

## 14 The Hippocratic Oath

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The short text in the Hippocratic corpus which is known as the *Oath* has been both influential and controversial, and it has a unique reception history among ancient Greek oaths, surviving as it does in one form or another to the present day.<sup>1</sup> As Jouanna notes: “The roots of modern medical ethics...are to be found in the *Oath*”.<sup>2</sup> The *Oath* was ostensibly sworn by men entering the medical profession,<sup>3</sup> and was composed at some point in the fifth or fourth century BC.<sup>4</sup> It is currently best known for its clauses on refraining from giving a woman a “destructive pessary” and from administering deadly drugs. These passages have been coopted and, in some cases, substantially rephrased in order to give historical authority to the condemnation of abortion and euthanasia.<sup>5</sup> At issue in much

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<sup>1</sup> Some version of the Hippocratic *Oath* is often used as part of graduating ceremonies at medical schools throughout Europe and North America. On the reception of the Hippocratic *Oath*, see especially Rütten 2007, Miles 2004, and Nutton 1997.

<sup>2</sup> Jouanna 1999, 129. See also Flashar 1997, 1–3, who discusses some significant modern adaptations of the *Oath*.

<sup>3</sup> Although older women often served as midwives, the medical profession in classical Greece was almost exclusively male, and the case of Phanostrate, named a “midwife and doctor” on her late fourth century funeral monument is a rare exception (see Nutton 2004, 100–2 and cf. Miles 2004, 84). As far as the *Oath* goes, we note that the doctor-to-be swears, inter alia, to share his knowledge with his *sons* (not “children”) and the sons of his teacher, and that the text is composed with masculine adjectives and participles. The text followed here is that of Littré 1962.

<sup>4</sup> Edelstein 1967, 55, suggested the second half of the fourth century but Jouanna 1999, 401–2, leaves the issue open noting that some date the *Oath* to the fifth century and others to the fourth.

<sup>5</sup> For example, the National Catholic Bioethics Center’s “Restatement of the Oath of Hippocrates, circa 400 B.C.” rephrases the clause concerning the destructive pessary (which reads “I will not give a woman a destructive pessary”), and adapts it as follows: “I will maintain the utmost respect for every human life from fertilization to natural death and reject abortion that deliberately takes a unique human life.” The passage is mentioned by Miles 2004, 81, and the entire “Restatement” was printed in the program of the Catholic Medical Association’s 76th Annual Educational Conference, which took place in Atlanta, Georgia, in October 2007 (<http://www.cathmed.org/assets/files/Atlanta%20Program%20Book.pdf>, p. 11, accessed 20 October 2013). Similarly, the “Restatement” expands the original Hippocratic *Oath*’s provision on administering lethal drugs. The *Oath* states “I will not give a drug that is deadly to anyone if asked [for it], nor will I suggest the way to such a counsel”. This is rewritten by the National Catholic Bioethics Center as follows: “I will neither prescribe nor administer a lethal dose of medicine to any patient even if asked nor counsel any such thing nor perform act or omission with direct intent deliberately to end a human life.” Translations of the original Hippocratic *Oath* quoted here are taken directly from

scholarship, however, has been the special nature of the *Oath* which does not seem to be representative of wider practice in ancient medicine.<sup>6</sup>

These issues will not be debated again here. Rather, I would like to investigate how the language, structure, content, and purpose of the Hippocratic *Oath* compare with Greek oaths more generally. Studies of the *Oath* within its ancient context have tended to focus on the relationship between the *Oath* and the corpus of Hippocratic writings as a whole. Some scholars have stressed its anomalous nature, in particular its religious tone, which is largely absent from other medical writings,<sup>7</sup> and it is remarkable that, apart from the *Oath*, the Hippocratic corpus does not contain a single use of oath-language whether formal or informal, in spite of a regular exploitation of first-person statements in several Hippocratic treatises.<sup>8</sup> This is doubtless related to the corpus's focus on scientific and empirical data, evidencing a belief in "a logical causation that is independent of any divine intervention, for good or ill".<sup>9</sup> The *Oath*, then, would seem to be doubly out of place within the corpus, as a religious text which binds the medical student to his craft through the invocation of a series of divinities. At the same time, however, the content of the *Oath* is not entirely inconsistent with concerns found elsewhere in the corpus. Von Staden, for example, has stressed the significance of the term *technē* in the *Oath* and elsewhere in the Hippocratic writings.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, Jacques Jouanna has shown that scientific purpose and traditional religion coexist in those Hippocratic writings where the divine is mentioned, and that Hippocratic rationalism was not atheistic.<sup>11</sup> I will argue that, while the *Oath* con-

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Von Staden 1996, 407. For a general discussion of the Hippocratic *Oath* and its role in modern medical ethics, see Nutton 1997.

