there is one in [Dem.] 58 (*Against Theocrines*) and six in [Dem.] 25 (*Against Aristogeiton I*).

five in Isaeus,<sup>16</sup> three in Hypereides,<sup>17</sup> and one in Deinarchus.<sup>18</sup> The trope is not used at all by Aeschines – which, in view of the great length of his three speeches, is probably not an accident.

From the 350s onwards another variety of the trope becomes popular. In this, the orator asks a question, invents an answer which might be given by someone determined to disagree with him, and then tears this answer to pieces. Here is a Demosthenic example from a dispute between two sons of Mantias of Thoricus by different mothers. Boeotus has been claiming the right to be known by the name of Mantitheus, which happens also to be the name of his half-brother; the latter – who, unlike Boeotus, has no alternative name to fall back on – asks what will happen, in various situations involving compulsory civic responsibilities, if the two men have precisely the same name.

What if some other magistrate appoints [“Mantitheus son of Mantias of Thoricus”] to perform a liturgy – say the archon, or the king, or the *athlothetai*<sup>19</sup> – what indication will there be which of us they are appointing? *By Zeus*, they will add the words ‘the son of Plangon’, if they mean you,<sup>20</sup> and my mother’s name<sup>21</sup> if they mean me. And who has ever heard of that, or by what law could one insert that supplementary designation, or anything else except the father and the deme? (Dem. 39.9)

In this case the invented answer is one that Boeotus could really (and, as a matter of fact, quite reasonably) have given. But sometimes the device is used in a spirit of savage irony, and the answer offered is obviously false –

You must ... consider what on earth Meidias can have suffered to make him plan to take such ferocious revenge for it on a fellow-citizen. If it is something terrible and monstrous, you will forgive him; but if it is nothing of the kind, then just look at the unbridled barbarity which he displays towards everyone who crosses his path. Well, what has he suffered? “*By Zeus*, he lost a big lawsuit, so big as to strip him of his worldly goods.” But the lawsuit was only for a thousand drachmae! (Dem. 21.88)

<sup>16</sup> Isaeus 3.24, 73; 4.20, 24; 7.33.

<sup>17</sup> Hyp. *For Euxenippus* 11, 14 and *Against Diondas* 8.25 (Carey et al. 2008, 11).

<sup>18</sup> Dein. 2.8.

<sup>19</sup> These magistrates, among their other duties, appointed the *chorēgoi* for the City Dionysia and Thargelia, for the Lenaea, and for the Great Panathenaea respectively.

<sup>20</sup> Although this answer is presented as being one that Boeotus might give, Mantitheus does not adopt Boeotus’ persona when uttering it: the second person still denotes Boeotus, and the first person Mantitheus himself.

<sup>21</sup> As is usual, the speaker avoids mentioning the name of a respectable living woman connected with himself, but is happy to refer to his opponent’s mother by name; see Schaps 1977 and Sommerstein 1980.

– or obviously such as no sane person, or no self-respecting person, would give, as in the following two instances:

It is written in his law, “And if any of the debtors has been, or is subsequently, punished additionally with imprisonment, he may be released on providing sureties that he will pay the sum due by the ninth prytany.” So what resources will there be? How is an expedition going to be sent out? How shall we enforce payment, if every debtor posts sureties according to this man’s law, instead of fulfilling his duty? *By Zeus*, we will say to the rest of Greece “We have Timocrates’ law here; please wait till the ninth prytany, then we will send out our expedition”! That’ll be all we can do. And if you need to defend *yourselves*, do you imagine that our enemies will wait for the dodges and crookeries of our local villains? (Dem. 24.93–94)

So I, who had observed our city, on so many notable occasions, willingly fighting for the interests of others – now when we were taking counsel, in a manner of speaking, about the city’s own future, what was I going to instruct or advise her to do? To bear grudges, *by Zeus*, against those who wanted us to save them, and to seek excuses that would lose us everything! And who wouldn’t have put me to death, and rightly too, if I had attempted even by word [let alone action] to put any of our city’s former glories to shame? (Dem. 18.101)

Once this use of *nē Dia* became established, it might sometimes function as little more than a sentence-adverbial, with very little surviving of its original meaning, and serving merely to signal irony, as in this instance, again from the *Chersonese* speech:

If ... it is manifest that Philip – before Diopieithes and the settlers, whom he now accuses of having caused the war, ever left Athens – had unjustly seized many of our possessions ... and had all the time continually been taking control of Greek and barbarian territory and organizing it against us, what is this that is being said, that we must “either go to war or keep the peace”? We don’t have a choice in the matter: all that remains is to do the thing that is absolutely right and absolutely necessary, which these speakers deliberately ignore. And what is that? To fight back against one who is already waging war on us. Unless they’re saying, *by Zeus*, that so long as Philip keeps his hands off Attica and the Peiraeus, he is not harming our city and is not making war! (Dem. 8.6–7)

Note that *nē Dia* here stands *outside* the clause giving the supposed content of what “they’re saying”. Roughly speaking, the message it conveys is “Of course they’re not *actually* saying this in so many words, and they wouldn’t be prepared to admit that it’s implicit in what they do say – but it is, and it’s an absurd position to take”. We are well on the way to the time when *nē Dia* can be used in this sense by a believing Jew like Josephus without any apparent awareness that it is actually an oath by a pagan god:

He [Manetho] says that King Amenophis had a desire to see the gods. What gods? If he meant the gods who were recognized by Egyptian law – the ox and the goat and the crocodile and the baboon – he could see them already. But how could he see the heavenly gods?