<sup>6</sup> King 1998, 139 stresses that the termination of pregnancies was "permitted in all classical cultures" and that the *Oath* seems to prohibit only the use of abortive pessaries (cf. Littré 1962, 629). Miles 2004, 81–94, argues that this portion of the *Oath* has been "transformed by history" (82); he discusses the status of women and the practice of abortion in ancient Greece and suggests that this context has not been properly considered in modern uses of the *Oath*. Nutton 2004, 337 n.90 proposes that "it is easiest to take the abortive pessary as representing all abortive methods", although he concedes (68) that the Hippocratic treatise *The Nature of the Child* contains a famous case of abortion and that abortion was practised by various means throughout antiquity. Similarly the reference to administering "a deadly drug" has been variously interpreted as prohibiting euthanasia, vivisection, execution or murder; see Miles 2004, 66–80 for further discussion.

<sup>7</sup> See Nutton 2004, 68.

<sup>8</sup> G.E.R. Lloyd 1987, 61–9; cf. Von Staden 1996, 418. On first-person oaths in classical Greek literature see ch. 13a.

<sup>9</sup> Nutton 2004, 70.

<sup>10</sup> Von Staden 1996, 411–14.

<sup>11</sup> Jouanna 2012, 97–118.

forms to identifiable norms of oath-taking, it is also unusual and contains several distinctive features which help to explain its place within the Hippocratic works.

In its structure and expression, the Hippocratic *Oath* is, in many respects, typical of a formal oath. The swearer uses the performative verb of swearing (*omnumi*) and invokes a series of context-specific deities, making them witnesses to his oath (*historas poieumenos*). As we saw in ch. 6, the number and context-specific identity of deities invoked could contribute to the solemnity of the oath.<sup>12</sup> In this case, the deities are Apollo the Healer (*Iatros*), Asclepius, Health, Panacea. The designation of Apollo by the epithet *iatros*, which means both “healer” and “physician”, is clearly important. Apollo is associated with healing in classical Greek literature,<sup>13</sup> but his identity as healer and physician is stressed in this medical context where he is the only Olympian god invoked by name. The epithet *Paian* “healer” is given to Apollo as an oath-witness in a passage of Plato’s *Laws* (664c7) where Cleinias and the Athenian have decided that three choruses should entertain the children of the Magnesians with stories of noble deeds, and tell them that the best life as declared by the gods is the most just as well as the most pleasant. The second chorus should invoke Apollo the Healer (*Paian*) as witness to the truth of what they say.

Two elements seem important in this passage, the only other example of Apollo the Healer being used as an oath-witness in our classical sources. First is the emphasis on truth, which implies a strong connection between Apollo’s powers of healing and his prophetic gifts. The connection is made explicitly in Aeschylus’ *Eumenides* (62) where Apollo is an *iatromantis* “healer-seer”, and in Aristophanes’ *Wealth* (11) where Apollo “is both healer (*iatros*) and seer (*mantis*)”, and Nan Dunbar has noted Apollo’s “oracular role at Delphi as adviser on cures for diseases both in legend (e.g. S. *OT* 68–72) and in history (e.g. Hdt. 1.85...).”<sup>14</sup> The act of swearing an oath is in itself tantamount to guaranteeing the truth of one’s claims. However, by invoking Apollo, the medical student is calling as witness both a patron of his medical craft (*technē*) and the god of oracular

<sup>12</sup> So we need not wonder, as does Miles 2004, 16–17, why Zeus was not invoked, nor Ares.

<sup>13</sup> He is given the epithet *iatros* in Aristophanes’ *Birds* (584), the point being, as Sommerstein 1991 observes *ad loc.*, that he “is implicitly being compared with the state-employed physicians who were paid very high salaries in return for giving free treatment to all citizens (cf. *Ach.* 1030–2, *Wealth* 407–8, Hdt. 3.131, Pl. *Gorg.* 514d–515b)”. Apollo is more commonly called *paian* “healer” (e.g. *h.Ap.* 517, Aesch. *Ag.* 146, 1248, Soph. *OT* 154, *Trach.* 221, Eur. *Alc.* 220, Ar. *Ach.* 1212), and is also invoked as *akestor* “healer” by Orestes in Euripides’ *Andromache* (900), although Stevens 1971 notes *ad loc.* that this is the only instance of this term being used as an epithet of Apollo. See also Nutton 2004, 38–9 on Apollo’s association with healing in Homer.

<sup>14</sup> Dunbar 1995, *ad* 584.

truths.<sup>15</sup> The sincerity of the oath-statement is thus further solemnized, and it may be significant in this context that the oath seems to have been recited from a set text and not scripted by the individuals who swore it. The second important feature of the parallel from Plato is that the Magnesians oath is to be sworn by the chorus of *men*. Similarly the Hippocratic oath is formulated in male language and must have been sworn only by men. Invoking Apollo in this context is thus appropriate in one further respect, namely that oaths by Apollo tend to be male oaths (see §13.1, p. 321–2).

Oaths by Asclepius also seem to be male oaths. A comic fragment of Alexis' *Homoia* (fr. 168.1 K-A) contains an informal oath by Asclepius, and Arnott notes that swearing by Asclepius is a "standard male oath in later comedy".<sup>16</sup> Asclepius, of course, is Apollo's son and the god of healing. His cult was introduced into Athens at the end of the fifth century BC, and Sophocles reputedly had a strong connection with it.<sup>17</sup> The arrival of Asclepius, however, did not displace Apollo's association with healing.<sup>18</sup> Indeed the heading of the main Epidaurus healing inscription reads *ιάματα τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ* "Cures of Apollo and Asclepius" (*IG* iv<sup>2</sup> [1] 121). It is important that both gods are invoked in the *Oath*, not only as the foremost patron deities of healing, but also as a father-son model, since the content of the *Oath* stresses the transfer of knowledge from father to son and the creation of virtual familial bonds between students and their teachers.<sup>19</sup> Health (*Hygieia*) and *Panacea*, daughters of Asclepius, are also listed as context-specific oath-witnesses, and do not appear elsewhere in classical Greek oaths. As a final measure of solemnity, the swearer of the *Oath* calls upon "all the gods and goddesses" as the closing witnesses to the list of gods in a formula which could

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<sup>15</sup> Miles 2004, 128–38, argues against the paternalistic view of ancient Greek medicine and shows that ancient Greek doctors favoured disclosing their information and prognosis to patients, linking such truth-telling to the *Oath*'s clause in which the speaker swears to act "for the benefit of the ill".

<sup>16</sup> Arnott 1996, 493. He cites *Men. Dysk.* 666, *Perik.* 336, *Sam.* 310, fr. 85 K-T = 93 K-A, and what is now *com. adesp.* 1092.8 K-A.

<sup>17</sup> Nutton 2004, 105–6 notes that popular tradition subsequently made Sophocles the host of Asclepius, and see further Craik 2003, 45–8. Asclepius features in Sophocles' *Philoctetes* (1333–4, 1437–8), in one of his *Phineus* plays (fr. 710) and possibly in his *Phaedra*, on which see Talbot & Sommerstein 2006, 285–6. Sophocles also wrote a paeon in honour of Asclepius, some fragments of which survive (*PMG* 737). See Connolly 1998 for further discussion.

<sup>18</sup> Nutton 2004, 107.

<sup>19</sup> The swearer of the *Oath* agrees to regard his teacher in medicine as equal to his parents and the teacher's sons as equal to his siblings, and to teach them and his own sons what he has learned.

be added to particularly solemn oaths.<sup>20</sup> The form of the invocation in the Hippocratic *Oath* clearly follows the expected pattern for a solemn oath. A detailed statement is made with appropriate gods as witnesses and a curse is invoked for perjury at the close of the *Oath*. The formulation of the curse is a little unusual, as will be discussed below, but the purpose of the *Oath* parallels a number of other oaths commonly taken in ancient Greece wherever a person held a position in which there was a perceived potential for abuse. Archons, generals, members of the *boulē*, jurors, judges in festival competitions, and even the most minor officials all swore oaths of office stating, in essence, that they would fulfill their functions fairly and to the best of their abilities.<sup>21</sup> It seems natural within this climate that an oath for physicians was formulated since the nature of their work left unprotected patients open to potential abuse.<sup>22</sup>