And why did he conceive this desire? Because, *by Zeus*, another king before him had seen them! In which case he had learned from this predecessor where they came from and how he had managed to see them, so he did not need any new technique for the purpose (Jos. *Against Apion* 1.254–5)

In another, related rhetorical use of *nē Dia*, it comes to be virtually a more emphatic equivalent of the familiar particle *men* “on the one hand”; it says to one’s hearers “yes, this statement is true and important, but another statement is coming that is also true and is much more important”.<sup>22</sup> Thus Demosthenes in the *Second Philippic*, quoting what he claims to have said to the Messenians about the danger of trusting monarchs bearing gifts, after instancing the examples of Philip’s treatment of the Olynthians and the Thessalians:

But these things are in the past, and everyone can see them. You now behold Philip making gifts and promises: you should pray, if you are wise, not to see the day after he has cheated and tricked you. Well, there are all sorts of things, *by Zeus*, which have been invented for the protection and safety of cities – palisades, walls, trenches, and everything of that kind. They are all the work of men’s hands, and money has to be spent on them. But there is one means of protection which is possessed innately by all wise men alike, which brings blessing and safety to all, but especially to democracies confronting tyrants. And what is this? Mistrust! Keep watch on that, hold fast to it; if you maintain that, you will never suffer disaster (Dem. 6.22–24)

Unlike the oath of the “imaginary objector”, this use of *nē Dia* is also found in the speeches of his great rival Aeschines, who here exploits it the more effectively to damn Demosthenes’ ancestry.

There was one Gylon of Cerameis, who [after being prosecuted for treason and fleeing the country before trial] came to Bosphorus<sup>23</sup> and there acquired as a gift from the local rulers the place known as The Gardens. He married a woman who was rich, *by Zeus*, and brought him a large dowry in gold, but was a Scythian by race. She bore him two daughters ... one of whom, in defiance of the laws of the city,<sup>24</sup> Demosthenes of Paeania took as his wife, to become the mother of this denouncing busybody that you have here (Aeschines 3.171–2)

At the same time, oaths of greater weight, often taken in the name of two or more gods or of “the gods” collectively, were frequently used to add force and credibility to key assertions, as Plato (*Laws* 949a–b) complains. Numerical particulars of such oaths will be given in ch. 13; like the other kinds of oaths we have

<sup>22</sup> English for this purpose can use phrases such as “to be sure” and “it is true that”; German has the particle *zwar* (derived from *zu wahr* “for a truth”).

<sup>23</sup> i.e. Crimea.

<sup>24</sup> Unlikely to be true, since Demosthenes’ right to citizenship was never, so far as we know, challenged in the courts.

seen, they first make a significant appearance in Isaeus and are most frequent in Demosthenes. They can be used for a variety of purposes. Here, for instance, is Demosthenes trying to disparage the importance of the actual charges of illegality against the decree awarding him a gold crown, and to distract attention from the weakness of his defence to these charges:

As for the arguments which this man produced about the laws attached to his indictment, churning everything up and down, I don't suppose, *by the gods*, that you understood them, and I myself couldn't make out what most of them were about; but I shall speak to you, straight and simple, about the rights of the matter (Dem. 18.111).

And here is Aeschines getting maximum mileage out of allegations of appalling depravity that he hasn't actually made, and for which he probably has no evidence:

The crimes and outrages which I have heard this fellow [Pittalacus] has committed against the person of Timarchus are such, *by Olympian Zeus*, as I would not dare to mention to you. They are things which he was not ashamed to do in actuality, but if I described them to you clearly in words I could not afterwards bear to live (Aeschines 1.55).

I end by citing a remarkable passage, again from the *Chersonese* speech, in which Demosthenes *combines* the two usages we have just been talking about. He seems at first to be using an oath in the sense of (indeed, in combination with) the particle *men* to say “yes, this is true, but there's more to come”; but as he proceeds, it becomes clear that the first half of the antithesis is the one that carries the weight: “disgraceful but not disastrous” turns into “not disastrous, but disgraceful”, and we realize that the oath is not designed to diminish but to enhance the force of the statement to which it is attached, and that Demosthenes is doing what he does so often, affirming that his policy of strenuous resistance to Macedonian power is in line with the principles and ideals that Athens has always championed, striking the same note that he does even more memorably in the Marathon oath (Dem. 18.208; see ch. 13 *ad finem*) a dozen years later.

If there is any god (for there could never be a human being with enough credit-worthiness for the task) who could guarantee that, if you keep quiet and let everything go, that man [Philip] won't come for *you* in the end, then while it is disgraceful, *by Zeus and all the gods*, and unworthy of you and of your city's record and of your ancestors' deeds, to let all the rest of the Greeks fall into slavery for the sake of your own ease, and I myself would sooner be dead than have said such a thing – all the same, if someone else says it is so and persuades you of it, then so be it, don't resist, surrender everything! But if nobody believes that – if on the contrary we all know that the more we let him extend his power, the stronger and more dangerous will be the enemy we have to face – then why are we hesitating? What are we waiting for? When, Athenians, shall we do what needs to be done? (Dem. 8.49–50)