Overall, then, the *Oath* is both recognizable as and typical of a formal oath of the classical period. In some of its details, however, the oath is unusual. For example, the curse on the would-be perjurer is expressed not as an explicit punishment but as “the opposite” (*tānantia*) of specific blessings to be incurred by the person who keeps his oath. Rewards are thus stressed rather than a potential punishment. The anticipated blessings are prayed for as follows: “May the benefits of my way of life and skill be reaped [by me] having a good reputation among all human beings forever” (εἴη ἐπαύρασθαι καὶ βίου καὶ τέχνης δοξαζομένῳ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐς τὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον).<sup>23</sup> The oath-breaker, then, would suffer a bad reputation and a lack of benefits from his way of life and skill. This amounts to a metaphorical destruction rather than the literal death or extinction of lineage normally expected, whether implicitly or explicitly, in other formal oaths.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, although a brief prayer for blessings as a consequence of keeping one’s oath sometimes occurs at the end of official oaths, it is unusual (*pace* Faraone) for such specific rewards to be mentioned or for these to form the bulk of the expressed conditions.<sup>25</sup> In the dicastic oath, for example, the swearer invokes

<sup>20</sup> See § 6.1.

<sup>21</sup> See S&B §§3.1–4, 5.4, 5.16.

<sup>22</sup> Jouanna 1999, 21–2, discusses the case of Apollonides who served as a doctor at the Persian court, took advantage of Megabyzes’ widow, and ultimately met a grim end.

<sup>23</sup> On the interpretation of βίος as “way of life”, see Von Staden 1996, 419–22, and 1997, 176–8.

<sup>24</sup> See § 12.1.

<sup>25</sup> Faraone 2006, 139 claims that the Greeks “often enforced the compliance and truthfulness of... oaths by sanctioning them with a balanced pair of conditional self-blessings and self-curses, such as we find at the end of the well-known Hippocratic oath”, and similarly states in Faraone 2012, 121 that the Greeks “often concluded their oaths with a pair of curses and blessings” once again giving the Hippocratic *Oath* as the only example. I do not share Faraone’s convic-

utter destruction on himself and his house should he transgress any of the oath's provisions, but expects "many blessings" (Dem. 24. 151: *polla kāgatha*) if he keeps his oath.<sup>26</sup> The oath of Demophantus contains a similar clause, which seems to be derived from this.<sup>27</sup> An oath sworn by Ariston in his prosecution speech against Conon concludes in a similar manner also (Dem. 54.41), as does a reconciliation oath taken by the citizens of Dicaea at some point between 365 and 359 BC (*SEG* lvii 576).<sup>28</sup> A variant on this formula is the oath required of the winner in a homicide trial, who invoked destruction on himself and his house but many blessings on the judges should his oath be false (Aeschines 2.87).<sup>29</sup> When we are told by Hesiod that the family of a man who keeps his oath "is better thereafter" (*WD* 285: μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων) we are given no details as to how exactly this might happen, and Pindar's unique suggestion that those who keep their oaths keep company with the gods (*Olymp.* 2.65–7) seems purposely designed to implicate the poet himself as deserving a place among the gods, as I argued in §13a.2.

There are problems with Edelstein's theory that the Hippocratic *Oath* "is a Pythagorean manifesto",<sup>30</sup> but the fact remains that the conditional benefits and punishments contingent on the oath have a remarkably more philosophical tone than any other of our recorded oaths from classical Greece. Earning and maintaining a good reputation (*doxa*) both before and after death is a common human objective in archaic and classical Greece, a shame culture where reputation was of the highest significance, as has been well documented.<sup>31</sup> The swearer's antici-

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tion that the Hippocratic *Oath* is paradigmatic in this respect. The only comparable examples I have found, where specific rewards are stressed, are two jokes from Aristophanes, one in *Clouds* (518–25; see §13a.2) and one in *Lysistrata* (233–4) where being able to drink from the wine cup is mentioned as a reward for keeping the oath, while the punishment for perjury entails the cup being filled with water. The humour in these passages, however, sets them quite apart from the serious nature of the Hippocratic *Oath*.

<sup>26</sup> Dem. 24.149–51 with S&B § 5.4, esp. 71.

<sup>27</sup> S&B, 74–5.

<sup>28</sup> See S&B, 86–7 and 141–3, respectively, on these oaths.

<sup>29</sup> The *ekklēsia* curse, which called down destruction upon those who committed a variety of crimes against the city but many blessings for the rest of the community, is comparable. See further S&B, 49.

<sup>30</sup> Edelstein 1967, 17–63, quotation from p. 63. As observed by Von Staden 1996, 409, Edelstein's theory "fails to account satisfactorily for this feature of the *Oath*: the *Oath*'s concluding prayer and imprecation do not correspond to the aspirations shaped by a Pythagorean belief in the transmigration and reincarnation of the soul after death". Edelstein has difficulty explaining why Pythagoreans would invoke the gods in an oath when "some Pythagorean sources stipulate that one should not swear by the gods" (1967, 53). See also Miles 2004, 28–33, on the influence of and problems with Edelstein's theory.

<sup>31</sup> See e.g. Fisher 1992, Cairns 1993, Williams 1993.

pated reward for keeping his Hippocratic oath is in line with such belief,<sup>32</sup> but it remains striking that the conditional reward and antithetical curse affect the *name* of the swearer and not his body or that of his progeny as was common in oath curses. The distinction between name and body, or between appearance (*doxa*) and reality, was important in fifth-century philosophical thought,<sup>33</sup> but it seems clear from the context of the *Oath* that *doxa*, “reputation” or “appearance”, is conceived of as being compatible with rather than antithetical to “reality” or “truth”.<sup>34</sup> A good reputation is expected as a result of remaining true to the oath, witnessed by Apollo, the god of oracular truths. However the formulation of the reward and inverse punishment seems philosophically charged in the sense that it is the name which will be punished rather than the body.

In addition, the medical student expects to enjoy the benefits of his way of life (*bios*) and his skill (*technē*) as a result of keeping his oath. These three rewards (good reputation, benefits from manner of living and benefits from skill) can, to a large extent, be understood as depending on human rather than divine agency. The divine element is not entirely absent, of course, since a healthy cohort of divinities are witnesses to the oath, but the expressed curse on the perjurer (namely, a bad reputation, and an inability to enjoy the benefits of his life and his profession) is largely dependent on human agency for its fulfilment (assuming, of course, that a doctor’s misdeeds are detected), unlike other oaths of office in which death and destruction at the hands of the gods are imagined. The gods might be thought of as influencing the implementation of the curse in the Hippocratic *Oath*, but their involvement is not expressed.<sup>35</sup> The swearer of the *Oath* agrees to maintain his life and his skill (διατηρήσω βίον τὸν ἐμὸν καὶ τέχνην τὴν ἐμήν) “in a pure and holy way” (ἀγνῶς ... καὶ ὁσίως), which would seem to lend a deeper religious content to the oath. However, as Von Staden has demonstrated, the notion of a doctor living “in a pure way” (ἀγνῶς) is problematic since it would, by classical standards, prohibit the doctor from coming into contact with the pollution associated with death, birth, sexual intercourse, menstruation and other such common encounters in a doctor’s professional experiences.<sup>36</sup> Von Staden argues that the concepts of purity and holiness advocated by the *Oath* have developed beyond their traditional associations, and are here

<sup>32</sup> But a good reputation “is hardly a Pythagorean ideal” (Von Staden 1996, 409).

<sup>33</sup> See Dover 1974 (esp. 226–9, 236–42), M.E. Wright 2005, 268–78.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Von Staden 1996, 437.

<sup>35</sup> Edelstein does not give due consideration to the religious context of oaths when he suggests (1967, 61) that the Hippocratic *Oath* “is vouchsafed [sic] only by the conscience of him who swears.”

<sup>36</sup> Von Staden, 1996, 423–4 and 1997, 179–81.

internalized, intellectualized and applied to purity of thought rather than purity of physical experience.<sup>37</sup> Human cognitive acts form the basis of the *Oath*,<sup>38</sup> and the secular sphere of the swearer's life is emphasized by the clause to "be far from all voluntary and destructive injustice" (ἐκτὸς ἐὼν πάσης ἀδικίης ἐκουσίης καὶ φθορίας) which refers directly to his relationship with other men and women.<sup>39</sup>

The Hippocratic *Oath* is at once deeply religious and paradoxically secular. In a *Commentary* on the text, ascribed to Galen, fragments of which are preserved in the Arabic tradition, the theory is put forward that medicine "is such an exalted science that it cannot [have been] invented by the intellect of man" and must be divine in origin.<sup>40</sup> In this elusive text, which was apparently a sort of "mythological history of medicine",<sup>41</sup> the author (who may or may not have been Galen)<sup>42</sup> seems to have used the *Oath* to elucidate the religious nature and divine origins of the craft of medicine. As the only religious text in the Hippocratic corpus it is not surprising that it was chosen for this purpose. However, as we have seen, the *Oath* contains an unusual emphasis on issues of human agency, for all its ostensibly religious language and formal structure as an oath.

That the Hippocratic *Oath* seems to be all-encompassing for every aspect of the swearer's life is another of the *Oath*'s distinguishing features. If it merges the religious and the secular, it also combines the professional and the private. Formal oaths in our surviving evidence normally relate to a specific event or to a period in office, not to a way of life as a whole. Von Staden rightly claims that "few, if any, extant Greek oaths draw attention to the speaker so consistently and emphatically", and further explains that the commitments made in the *Oath* "might largely concern professional conduct, but the amassing of first-person forms ensure that they are never separated from an individual, personal responsibility and guarantee."<sup>43</sup> Moreover, it is clear that only those who were not members of medical families were required to commit to a written contract, since the speaker agrees to teach the sons of his master, should they desire to learn, "without fee and written contract" (ἄνευ μισθοῦ καὶ ξυγγραφῆς). The written contract, then, seems to have been added for additional security in safeguarding the

37 Von Staden 1996, 430–1 and 1997, 187–8.

38 Von Staden 1996, 431–2 and 1997, 189–90.

39 Von Staden 1996, 428.

40 Rosenthal 1956, fr. B.1.b (p. 59) and cf. fr. B.1.c (p. 60).

41 Rosenthal 1965, 87. The *Commentary* seems to have focused on the first, historical, part of the *Oath* and not on the deontological second part, as noted by Nutton and Jouanna in Jouanna 1997, 247–8.

42 See Rosenthal 1956, 81–7.

43 Von Staden 1996, 419.



art of medicine while also allowing outsiders access to training. The oath itself also seems to have been conceived for outsiders, at least initially,<sup>44</sup> and the separation between those who were members of the Asclepiad families and those who were not is emphasized by another oath, recorded in an inscription dating from c. 360 B.C. (*CID I*, 12). The speaker must swear that he is an Asclepiad of the male line in order to be able to consult the oracle at Delphi or make a sacrifice.<sup>45</sup>

Nutton's suggestion that the *Oath* was developed "in a situation in which an earlier pattern of medical education [was] gradually breaking down" seems justified,<sup>46</sup> and helps to explain the anomalous position of this religious text within the largely secular Hippocratic corpus. In a profession where empiricism was valued over divine intervention, but where a mythological history was traced back to the gods and the practice of traditional religion continued, the unusual features of the *Oath qua* oath also make sense. An oath invoking the mythological patrons of medicine was recited by the in-comer, and while the *Oath* retains a clear and traditional religious structure, its human concerns are seen to extend beyond its content and into the expected rewards or punishments for keeping or breaking the oath.

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<sup>44</sup> Jouanna 1999, 129 suggests that "originally the entire oath was taken only by disciples from outside the family of Asclepiads" (cf. 47 and see also Jouanna 2012, 116–18), but it is possible, at least, that the *Oath* was taken *orally* also by members of the medical families. Certainly, as Jouanna notes (1999, 129), the oath came to be "uttered by physicians in general". The Arabic tradition, which records references to the commentary on the Hippocratic *Oath*, includes one source which claims that the craft of medicine was transmitted orally from fathers to sons until so few heirs remained that Hippocrates decided to commit his knowledge permanently to writing for fear that it might be lost (see Rosenthal 1956 fr. B.3.f. p. 80). Another states that a lack of heirs made Hippocrates decide to take in strangers and teach them the craft of medicine, and that he "established the written *Covenant* for them and made them swear the oaths contained in it", including a clause preventing the swearer from teaching any other "unless he had declared before that he would abide by this *Covenant*" (Rosenthal 1956, fr. B.3.g, quotations from p. 81).

<sup>45</sup> The oath of the Asclepiads is discussed by Jouanna 2012, 115–18.

<sup>46</sup> Nutton 2004, 69; see also Jouanna 1997, 214, and 1999, 47, who argues that the "*Oath* is closely tied to the revolution represented by the opening up to outsiders of a school of medicine whose teaching was originally reserved for the members of a single family."